By Troy Stangarone, Andrew Kwon, and Peter Taves

With the passing of Kim Jong-il in December of 2011, the United States and South Korea entered into a new period of uncertainty with North Korea. Shortly after Kim Jong-un assumed power, questions were raised regarding the extent of his hold on the regime in Pyongyang and what his rise to power would mean for the future of North Korea. The events of recent months have only added to the level of uncertainty surrounding the regime in Pyongyang. While the rhetoric and provocations have begun to subside, the most recent crisis has seen a shift in the use and intensity of bellicose rhetoric by the regime in Pyongyang.

North Korea has a history of engaging in threats to extract concessions from the United States and South Korea. During his time in power, Kim Jong-il mastered the art of escalating a crisis for effect, only to dial the tensions back down when the time was right to achieve his ends. Over the years, the United States and South Korea grew familiar with his patterns of behavior, much as with Kim Il-sung before him. With Kim Jong-un that same level of familiarity has yet to develop.

While the events of recent months contain elements of North Korea’s prior provocations, there has been a higher degree of specificity in the threats, an increase in the rhetorical intensity, and a longer duration than during previous crises. North Korea has also shown an increasing ability to follow through on its threats. Though North Korea does not yet possess the technical capability to hit targets in the mainland of the United States, it has demonstrated a growing sophistication in its nuclear and missile programs. The wreckage from the December satellite launch has lead some in the intelligence community to believe that North Korea is closer to miniaturizing a nuclear warhead than was previously believed.

If North Korea’s weapons programs are growing more sophisticated, the recent crisis has also seen a shift in Pyongyang’s rhetoric. Since Kim Jong-un took power the hostility of North Korean rhetoric has increased markedly, even during times of perceived calm. An analysis of the current and previous crises with North Korea shows the use of terms such as “war,” “satellite,” and “nuclear” growing markedly more prevalent in North Korean rhetoric in KCNA than terms such as “peace,” “reconciliation,” and “dialogue” (see foot note for details)[1].

During the recent crisis that began in December, many analysts have noted the increasing volume of provocative rhetoric coming out of North Korea. However, analysis shows that the increase in rhetoric under Kim Jong-un predates the current crisis. In 2012, references to “war” in KCNA were up 190 percent from 1998, when North Korea was sanctioned for a missile test, and 107 percent from North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009. In 2012, references to war never fell below 217 in a month and were over 300 in all months but January and November. In 1998, they never exceeded 166 mentions in a single month, while in 2009 they only exceeded 200 when North Korea evicted IAEA inspectors in March and when it was sanctioned by the UN in June. In the case of 2009, mentions of war decreased by 50 percent in April and 28 percent in July after spikes in the prior months (Chart 1).

Chart 1: Use of terms “War” and “Peace” in 1998, 2009 and 2012

While North Korea’s use of “peace” in its rhetoric is also increasing, it is growing at a slower rate than “war.” The use of peace in KCNA rose by 129 percent from 1998 to 2012 and 77 percent from 2009 to 2012 (Graph 1).

Graph 1: Ratio change and usage change of terms of “War” and “Peace” between 1998 and 2012

Interestingly, there seems to be a pattern in North Korea’s usage of the terms “war” and “peace,” which are used in tandem at a roughly 2-to-1 ratio. In 1998, war was used on average 1.98 times for every usage of peace. In 2009, the year of North Korea’s second nuclear test, the ratio rose slightly to 2.11. However, in 2012 the ratio rose to 2.38 percent, a 20 percent increase from 1998, despite relative calm for most of the year.

At the peak of the crisis over the December 2012 satellite launch, references to “satellite” grew nearly 170 percent compared to a similar period after the August 1998 launch (Chart 2).  References to “nuclear,” however, during the peak points of the 2009 UN sanctions and the most recent UN sanctions in response to North Korea’s third nuclear test are virtually identical (Chart 2). This difference most likely stems from the dispute between North Korea and the United States over the nature of its satellite program.

Chart 2: Use of terms “Satellite” and “Nuclear” in 1998, 2009 and 2012

However, looking beyond the peaks there is a notable increase in North Korea’s use of “nuclear” in its rhetoric under Kim Jong-un. References to nuclear in KCNA grew 164 percent from 1998 to 2009, and another 70 percent from 2009 to 2012. Overall, references to nuclear have grown 350 percent from 1998 to 2012 and were up another 139 percent over the first three months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012 (Graph 2).

Graph 2: Usage change of terms “Satellite” and “Nuclear” between 1998 and 2012

North Korea’s use of more positive terms such as “reconciliation” and “dialogue” has been inconsistent (Chart 3). Mentions of reconciliation have actually fallen since 1998 by 32 percent between 1998 and 2009, though they rose by 27 percent between 2009 and 2012. This is somewhat interesting given the harsh rhetoric Pyongyang directed towards Lee Myung-bak during the period. However, overall mentions of reconciliation are down 14 percent from 1998 to 2012 and are down another 17 percent over the first three months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012.

The use of “dialogue” has risen 56 percent between 2009 and 2012 and 41 percent overall between 1998 and 2012. However, over the first three months of 2013, much like North Korea’s use of reconciliation, usage of dialogue is down 41 percent over same period in 2012.

Chart 3: Use of terms “Reconciliation” and “Dialogue” in 1998, 2009 and 2012

Despite the use of “dialogue” being down over the first three months in 2013, there may be indications in the shift of the crisis in April. Data for this study was only available through the first half of April, but in that time use of dialogue in KCNA was up 29 percent from March and at a higher level than at any point during 2012.

Despite the potential positive sign in North Korea’s usage of “dialogue” over the first half of April the overall rate of usage of terms such as “war” and “nuclear” are growing at a faster rate than “reconciliation” and “dialogue.”

Beyond the increasing usage of rhetoric by the regime in North Korea, there have also been changes in the tone of the rhetoric. Under Kim Jong-il, North Korean rhetoric while certainly bellicose was calculated, predictable, measured, and occasionally even conciliatory. In earlier periods of the North Korean nuclear crisis, efforts to allow inspectors from the IAEA were rhetorically deemed almost diplomatically as “unreasonable” and Kim Kye Gwan argued that dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons without a peace treaty would be “unreasonable” as well. As recently as 2005, Kim Jong-il’s government stated a potential for “friendship” between the United States and North Korea, and Kim Jong-il admitted that he thought “favorably” of the United States.

The rhetoric under Kim Jong-un has not been so friendly.

In place of intermittent conciliatory language, the regime under Kim Jong-Un has opted for escalation. Kim Jong-il’s threats were largely innocuous, typically referring to “effective countermeasures” in a defensive response to an American attack. Media threats under Kim Jong-un, however, designate specific targets and even threaten pre-emptive war. Whether these too are innocuous remains to be seen.

