By Troy Stangarone, Andrew Kwon, and Peter Taves

With the passing of Kim Jong-il in December of 2011, the United States and South Korea entered into a new period of uncertainty with North Korea. Shortly after Kim Jong-un assumed power, questions were raised regarding the extent of his hold on the regime in Pyongyang and what his rise to power would mean for the future of North Korea. The events of recent months have only added to the level of uncertainty surrounding the regime in Pyongyang. While the rhetoric and provocations have begun to subside, the most recent crisis has seen a shift in the use and intensity of bellicose rhetoric by the regime in Pyongyang.

North Korea has a history of engaging in threats to extract concessions from the United States and South Korea. During his time in power, Kim Jong-il mastered the art of escalating a crisis for effect, only to dial the tensions back down when the time was right to achieve his ends. Over the years, the United States and South Korea grew familiar with his patterns of behavior, much as with Kim Il-sung before him. With Kim Jong-un that same level of familiarity has yet to develop.

While the events of recent months contain elements of North Korea’s prior provocations, there has been a higher degree of specificity in the threats, an increase in the rhetorical intensity, and a longer duration than during previous crises. North Korea has also shown an increasing ability to follow through on its threats. Though North Korea does not yet possess the technical capability to hit targets in the mainland of the United States, it has demonstrated a growing sophistication in its nuclear and missile programs. The wreckage from the December satellite launch has lead some in the intelligence community to believe that North Korea is closer to miniaturizing a nuclear warhead than was previously believed.

If North Korea’s weapons programs are growing more sophisticated, the recent crisis has also seen a shift in Pyongyang’s rhetoric. Since Kim Jong-un took power the hostility of North Korean rhetoric has increased markedly, even during times of perceived calm. An analysis of the current and previous crises with North Korea shows the use of terms such as “war,” “satellite,” and “nuclear” growing markedly more prevalent in North Korean rhetoric in KCNA than terms such as “peace,” “reconciliation,” and “dialogue” (see foot note for details)[1].

During the recent crisis that began in December, many analysts have noted the increasing volume of provocative rhetoric coming out of North Korea. However, analysis shows that the increase in rhetoric under Kim Jong-un predates the current crisis. In 2012, references to “war” in KCNA were up 190 percent from 1998, when North Korea was sanctioned for a missile test, and 107 percent from North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009. In 2012, references to war never fell below 217 in a month and were over 300 in all months but January and November. In 1998, they never exceeded 166 mentions in a single month, while in 2009 they only exceeded 200 when North Korea evicted IAEA inspectors in March and when it was sanctioned by the UN in June. In the case of 2009, mentions of war decreased by 50 percent in April and 28 percent in July after spikes in the prior months (Chart 1).

Chart 1: Use of terms “War” and “Peace” in 1998, 2009 and 2012

While North Korea’s use of “peace” in its rhetoric is also increasing, it is growing at a slower rate than “war.” The use of peace in KCNA rose by 129 percent from 1998 to 2012 and 77 percent from 2009 to 2012 (Graph 1).

Graph 1: Ratio change and usage change of terms of “War” and “Peace” between 1998 and 2012

Interestingly, there seems to be a pattern in North Korea’s usage of the terms “war” and “peace,” which are used in tandem at a roughly 2-to-1 ratio. In 1998, war was used on average 1.98 times for every usage of peace. In 2009, the year of North Korea’s second nuclear test, the ratio rose slightly to 2.11. However, in 2012 the ratio rose to 2.38 percent, a 20 percent increase from 1998, despite relative calm for most of the year.

At the peak of the crisis over the December 2012 satellite launch, references to “satellite” grew nearly 170 percent compared to a similar period after the August 1998 launch (Chart 2).  References to “nuclear,” however, during the peak points of the 2009 UN sanctions and the most recent UN sanctions in response to North Korea’s third nuclear test are virtually identical (Chart 2). This difference most likely stems from the dispute between North Korea and the United States over the nature of its satellite program.

Chart 2: Use of terms “Satellite” and “Nuclear” in 1998, 2009 and 2012

However, looking beyond the peaks there is a notable increase in North Korea’s use of “nuclear” in its rhetoric under Kim Jong-un. References to nuclear in KCNA grew 164 percent from 1998 to 2009, and another 70 percent from 2009 to 2012. Overall, references to nuclear have grown 350 percent from 1998 to 2012 and were up another 139 percent over the first three months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012 (Graph 2).

Graph 2: Usage change of terms “Satellite” and “Nuclear” between 1998 and 2012

North Korea’s use of more positive terms such as “reconciliation” and “dialogue” has been inconsistent (Chart 3). Mentions of reconciliation have actually fallen since 1998 by 32 percent between 1998 and 2009, though they rose by 27 percent between 2009 and 2012. This is somewhat interesting given the harsh rhetoric Pyongyang directed towards Lee Myung-bak during the period. However, overall mentions of reconciliation are down 14 percent from 1998 to 2012 and are down another 17 percent over the first three months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012.

The use of “dialogue” has risen 56 percent between 2009 and 2012 and 41 percent overall between 1998 and 2012. However, over the first three months of 2013, much like North Korea’s use of reconciliation, usage of dialogue is down 41 percent over same period in 2012.

Chart 3: Use of terms “Reconciliation” and “Dialogue” in 1998, 2009 and 2012

Despite the use of “dialogue” being down over the first three months in 2013, there may be indications in the shift of the crisis in April. Data for this study was only available through the first half of April, but in that time use of dialogue in KCNA was up 29 percent from March and at a higher level than at any point during 2012.

Despite the potential positive sign in North Korea’s usage of “dialogue” over the first half of April the overall rate of usage of terms such as “war” and “nuclear” are growing at a faster rate than “reconciliation” and “dialogue.”

