Last week the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) released a report which put Eritrea as the world’s leading censor of the media.  Eritrea sat on top of a list of ten countries which CPJ said had “dictatorial controls” on domestic media, followed closely by North Korea, Syria and Iran.  North Korea, which was long regarded as worse than Eritrea when it came to press freedom, seems to have improved its standing since the CJP’s last report in 2006. The improvement is also reflected in the work of Reporters Without Borders, who now rank North Korea as second to last when it comes to this year’s Press Freedom Index.  While there is still huge room for improvement, the shift is somewhat notable. But what is behind this change? Have things actually gotten better in North Korea or is the situation in Eritrea so bad now that North Korea’s position had to improve, albeit relatively?

Although Eritrea surfaces in the news a lot less than North Korea, there is no doubt that the dictatorship of Isaias Afewerki has done much to limit press freedom. Having seized power in 1993, Afewerki promised elections to take place in 1997, but in the end they never happened. Fast forward to 2001 and responding to criticism from the private press about the lack of elections, Afewerki ordered the closure of all independent media and expelled all foreign journalists. Since 2001 there has been not one single foreign correspondent based in the country, with the case of Swedish correspondent Dawit Isaak, imprisoned for over a decade now, underlining the harsh conditions foreign journalists face in reporting on the country.

With media restricted now to three state-run newspapers, three radio stations and two television stations, the government controls nearly all media in Eritrea. Internet access is theoretically available but is highly monitored, with all foreign news sites blocked.  And while satellite TV is possible, only the affluent can afford the dishes required to receive outside broadcasts. In this environment even state media officials fear for their safety, and in 2009 the entire staff of Radio Bana, a small radio station based in the capital city that put out educational programs under the sponsorship of the education ministry, were all arrested without explanation.  As such in this environment it is not hard to understand why even government employed journalists regularly flee the country, fearful of provoking the wrath of their government employers.

From looking at the above facts, it looks clear that the situation in Eritrea has worsened significantly over the past decade or so. But have things really improved in North Korea, or did Eritrea’s situation become so dire that the CJP authors had little choice but to elevate the DPRK, even though little had changed?  In answering this question one must consider two factors; the internal and the external.

Internally there is not much evidence that the media environment of North Korea has changed much over the past decade. Citizens of the DPRK still receive nothing but state run media, forming principally of one nationwide TV station, three radio stations, and five newspapers. TVs and radios must be specially modified to receive only state authorized stations, and jamming is commonplace along the border areas. The internet continues to be banned for almost all citizens, but a highly controlled intranet system known as “Kwangmyong” has surfaced in recent years.  All North Korean media outlets continue to serve the government as both propaganda outlets and censors – only news and information that can be used to help bolster regime credentials or undermine adversaries is published. Whether or not there is the same degree of repression for government journalists as in Eritrea is unknown in North Korea, where it would be almost unthinkable to challenge the leadership in any media.

While nothing has changed in North Korea’s government run internal media environment, there has nevertheless been a “quiet opening” as far as the reach of foreign media is concerned.  New communications technologies have opened the country up to foreign news, information, and entertainment, through the import of DVDs, USB sticks, cell phones and radios. Recent research suggests that up to 48% of the population has viewed a foreign DVD, while foreign radio broadcasts are increasing in reach and helping to shape citizens’ views of the outside world more than ever before. The changes in how foreign media are handled  marks a stark change to over a decade ago, when punishments for watching foreign DVDs or listening to illegal radio broadcasts were harshly punished as a matter of course, and when communications technologies had not evolved to the point of facilitating easy and clandestine distribution.  But it is nevertheless important to remember that this development does not come with the blessing of the state.

Externally, North Korea does appear to have made some basic progress regarding improving its outward-facing media environment.  Unlike Eritrea, North Korea has for many decades allowed foreign media to operate bureaus in Pyongyang, although for long this had been restricted mainly to “friendly” countries like Russia or China.  However, with the opening of an Associated Press bureau in January 2012, headed by experienced journalist Jean H. Lee, Pyongyang appears to opening to Western media in ways not seen until this year.  AP now partners with KCNA and at their Pyongyang bureau both international and local journalists work side-by-side. As of yet the international reporters rely on North Korean officials to escort them around the country, which has sparked some strong debate about AP’s degree of reporting freedom. Joshua Stanton has spear-headed this criticism, blogging about his concerns several times over the past few months. However, in a recent interview with KoreAm, office Director Jean H. Lee countered this criticism, explaining that her team is neither censored nor told what to write about.  Whatever the reality, the presence of AP has led to some interesting new coverage from North Korea and Tweeting from Pyongyang that would have been unthinkable just a year ago. As such, in this author’s opinion it makes a welcome addition to the North Korea media environment, and one that with hope will lead to increased transparency in the traditionally closed off state.

The improvements in press freedom in North Korea are small, but should nevertheless be welcomed and do justify its small but noticeable improvement in international rankings. For its part, the situation in Eritrea has clearly become extremely dire and more attention should be focused on highlighting the brutal conditions imposed by President Afewerki.  While North Korea continues to regularly feature on international news broadcasts, the plight of millions of Eritreans is more or less left ignored by Western media.  Arguably, this is related to North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons – so Eritrea’s new position as worst ranking in press freedom should be welcomed, helping cast much needed light on the countries dire situation.