Less clear is the intent of the rhetoric. Under Kim Jong-il, North Korea used provocations and hostile rhetoric to extract political and material concessions from the West, such as light water reactors and bilateral talks with the United States. With Kim Jong-un the motives are more opaque.

Many analysts have suggested that, along with the need to consolidate power domestically, the regime is setting the stage for future negotiations. However, Pyongyang has made clear that its nuclear weapons are not up for negotiation, calling them “the nation’s life” and, in contrast to the past, has made virtually no demands of the West other than halfhearted appeals for a peace treaty.

Prior to the United States and South Korea offering talks, media references to bilateral discussions with the United States were nonexistent; in many respects leaving the impression that North Korea was disinterested in talks at all. In fact, the only mention of talks is from anonymous sources in China, which may not be accurate as the Economist has reported that no high level meetings have taken place between China and North Korea in months. At the same time, Pyongyang’s response to the offer of talks has been to set its own preconditions, demanding the end of sanctions and U.S.-South Korea military drills.

What has become clear in the early stage of his rule is that Kim Jong-un will be different and more willing to engage in provocations than his father. With the growth in rhetoric predating the successful satellite launch and third nuclear test, it seems likely that the shift in leadership style we are witnessing is driven more by the new leadership than North Korea’s recent successful weapons tests. However, those same weapons tests could make the regime more dangerous in the future. With the successful tests behind it, the regime could feel emboldened in the measures it could take, making future crises potentially less stable if Pyongyang continues to escalate the level of rhetoric.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute of America. Andrew Kwon is a recent Masters of International Security Graduate from the University of Sydney. Peter Taves is currently undertaking a Masters of International Economic Relations at American University. The views expressed here are the authors alone.

Photo from theADDproject.com’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Luke Herman

As the Kim Jong Un regime completes its eighth month in power following Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011, there seem to be a number of differences between how this succession is being carried out with how it was carried out in 1994. For one thing, it has proceeded at a much more rapid pace: excluding the December 2011 appearances where KJU visited KJI’s bier, he has made 101 appearances in eight months. By comparison, KJI made 88 appearances total from July 1994 – December 1996 as he went through a three-year mourning period.

This piece will attempt to lay out other differences between the successions, possible reasons for them and prospects going forward. In this article I will lay out the background of each succession, examine which elites were important (using on-the-spot guidance inspection data), as well as examining who rose and who fell (and who died) during the respective periods. In addition, I will take a close look at the reemergence of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) under Kim Jong Un, the growing visibility of the security services and what both could mean going forward.

Background

The Kim Jong Il Succession (1994-1996)

The groundwork for the Kim Jong Il succession was laid for nearly twenty years before he formally took over power. He was first mentioned in the North Korean press in the 1970s, but was referred to as the “party center.” His first true public introduction was in 1980 when he appeared at the Sixth Party Congress and was given a number of important party positions. Eventually, as Kim Il Sung aged and declined in health he began to take over the day-to-day affairs of running North Korea, and became Supreme Commander of the armed forces in 1992. Despite this preparation, the regime was not fully prepared for Kim Il Sung’s sudden death on July 8, 1994. There were eleven days between the death and actual funeral, supposedly to allow for the public to fully express their grief but more likely because the regime needed to figure out exactly what message they wanted to convey.

As Ken Gause discusses in his excellent North Korea under Kim Chong-il, there were two major (but related) splits that Kim Jong Il had to overcome as he took the throne: 1) a generational split between the old revolutionaries that fought alongside KIS in Manchuria and in the Korean War and the newer army officials who KJI had become close to, and 2) a hierarchical split that had existed for a number of years as both KIS and KJI had their own lines of communication and power. Failure to adequately deal with either would likely have doomed KJI. He approached both cautiously, keeping in place much of the old guard while consolidating his own rule through appointments of loyalists at lower levels. After the death of O Jin U, who had been Minister of the People’s Armed Forces for almost two decades, he replaced him with Choe Gwang (at that time Chief of the KPA General Staff), another old timer. However, he replaced Choe with a relative unknown, Kim Yong Chun, who had risen through the ranks rapidly (reportedly after putting down a coup attempt by the VI Corps).

The KJI succession came at a particularly difficult time for North Korea. Though the first nuclear crisis had been peacefully settled with the Agreed Framework, the famine (called the “Arduous March” in North Korea) was just beginning. The Party and State institutions that were responsible for economic decision-making and food distribution essentially stopped functioning effectively. KJI, who preferred to rule through informal networks in any case, therefore turned to the only body that seemed capable of responding – the military. Along with the nuclear crisis, the famine was a major catalyst for the songun (military-first) policy that would eventually take hold.

The Kim Jong Un Succession

The KJU succession began in earnest following KJI’s stroke in August 2008. It was after this point that a large number of reshuffles were carried out in 2009 (notably Ri Yong Ho became Chief of the KPA General Staff at this time) and the younger Kim was reportedly accompanying his father on inspection tours (though he was not publicly identified). His formal introduction to the public came in September 2010 at the Third Party Conference, which was the first major party meeting in 30 years. Though his only party post was as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), he was also named a four-star General and was reported to be working closely with the Ministry of State Security. After this point he appeared frequently with KJI until the latter’s death last December. There was an eleven-day period between his death and the funeral, the same as with Kim Il Sung, and (as many remarked at the time) the funeral ceremony was remarkably similar in style to the KIS funeral.

There are two major differences in how the successions have unfolded. First, the KJU succession is moving at a far advanced pace compared to his father’s. As mentioned before, KJU has already made more public appearances in eight months than his father made in his first two and a half years. Additionally, the mourning period was officially one hundred days as opposed to three years. Finally, KJU acquired the functional equivalent of his father’s titles four months after KJI’s death, and did so through formal means at the Fourth Party Conference in April of this year. KJI, on the other hand, became General Secretary of the WPK in October 1997 by Central Committee and Central Military Committee decree.

Second, and likely related, the regime is facing nothing like the crises that racked the country from 1994-1996. Harsh sanctions remain in place, but the country has adapted and actually experienced modest growth last year. Relations with China are much improved since the mid-1990s and give the regime a buffer against something like the famine reoccurring. Furthermore, the security situation has improved since the regime built a nuclear deterrent to complement its conventional deterrent.

The Elites

This section will detail the elites who appeared with both KJI and KJU most frequently (over 20% of the time) during the post-succession period we are examining. It gives one a good, though not complete by any means, idea of who was being featured prominently at the time, as well as their positions (and any promotions that they received during this time).

