By Troy Stangarone, Andrew Kwon, and Peter Taves

With the passing of Kim Jong-il in December of 2011, the United States and South Korea entered into a new period of uncertainty with North Korea. Shortly after Kim Jong-un assumed power, questions were raised regarding the extent of his hold on the regime in Pyongyang and what his rise to power would mean for the future of North Korea. The events of recent months have only added to the level of uncertainty surrounding the regime in Pyongyang. While the rhetoric and provocations have begun to subside, the most recent crisis has seen a shift in the use and intensity of bellicose rhetoric by the regime in Pyongyang.

North Korea has a history of engaging in threats to extract concessions from the United States and South Korea. During his time in power, Kim Jong-il mastered the art of escalating a crisis for effect, only to dial the tensions back down when the time was right to achieve his ends. Over the years, the United States and South Korea grew familiar with his patterns of behavior, much as with Kim Il-sung before him. With Kim Jong-un that same level of familiarity has yet to develop.

While the events of recent months contain elements of North Korea’s prior provocations, there has been a higher degree of specificity in the threats, an increase in the rhetorical intensity, and a longer duration than during previous crises. North Korea has also shown an increasing ability to follow through on its threats. Though North Korea does not yet possess the technical capability to hit targets in the mainland of the United States, it has demonstrated a growing sophistication in its nuclear and missile programs. The wreckage from the December satellite launch has lead some in the intelligence community to believe that North Korea is closer to miniaturizing a nuclear warhead than was previously believed.

If North Korea’s weapons programs are growing more sophisticated, the recent crisis has also seen a shift in Pyongyang’s rhetoric. Since Kim Jong-un took power the hostility of North Korean rhetoric has increased markedly, even during times of perceived calm. An analysis of the current and previous crises with North Korea shows the use of terms such as “war,” “satellite,” and “nuclear” growing markedly more prevalent in North Korean rhetoric in KCNA than terms such as “peace,” “reconciliation,” and “dialogue” (see foot note for details)[1].

During the recent crisis that began in December, many analysts have noted the increasing volume of provocative rhetoric coming out of North Korea. However, analysis shows that the increase in rhetoric under Kim Jong-un predates the current crisis. In 2012, references to “war” in KCNA were up 190 percent from 1998, when North Korea was sanctioned for a missile test, and 107 percent from North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009. In 2012, references to war never fell below 217 in a month and were over 300 in all months but January and November. In 1998, they never exceeded 166 mentions in a single month, while in 2009 they only exceeded 200 when North Korea evicted IAEA inspectors in March and when it was sanctioned by the UN in June. In the case of 2009, mentions of war decreased by 50 percent in April and 28 percent in July after spikes in the prior months (Chart 1).

Chart 1: Use of terms “War” and “Peace” in 1998, 2009 and 2012

While North Korea’s use of “peace” in its rhetoric is also increasing, it is growing at a slower rate than “war.” The use of peace in KCNA rose by 129 percent from 1998 to 2012 and 77 percent from 2009 to 2012 (Graph 1).

Graph 1: Ratio change and usage change of terms of “War” and “Peace” between 1998 and 2012

Interestingly, there seems to be a pattern in North Korea’s usage of the terms “war” and “peace,” which are used in tandem at a roughly 2-to-1 ratio. In 1998, war was used on average 1.98 times for every usage of peace. In 2009, the year of North Korea’s second nuclear test, the ratio rose slightly to 2.11. However, in 2012 the ratio rose to 2.38 percent, a 20 percent increase from 1998, despite relative calm for most of the year.

At the peak of the crisis over the December 2012 satellite launch, references to “satellite” grew nearly 170 percent compared to a similar period after the August 1998 launch (Chart 2).  References to “nuclear,” however, during the peak points of the 2009 UN sanctions and the most recent UN sanctions in response to North Korea’s third nuclear test are virtually identical (Chart 2). This difference most likely stems from the dispute between North Korea and the United States over the nature of its satellite program.