Chad O’Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Since his inauguration in 2008, President Lee Myung-bak has promoted a “Global Korea” policy for Korea to be a more active and responsible member of the international community. However, with the upcoming presidential election and potential pendulum swing in South Korea’s leadership, what is the future of Korea’s growing global leadership role?

With the U.S.-ROK alliance as the bedrock of its growing global presence and the “Global Korea” policy, Korea has pushed for improved and active bilateral relations across the world. Korea has not only solidified relations with its neighbors such as Japan and China, but also strengthened ties with Russia, countries of Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. President Lee Myung-bak was the first Korean head of state to visit Africa, while existing ties with Europe strengthened with the Korea-EU FTA. Korea has also boosted cooperation with ASEAN.

Korea has worked to improve efforts to fight poverty and contribute as a responsible member of the international community through official development aid (ODA) and peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and Somalia, and disaster relief to Haitai and others. As the only country in the world that transformed itself from an aid recipient to aid donor within five decades, Korea spent $862 million in ODA in 2009, and has planned to double its ODA budget by 2012 and triple it by 2015.

In 2010, Korea successfully hosted the G-20 Summit in Seoul, elevating its status as an economic leader and global summit convener. It was the first non G-7 country to host the summit. In 2011, Korea hosted the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, participating and leading in issues related to global development and poverty reduction. Korea has been working closely with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other multilateral organizations for knowledge sharing and technical assistance. In March 2012, Korea hosted the second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. From May to August 2012, the World Expo takes place in the coastal city of Yeosu. Korea will also host the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics.

Moreover, Korea’s culture and pop culture, including Hallyu (Korean Wave), has swept across the world throughout Asia, Latin America, North America, and Europe. Korean companies have also contributed to Korea’s global presence. Korea’s soft power has shown to be active and influential.

“Global Korea” has clearly not been a misnomer in the recent years. At the same time, democratic politics in Korea is extremely dynamic and dramatic, which often makes policy predictions difficult especially in an election year. In this year of change, will “Global Korea” hold?  Although a large-sized country with a developed economy is unlikely to need such a policy, a small middle-power country like Korea has a stronger need for such a policy approach to help it find a competitive advantage on the world stage. In other words, a policy such as “Global Korea” is inherently in Korea’s interest to remain competitive. President Lee’s green growth initiative is also similar in nature in that Korea needs to preserve its national capital for sustainable long-term growth. Embedded in “Global Korea” is also the country’s position to stay effective as a world leader. On the other hand, Korea is strategically tying its new global position with a shared growth vision, which takes the edge off the potential negative impacts of national branding.

The one potential hurdle may be that the core issue in the current election campaign is the issue of social welfare. Consequently, both parties may become more focused on domestic policies as opposed Korea’s place in the international community. However, an agenda focused on Korea’s role on the global stage and shared growth should be a non-partisan issue, as the need for increased global and regional governance is stronger than ever before. Therefore, while the terminology and some of the function may change, the idea of Korea having a greater global role should be sustainable under future administrations and the assumption that Korea will continue to strive to maintain its middle-power leadership in the world.

Continuing Korea’s leadership in the world may continue to take shape in many forms, including international summit convener, economic role model, soft power leader, and others. On the other hand, there are three agenda items for Korea to enhance its leadership in the world. The first is to become an industry hub, just as Hong Kong and Singapore are financial hubs and Bangkok is an international development center in Asia. The second is to boost international volunteer programs such as KOICA to engage young leaders in Korea’s global participation. The third is to improve the social safety net that has been impacted by the financial crisis and strengthen the civil society that is beginning to solidify as a significant player in Korean society. At the same time, Korea has to delicately balance domestic and international issues in order to continue as a global leader.

Korea has shown remarkable resilience from historical violence and divisions. It has risen to be one of world’s most stable and dynamic democracies and markets, becoming a role model for many developing countries. Korea is a country that bridges the divide between developed and developing countries. With this responsibility, it would be a misstep to forgo Korea’s emerging leadership role under any administration.

Sarah K. Yun is the Director of Public Affairs and Regional Issues for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are her own.

Photo from underclasscameraman’s photo stream on flickr creative commons.

On May 2, Korea and China announced that they would begin talks on a bilateral free trade agreement. In many ways, this is a significant step in bilateral relations between Korea and China. The two countries only formally established relations in 1992, and in two short decades the relationship has blossomed on an economic level. In 1992, Korea and China did very little trade with each other, but today China is Korea’s largest trading partner surpassing the United States, Japan, and the European Union by wide margins.

A Korea-China FTA would link Korea with its largest trading partner, but would also make Korea the only nation with free trade pacts with the world’s three largest economies – the United States, the European Union, and China, potentially turning Korea into a regional FTA hub. With talks set to begin soon, what should we expect from a Korea-China FTA?

1.      What Will a Korea-China FTA Look Like?

While Korea has pursued high level, comprehensive agreements with the United States and the European Union, an FTA with China will likely fall short of that standard. China has largely pursued FTAs for strategic reasons tied to geopolitical or resource considerations rather than broad market openings. While China did conclude a high quality agreement with New Zealand, Korea is a much larger economy and China may be reluctant to make concessions on major trade irritants related to subsidies, state owned enterprises, or regulations outside of a multilateral agreement.

This means that we are likely to see a range of exceptions in this agreement, and along those same lines both sides have agreed to negotiate in two stages. If they are unable to agree on what exceptions should be contained in the agreement, it will not proceed forward. One interesting thing to look at here will be the services sector. China has excluded services in some of its agreements, but with Korea’s increasing emphasis on services the inclusion of a robust services chapter could be a sign of a higher level agreement on the Chinese part.