Beyond the increasing usage of rhetoric by the regime in North Korea, there have also been changes in the tone of the rhetoric. Under Kim Jong-il, North Korean rhetoric while certainly bellicose was calculated, predictable, measured, and occasionally even conciliatory. In earlier periods of the North Korean nuclear crisis, efforts to allow inspectors from the IAEA were rhetorically deemed almost diplomatically as “unreasonable” and Kim Kye Gwan argued that dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons without a peace treaty would be “unreasonable” as well. As recently as 2005, Kim Jong-il’s government stated a potential for “friendship” between the United States and North Korea, and Kim Jong-il admitted that he thought “favorably” of the United States.

The rhetoric under Kim Jong-un has not been so friendly.

In place of intermittent conciliatory language, the regime under Kim Jong-Un has opted for escalation. Kim Jong-il’s threats were largely innocuous, typically referring to “effective countermeasures” in a defensive response to an American attack. Media threats under Kim Jong-un, however, designate specific targets and even threaten pre-emptive war. Whether these too are innocuous remains to be seen.

Less clear is the intent of the rhetoric. Under Kim Jong-il, North Korea used provocations and hostile rhetoric to extract political and material concessions from the West, such as light water reactors and bilateral talks with the United States. With Kim Jong-un the motives are more opaque.

Many analysts have suggested that, along with the need to consolidate power domestically, the regime is setting the stage for future negotiations. However, Pyongyang has made clear that its nuclear weapons are not up for negotiation, calling them “the nation’s life” and, in contrast to the past, has made virtually no demands of the West other than halfhearted appeals for a peace treaty.

Prior to the United States and South Korea offering talks, media references to bilateral discussions with the United States were nonexistent; in many respects leaving the impression that North Korea was disinterested in talks at all. In fact, the only mention of talks is from anonymous sources in China, which may not be accurate as the Economist has reported that no high level meetings have taken place between China and North Korea in months. At the same time, Pyongyang’s response to the offer of talks has been to set its own preconditions, demanding the end of sanctions and U.S.-South Korea military drills.

What has become clear in the early stage of his rule is that Kim Jong-un will be different and more willing to engage in provocations than his father. With the growth in rhetoric predating the successful satellite launch and third nuclear test, it seems likely that the shift in leadership style we are witnessing is driven more by the new leadership than North Korea’s recent successful weapons tests. However, those same weapons tests could make the regime more dangerous in the future. With the successful tests behind it, the regime could feel emboldened in the measures it could take, making future crises potentially less stable if Pyongyang continues to escalate the level of rhetoric.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute of America. Andrew Kwon is a recent Masters of International Security Graduate from the University of Sydney. Peter Taves is currently undertaking a Masters of International Economic Relations at American University. The views expressed here are the authors alone.

Photo from theADDproject.com’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Jinho Park

While North Korea ratchets up the tension in Northeast Asia, Kim Jong-un made the bold—though not surprising—decision of withdrawing all North Korean workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Recently, South Korea and the United States together have called for a dialogue with North Korea. North Korea has dismissed the offer by denouncing it as a “crafty trick.” To some extent, offering a dialogue manages North Korea’s provocations. So, is it a signal of moving into a new game on the Korean Peninsula? For South Korea it is now crucial to plan what to do next while preparing for a new game with Kim Jong-un.

First, South Korea’s call for a dialogue is not an “out of the box” response to North Korean decision-makers. So, it is unlikely that this offer changes the atmosphere surrounding North Korea’s decision-making process. As the reform of the intelligence service is under discussion in South Korea to strengthen its human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to better access information of value in North Korea, the way for reforming HUMINT operations should be focused on providing stories—beyond gathering information—to be discussed and exerting an influence on the consensus-building process among decision-makers in Pyongyang. Anything taken for granted by North Korea does not change the cognitive and intuitive the mind-set of its leaders. We have to ‘educate them to learn from us’ through HUMINT operations.

Second, if North Korea decides to sit at the table with Korea or the U.S., what can we discuss with North Korea to change a negotiation paradigm, while not going back to the status-quo? Among several options for North Korea—probably in consultation with China—is to hold a separate dialogue regarding different issues with South Korea and the U.S. respectively. To U.S. policymakers, this is a dangerous option, to sit back and watch a dialogue between the two Koreas regarding issues such as nuclear and missile development and proliferation. To South Korea, a top priority is to resume the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Last month, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification introduced an ambitious plan to attract foreign investment in the Complex and further transform it into an international complex. From the founding spirit of the Kaesong Industrial Complex for mutual economic benefits, it was regrettable that the Ministry of Unification did not articulate how such a plan would be helpful for the North Korean regime at the same time. After all, what is going on now seems to return to the status-quo rather than a paradigm shift.

Third, the Park administration needs to explore a new partner for supplementing its efforts toward building political and economic confidence with North Korea to overcome the realistic limits of cooperation with the U.S., China, and Japan. An opportunity to work with a new partner would create the chance to intensify a multi-directional approach to North Korea. The new partner should be one who can exert an influence on North Korea and at the same time be relatively free from North Korean provocations. In this regard, the EU is potentially a very appropriate partner. As the EU has a strong and strategic relationship with the U.S. and China, the EU could be a reliable and sustainable broker between the two Koreas, hopefully the U.S. and China as well. President Park Geun-hye visited North Korea in 2002 under the auspice of the Korea-Europe Foundation.

Fourth, while discussing what to do with North Korea, South Korea should develop a realistic assessment of how the tension on the Korean Peninsula affects the strategic competition in Asia between the U.S. and China. Chinese officials recently expressed their serious concerns about U.S.’s recent military demonstration—both air and naval power—in responding to North Korea bellicose threats. Although the U.S. and China have a different strategic perspective in dealing with North Korean issues, they share a common view on North Korean issues in regards to how to protect and increase their own national interests, particularly in Northeast Asia.

It is not certain whether this common denominator among the two global powers is helpful for South Korea’s strategic interests. As it is incredibly difficult for South Korea to reduce the perspective gap between the U.S. and China, South Korea needs to find and expand common interests with the U.S. and China respectively in negotiating with North Korea while increasing cooperation among the three players. This balancing effort between the two superpowers should be one of key strategic guidelines for implementing President Park’s Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula.