 Notes:

–> indicates the elite was promoted from lower rank to higher during this time

KPA = Korean People’s Army

GPB = General Political Bureau

GSD = General Staff Department

CMC = Central Military Commission

NDC = National Defense Commission

Kim Jong Il (July 1994-December 1996)

Out of the 16 most frequent accompaniers, 10 were military and the rest held high-level positions within the WPK. Three things are notable from the table:

1)      Clearly we see the beginning of a shift towards the military, and notably a shift towards the next generation military as opposed to the old revolutionaries. Though KJI was cautious in appointing 1.5 / 2^nd / 3^rd generation military men to the high level positions, nine of his most frequent accompaniers were from this group, while two (Choe Gwang and Ri Ul Sol) were first generation revolutionaries.

2)      The two most frequent accompaniers during this period were the WPK members responsible for propaganda (Kim Ki Nam) and security (Kye Ung Thae), two areas that were critical to a successful succession.

3)      There are no state officials at the top of this list (the first one who is classified as such is Yang Hyong Sop at 19^th most frequent). State officials and institutions, not counting the NDC, were simply not a priority at this point.

Kim Jong Un (January 2012 – July 2012)

As one would expect, the most frequent accompaniers with KJU is more balanced than under his father. Two notable observations:

• These numbers certainly lend more credence to the theory that there is a Jang Song Thaek – Choe Ryong Hae alliance. Choe has also made a number of his own visits since being named Director of the KPA General Political Bureau.
• Two of the top military accompaniers – Ri Yong Ho and Kim Yong Chun –have respectively been removed and demoted. As we all know, Ri was removed in July from all his positions for “illness,” though it is more likely he was purged. Kim Yong Chun was removed from his position as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces and instead became director of the WPK Civil Defense Department – an indication that his stock has dropped significantly. The numbers show a definite shift occurring since May began– before May Ri appeared with KJU 31 times, while Kim appeared 23 times (out of 57 total appearances). The story is drastically different once May began – 4 times for Ri and 4 for Kim Yong Chun (out of 44). By contrast, the splits for Jang and Choe are 32/30 and 24/26 respectively.

Promotions, Purges and Deaths

Promotions

There were a few promotions during the early KJI years, but none were related to party or state institutions; instead, they were all related to the military or security apparatuses. The most important emerged due to O Jin U’s death in February 1995. As mentioned, KJI promoted Choe Gwang from Chief of the KPA General Staff to Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, while Kim Yong Chun went from being a director of logistics in the General Staff Department to Chief of the KPA General Staff. Jo Myong Rok, who would play a major role going forward, was promoted from Commander of the KPA Air Force to Director of the General Political Bureau. Pak Ki So became commander of the important Pyongyang Defense Command. Jang Song U, brother of Jang Song Thaek, became a Deputy Director in the Guards Command (and may have essentially run the Command in place of Ri Ul Sol.) Furthermore, there were a number of promotions in the military ranks handed out by KJI.

By contrast, the promotions under KJU have also included party and state institutions. Thirteen elites were either added to the Politburo or promoted from alternate to full member or alternate to presidium member. Four were added to the NDC and five added or promoted on the CMC. There were also significant promotions in the military / security apparatuses. Kim Won Hong became Minister of State Security, Kim Jong Gak Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Hyon Yong Chol Chief of the KPA General Staff and Choe Ryong Hae Director of the KPA General Political Bureau. There were also, of course, the obligatory orders raising military rank for a number of elites. Again, the main takeaway is that the state and party institutions that languished for many years under KJI have been revitalized since his stroke, and received an additional shot in the arm under KJU.

Purges / Deaths

The first three years of KJI’s rule were relatively free of purges, though some occurred at lower levels in the security agencies. The only major events along these lines were the death of O Jin U in February 1995 and the deaths of Choe Gwang and Kim Kwang Jin in February 1997, as well as the defection of Hwang Jang Yop in the same month.

The same cannot be said for the first few months of KJU’s tenure. There have been no major deaths within the regime like KJI faced, but quite a few members have been publicly and privately removed. Most important was the aforementioned Ri Yong Ho, but April also saw the removal of a number of Politburo members (both full and alternate). This includes: Jon Pyong Ho (Secretary of the Politburo), Pyon Yong Rip (SPA Chairman), Ri Thae Nam (Vice Premier), and Kim Rak Hui (Vice Premier). Thae Jong Su, who was previously a member of the Secretariat and Director of the General Affairs Department was demoted to Chief Secretary of the South Hamgyong Province and likely lost his Politburo spot (unconfirmed as of right now). U Tong Chuk, who was (is?) First Vice Director of State Security was also removed from the Politburo, NDC and CMC; however, it remains unclear if he was purged, fell ill or is still in power but had his institutional roles taken over by Kim Wong Hong who is now head of MSS.

The Rise of the WPK

The major story of Kim Jong Un’s first eight months in power is the re-emergence of the WPK. Below is a comparison of elite appearances made during the periods under examination (for Kim Jong Il July 12, 1994 – December 31, 1996, for Kim Jong Un January 1, 2012 until July 25, 2012.) I made a list of every elite who appeared with KJI and KJU during their respective periods, assigned each elite to a particular category (party, military / security, state or provincial), and then tallied the total number of appearances each elite in that particular category made. The percentage is derived from dividing the category number by the total number.

The numbers below show that military figures appeared However, as Stephan Haggard and I have pointed out, classifying elites under Kim Jong Un is not quite as simple as it used to be, especially when it comes to the military. There are a number of elites given military rankings – up to Vice Marshal – who have no real military background, but are essentially civilians in military clothing. As can be seen in the figure below, there is a major difference in the story the data tells based on how one classifies. If one classifies based purely on holding a military ranking, it seems like the military has actually gained prominence under KJU.[1] But if we classify more accurately, it is clear that party members – based on public appearances – are appearing more frequently with KJU (though not by a large percentage).

The evidence gets stronger once we break the KJU numbers down by month as shown in Figure 2. The party and military actually track fairly closely – right up until the beginning of May, at which point we see a huge divergence. Following the April 2012 Party Conference, Aidan Foster-Carter wrote that Choe Ryong Hae’s appointment as Director of the KPA General Political Bureau was “a bid to reassert Party control over a military which under Kim Jong Il rather ruled the roost.” This data gives credence to that idea. Paired with the fact that two of the most influential military men, Ri Yong Ho and Kim Yong Chun, were either removed or demoted as well, there definitely seems to be a pattern emerging.

For comparison purposes, we can look at a breakdown of Kim Jong Il’s appearances (note: due to the more spread out nature of his appearances, these are done by half-years instead of months). This breakdown also fits in well with what we now know about the military’s rise, though admittedly it bounces around much more.