2.      What Are the Benefits for Korea of an FTA with China?

While countries such as the United States have seen their trade deficits with China widen since it joined the WTO, Korea has seen its trade surplus with China grow from $2.9 billion in 2001 to $39.3 billion in 2010. Korea’s exports to China have grown from $10.4 billion in 2001 to $111.3 billion in 2010, about $19.4 billion more than the United States.

Given Korea’s success in the Chinese market, and that China is still a significant platform for Korean exports to the United States and Europe, Korea would seem to have a good deal to gain from an FTA with China. One study has indicated that an agreement could increase Korea’s economic output up to 1.25 percent within five years and by 3 percent within 10 years of the FTA taking effect.

Korea has done well in exports of electronics and steel to China, despite China’s own success in these areas.  While China may be reluctant to address a wide range of subsidies or regulations, the FTA does represent an opportunity for Korea to seek reductions in states subsidies or improved regulations related to foreign direct investment that would benefit Korean producers in key areas.

 3.      What are Some Potentially Sensitive Issues for Korea?

With both the United States and the European Union, agriculture was a sensitive issue for Korea. However, in both of those agreements, along with expectations for potential agreements with Australia and New Zealand, Korea opened up significantly to foreign agricultural products.  On one level this is necessary as Korea only has the arable land to grow about half of its food, but its prior FTA partners are also developed nations with higher cost agricultural products. But opening up to China’s agricultural sector would be different. China is both geographically closer and more likely to directly compete in the products that Korean farmers grow.  There are also likely to be greater concerns regarding the sanitary aspects of Chinese produce. In terms of the economic impact of agriculture from China, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy estimates an FTA with China would cause farm production to fall about 15% within a decade. Just as Korean farmers protested against the U.S.-Korea FTA, they have already begun protesting against an agreement with China.

4.      What About North Korea?

Korea and China have both indicated that they are open to discussing the inclusion of outward processing zones in the agreement. It seems likely that the two sides will strike a deal to allow goods from the Kaesong Industrial Complex and China’s own potential zones in Northern China to receive preferential treatment. While this would provide a boost to production in Kaesong in the short-term, it could in the long-run lead to conflicts with the United States. The sanctions on North Korea currently prohibit the importation on any non-Office of Foreign Assets Control approved goods or parts. If goods assembled in China were to include parts manufactured in Kaesong, they would run afoul of these sanctions.

5.      What are the Broader Implications?

While some have speculated that an FTA between Korea and China would bring tensions between the United States and Korea, this seems unlikely. As has been previously mentioned, the agreement between China and Korea will unlikely rise to the level of the KORUS FTA and the agreement is more directly a response by China to the KORUS FTA. In terms of the alliance, it is doubtful anyone in Washington or Seoul will confuse this for more than a commercial agreement between two key economic partners.

However, beyond the question of the alliance, the agreement could have implications for trade in East Asia. With the push for a broader Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, questions have become more focused on what Asian economic integration should look like. In the trade arena, there are competing visions of an East Asian FTA centered on ASEAN and the TPP. Because of Korea’s size as a trading nation, it could have significant influence on this process. However, there is also the possibility that once it has an agreement in place with China, the Korean preference could be to maintain its bilateral agreements and not become involved in what some view as a competition between China and the United States.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Korea.net photo stream on flicker creative commons.

The ongoing trial of Anders Behring Breivik, the alleged mass killer from Norway who is undergoing trial for the murder of 77 people, reopens the concept of a link between violent video games and acts of violence in real life. During his trial, Breivik stated that he used the game “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2” as shooting practice prior to the incident and had in the past spent time playing “World of Warcraft” for up to 16 hours a day. Although various studies and recent articles by Forbes and Reuters agree that there is no correlation between violent video games and violence itself, there is still a fear of correlation which the media plays upon, particularly in cases such as school shootings. Additionally, there also exists the problem of video game addiction, a problem currently faced by the South Korean government, as well as many other nations.

Imagine Seoul, a city where there is a 24-hour PC room on almost every street, filled with people of various ages who stay there from anywhere to a few hours to over a day. South Korea is a country where celebrities aren’t just movie stars and singers, but are also pro-gamers, such as Lim Yo-Hwan (aka Slayers_BoxeR), who earns around US $400,000 a year. In addition to celebrity pro-gamers, as of 2002, many of Korea’s major companies, such as SK Telecom and Samsung Electronics, began to sponsor teams to compete in pro-matches and tournaments, some of which reached audiences of 120,000 on-site and over 1,000,000 through online streaming.

For any video game fanatic, this would seem like paradise, but to the Korean government, this might not be the case. According to the National Information Society Agency, approximately 8% of the population in South Korea between the ages of 9 and 39 suffers from internet addiction, the rate being the highest for those between the ages of 9 and 12, coming in at around 14%. Due to this the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family instituted the Cinderella Law (also known as the Shutdown Law) in 2011. Under the Cinderella Law, individuals under the age of 16 are banned from accessing gaming websites between midnight and 6am. The South Korean government started this initiative in the hopes of treating people for gaming addiction and to help increase the amount of time that students spend studying, rather than online.