Lastly, it should be noted that Americans do not have a clear understanding about what President Park’s Trust-building Process is and how it is different from former policies.  Through the recent Korea-US Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on April 12, the U.S. welcomed the process. Such diplomatic rhetoric does not necessarily mean that the U.S. supports the new initiative under a common approach for the goal of peaceful denuclearization. What the two nations can do together is still to be seen. In a similar vein, the upcoming trilateral Korea-China-Japan summit talks in Seoul would be the first official venue for discussing the initiative among the three leaders together. Some argue that building a trilateral cooperative mechanism among the three nations for the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula might be more challenging than achieving a similar goal among Korea, the U.S., and China.  The reason is that China and Japan do not have significant common ground to cooperate.

President Park Geun-hye faces a tough and challenging deadlock with North Korea. The same is true for North Korea’s leaders. In continuing negotiations with North Korea, the current situation should not been viewed as a matter of ‘strategic patience’, but as a rare chance of ‘taking steps toward paradigm shift.’ Adhering to strategic patience will at best control the escalation of tensions, while not resolving issues with North Korea.

Mr. Jinho Park is a Legislative Aide to South Korean Legislator Jinha Hwang of the ruling Saenuri Party, also a non-resident fellow of Korea Defense & Security Forum (KODEF) in Seoul.

Photo from Joseph A. Ferris III’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

Last week former NBA player Dennis Rodman, along with three members of the Harlem Globetrotters and Vice Media, traveled to North Korea to play and promote basketball as well as hang out with the new North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. On Sunday, Dennis Rodman talked about his trip with George Stephanopoulos on “This Week.” Rodman’s answers in his interview with George Stephanopoulos illustrates that he doesn’t understand the larger picture of U.S.-North Korea relations, and he doesn’t care. His visit and his conveying of messages from Kim Jong Un to President Obama didn’t help the larger picture for U.S. relations with North Korea. Kim Jong Un’s responses to U.S. offers of engagement with missile and nuclear tests effect the relationship more that his love of basketball.

The big news from the interview is that Kim Jong Un supposedly told Dennis Rodman that he would like President Obama to call him. With the U.S.-North Korea relationship in a poor state right now, some in the media and policy world will see this as an opportunity for the U.S. to respond to North Korea. However, this statement from Kim Jong Un via Dennis Rodman could put pressure on the U.S. to do something. There will be a sentiment that North Korea is reaching out to the United States. Yet the main thrust behind the offer is power and politics. North Korean leadership understands that the U.S. and its allies are currently trying to put pressure on the international community to do more against North Korea in response to its nuclear test. The North Korean leadership also understands there are prominent Chinese commentaries questioning China’s relationship with North Korea. By requesting President Obama call him, Kim Jong Un and his leadership team are trying to force the focus on the United States to respond to their overture rather than North Korea stopping its missile and nuclear programs.

In the interview, Dennis Rodman tried to excuse his behavior and that of his “friend” Kim Jong Un by saying everything is about politics. But President Obama knows the real effect of politics with North Korea. He used his political capital, which is part of his power, to try to engage North Korea. Throughout his campaign for president and then after taking office in 2009, President Obama and his team made it clear they would be willing to reach out to problematic leaders of the world if they would unclench their fist. North Korea took its fist and slammed it down on the button to launch a missile four months into President Obama’s presidency and followed it up with a nuclear test.

Risking political capital in an election year, the Obama administration signed a bilateral agreement with North Korea on February 29, 2012 in which the U.S. offered food aid in exchange for a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. Kim Jong Un couldn’t even wait two weeks before announcing a missile test disguised as a satellite launch, and launched it on April 12. Despite breaking the deal, President Obama again said the U.S. would give North Korea an “extended hand.” This came just after he was elected for a second term when he traveled to Burma and while North Korea appeared to be gearing up for another missile launch. Kim Jong Un responded to President Obama’s offer of an extended hand with that rocket test that put a satellite into orbit in December 2012.

Once more, President Obama signaled the possibility for better relations when he stated in his second inaugural address that “engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.”   Kim Jong Un couldn’t even wait a month before having North Korea test a nuclear device. The Obama administration has used some of its political capital to engage North Korea, and North Korea slapped them away. Now, Kim Jong Un wants a phone call.

When asked what he learned about Kim Jong Un, Dennis Rodman said his “friend” loves power and control. As much as Rodman thinks it is a nice gesture, Kim Jong Un hosting him and the Globetrotters and then asking President Obama for a phone call is mainly about power and control, not about actual engagement. The main example was highlighted last month with Eric Schmidt’s visit to North Korea, one month after North Korea tested a rocket. The visit was portrayed to the international community as North Korea trying to open up to the outside world, but internally, the North Korean media barely mentioned the visit. Perhaps they even subtlety bashed Eric Schmidt and Bill Richardson. The propaganda machine would be in full force if the leader of the free world called Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un and the North Korean leadership are using Rodman’s visit and the offer of a phone call to shift the blame to the United States and go unpunished for its own actions of testing a nuclear device.

Dennis Rodman tried to describe his visit as historic. However, his engagement with Kim Jong Un was only small part of a larger and complex relationship between the U.S. and North Korea. George Stephanopoulos was correct in telling Rodman that basketball is just “one tiny bit of common ground.” Small efforts like tourism can in the long run possibly lead to bigger things. Basketball may be a great bridge for connections. Koryo Tours has already led basketball and other sports groups to North Korea, and others will likely try to do so after this visit as well. One possibility would be to have the whole Harlem Globetrotters team go over. However, one basketball game that ended in a tie is not going to immediately open things up. The trip was a small gesture. A phone call from President Obama to a country that threatens U.S. allies and interests in Asia and is getting closer to directly threatening the United States with its most recent rocket and nuclear tests would be a very large step that should not be undertaken. The Obama administration rightly said that North Korea knows how to contact them.