Emergence of the Security Services

Another thing that differentiates the KJI and KJU successions is the greater public prominence of the security services, namely the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Minister of People’s Security (MPS), Guard Command (GC) and Military Security Command (MSC) (the Korean People’s Internal Security Force, which is a part of the MPS, has also been fairly prominent). For a great overview of the history and mission of each of these agencies see Ken Gause’s piece at HRNK.

The below graph compares security members based on the percentage they appeared (out of total elite appearances). It also shows what percentage of the military / security category figure they made up. (Kim Jong Il’s numbers are in blue, Kim Jong Un’s in red)

The heads of these security organizations have also been well-placed in the relevant party and state institutions.

(MSS – Political Bureau)Ri Myong Su (MPS) Ri Pyong Sam (KPISF)

Total = 14%

Total = 16%

Total = 17%

It should also be pointed out that Jang Song Thaek, who oversees party control of these organizations through his position as Director of the Administration Department, sits on all three institutions.

How does this fit into a shift towards greater party control and a shift away from the military-first policy? Because the security organizations will all play an essential role in ensuring the military does not become a source of dissent. They may also see a chance to increase their own stature, especially as money that was once allocated specifically to the military is freed up.

Conclusion

Given the preceding paragraphs, it’s fairly clear that the KJU succession has been undertaken in a far different way from his father’s. While most analysts were skeptical that an untested 28 (or 29) year old could successfully take control, from the outside (an important qualifier when talking about North Korea) it seems like he has successfully begun the process of consolidating power. He was aided in this process greatly by the security and economic situation, both of which were not nearly as tumultuous as when his father took over. Another overlooked aspect is that many of the same people running this succession were around for the last one, including Kim Ki Nam (propaganda), Kim Kyong Hui and Jang Song Thaek, It seems likely that they learned a great deal from their previous experience and have used that to their advantage in carrying out this succession. The result has been far smoother than anyone expected. However, whether or not this “smoothness” can translate into meaningful change within the country is anyone’s guess.

Sources:

Gause, Kenneth E. Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of the North Korean Police State.  Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012.

Gause, Kenneth E. . North Korea under Kim Chong-Il: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change.  Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International 2011.

Kim, Insoo, and Min Yong Lee. “Predictors of Kim Jong-Il’s on-the-Spot Guidance under Military-First Politics.” North Korean Review 8, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 93-104.

North Korea Leadership Watch. www.nkleadershipwatch.com

Korean Institute for National Unification. Kim Jong Il Hyunjijido Donghyang 1994-2011

(Analysis of Kim Jong Il’

Ministry of Unification. http://unibook.unikorea.go.kr/?sub_num=54&sty=I&ste=%A4%A1.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

There was an interesting contrast last week on the Korean peninsula as South Koreans went to the polls to democratically elect members for its National Assembly; conversely, North Korea had two meetings to put into place its new leadership structure. Unlike in South Korea where the results were difficult to predict, in North Korea, the predicted outcome occurred with Kim Jong-un being formally given titles to lead the party and the military. The promotions last week offer some possible ideas on leaders that could be significant under this new regime. There were also a few statements and actions suggesting that some in the North Korean leadership know they are not where they need to be as a country. However, prior statements by North Korean leaders indicating reforms could be in the offing have been followed by either the failure to follow through or actions which undercut the prospect of reform.  Whatever policies and actions come out of North Korea from now on, they will be associated with Kim Jong-un and this new leadership.

With the Fourth Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and the Supreme People’s Assembly meetings last week in North Korea, Kim Jong-un was officially given titles to run the Party and the military. Moreover, Kim Jong-il now has two posthumous titles, Eternal General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Eternal Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). With these new titles for Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un had to settle for First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. He also was named Chairman of the Central Military Commission. KCNA reports noting that decisions were made regarding revising Party rules and the Constitution of the DPRK suggest these documents now reflect these new titles and connections to leadership positions within North Korea, with Kim Jong-un at the head of the Party and military.

The family connections are very important in North Korea, especially for Kim Jong-un. The similarity in physical appearance between Kim Jong-un and his grandfather, Kim Il-Sung, have already been noted. Furthermore, many of the phrases in KCNA about the transition to Kim Jong-un are saying these moves are occurring “true to the behest of leader Kim Jong Il.” These connections are important and necessary for Kim Jong-un’s survival.

Kim Jong-un’s living family connections will be significant as well. His aunt and uncle, Kim Kyong Hui and Jang Song Taek, are seen as vital players in the new leadership. Jang Song Taek joins his wife in the Political Bureau of the WPK, and Kim Kyong Hui got another position in the Party as a secretary in the Secretariat. The key factor will be if Jang Song Taek and Kim Kyong Hui work to help Kim Jong-un and protect him or if they will use their position and influence with their nephew to manipulate power to address their own desired policies.

Beyond Kim Jong-un’s family, a few new leaders are beginning to emerge in the upper elite of North Korean leadership. Announced the day before the Workers’ Party Conference, Choe Ryong Hae was promoted to Vice Marshall in the North Korean Army. The next day he was named Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. After the Supreme People’s Assembly, he received a position as a member of the NDC.  As a relatively young leader at 61, Choe’s rise should be watched closely. In fact, Choe Ryong Hae has been listed ahead of Ri Yong Ho in at least three recent KCNA articles. Vice Marshal Ri is a Vice Chairman on the NDC and has often been seen next to Kim Jong-un during his visits and meetings.

Kim Jong Gak was also promoted to the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. Replacing Kim Yong Chun, Kim Jong Gak is seen as another rising power player and was one of the men walking next to the car carrying Kim Jong-il during the funeral. He was promoted to Vice Marshal in the Korean People’s Army in February 2012, and it has been rumored that he might be one of the people tutoring Kim Jong-un on how to use Party mechanisms to control the military.

In addition to these moves, North Korean leaders made a couple short statements suggesting they understand North Korea is not as developed as other countries in the world. Choe Yong Rim, Premier of North Korea, stated in front of the Supreme People’s Assembly: “It is the most important target of the struggle set by the WPK for this year to bring about a signal improvement in the people’s standard of living.” Kim Jong-un was also recently quoted as saying: “It is the firm resolution of the Workers’ Party of Korea to enable our people, the best people in the world who have remained loyal to the party, overcoming all difficulties, to live, without tightening their belts any longer, and fully enjoy wealth and prosperity under socialism.” However, there are numerous quotes in the past from North Korean leaders suggesting a desire to reform and change. It will be the actual actions this new leadership takes that will matter, rather than statements that could be possibly made to sound good for and gain benefits from the international community.