Despite the fact that this program was started less than a year ago, there have already been some mixed reactions by the parents of the game playing youth. Some parents state that they feel the government is trying to dictate their children’s lives, while giving the parents less say in how to educate their children. At the same time, there has also been some positive feedback from other parents, such as those who feel that as parents they often don’t have the time to constantly monitor their children’s online-gaming behavior due to having to work late. No matter which side their parents fall on though, young students who have been blocked from their hobby have already found other ways to get around the system, using their parents’ ID numbers instead of their own to register for the games for example.

Unfortunately, the Cinderella Law initiative, focused mostly on younger students, does not fully address the issue of gaming addiction in Korea. Although the Korean cases of internet and gaming addiction are not linked to cases of murder, such as the case of Columbine High School in the United States, there are many cases of personal and familial neglect that have stemmed from gaming addiction. One of such cases was in 2005 when a 28 year old man collapsed and died after playing the game “StarCraft” for 50 hours straight, with little sleep and few meals. The man, who died in a Daegu hospital after collapsing in a PC room, is said to have passed due to heart failure stemming from exhaustion. There was also another case in 2010 in which a Korean couple pleaded guilty to negligent homicide after their three month old daughter died of malnutrition while they visited PC rooms for extended gaming sessions. Ironically, the game they played, “Prius Online,” involved the raising of a child in the game. Although these types of cases are quite rare, the Korean government has responded by subsidizing programs in hundreds of hospitals and clinics focused on treating gaming addiction, one example being the Save Brain Clinic at Gongju National Hospital.

Although the figures for gaming addiction in South Korea seem relatively small compared to that of the United States, where up to 90% of young individuals play video games and up to 15% of them may be addicted to gaming, and China, where approximately 20 million people play online games, it is still a positive step that the South Korean government is looking into the issue. Along with South Korea, several other countries, including the United States, China, the Netherlands, and Canada have also begun opening treatment centers for gaming addiction. While the threat of gaming addiction looms, the Korean government also cannot deny that in a country of nearly 50 million people, of which more than half are registered for online gaming, the online-gaming industry is an important industry for the country. In 2011, it earned $1.1 billion in exports, more than half of the country’s overseas revenue. Balancing the benefits of this booming industry with its potential cost will likely continue to be a challenge as the influence and benefits, as both a hobby and occupation, continue to grow, particularly for the younger generations, in the most wired country in the world.

Caryn Fisher is the Executive Assistant to the President at the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are her own.

Photo from Rory O’Donnell’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

To hear the full interview, please check out the Korean Kontext’s podcast page.

1.      Did you have any role models when you were starting out as an actor? Perhaps Korean-American actors?

SY: I don’t know if I had any direct Korean-American role models. I definitely look up to everyone that came into this before me; they had a tough, tough road. John Cho was doing really well when I was starting out. I think for me, my influences were more like people who were good at what they were doing. I really looked up to Steve Carell. I was also really set on Barry Pepper becoming a really good influence of mine, but it was more along the way of how he navigated through Hollywood. I don’t think that many people know who he is, but he’s really talented.

2.      Do you think that over the years the perception of Korean or Asian actors has changed in the United States?

SY: I think it’s slowly changing. I think there are roles out there that help to change that perception. I’m very fortunate to playing something that isn’t stereotypical. I don’t know if that is going to be a hard changing trend, but these are small steps that are making big waves and hopefully five, ten years from now, we won’t be having many conversations about if Asian-Americans can make it in this industry or not.

3.      Being as Koreans are very proud when there’s a Korean actor in a TV show or movie, how do you feel about sometimes being characterized first and foremost as a Korean actor?

SY: I guess that is something that is definitely there. I don’t know if people have been outwardly referring to me being Korean as an actor. In terms of Korea and how they perceived this, it’s really great. When I was there, there was a lot of love, a lot of really kind words, and people were just really kind to me, so I can’t be more thankful. It’s great to have a job in America, it’s great to do something that I love, and then it’s also great to make people proud that somebody of their own culture has been in a fortunate position.

4.      If you were given the chance, would you like to star in a Korean movie or TV show sometime in the future? And if so, who would you like to play alongside you?

SY: I don’t know if I would be good at doing television in Korea. My Korean is okay, but my pronunciation is obviously American. I would say, if I could do films, that would be amazing. But, I definitely want to make sure that if I do star in a film, that it’s not based on the fact that I have some sort of steam coming from America. Rather that it’s that I fit that role and that I can do a good job. Son Kang-ho is one of my heroes over there. That guy is such a chameleon. He’s so dedicated in the moment. If I could play anything with him, that would be so awesome.

5.      Do you have any advice or feedback to give to aspiring young actors?

SY: I’m definitely not the authority on this and I’m definitely very lucky to be where I am. But, I think that if I’ve learned one thing it’s that, definitely, self awareness is really key. I think that’s something that people don’t really talk about. That just means, know yourself well, know what you’re able to do, know what you’re not as good at, and be humble about the fact that you can learn something at all times. It’s not going to be an easy road. Also, put yourself out there. I think one of the problems that a lot of people run into is that Asian-Americans sometimes try to pit themselves up against other Asian-Americans, and that doesn’t matter. There will be instances in which you’ll have to be better than this one other Asian-American guy, but, why not try and be better than everyone else?  Everyone that looks your type, everyone who is a scrawny kid, everyone who is a big bulking dude, everyone that’s a tall, handsome man. Just be good. Not just among Asian-Americans, but, be good for everyone. I think that is something that’s very important that people tend to overlook.