The trip with Dennis Rodman to North Korea was described by Vice co-founder Shane Smith as a “crazy story,” but it should not dramatically affect the overall political relationship between the two sides because Kim Jong Un is are using the trip and the phone call for power and control. The North Korean leadership has to expect potential sanctions and hardening of diplomatic positions after its nuclear test. The visit and phone call request is an attempt to shift the pressure to the United States, hoping that heightened tensions will increase the public pressure on President Obama to respond to its attempted charm offensive. As much as he loves basketball, President Obama should know that lasting engagement is tougher than talking hoops over the phone with Kim Jong Un. President Obama and the United States have offered North Korea real opportunities for engagement, but Kim Jong Un has rejected them.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Storm Crypt’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

Nearly 70 nations and international organizations issued statements on North Korea’s third nuclear test. The following is a list of current available statements:

Albania-Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Australia – Prime Minister Julia Gillard

Austria – Foreign Minister Spindelegger

Bahrain – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Belarus – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Belgium – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation

Brazil

Bulgaria – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Canada – John Baird – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chile – Ministry of Foreign Relations

China

Colombia – Ministry of Exterior Relations

Croatia – Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs

Costa Rica – Ministry of Foreign Relations

Estonia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Finland – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

France – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Germany

Georgia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Greece – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Guatemala – Ministry of Foreign Relations

Honduras – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

India – Ministry of External Affairs

Indonesia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ireland – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Israel – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Japan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Kazakhstan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Kosovo

Latvia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Malaysia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Maldives – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Malta – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mexico – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mongolia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Netherlands – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

New Zealand

Norway

Pakistan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Panama – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Paraguay – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Peru – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Philippines

Poland – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Republic of Korea – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Romania – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Russia – Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

Singapore

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa – Department of International Relations and Cooperation

Spain

Sri Lanka – Ministry of External Affairs

Switzerland

Taiwan

Thailand

Turkey

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom – Foreign and Commonwealth Office

United States

Uruguay – Ministry of External Relations

Uzbekistan

Vietnam

ASEAN

European Union – Council of the European Union

NATO

United Nations- Security Council

Photo from United Nations Photo’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Troy Stangarone

With North Korea having successfully conducted a third nuclear test, questions are once again being raised about the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” towards North Korea. However, have critics of strategic patience hit on a fundamental flaw of the policy or are they merely expressing their policy preferences?

One of the more recent criticisms of strategic patience comes from William Tobey, who on ForeignPolicy.com argues that “the Administration can no longer apply “strategic patience” to the threats from Iran and North Korea. Patience is becoming neglect and neglecting them will only make them worse.”

However, it is unclear what alternative policy Tobey or others would suggest. In the case of both Iran and North Korea, the United States has alternatively attempted to engage both regimes in dialogue while also pursuing additional sanctions either through the United Nations Security Council or on a bilateral basis. In many ways, both North Korea and Iran are relatively insensitive to sanctions, while efforts such as the “Leap Day” agreement to reach even a limited new understanding with Pyongyang quickly feel apart with North Korea’s missile test.

Tobey’s criticism of strategic patience isn’t the first. In 2010, it was criticized as “strategic passivity” and a “strategic blunder” among other things.  Many of these criticisms are based in the idea that by not actively engaging North Korea the United States is only allowing the problems with North Korea to grow and that it is not really addressing the root of the problem on the Korean peninsula, the strategic insecurity of North Korea. Of course, if Pyongyang was pursuing a highly enriched uranium program in secret while negotiating on its plutonium program, it raises questions about the ability of dialogue to contain the problem.

At the same time, critics have argued in the past that Pyongyang is open to negotiations because of its concerns about becoming increasingly dependent upon China. However, just because Pyongyang is open to dialogue, does not mean that the regime has the same goals and objectives for discussions. While Pyongyang may be uncomfortable with too great a reliance on China, and hence hopeful of eliciting U.S. and South Korean aid, that does not also mean that they are willing to give up their weapons programs. If North Korea has made the strategic decision to proceed with its program, no amount of dialogue and engagement may be successful.

In this context, the policy of strategic patience was put in place as an attempt to modify Pyongyang’s behavior. Or rather, to demonstrate that there would be no reward for North Korean provocations as in the past.

The administration’s policy of strategic patience was never designed to preclude negotiation with North Korea over its weapons programs. In fact, the United States held talks with North Korea in Geneva in 2011 that at the time seemed to lead nowhere due to concerns that Pyongyang was not seriously interested in denuclearization. Those talks, however, likely laid the groundwork for what became the “Leap Day” agreement in early 2012 when the administration reached out to the new regime in Pyongyang shortly after Kim Jong-il’s death. The agreement sought to establish a moratorium on North Korean missile tests, but was left stillborn by North Korea’s failed satellite launch later that April.

The real challenge for strategic patience is that it faces the same difficulty as the “Sunshine Policy” under progressive administrations in Seoul. Can the policy yield results before it loses the political support needed to be viable? For any policy of strategic patience to work, North Korea would have to engage in a series of provocations for which the administration did not respond with engagement. By seeking talks too soon after a provocation, the administration would run the risk of its engagement being seen as the same past attempts of offering concessions for promises of better behavior. Hence, to conclude that the policy has failed because North Korea engaged in a provocation is more a statement of the critics’ policy preference than a criticism of the actual policy’s weaknesses – the primary of which is arguably that the policy provides no active leverage to change North Korea’s behavior.

This means that any policy of strategic patience must be coupled with a policy of strategic ambiguity. Without uncertainty regarding if and how the United States will respond to provocations, it is unlikely that the calculus in Pyongyang will fundamentally change. Instead the risk, which critics would rightly point out, is that North Korea will merely conclude that a higher threshold of provocations is needed to achieve its goals. In essence, like the rest of North Korea’s economy, inflation will have set into its policy of nuclear blackmail.