The new leadership announced last week can no longer hide. The big public events in North Korea following the death of Kim Jong-il and connected with the celebrations for the 100^th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday are now over. Both the February 29, 2012 deal between North Korea and the United States and the missile launch both seemed to have started under Kim Jong-il. As much as Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are eternally present in North Korea, decisions and actions from now on will be connected with Kim Jong-un and this new leadership.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Joseph A. Ferris III’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Luke Herman

North Korea recently held a series of meetings to formalize leadership positions in the new regime. Kim Jong-il was named the Eternal Secretary General, while Kim Jong-un became the party’s First Secretary. Here is an updated Workers Party of Korea leadership chart.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

After holding its Fourth Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea, North Korea now has an eternal president and an eternal general secretary. Kim Jong-il was named Eternal General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), and Kim Jong-un was given the title of First Secretary of the WPK. These initial changes and those suspected to come in the next few days will give some indications on how North Korea will try to structure its leadership under Kim Jong-un.

After his death, it was likely that North Korea would try to honor Kim Jong-il in some way. The Kim family lineage being an important aspect of the young Kim Jong-un’s power, it was anticipated that Kim Jong-il would be given a special recognition along the lines of Kim Il-sung. There were some predictions that Kim Jong-il would be given an eternal title in connection with the National Defense Commission (NDC). Now with Kim Jong-il posthumously given the title of Eternal General Secretary, it will be interesting to see if this move further indicates a renewed emphasis leadership on the Party instead of the military.

For Kim Jong-un, he officially becomes head of the party through the new position of first secretary. After the death of Kim Jong-il, North Korean media labeled Kim Jong-un as head of the Party and supreme commander of the military. Even in the story announcing Kim Jong-un’s new title, KCNA said Kim Jong-un as the “supreme leader of the WPK and the people of the DPRK” was elected “as first secretary of the WPK, true to the behest of leader Kim Jong Il.” With him as the head of the party, the question now is Kim Jong-un officially the chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC)?

A week after Kim Jong-il’s death, the Rodong Sinmun apparently said Kim Jong-un was leading the CMC. Yet, the AP’s Jean Lee recently saw signs in North Korea saying “”We will defend vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission Comrade Kim Jong Un to the death.” According to the Party’s constitution updated in September 2010, it states the “general secretary” (총비서) is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission, compared to Kim Jong-un’s new title as first secretary (제1비서). KCNA did say that the Fourth Conference of the WPK discussed “revising WPK rules,” so possibly this is where changes will occur to officially connect Kim Jong-un’s new title with the chairmanship of the CMC.

Further evidence of Party strengthening can be seen with Jang Song Taek and Kim Kyong Hui, uncle and aunt of Kim Jong-un, moving into prominent positions in the WPK. Jang Song Taek now joins the Political Bureau while his wife becomes a secretary in the Party Secretariat. Ri Myong Su, the Minister of Public Security, joins Jang Song Taek on the Political Bureau and was named a member of the CMC. Ri Myong Su, the Minister of Public Security, joins Jang Song Taek on the Political Bureau and was named a member of the CMC.

Choe Ryong Hae and Hyon Chol Hae, members of the CMC and the NDC respectively, were both awarded the title of Vice Marshal in the Korean People’s Army. These military promotions probably helped with their new positions in the WPK. Choe, a relatively young leader at 61 and appears to have close ties with Jang Song Taek, was given big promotions to Vice-Chairmen of the CMC as well as a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau. Hyon Chol Hae is now part of the CMC in addition to his role in the NDC.

For leadership changes, we will wait to see if any other announcements are made on moves stemming from the Workers’ Party Conference. With the WPK having a lot of changes during its last recent meeting in September 2010, it is possible few other changes will occur. The Supreme People’s Assembly is scheduled to meet on Friday, April 13, so more news could follow. The main question still remains if Kim Jong-un will officially be the chair of the CMC and the NDC, despite North Korean media basically describing him as the supreme leader of the Party and the military. All of these meetings and moves, along with the anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday next week, are meant to illustrate North Korea’s ability to smoothly transition to Kim Jong-un.

Early indications suggest a strengthening of the Party as key members of the North Korean leadership gain positions. If Kim Jong-un will indeed rule more through the Party than his father, he will likely need people like Jang Song Taek, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Gak, and Ri Myong Su to help him. Their new positions, along with the promotions of Choe Ryong Hae and Hyon Chol Hae give some indication on how Kim Jong-un and the leaders around him plan to maintain power and begin a new era of Kim family leadership in North Korea.

For more info on Kim Jong-un, Jang Song Taek,  Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Yong Chun, and Ri Myong Su, visit  10 People You Need to Know for Transition in North Korea on The Peninsula blog.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Zennie Abraham’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad 0Carroll

Rewind to April 1995, just one year after the death of Kim Il Sung, a nuclear crisis that nearly brought about war, and a time of biting economic hardship.  After such a long period of mourning, probably the last thing you would have expected to see taking place would be an international wrestling tournament in Pyongyang, attended by the likes of boxing champion Muhammad Ali and World Championship Wrestling’s (WCW) Rick Flair.  But that’s exactly what happened, and bizarrely, all in the name of international peace and friendship.  If the post Kim Il Sung period is providing the template for North Korea after Kim Jong-il, might Pyongyang now seek to repeat history through another major wrestling tournament at some point this year?

Having organized a number of similar events in Beijing, Moscow and Baghdad, event director Antonio Inoki evidently saw 1995 as the perfect time to help improve the DPRK’s relations with long-time adversaries Japan and the USA. As a well-known wrestler and former Japanese politician, Inoki was in a unique position to put on an event like “Collision in Korea”.  Having been trained by the legendary Korean wrestler Rikidozan (much admired in the DPRK), Inoki’s popularity in North Korea gave him the capacity to convince authorities there about the benefits of his prospective tournament.  And as owner of New Japan Pro Wrestling (a well respected international wrestling promotions company), he had good connections to wrestling communities in both Japan and the United States.

Former WCW President Eric Bischoff wrote about being approached for the tournament in his biography, Controversy Creates Cash. Recounting Inoki’s initial proposal to WCW, he explained:  “When I got that phone call and the opportunity to go to a place that [was] off-limits to Americans, I jumped at it. I said, “Ab­solutely, no problem”.  With support from an American wrestling promoter secured, agreement from the North Koreans to host it in their mammoth sized May Day Stadium, and access for foreign visitors approved, Inoki scheduled the tournament to form the main pillar of the 1995 Pyongyang International Sports and Cultural Festival for Peace.  He was even able to persuade Muhammad Ali to attend, having fought against him in a special event in 1976.