Photo from NRK P3′s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

North Korea continues to ratchet up its belligerent rhetoric against South Korea, this week threatening to destroy a range of South Korean targets including the Blue House and the offices of various (and named) conservative newspapers and television stations. Rather spectacularly, DPRK state media claimed its military would “reduce all the rat-like groups and the bases for provocations to ashes in three or four minutes, in much shorter time, by unprecedented peculiar means and methods of our own style.”  As if this wasn’t enough, yesterday KCNA went one stage further and posted a series of eight cartoons depicting Lee Myung-bak‘s bloody death, head super-imposed on the body of a rat each and every time.  On one side, anyone following North Korean statements for the first time might be forgiven for thinking that the Koreas were coming ever-close to major war.  On the other, some long-time North Korea watchers will just dismiss the latest rhetoric as nothing more than bluster.  However, there is a range of reasons why both South Korea and the international community should remain on guard in the coming months.

While North Korea has often been derogatory about South Korean leaders, the latest bluster is much more militant than what we have seen in recent years.  Indeed, the most recent threats have shown a specificity in targets not seen before (including a long list of Conservative media outlets), while the “cartoon” series shows just how far Pyongyang’s disdain for Lee Myung-bak has come since him taking the Presidency in 2008.  On the surface, the harsh reaction seems to be a tit-for-tat retaliation to Lee Myung Bak’s recent farmland advice to Kim Jong-un, his suggestion that North Korea could have used its rocket-launch budget to instead alleviate hunger, and the South Korean militaries’ decision to showcase extended-range cruise missile to international media last week, capable of reaching “anywhere in North Korea.”  Beyond these triggers, internal factors are likely also contributing to the increase in North Korean rhetoric, with the government either trying to divert attention from the failed satellite launch or attempting to increase tension in order to bolster flailing support for new leader Kim Jong-un.

But should we read anything particularly into this? Of course, this is not the first time belligerent rhetoric has been used against Seoul, with North Korea threatening to spill seas of blood and destroy imperialist lackeys for many years now.  In fact, on most days there is language published on KCNA which might in one way or another be construed as being threatening to South Korea or the U.S and as a result, some are on record as saying these threats are little to worry about.  This is presumably why one report from 2010 suggested that most young people in the ROK remain unconcerned about North Korea, despite heightened tensions even after the sinking of the Cheonan. Of course, decades of threats make it relatively easy to disregard them.  But is there a risk to assume that North Korean rhetoric is something that can be safely ignored?

On occasion, the language in North Korea’s threats becomes far more belligerent than what is usually the norm for even its own fiery style. Often, this type of belligerent language includes threats of “Holy War”, “Seas of Fire”, “Bolstering Deterrence”, and “Physical Retaliation”.  A close look at the chronology of events on the Korean peninsula since 1994 (when Google News records first recorded Pyongyang’s first- use of its famous “sea of fire” threat) shows that it is imprudent to simply dismiss DPRK threats as bluster.  An inspection of 15 of North Korea’s most well-reported threats (that use belligerent rhetoric as described above) since 1994 show an alarming number of “incidents” that occurred subsequent to warnings:

Table: North Korean Threats and Actions

DATE	THREAT / INCIDENT	GEOPOLITICS AT TIME
1994 (April)	“Sea of Fire” (No KCNA record)	Made as the potential of U.S. strikes increased during the first nuclear crisis of 1994
1998 (December)	“Sea of Flames” (KCNA)	Made towards the U.S. following criticism of the August 1998 Taepodong launch
2003 (January)	“Holy War” (No KCNA record)	A threat made in response to criticism for leaving the NPT
2003 (February)	DPRK FIGHTER JET ENTERS ROK AIRSPACE SEVERAL TIMES	Continued fallout from DPRK departure from NPT
2003 (March)	DPRK FIGHTER JETS INTERCEPT U.S. RECONNAISANCE PLANE OVER EAST SEA	Continued fallout from DPRK departure from NPT
2003 (July)	DPRK & ROK EXCHANGE FIRE AT DMZ	Continued fallout from DPRK departure from NPT
2006 (October)	“Bolster War Deterrent” (KCNA)	Threat made following tightened sanctions under George Bush, including freezing of Banco Delta Asia funds in September 2005
2006 (October)	NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS NUCLEAR TEST	DPRK conducts nuclear test six days after warning.
2009 (April)	“Bolster self-defensive nuclear deterrent” (KCNA)	Following criticism of Unha-2 launch, DPRK withdrew from Six Party Talks and threatened a nuclear test
2009 (May)	NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS SECOND NUCLEAR TEST	North Korea makes good on its threat of another nuclear test within less than a month of initial threat
2009 (May)	“Sea of Fire” (KCNA)	Made by the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland just days after North Korea’s second nuclear test, and roughly a month after the Unha-2 rocket launch.
2009 (June)	SERIES OF NAVAL CLASHES TAKE PLACE NEAR NLL	Takes place following North Korea’s second nuclear test and Unha-2 rocket launch
2010 (January)	“Holy War” (Threat from NDC)	“Came amid announcement of ROK contingency plans to deal with collapse of Pyongyang government and prior to failed DPRK attempts to talk about formalizing a Peace Treaty with the U.S.
2010 (26 March)	SINKING OF SOUTH KOREA NAVAL CORVETTE CHEONAN (70 Days after threat)	Occurred following several DPRK attempts to restart dialogue and formalize peace treaty with U.S. (amid “strategic patience” policy)
2010 (June)	“Sea of Flames”  (KCNA)	Following raised inter-Korean tensions post sinking of the Cheonan corvette
2010 (August)	“Strong Physical Retaliation” (KCNA)	Warning fishermen to keep away from disputed border waters, made following five days of anti-submarine exercises
2010 (September)	"DPRK is prepared to counter any preemptive attack” (KCNA)	Warning made by the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland in advance of joint war U.S. - ROK exercises in both the East and West Seas.
2010 (October)	“Blow up their strongholds” (KCNA)	Made by the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland as a warning to the U.S. and ROK to not go ahead with joint “DPRK targeted” PSI exercises near Busan.
2010 (23 November)	SHELLING OF YEONPYEONG ISLAND (40 Days after threat)	Occurred in context of recent naval exercises in NLL area
2011 (January / February)	“Sea of Flames” (KCNA)	A threat to try and prevent joint U.S. – ROK military exercises from occurring
2011 (March)	“Sea of Flames” (KCNA)	Following ROK army unit using pictures of Kim family for target practice
2011 (November)	“Sea of Fire” – (KCNA)	Made after ROK military exercises  responding to Yeonpyeong Island shelling anniversary exercises
2012 (March)	“Sea of Flames” (KCNA)	Made in context of anti-Lee Myung-bak rhetoric ahead of South Korean National Assembly elections