In the end, whether strategic patience succeeds or fails, the United States faces few good options in dealing with North Korea. At the same time, while there are good reasons to engage North Korea when opportunities present themselves, negotiations should not be seen as an end in themselves. Negotiations are a tool, one which can be used by both sides. In the end, to succeed with North Korea there must be a willing partner in Pyongyang. Otherwise, negotiations could end up just being North Korea’s own version of strategic patience.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his alone.

Photo from the Secretary of Defense’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

Earlier this week the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) finally responded to North Korea’s December 12^th rocket launch with a new resolution. Predictably, North Korea reacted angrily with statements, including one attributed to its National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC statement specifically targeted the United States as a problem and as a threat to North Korea; moreover, it vowed that “a variety of satellites and long-range rockets will be launched by the DPRK one after another and a third nuclear test of higher level which will be carried out by it in the upcoming all-out action, a new phase of the anti-U.S. struggle that has lasted century after century, will target against the U.S., the sworn enemy of the Korean people.” North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in the past after being punished by UN resolutions for launching missiles. If the North Korean leadership tests another nuclear device, it might actually do more to separate U.S.-ROK coordination than the anticipated engagement of North Korea from the incoming Park Geun-hye administration.

This potential nuclear test could disrupt close U.S.-ROK coordination. In the event of a third North Korean nuclear test, the U.S. would have to respond, at least with another trip to the UNSC to maintain some credibility for UN resolutions and to demonstrate an international consensus against North Korea’s actions. Moreover, a successful nuclear test would move North Korea one step closer to being a direct threat to U.S. territory. Two years ago, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that North Korea would be able to hit the continental U.S. within five years with an intercontinental ballistic missile. North Korea’s actions suggest they are trying to make that schedule a reality and become a direct threat to the U.S., not just to its troops, citizens, and interests in Asia. These factors could force the Obama administration to push for a firm response from its South Korean ally to the nuclear test rather than supporting its immediate direct outreach.

Even though support for engagement with North Korea inside the U.S. is quite low because of the difficulty in getting a quicker turnaround on a resolution condemning the North Korean rocket launch, the April rocket launch that scuttled the February 29 agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, and North Korean missile and nuclear tests in 2009 that welcomed an incoming President Obama open to engagement, it could still be possible. In President Obama’s second inaugural address he stated that “engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.” Additionally, his likely incoming Secretary of State John Kerry has been perceived as more open to dialogue. Lastly, the U.S. wants to be supportive of South Korea in inter-Korean relations, and would probably look for ways to demonstrate its support for the South Korean government’s engagement efforts. In some ways, a second Obama administration and the more cautious approach to engagement described by the Park Geun-hye team was seen as the best possible combination for maintaining strong U.S.-South Korea relations through difficult early challenges. Thus, the often worrisome divergence in the engagement and containment approaches by the U.S. and South Korea that have caused separation in U.S.-Korea relations in the past could be minimized. But those small possibilities for support and engagement shrink considerably if North Korea tests a nuclear device.

A third nuclear test would put Park Geun-hye in an almost no win situation. If she immediately engages North Korea after a nuclear test, it could be seen as undermining her pledge to present a credible deterrence and seek commensurate actions from North Korea on denuclearization. This is especially the case in light of North Korea’s threat to attack South Korea if it takes part in new UN sanctions. If she pushes for tougher sanctions and doesn’t reach out to North Korea quickly, she could be seen as failing to live up to her campaign pledges and continuing the perceived hard-line policy of President Lee Myung-bak. Park campaigned on a new engagement with North Korea based on trust. A positive action from North Korea would help her argue that South Korea can benefit from engaging North Korea and convince the U.S. to support her policy, but a significant gesture hasn’t happened yet. A last resort for justifying an outreach gesture, especially if North Korea explodes a nuclear device before her inauguration, is to blame the test on President Lee’s perceived failure to engage North Korea.

But with such a direct reference to the U.S., could the Park administration convince President Obama and his team to support South Korea’s outreach to North Korea after a nuclear test? Exploding a nuclear device challenges the ability of the U.S.-Korea alliance’s leaders to coordinate potentially different policies toward North Korea aimed at convincing it not to provoke the U.S. and its neighbors. A third nuclear test could lead to a difference in approaches by Park and Obama administrations toward North Korea and could create that separation amongst allies that North Korea loves to exploit even further.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from the Secretary of Defense’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

As countries in Asia emerge from this year of elections and transitions, the role and rise of China in the region will remain a top priority. For most of these countries, significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of positive U.S.-China relations in the region. This is especially true for South Korea. And in that need for better U.S.-China relations, there is an idea that a country can mediate the tensions between the two largest players in the region. There are suggestions that South Korea, as an ally of the U.S. and a strategic partner to China, can play this mediator role. However, South Korea inserting itself into U.S.-China bilateral issues would not bring about the positive relations it seeks, and it would limit South Korea’s own options and strategic interests it has worked so hard to develop.

First, South Korea is not seen by China as unbiased. An alliance trumps a strategic partnership. China does not view its relationship with South Korea as on the same level as South Korea’s relationship with the United States. Related to this is a belief that removing U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula would likely be one of the first requests from Chinese leaders after unification. South Korea can try to be a mediator if it wants, but it will eat up significant resources and be forced to remain engaged in the process instead of working on other issues more impactful toward its own interests. This is especially true if the process is long or if South Korea is unable to bring the two sides together. Additionally, if China doesn’t view South Korea as a fair mediator, then South Korea’s actions will be put toward a policy that will inevitably fail because China will not use South Korea to help create better ties with the U.S.

Second, talk of a mediator role for South Korea could also bring to mind the difficult times of the South Korea-U.S. relationship during the Roh Moo-hyun era. The dynamics between the two countries led to a perception where South Korean officials thought their country needed a more equal balance between the U.S. and China, and thus start to move away from cooperation opportunities with the United States. Although different circumstances now surround the relationship, a move in this direction is one of the few concerns in the U.S. about the aftermath of the South Korean elections. Aspects of this sentiment can be found in the young generation in Korea, meaning these feelings will be something U.S. officials will have to deal with for a long time.