Recorded in history as the largest ever professional wrestling event, the North Koreans packed a record breaking 320,000 spectators into Pyongyang’s May Day stadium to watch proceedings over the course of two days.  But compared to the raucous crowds commonly associated with American wrestling events, the Pyongyang crowd appear subdued in video recordings of the event.  Given North Korea’s isolation at the time, this should come as no surprise.  And as Bischoff recalled,  “I wondered what they could possibly be thinking when they saw Ric Flair come out in his flowered, sequined robe as the 2001 Space Odyssey theme blared through the speakers.”

While the audience was mainly local, some 15,000 Japanese, Chinese and overseas Koreans were reported as also having attended the event, with even a handful of Americans joining.  This foreign presence led to some unforeseen consequences for the hosts, with one post-event news article drawing attention to the plight of the hundreds of ethnic Koreans who had ostensibly attended for wrestling, but really in hope of connecting with lost family members.  Obliged to attend the tournament by night and tour the country’s official sights by day, all requests for family reunions were turned down – even when relatives were known to be living in the center of Pyongyang.   The heartbreak was reportedly too much for one 75 year old woman.  When the tour bus happened to visit a site just a few miles outside her hometown, where her sister still lives, she looked up at the sky and cried out: “Mother, Father! Your daughter has come home!”

Walter Keats, manager of Asia Pacific Travel, was one of the few American tourists allowed to go on the trip, in what marked one of the first opportunities U.S. nationals ever had to visit the DPRK.  Entering the country by train (now impossible for Americans), his group took in a nine day tour of the country that centered around the two day wrestling event. Talking to The Peninsula, Walter recalled the tour as being extremely restrictive, but that the group unexpectedly got to see well beyond the capital, taking in sites deep in the country – all just months before the onset of the countries’ worst-ever famine.

In the final match of the event, Antonio Inoki fought against Rick Flair, winning (predictably) after just 14 minutes to roars of excitement from the North Korean crowd. Even if they didn’t understand wrestling initially, they did know that Flair was an American and were happy to see his demise in the last stage of the event. With Inoki’s victory, one of the most bizarre examples of sporting diplomacy came to an end, bizarrely then kept off American TV screens until one year later, when WCW turned it into a Pay-Per-View for its domestic audience.

As far as sports diplomacy goes, the nature of North Korea makes it hard to see if Inoki’s wrestling tournament helped foster a better understanding of the Japanese and Americans even one iota.  While other sports might strengthen people-to-people relations through team-work and collaboration, by its very nature, wrestling was never going to do much to change North Korean opinions towards two traditional adversaries.  And if the event was at all meant to improve American understanding of the DPRK, it looks to have failed miserably on this front.  Recounting his departure from Pyongyang, in his autobiography Ric Flair describes kissing the ground on arriving in Japan, so “glad to be back on friendly soil”.  And as for Muhammad Ali’s reaction, well, due to expletives it cannot be published here. Suffice to say, he didn’t get a very good impression of North Korea.

While the 1995 wrestling tournament may have had some lofty objectives related to peace and friendship, they sadly went by unachieved. And if anything, the tournament may have even contributed to worsening international opinion of North Korea, such was the nature of the feedback from much of the wrestling community. So while there may be some sense in repeating as much of the past as possible to help bolster Kim Jong-un’s leadership credentials post Kim Jong-il, North Korea would now be ill advised to host another major wrestling tournament.  Instead, a drug-free and constructive participation at the London Olympics offers a much better opportunity for the DPRK to improve its standing and contribute to an environment of international peace and friendship.

Chad 0Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from David Stanley’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

by Chad 0Carroll

Kim Jong-nam made headlines last week with reports suggesting he was not comfortable with the third generation succession to his brother, Kim Jong-un.  It wasn’t the first time Kim Jong-nam’s name made the news, with previous reports showing his desire for reform, his unhappiness with DPRK military first policy, and even his prediction that the country would collapse soon after a transfer to brother Jong-un.  This time though, the latest spate of stories connected to Kim Jong-nam’s outspoken views relate to his conversations with Tokyo based journalist, Yoji Gomi.

As the most public of Kim Jong-il’s sons, Jong-nam has long been regarded by the mainstream press as the careless playboy who enraged his father through an attempted visit to Japan’s Disneyland with forged documents in the early 2000s.  But a new book by Yoji Gomi suggests that while a heavy drinker, much of the initial speculation on Jong-nam’s character and predicament may actually be incorrect.  Basing the book on an exchange of over 150 emails, Yoji Gomi paints the picture of a “well-read,” “intelligent,” “sensible” and in some respects “ordinary” individual, deeply concerned with his home country.  And if what Kim Jong-nam said was true, then his exile might not have been quite to the extent that some had assumed, with him speaking to his father by phone regularly before his death.

While Kim Jong-nam has long made a habit of speaking to media, until the publication of Yoji Gomi’s book it had appeared that most of his conversations had been through chance meetings with foreign correspondents at airports and other public locations.  Few would have suspected that he would be in such regular contact with the press as it seems he was with Mr. Gomi.  As such, his conversations raise lots of interesting questions for Korea watchers, some of which we managed put to Mr. Gomi in a recent interview.

1. How did you happen to meet Kim Jong-nam and why was he so trusting in a stranger like yourself at first?
I happened to meet him at Beijing airport. We have exchanged more than 150 emails since meeting. We met two times last year and I persuaded him to take an interview with me – and he basically agreed with my plan. I suppose he wants to appeal to the public that the DPRK should make economic reforms as soon as possible.

2. Did Kim Jong-nam offer any insight into the practical way he hopes the regime could make reforms without upsetting the internal balance of power too much?
He believed that the Chinese way is the best for the DPRK. It is possible to invite capitalism while maintaining socialism. For him, the most important thing is to protect foreign investors, including those from South Korea.

3. Why do you think Kim Jong-nam has been so vocal with media, when traditionally the Kim family has been very averse to speaking with foreign media?
Good question. The motivation for contacting media, including myself, is to protect himself. When he feels that his life is in danger, he tries to get in touch with media and expose the secrets of the DPRK.

4. Do you think Kim Jong-nam has much concern for his own personal safety? He claims to be protected by China, but as we know, North Korea has the capacity to make people go missing overseas quite easily.
Yes, he is concerned about his safety. My source said that he has been protected by someone in Macao.

5. How does Kim Jong-nam feel about the forthcoming book you are publishing? Was he on board with its publication?
He is not happy with my book. So has stopped sending me emails.

6. Has Kim Jong-nam ever expressed much regarding unification to you? If so, what was his position on this?
He never referred to unification. But he does hope for economic development of North Korea.

7. What is Kim Jong-nam’s estimation of the current South Korean government led by President Lee Myung Bak?
The relationship between South and North Korea will be difficult for a whole because neither government recognizes each other, he said.