From this table we can observe that from a total of 15 major threats, 8 subsequent incidents took place (5 if you count the 3 occurring between February – July 2003 as a single response).  Caveat: this is only using a small range of threat terms – there have been times when North Korea has made good on other less belligerent threats and many other times when it has not.  And while it is difficult to know if we can link specific warnings to incidents like naval clashes or the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, some are obviously very clearly linked (for example, nuclear test warnings).

So should we be worried about the current increase in threat from North Korea?  With elections forthcoming in South Korea, Pyongyang has a strong motivation to try to manipulate the South Korean populace.  It’s no secret that the DPRK prefers a liberal administration in the Blue House so Pyongyang will be keen to demonstrate to South Koreans that keeping the conservatives in power will create unnecessary future complications. As a result, these recent threats might be designed to make South Korean voters think twice when voting at the next elections, especially after the conservative’s recent (albeit marginal) victory in April’s parliamentary elections.  But if is true that North Korean threats will no longer make an impact on the future voting behavior of South Korea, might Pyongyang have a stronger motivation to actually make good of its latest range of threats?

Pyongyang’s claim that their newly threatened special actions will be “unprecedented” implies that nuclear tests, naval skirmishes, and border incidents along the DMZ are unlikely to comprise the core of their most recent threats.  If these threats are to come to fruition, perhaps we can expect  unconventional means, like those used on  Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, or large-scale cyber-attacks on South Korean online media and government.  “Limited” actions such as these appear far more likely than major aggressions like the outright shelling of targets in Seoul, perhaps explaining why South Korea has stationed around 240 officers around aforementioned media offices.  Either way, with the Blue House and South Korean military promising severe retaliation to any provocation, the risk of escalation remains severe if North Korea goes ahead even with even limited physical attacks.

Although reading into North Korean threats is like attempting to read tea leaves, one should not be too hasty in dismissing them entirely.  With Kim Jong-un’s uncertain hold of power, there is a stronger chance than ever that brinkmanship between the two Koreas could prove highly dangerous this year. The sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island have changed the dynamics on the Korean peninsula and South Korea may be unable to show the restraint it has during past provocations. .  However, while Seoul shouldn’t pander to North Korea’s belligerence, it should also be cognizant that for the moment it seems it is the hardliners who are behind the wheel of North Korean foreign policy.

Chad O’Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

On Wednesday, April 25, 2012  Private Richard Erwin Clapp was laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors. Private Clapp was like so many young Americans who knew nothing about the people of South Korea, but choose any way to enlist in the Army and fight for their freedom. We are periodically reminded of the nobility of mankind when 19 year olds like Richard Clapp step forward, placing the welfare of an unknown people above their own personal safety.  I have often heard Korean ambassadors to the United States thank veterans for their sacrifices, saying “the Korea of today would not have been possible without the sacrifices you made at such a young age for a people you did not know.”  On Wednesday, that message of thanks became personal for the family and friends of Richard Clapp.  On Sept. 2, 1950, Richard and C Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment came under fire near Yulchon, South Korea. Richard was killed in action.  The Army was unable to identify his remains at the time, and he was buried as “Unknown” in a military cemetery on the Korean Peninsula and later moved to the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific.  In 2011, because of advances in technology, his remains were exhumed and identified.  Richard came to our attention because he is a relative of our former colleague, Nicole Finnemann – now serving her country as a Foreign Service Officer in Mexico City.

The Korean War is not a footnote in history books.  There were almost 34,000 Americans killed in the war, another 104,000 wounded.  But the number that haunts many of our fellow citizens is the more than 8,000 that are still listed as missing. Both my father and father-in-law fought in the Korean War, not long after having fought in World War II. My wife and I are thankful our fathers came home. We are also thankful that there are many good people involved in establishing a Korean War National Museum in New York City where the valor and sacrifices of heroes like Richard Clapp can be appropriately remembered.  With your help the museum will be open to the public in 2015.  For more information on the museum and ways you can honor those who sacrificed during the Korean War please visit the Korean War National Museum website at www.kwnm.org.

Jack Pritchard is the President of the Korea Economic Institute. The photo is one he took in Seoul in November 2011. The views expressed here are his own.