Third, South Korea can’t be more assertive in its own foreign policy if it is trying to be a mediator. In the book Korea at the Center, it is suggested that throughout history, Korea has only been free to pursue its own interests when there is no hegemonic power in the region. Thus, it is understandable for Korea to desire that a hegemonic order not develop in the region. Korea wants to preserve space to act; however, becoming a mediator in U.S.-China relations might actually constrain the space for Korea. Part of South Korea’s freedom to maneuver is embedded in its own growth. South Korea’s development has allowed it to be more active internationally in a wide variety of issues. Korea has more to gain at the international level as a middle power than it does as a mediator for U.S.-China tensions.

Lastly, suggesting that Korea be a mediator between the U.S. and China can conjure up the idea that the U.S. is in decline and countries that are friends and allies of the U.S. need to help manage its decline. Look at Australia, another country that has an alliance with the United States and whose top trading partner is China. Hugh White, one of the main people responsible for Australia’s 2000 defense white paper, suggested a similar type of role for Australia. He said Australia should “persuade America that it would be in everyone’s best interest for it to relinquish primacy in Asia, but remain engaged as a member of collective leadership.”

While South Korea rightly has to evaluate the future of Asia and determine its own interests and goals, the U.S. needs to convince its ally that the U.S. can maintain its primacy in Asia and that the alliance can provide the security and collaboration that will benefit South Korea in the Asia-Pacific Century. This is why joint vision statements for the alliance that indicate pathways for the alliance beyond North Korean issues are vital. The U.S. wants Korea and the alliance to be more involved in other issues not because the U.S. is declining but because it is the best way to shape and create a strong and more secure Asia for everyone. The U.S. government has welcomed Korea’s impact globally, especially seen in hosting the G-20 and Nuclear Security Summit.

Uncertainty over America’s role in Asia is also why the relationship must go beyond alliance management tactics by the U.S. constantly demonstrating the value of the alliance, the staying power of the U.S. in Asia, and the importance of a strong U.S. presence in Asia, regardless of whether the current U.S.-China relationship is good or bad.

Part of the difficulty with these types of discussions is the misunderstanding of the ideas of shaping versus mediating. Shaping means creating norms, values, institutions, and processes that provide countries a positive, safe environment for interaction, collaboration, and peace. Mediating is often a country inserting itself into a broken or stalemated process between two countries and developing norms, processes, or an actual agreement for the two sides to use for their future relationship. The U.S. and other countries and international institutions around the world are trying to shape China’s rise. Both history and current interactions indicate that having a rising power develop without conflict is important and necessary for regional and global development and stability.

The U.S.-South Korea alliance can be used to help shape China’s rise as well as remind the U.S. of the importance of good Sino-U.S. relations for South Korea. South Korea itself can help shape China’s rise by undertaking projects abroad that demonstrate proper development assistance in places like Africa and Southeast Asia. South Korea’s developmental history and assistance can illustrate how host countries can sustain development and improve the lives of their own people rather than having resources exploited by an outside partner. However, it doesn’t seem to be in South Korea’s interest to mediate the overall relations between the United States and China. There are too many other factors that would draw Korea away from focusing on its own plans for the future development in Asia and South Korea’s role in the world.

South Korea is better positioned for shaping the environment surrounding U.S.-China relations rather than inserting itself into the always changing dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship. Moreover, South Korea’s interests of economic growth dependent on trade, seeing the Korean development model and values implemented abroad, and creating a secure environment through an alliance, partnerships, international law, and diplomacy to deal with North Korean provocations and possible unification can all be achieved even if U.S.-China relations are poor.

In an Asia-Pacific Century with uncertainty still surrounding the future paths of China and the U.S., combined with the fear that the paths could very possibly intersect in violence, it is understandable for other countries in the region to look for ways to create good U.S.-China relations. The mediator idea is there, but South Korea gains more as a middle power. Shaping the environment around U.S.-China relations fits better with South Korea’s goals and capabilities.  South Korea needs good U.S.-China relations; however, attempting to mediate between the two countries, and sacrificing its own interests and damaging relations with its U.S. ally in the process, will prevent South Korea from fully benefiting from the good Sino-U.S. relations it seeks.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own. He would also like to thank Matt Tranquada and Troy Stangarone for their discussions on these issues. 

Photo from U.S. Mission Geneva’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

A year of transitions finishes in historic fashion as South Korea elects Park Geun-hye as its first female president. Her election capped off a series of democratic presidential elections that featured nicely at the beginning and end of this year of transitions, leading off with Ma Ying-jeou winning reelection in Taiwan. Yet North Korea still tried to garner all of the attention. Kim Jong-il’s death in late December 2011 and the rocket launch this December briefly took headlines away from these important elections. Despite these North Korean events, much of the focus will turn to the new leader in South Korea. While Park Geun-hye will still have to deal with North Korea and relations in the region, she will also have a heavy domestic agenda that will be vital for the future of South Korea. Her ability to handle North Korea relations while working toward solutions to domestic issues will determine the rest of her legacy in the Blue House beyond being South Korea’s first female president.

While there is no polling data yet on the impact of the North Korean rocket launch or the effect of important voter concerns on the election, relations with North Korea were likely seen as an issue during the election, not the issue. There were increasing sentiments in South Korea that Lee Myung-bak’s policy was not working. Both Moon Jae-in, the progressive candidate, and the conservative Park Geun-hye, offered ideas on reengaging North Korea. Some of Park’s ideas during the campaign for reaching out to North Korea consisted of humanitarian aid, resuming family visits, diplomatic, and social exchanges, and expanding Kaesong. These possibilities for dealing with North Korea would all fall under her trustpolitik policy toward North Korea. While still vaguely defined, the recent North Korean rocket launch will probably force Park Geun-hye to emphasize the trust part of the trustpolitik early in her administration.