8. Has Kim Jong-nam expressed any thoughts about what a North Korea would look like not ruled by one of the Kim family? Or at least, one not ruled by his brother.
He opposed the power succession to his brother. But he did not elaborate on who is suitable to be the next leader.

9. In a WSJ report with you, Kim Jong-nam said that he spoke regularly to his father by telephone, despite media reports that he was “cut off” from Pyongyang. Did he ever reveal much about the type of conversations he had?
He said he and his father talked about the nuclear issue and power succession by phone. But he never elaborated on the details of their conversation.

10. While reports have indicated that Kim Jong-nam doesn’t know his brother Jong-un, has Jong-nam ever revealed any personality details about his younger brother to you that he picked up from other family members? If so, what were these?
Kim Jong-nam said noting about his brother, as he has never met Jong-un.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz, Sarah K. Yun, Chad O’Carroll, and Troy Stangarone

Last year saw significant changes on the Korean peninsula. While 2011 ended with the surprise death of Kim Jong-il and the beginning of succession to Kim Jong-un, last year also saw Korea become one of only nine nations to surpass $1 trillion in total trade, the passage of the KORUS FTA, and a surprise election for the mayor of Seoul. With even more change set for 2012 in both Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula, here are twelve economic and foreign policy issues that are worth following in the coming year:

1.      The Transition and Public Events in North Korea: Kim Jong-un has been declared the successor to his father. The North Korean government is working hard to illustrate the unity of the nation and the loyalty of the elites to Kim Jong-un. There will likely be a formal meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea where titles and positions will be made and adjusted. Kim Jong Un possibly has an advantage with the early schedule of public events where his new leadership will continue to be highlighted, such as the one hundred year anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth in April and the start of North Korea’s development as a prosperous and powerful nation. However, after those events, there could be more room for maneuvering if other North Korean elites do not like the direction of the country.

2.      Political Change in South Korea: While North Korea may have got the jump on political change in 2012, South Korea will conduct elections for both the National Assembly and the presidency this year. With South Korean presidents limited to a maximum term of five years, Lee Myung-bak will be ending his term in December.  Lee’s Grand National Party (GNP) has Park Geun-hye at the forefront of potential presidential candidates. However, she will likely face a significant challenge from Ahn Cheol-soo, founder of anti-virus software company AhnLab.  Although yet to declare his candidacy, there are growing signs that he will run as the opposition candidate – and recent polls suggest that he has strong support polling at 49.7 percent, some 7 percent more than rival Park Geun-hye.

Additionally, in April, all 299 seats of the National Assembly will be up for vote, with 245 in single-member districts and 54 seats determined through proportional representation. The ruling GNP has fared poorly in local elections recently and developments indicate that progressives may be uniting under a unified banner for the April elections that could seriously compound difficulties for the GNP.

3.      Kim Jong-un and China: In the early days of the transition, China has thrown its support behind Kim Jong-un. Who from China visits North Korea, and especially if Kim visits the new leadership in China, will likely provide clues to the relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing, as well as how secure the new regime feels in its position. Given that China will undergo its own leadership transition this year, 2012 will likely set the tone for both sides going forward.

4.     The Role of Social Media in South Korean Politics: Social media, including Twitter, are playing an increasingly prominent role in Korean political discourse. A recent Hankyroreh and Korea Society Opinion Institute poll showed politics to be one of the most retweeted topics by users in South Korea this year. This suggests that the conversations that take place on Twitter in 2012 will play a significant variable in this year’s presidential election.  South Korea’s Twitter community has an active user rate that is some two times higher than the world average, with nearly 10% of the nation signed up.  The important role Twitter plays in politics can be seen in a campaign that was credited with a higher than expected voter turnout among young voters during the during the April 2011 by-elections.

The team behind the one of the world’s most listened to podcast, Naneun Ggomsuda, may have a key role in determining the outcome of elections in South Korea this year.  Specializing in political satire, their podcast has to date taken a vehemently anti- Lee Myung Bak and Grand National Party position.  They have also developed a number of investigative stories that have attempted to highlight mis-steps by the ruling government, often with significant media interest.  Their feature on Na Kyung-won’s alleged visits to a luxury skin care clinic is said to have contributed to her loss of support in recent Seoul mayoral elections.

5.   The Euro Crisis: Strictly speaking, this isn’t about Korea, but with Korea heavily dependent upon trade for growth and Europe a major trading partner, the euro zone matters for Korea. If Europe is unable to restore market confidence and avoid a deepening of its debt crisis, a steep economic decline in Europe or the unraveling of the euro could hit the global economy hard. While Europe has managed to consistently fail to address the debt crisis in a comprehensive manner, there may be some tell tale signs early in the year regarding whether Europe has turned the corner or not. If France is able to maintain its AAA credit rating and Italy and Spain are able to roll over nearly $200 billion in debt in the first quarter of the year, Europe will likely have passed the most immediate dangers. When it comes to Korea, the stats to think about are this, the EU accounted for 10.2 percent of Korea’s exports and 9.6 percent of its total trade through the first 11 months of 2011.

6.    U.S. Defense Budget Cuts: The U.S. Department of Defense budget is expected to cut $260 billion over the next five years and more than $450 billion over the next decade. In the new budget strategy announcement on January 5, President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta presented a revamped U.S. military strategy with an emphasis on Asia and space and cyber capabilities, and preservation of missions in the Middle East.

With a reduced defense budget, partner relationships will become more important. Although the 5% increase in the 2012 South Korean defense budget may offset the potential challenges in the U.S.-Korea military alliance, uncertainties continue as both countries enter an election year. Despite reassurances from Obama and Panetta, the future shape of United States presence in Korea and Asia is still to be determined. With both nations preparing for op-con transfer in 2015, how the budget and strategy changes in the U.S. play out could play a role in the future force structure of the alliance.

7.    North Korea’s Interaction with the United States and South Korea:  Despite its current turn inwards, North Korea will likely turn its attention outwards at some point in 2012. North Korea and the United States seemed to be on the verge of a deal over food aid and possibly moving forward on nuclear talks before Kim Jong-il’s death, and there are early indications these may start back up at some point. As for South Korea, Pyongyang has said that it will not deal with the current administration in Seoul, but 2012 will also bring fresh elections for the National Assembly in April and the presidency in December, key points to watch for in North-South relations.

8.    Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: Seoul will be hosting the second Nuclear Security Summit in March with participation from over 50 national leaders. The agenda will consist of mainly three issues: international cooperation against nuclear terrorism, prevention of illicit transaction of nuclear materials, and protection of nuclear materials, nuclear power plants and other nuclear related institutions.