Nutritional aid might not be the only cost of North Korea’s recent failed satellite launch.  Only a few months prior to Kim Jong-il’s death there had been significant discussion of building a pipeline to transmit Russian gas through North Korea to the South. North Korea had indicated that it would be willing to take part in the project and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak had agreed to work closely with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to push the project forward. Now, only a few months into the new regime under Kim Jong-un there are real questions if the project is viable.

On the surface, the pipeline made sense for all parties involved at the time and Kim Jong-un had indicated his support for the project in April. The Russian Far East is rich in natural resources, including natural gas, and tapping the South Korean market would allow Russia to diversify its exports away from European markets and place pressure on China in their stalled gas talks. For South Korea, which is dependent on imports for its energy needs, the pipeline promises a supply of natural gas potentially 30 percent below what it currently pays. For North Korea, which is seeking to prop up its economy the project presents the prospect of a significant infusion of hard currency from the estimated $100 million dollars in annual transit fees the pipeline would provide. Everyone would seem to have something to gain.

Under Kim Jong-il, one could have been fairly confident that the political risk surrounding the project could be managed based on the experience of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. While Pyongyang has sought raises for workers beyond the contractual agreement between North and South Korea in the complex, it has also refrained from interfering in the complex’s operations during periods of heightened tensions between the two sides.

Russia and South Korea in their talks in the fall had also taken steps to try to disincentivize North Korea from interfering in the pipeline. Russia would be responsible for the transit fees, and has indicated that it’s willing to structure the contract so that it is responsible for delivering the gas to South Korea if Pyongyang were to interfere with the pipeline. Additionally, South Korea has proposed running the pipeline to Seoul before it cuts back up to Pyongyang, meaning North Korea would cut off its own gas supply if it were to interfere with the pipeline. These steps would take away potential leverage that North Korea would gain from the pipeline, but still leave the possibility that Pyongyang could try to tap the pipeline upstream for its own uses. The project had been promising enough that Gazprom and Kogas held talks as recently as April 9 to discuss the commercial parameters of the project.

However, with North Korea having defied international consensus to conduct its satellite launch, made suggestions that it will turn parts of  Seoul to “ashes”, and a third nuclear test in the offing it would only seem prudent for all of the parties involved to reassess their positions in the project. Even if the rhetoric coming out of Pyongyang is dismissed as par for the course, the prospect of a significant financial return for the regime from the pipeline has not tempered the regime’s actions. At the very least it would seem there is a significant prospect of the project being delayed. After the missile launch the United Nations Security Council statement stated that “If North Korea chooses to again defy the international community, then the Council has expressed its determination to take action accordingly.” Pushing forward with the pipeline project in this environment could send both the wrong message to the new regime in Pyongyang and lead to the unfortunate appearance of providing the new regime with a significant cash infusion at a time when it has taken multiple actions condemned by the international community.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Leftik’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

There was an interesting contrast last week on the Korean peninsula as South Koreans went to the polls to democratically elect members for its National Assembly; conversely, North Korea had two meetings to put into place its new leadership structure. Unlike in South Korea where the results were difficult to predict, in North Korea, the predicted outcome occurred with Kim Jong-un being formally given titles to lead the party and the military. The promotions last week offer some possible ideas on leaders that could be significant under this new regime. There were also a few statements and actions suggesting that some in the North Korean leadership know they are not where they need to be as a country. However, prior statements by North Korean leaders indicating reforms could be in the offing have been followed by either the failure to follow through or actions which undercut the prospect of reform.  Whatever policies and actions come out of North Korea from now on, they will be associated with Kim Jong-un and this new leadership.

With the Fourth Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and the Supreme People’s Assembly meetings last week in North Korea, Kim Jong-un was officially given titles to run the Party and the military. Moreover, Kim Jong-il now has two posthumous titles, Eternal General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Eternal Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). With these new titles for Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un had to settle for First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. He also was named Chairman of the Central Military Commission. KCNA reports noting that decisions were made regarding revising Party rules and the Constitution of the DPRK suggest these documents now reflect these new titles and connections to leadership positions within North Korea, with Kim Jong-un at the head of the Party and military.

The family connections are very important in North Korea, especially for Kim Jong-un. The similarity in physical appearance between Kim Jong-un and his grandfather, Kim Il-Sung, have already been noted. Furthermore, many of the phrases in KCNA about the transition to Kim Jong-un are saying these moves are occurring “true to the behest of leader Kim Jong Il.” These connections are important and necessary for Kim Jong-un’s survival.

Kim Jong-un’s living family connections will be significant as well. His aunt and uncle, Kim Kyong Hui and Jang Song Taek, are seen as vital players in the new leadership. Jang Song Taek joins his wife in the Political Bureau of the WPK, and Kim Kyong Hui got another position in the Party as a secretary in the Secretariat. The key factor will be if Jang Song Taek and Kim Kyong Hui work to help Kim Jong-un and protect him or if they will use their position and influence with their nephew to manipulate power to address their own desired policies.

Beyond Kim Jong-un’s family, a few new leaders are beginning to emerge in the upper elite of North Korean leadership. Announced the day before the Workers’ Party Conference, Choe Ryong Hae was promoted to Vice Marshall in the North Korean Army. The next day he was named Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. After the Supreme People’s Assembly, he received a position as a member of the NDC.  As a relatively young leader at 61, Choe’s rise should be watched closely. In fact, Choe Ryong Hae has been listed ahead of Ri Yong Ho in at least three recent KCNA articles. Vice Marshal Ri is a Vice Chairman on the NDC and has often been seen next to Kim Jong-un during his visits and meetings.  