A more cautious approach toward North Korea will help U.S.-South Korea relations remain positive and allow for the U.S. to be more prepared for South Korea’s engagement process with North Korea. The U.S. would like to follow South Korea’s lead with inter-Korean relations, and appear in coordination with its ally. Ideas like restarting humanitarian aid to North Korea or expanding Kaesong are politically feasible for support in both South Korea and the United States.

Even with all of these issues connected with North Korea, Park Geun-hye has an ambitious domestic agenda as well. Chaebol reform, rising education costs, an increasing unemployment rate, and creating greater economic gains throughout Korean society were all important campaign topics. Many of these issues fall under the rubric of “economic democratization,” key buzzwords during this election and involving the idea of closing the gap between rich and poor in Korea and making sure all Koreans can gain from its overall economic success. Moreover, a demographic challenge will also require Park to find ways to address some of these issues quickly as well as hope the interconnections in many of these problems also permeate through many of the solutions.

With pressure to fix the domestic economy and South Koreans’ individual welfare along with a desire to see improved relations with North Korea, Japan, and China, all while not ruining the current positive U.S.-Korea relationship, Park Geun-hye will have to work quickly on both fronts to have a chance of succeeding. Opportunities are there for both South Korean domestic and international success.  All South Korean presidents have to navigate a potentially turbulent Northeast Asia while solving domestic problems. Yet the emphasis and importance placed on Korea because of an Asia-Pacific century, the expectations for a Global Korea, uncertainty over the future of North Korea as well as U.S.-China relations, and the need for continued economic success only increases the difficulty and necessity for a impactful Park Geun-hye administration for the future of South Korea.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

By Sarah K. Yun

Both the United States and China went through leadership transitions in November. In the United States  President Barack Obama was reelected, while China announced a new era under General Secretary Xi Jiping.  With both countries future leadership now decided, what are the implications for Korea as the U.S. and China consolidate their respective leaderships and policy towards Asia?

The key takeaway from the U.S. election is that the United States will continue its strategy of rebalancing toward Asia.  This is less surprising given the re-elected Obama administration’s commitment to continue the rebalancing towards Asia.  Beginning in the fall of 2011, the Obama administration indicated the United States’ determination to play a larger role in the Asia-Pacific region militarily, economically, and politically.  In line with this position the U.S. renewed its commitment towards allies such as South Korea, Japan and the Philippines, and strengthened relationships with other partners such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and India.

Militarily, the U.S. cooperated with South Korea and Japan on missile defense technologies, while announcing new deployments or rotations of troops in Australia and Singapore.  At the same time, the U.S. continues to work to strengthen its commitment to South Korea and Japan, encourage Australia to take more active role in regional security, and renew security ties with the Philippines, while laying the foundations to solidify strategic relationship with Vietnam and India.

Economically, the U.S. recognizes that the fastest growing economies of the world are in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, the U.S. concluded the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement while actively participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement negotiations.  Furthermore, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have in unprecedented fashion attended consecutive regional forums including APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the EAS.

Recognizing that diplomacy requires more than agreements and public pronouncements, the rebalancing also implies the crucial need for trust-building in the region. To that end, President Obama’s first trip abroad after his reelection was to Southeast Asia to meet ASEAN leaders on November 18. His trip is a recognition that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy has shifted to the Asia-Pacific region.  Overall, the U.S. has been actively and comprehensively engaged in the region on a variety of issues both bilaterally and multilaterally.

While the United States pursues its policy of rebalancing, any policy change from China towards the region remains to be seen.  The Asia-Pacific is undoubtedly important to China as the country sees itself as the leader of the region to which they belong and centers its own policy around the need for a peaceful region to facilitate China’s own continued development.

China’s policy towards Asia is not as defined as the U.S. rebalancing strategy, leading neighbors to wonder what its intentions are. Many are concerned at China’s recent assertive posture related to maritime and territorial issues. However, the reality is that an assessment of China’s foreign policy under Xi may be too early at this point.  Although Xi became the General Secretary of the Community Party of China, he will not become president until the National People’s Congress in March 2013.  Furthermore, key foreign affairs officials have not been appointed yet, such as the director of Central Foreign Affairs Office, foreign minister, and the head of the CCP’s International Liaison Department. The best indication of Xi’s foreign policy may be Hu Jintao’s opening report at the 18^th CPC National Congress where Xi was appointed the successor. It was declared that China was to become a maritime power to exploit marine resources, develop its marine economy, protect marine ecological environment, and resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.  For the most part, however, the emphasis was on domestic politics, perhaps indicating that foreign policy will be largely reactive in the initial years under Xi.

In the backdrop of Xi Jinping’s leadership transition is China’s recent aggressive stance on maritime issues against Japan and Southeast Asia.  Recently, an Op-Ed in the state-run People’s Daily, stated that “China’s stance of maintaining peaceful development does not mean it gives up its right to protect national interests” and that China will “protect national sovereignty, safety and developmental interest and will never surrender to any external pressure”. The territorial dispute with Japan will likely be one of Xi Jinping’s top foreign policy priorities in 2013 in order to prevent any domestic dissatisfaction and instability. At the same time, China’s policy stance towards North Korea has remained largely consistent as it has urged all relevant parties to take a “prudent and moderate” response to North Korea’s missile launch.

On the economic front, China remains invested in international trade and economic development as its domestic economy depends on the global market. On September 22 during the China-ASEAN Expo, Xi pledged to advance China-ASEAN relations and FTA development, showing China’s emphasis on economic tools for diplomacy in the region despite intense maritime disputes.  Trade volume between China and ASEAN countries amounted to $362.8 billion in 2011, with a trade volume target of $500 billion by 2013.