The appointment of Korea as the chair of the second NSS is both practical and symbolic – practical in that Korea is a close ally of the U.S., enabling smooth coordination; and symbolic in that Korea has been an active member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with advanced nuclear energy capabilities, yet facing a serious nuclear threat from North Korea.

Whereas the hosting of the G-20 in 2011 elevated Korea’s status as a world economic power, the Seoul NSS will elevate Korea as a world security leader. The NSS will be even more significant in light of Kim Jong-il’s death. President Lee Myung-bak had previously extended an invitation to Kim Jong-il to attend. It will be interesting to see how the new regime responds to the summit.

9.    The Implementation of the KORUS FTA: Now that the United States and Korea have passed the KORUS FTA the two governments are looking to implement the agreement. The agreement should come into force early in the year, but might slip until after National Assembly elections in Korea for political reasons.

10.  The Politics Around the KORUS FTA and U.S.-Korea Relations: Speaking of the politics of the KORUS FTA, prior to the death of Kim Jong-il, the opposition in Korea was turning the FTA into a major campaign issue, calling on Korea to renegotiate certain provisions such as those relating to investor-state dispute settlement. Some had gone so far as to suggest Korea should withdraw from the agreement. Korea’s relationship with the United States is a complex one, and anti-Americanism has played a role in previous elections. While North Korea is now likely to become the major campaign issue, look for the FTA and Korea’s broader relationship with the United States to remain caught up in domestic politics for the time being.

11.  South Korea-China FTA: China has become South Korea’s largest trading partner by a significant margin, with the two countries doing more than $200 billion in trade in the first eleven months of 2011. With the EU and KORUS FTA now concluded, Korea will look to start negotiations with its biggest trading partner in the next few months.

12.  World Expo 2012 – Yeosu, Korea:From May to August, Korea will host the 2012 Expo in the port city of Yeosu. Under the theme of “The Living Ocean and Coast,” the Yeosu Expo will share knowledge in maritime cooperation, marine science, and the proper use of ocean and coast. Korea is anticipating an international recognition of Korea as a leading maritime nation.

Hosting the Expo can be seen as a completion of Korea’s campaign as a world leader – the 2011 G-20 on economic issues, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit on security issues, and the 2012 Expo on cultural and soft power issues.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs, Sarah K. Yun is the Director of Public Affairs and Regional Issues, Chad 0Carroll is the Director of Communications, and Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are the authors alone.

Photo from Rachael Towne’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Luke Herman

Updated January 11, 2012.

With the passing of Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s leadership transition is being formally put into place. Here is a quick abridged graphic highlighting the leadership on the National Defense Commission and the State Party’s Political Bureau and Central Military Commission. Below are links to expanded graphics for the Korean Workers Party, the military/security hierarchy, and North Korea’s state organs.

Expanded North Korean Leadership Charts:

Korean Workers Party

North Korean Military/Security Hierarchy

North Korean State Organs

Luke Herman is a Masters student of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego and former KEI Intern.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

In Asia much of the pressure and focus from the transition in North Korea after Kim Jong Il’s death is now on China, its neighbor and chief benefactor. As a rising power that provides both economic and national security assistance North Korea needs to survive, China is in a difficult situation with new leadership emerging in North Korea and new leadership scheduled to take over China in October. For the other major emerging power, however, India possesses more ability to monitor the situation in North Korea and react in its best interests to any changes on the Korean peninsula.

Ties between India and North Korea are growing. The two sides had a few diplomatic connections in 2011 that suggested an improvement in bilateral relations. Pak Ui-chun, North Korea’s Foreign Minister, visited India’s embassy in Pyongyang on January 26 for India’s Republic Day event. India’s ambassador to North Korea was then invited to a dinner with North Korean officials. India also provided food aid to North Korea by donating $1 million to the World Food Programme. Moreover, prior to donating food aid, India’s ambassador to North Korea was permitted to visit some of the countryside between Pyongyang and Nampo to see areas in need of economic assistance. The Indian ambassador then toured Nampo. North Korea also sent a delegation to India in May 2011 to examine India’s history with special economic zones. Although engagement with North Korea is often along these smaller interactions, the momentum in India – North Korea relations seems to have a positive trajectory.

Yet India’s relations with North Korea are still hampered by India’s concerns over North Korea’s relations with Pakistan, and to a lesser extent, Burma. Both of India’s neighbors have a history of dangerous interaction with North Korea. Pakistan and North Korea previously traded missile and nuclear technology. Moreover, North Korea’s insistence on keeping its nuclear weapons reminds the international community of A.Q. Khan, one of the fathers of Pakistan’s nuclear program and his network of illegal transfers of nuclear material, especially the connections to North Korea. North Korea represents the negative example of a country outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in contrast to the positive image India is trying to project for itself to the international community. For India, the rumors over North Korean assistance for Burma’s own nuclear weapons program, along with previous military cooperation, feed a sense of insecurity in the region. During her recent visit to Burma, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Burmese leaders that they must end their illicit activities with North Korea as part of the reforms they are trying to undertake.

North Korea provides some more immediate security concerns for countries recently enhancing their relations with India. South Korea, Japan, and the United States are more immediately impacted by the leadership transition after the death of Kim Jong Il and whose own policies can also more directly influence the outcomes on the Korean peninsula.

India has a strategic partnership and important economic relations with each of these countries. These new connections, along with India’s emergence as a rising power, will bring issues regarding transition in North Korea more deeply into India’s strategic portfolio. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of Japan was in India the last week of December and called on India to support and understand Japan’s position on North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell testified in March 2011 that the U.S. has discussed issues regarding North Korea with India. South Korea will also likely use its strategic partnership  with India to discuss approaches to North Korea in the near future.

The China factor is an important aspect in India’s foreign policy calculations. China’s reactions and responses to North Korea’s new leadership will demonstrate its confidence level toward Pyongyang. China would prefer a stable North Korea to prevent the burden of an uncertain government in Pyongyang and the possibility of major action toward North Korea during China’s own leadership transition in 2012. India probably would not mind if the uncertainties in North Korea kept China more preoccupied; some even suggest North Korea moving away from China would be beneficial to India as well.

India will have some benefit of not being directly impacted by the leadership transition in North Korea. However, the transition to Kim Jong-un will have an affect on India’s neighbors and its growing relationships with its strategic partners. India will be looking to see how the new North Korean leadership will approach their interactions with Pakistan, Burma, and China. South Korea, Japan, and the United States are likely to concentrate their efforts on the Korean peninsula, but will look to India for support as a regional and emerging world power. With the ascendance of Kim Jong-un, India’s development as a rising power will likely include more connections to issues regarding North Korea and the future of the Korean peninsula.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Sonal And Abe’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.