Kim Jong Gak was also promoted to the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. Replacing Kim Yong Chun, Kim Jong Gak is seen as another rising power player and was one of the men walking next to the car carrying Kim Jong-il during the funeral. He was promoted to Vice Marshal in the Korean People’s Army in February 2012, and it has been rumored that he might be one of the people tutoring Kim Jong-un on how to use Party mechanisms to control the military.

In addition to these moves, North Korean leaders made a couple short statements suggesting they understand North Korea is not as developed as other countries in the world. Choe Yong Rim, Premier of North Korea, stated in front of the Supreme People’s Assembly: “It is the most important target of the struggle set by the WPK for this year to bring about a signal improvement in the people’s standard of living.” Kim Jong-un was also recently quoted as saying: “It is the firm resolution of the Workers’ Party of Korea to enable our people, the best people in the world who have remained loyal to the party, overcoming all difficulties, to live, without tightening their belts any longer, and fully enjoy wealth and prosperity under socialism.” However, there are numerous quotes in the past from North Korean leaders suggesting a desire to reform and change. It will be the actual actions this new leadership takes that will matter, rather than statements that could be possibly made to sound good for and gain benefits from the international community.

The new leadership announced last week can no longer hide. The big public events in North Korea following the death of Kim Jong-il and connected with the celebrations for the 100^th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday are now over. Both the February 29, 2012 deal between North Korea and the United States and the missile launch both seemed to have started under Kim Jong-il. As much as Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are eternally present in North Korea, decisions and actions from now on will be connected with Kim Jong-un and this new leadership.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Joseph A. Ferris III’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

When members of the 19^th National Assembly take their seats in Seoul a defector from North Korea will join them for the first time. As a candidate on the New Frontier Party’s proportional representation list, Cho Myung-chul became the first defector to win a seat in the National Assembly.

Cho defected to South Korea in 1994 and came from a relatively privileged background in North Korea. His father was a minister in the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, while his mother was a professor at the People’s Economic College. At the time of his defection, he was serving as an exchange professor at Nankai University in China and had received a Ph.D from Kim Il-sung University where he would later become a professor before his defection.

Since arriving in South Korea, he has been fairly successful at integrating into society. Before turning to elective politics he oversaw the Center for International Development Cooperation at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy and became the first North Korean defector to work in a high level position at the Ministry of Unification where he served as chief of the Education Center, which develops curriculum for schools related to unification.

In an interview with CNN, Cho talks about how one of the reasons he chose to enter politics is to help policy makers shape better policy towards Pyongyang. When it comes to North Korea he points out that South Koreans “understand in an abstract sense that something is not right, but they don’t have actual knowledge of life there.”

While his election to the National Assembly as a proportional representative holds interesting questions regarding how he will be able to achieve his goal of bringing greater understanding to policy towards North Korea, it also represents a microcosm of the challenges that Korea will face when reunification occurs.

To date much of the discussion on reunification has focused on the financial aspects or how to slow the process down to avoid some of the difficulties Germany has faced. However, these are likely to be minor challenges when compared to the questions Korea will face when it comes to integrating North Koreans into South Korean society, including those in the former elite like Cho.

After sixty years of separation, the two societies have drifted apart in ways that will likely only truly become evident after reunification occurs. The most basic things in life from work to social norms in South Korea will be alien to many in the North and no amount of pirated DVD’s of South Korean movies will likely change that. Handling these challenges will raise a series of difficult issues beyond the hard choices that will have to be made in regards to handling members of the regime in North Korea.

For the average North Korean living in a society where the rule of law rather than the rule of force applies will be a challenge. Even though many North Koreans have been forced into markets for survival in the North, that does not mean that they will be prepared to live in a society where one is expected to work to support themselves in the manner that South Korea and many Western societies have developed.

Cho’s own experience in South Korea illustrates this. When describing his own transition to South Korean society in the same interview he said that “Living here [South Korea] I had to re-learn everything from the beginning. There was only one thing we had in common, the language and other than that, the gap was huge.”

Politically, there will be hard choices as well. Will people in the North be allowed to develop their own political party or will they be restricted to joining the existing political parties of the South? This question will befuddle many who will have come from a society where opposition parties are not allowed and Cho describes elections as event where North Koreans don’t have a choice but rather “have a little piece of paper and a pencil right next to it. If you don’t like the candidate you can pick up the pencil and cross the name off, but the person who picks up the pencil will die. There is always someone watching outside and of course there is only one candidate.”

While Cho’s achievement is an important step, the lack of experience with politics and multiple parties will be additional hurdles for South Korea in integrating citizens for the North. Just as being able to earn a living to support a family will be one of the key tests for the new integrated society, ensuring that North Koreans feel as though they have a true say and stake in the political system will be a key the long-term success of a united Korea.

Many Germans living in the East had prior experiences with democracy and living in a market based economy prior to the separation after World War II. North Koreans will share none of these institutional memories that likely helped to facilitate the reintegration of the people of the two German states.

While Cho’s election is likely an important first step on the road to successfully answering how to integrate the two societies, it also shows the potential difficulties that lie ahead as his achievements tend to be more the exception than the rule when it comes to the integration of defectors within South Korean society. The better Seoul is able to address that challenge before reunification the easier it will likely be to integrate the people of the North when the time comes.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Jeroen Elfferich’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.