All in all, there are signs of both continuity in China’s foreign policy as well as signs of a more assertive China. However, China’s policy also indicates a fragmentation between security and economic interests.  Priority goes to economic development and stability, then regional security.  Even maritime disputes have a strong economic interests regarding shipping lanes.  While China was on the course to develop a comprehensive Asia policy amidst the wars in the Middle East, the U.S. initiated its comprehensive rebalancing towards Asia, which threw a curveball into China’s plans.  China is realizing the need to increasingly get involved in multilateral channels such as the G-20, BRICs, and other Asia related multilateral forums.

As the two major powers navigate in the Asia-Pacific region to establish their respective leadership positions, what is the role that Korea can play?  U.S. policy towards Asia and the Korean Peninsula is more predictable, which eliminates many of the potential surprise elements.  The U.S.-Korea alliance has been coined the lynchpin of regional security, leaving little room for ambiguity in the U.S. rebalancing vis-à-vis Korea.  China, on the other hand, may require more management for Korea.  Although the initial phase of Xi’s foreign policy will likely be dominated by domestic issues such as economic slowdown and anti-corruption, bilateral issues such as Chinese fishermen in Korean waters and Korea-China Free Trade Agreement will need careful navigation.

Korea, like other countries in the region, does not want to be forced to choose between the U.S. and China.  Both the United States and China are important to Korea in different ways and the realities of their respective Asia policies may lead Korea to actively engage diplomatically with both powers.  Therefore, Korea can play a mediating role to support the U.S., Korea’s most important ally, and China, Korea’s largest trading partner, to work together on key issues.  This may include North Korea and Iran’s nuclear problems, disaster relief in region, and assisting China to mature its market capital structures and move towards a knowledge-based economy. Some of the seesaw dynamics between the U.S. and China may change after the South Korean presidential elections in December.  Regardless of who becomes the new South Korean president, the reality is that both the U.S. and China are important partners to Korea.  As a middle power, Korea can play an important and unique role the Asia policies of the U.S. and China.

Sarah K. Yun is the Director of Public Affairs and Regional Issues for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are her own. 

Photo from U.S. Pacific Fleet’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad O’Carroll

When South Korea picks either a progressive or conservative leader next month, we will know the full extent of the impact of President Obama’s re-election on the next four years on the Korean peninsula. Whether Obama and the next leader of South Korea will be able to sustain the current momentum of the U.S. – Korea alliance remains an unanswered question. But while there is much to suggest that Obama is in an advantageous starting position to work on U.S.-Korea ties, there are nevertheless several areas of real concern as we move forward post the December election.

Having strengthened the U.S – Korea alliance and forged a close friendship over the past four years with President Lee Myung Bak, Obama has proven he has the ability to work well with even those at the opposite end of the South Korean political spectrum. Having signed off on the KORUS FTA and cooperated closely on major global issues, whoever takes power in South Korea this December will inherent an excellent relationship from Lee Myung-bak. However, as Ambassador Thomas Hubbard recently pointed out, political transitions can be difficult periods when it comes to U.S. – Korea relations.

If Park wins the election, her administration will inherit five years of tacit experience in working with the current White House, a great starting point to be sure. And while a progressive administration will be starting afresh with Obama, compared to a Romney victory they can at least benefit from an external working understanding of how the relationship has worked so far. However, there is always the risk that things could deteriorate from the status quo, especially when considering how important personal friendship has been to contributing to the success of U.S.-Korea relations of late.

What does an alliance look like when personal friendship is lacking? The case of Benjamin Netanyahu’s relations with Obama is a case in point, showing how tensions can emerge among allies when the personal relationships of the two leaders don’t chime. For Israel – U.S. relations, over the past four years seemingly impassable policy chasms have been accentuated by leaks, distrust and seemingly artificially created protocol issues. As a result, Obama is often obliged to reach out to the Israeli public in order to remind them that the U.S. is still committed to Israel’s security. While this is a strong example, it underscores the importance of mutual respect between leaders. Naturally, both Washington and Seoul will be eager to avoid a repeat of the acrimonious relations that Bush had with the late progressive president Roh.

Another trouble spot for U.S. – Korea relations circles around North Korea policy. With Obama likely feeling burnt by his last attempt to engage Pyongyang in the “Leap Day Agreement”, it is unclear how supportive the U.S. will be of the next South Korean administration’s North Korea policy. After all, all three Korean candidates are campaigning for increased inter-Korean engagement, with even the conservatives calling for comparatively radical initiatives such as the opening of liaison offices in Pyongyang. Here the problem comes down to how denuclearization is prioritized by South Korea when it comes to engagement. That’s because Obama may have a hard time reducing focus on the denuclearization of North Korea if he is to continue emphasizing his wider global non-proliferation strategy. As such, there is a risk that an incoming South Korean administration may wish to sequence this goal in a way that proves incompatible with Obama’s own policy positions.

An additional hurdle that could set back U.S. – Korea relations relates to Seoul’s domestic nuclear power infrastructure. The current U.S.-ROK nuclear energy agreement is due to expire in March 2014 and South Korea is now increasingly eager to make use of the spent fuel from its nuclear reactors. Having outlined a goal of processing the spent fuel through a capability known as pyroprocessing, South Korea hopes to potentially recycle fuel by using the transuranic elements in fast reactors. As the world’s sixth biggest exporter of nuclear power plants, South Korea has an understandable desire to close the nuclear fuel cycle – doing so will put it in an even better position to offer full range of nuclear services worldwide and attract additional contracts. However, if the ROK were to be allowed to develop a reprocessing facility there would be consequences for global non-proliferation regime and implications for the dismantling of the DPRK nuclear program. As such, it is a delicate issue that will require thoughtful diplomacy to resolve.

Although there are challenges ahead, it is important to remember that Obama is extremely popular in South Korea. Data in a recent opinion poll released by the German Marshall Fund shows that compared to ten years ago, public support for the U.S.-Korea alliance has doubled under Obama’s stewardship. As such, there will be a strong onus on the incoming president of South Korea to maintain the close and friendly ties that have characterized the past five years between Lee Myung-bak and Obama. Correspondingly, among the risks outlined there should still be cause for optimism.

Chad O’Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from art_es_anna’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.