Chart 2: Use of terms “Satellite” and “Nuclear” in 1998, 2009 and 2012

However, looking beyond the peaks there is a notable increase in North Korea’s use of “nuclear” in its rhetoric under Kim Jong-un. References to nuclear in KCNA grew 164 percent from 1998 to 2009, and another 70 percent from 2009 to 2012. Overall, references to nuclear have grown 350 percent from 1998 to 2012 and were up another 139 percent over the first three months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012 (Graph 2).

Graph 2: Usage change of terms “Satellite” and “Nuclear” between 1998 and 2012

North Korea’s use of more positive terms such as “reconciliation” and “dialogue” has been inconsistent (Chart 3). Mentions of reconciliation have actually fallen since 1998 by 32 percent between 1998 and 2009, though they rose by 27 percent between 2009 and 2012. This is somewhat interesting given the harsh rhetoric Pyongyang directed towards Lee Myung-bak during the period. However, overall mentions of reconciliation are down 14 percent from 1998 to 2012 and are down another 17 percent over the first three months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012.

The use of “dialogue” has risen 56 percent between 2009 and 2012 and 41 percent overall between 1998 and 2012. However, over the first three months of 2013, much like North Korea’s use of reconciliation, usage of dialogue is down 41 percent over same period in 2012.

Chart 3: Use of terms “Reconciliation” and “Dialogue” in 1998, 2009 and 2012

Despite the use of “dialogue” being down over the first three months in 2013, there may be indications in the shift of the crisis in April. Data for this study was only available through the first half of April, but in that time use of dialogue in KCNA was up 29 percent from March and at a higher level than at any point during 2012.

Despite the potential positive sign in North Korea’s usage of “dialogue” over the first half of April the overall rate of usage of terms such as “war” and “nuclear” are growing at a faster rate than “reconciliation” and “dialogue.”

Beyond the increasing usage of rhetoric by the regime in North Korea, there have also been changes in the tone of the rhetoric. Under Kim Jong-il, North Korean rhetoric while certainly bellicose was calculated, predictable, measured, and occasionally even conciliatory. In earlier periods of the North Korean nuclear crisis, efforts to allow inspectors from the IAEA were rhetorically deemed almost diplomatically as “unreasonable” and Kim Kye Gwan argued that dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons without a peace treaty would be “unreasonable” as well. As recently as 2005, Kim Jong-il’s government stated a potential for “friendship” between the United States and North Korea, and Kim Jong-il admitted that he thought “favorably” of the United States.

The rhetoric under Kim Jong-un has not been so friendly.

In place of intermittent conciliatory language, the regime under Kim Jong-Un has opted for escalation. Kim Jong-il’s threats were largely innocuous, typically referring to “effective countermeasures” in a defensive response to an American attack. Media threats under Kim Jong-un, however, designate specific targets and even threaten pre-emptive war. Whether these too are innocuous remains to be seen.

Less clear is the intent of the rhetoric. Under Kim Jong-il, North Korea used provocations and hostile rhetoric to extract political and material concessions from the West, such as light water reactors and bilateral talks with the United States. With Kim Jong-un the motives are more opaque.

Many analysts have suggested that, along with the need to consolidate power domestically, the regime is setting the stage for future negotiations. However, Pyongyang has made clear that its nuclear weapons are not up for negotiation, calling them “the nation’s life” and, in contrast to the past, has made virtually no demands of the West other than halfhearted appeals for a peace treaty.

Prior to the United States and South Korea offering talks, media references to bilateral discussions with the United States were nonexistent; in many respects leaving the impression that North Korea was disinterested in talks at all. In fact, the only mention of talks is from anonymous sources in China, which may not be accurate as the Economist has reported that no high level meetings have taken place between China and North Korea in months. At the same time, Pyongyang’s response to the offer of talks has been to set its own preconditions, demanding the end of sanctions and U.S.-South Korea military drills.

What has become clear in the early stage of his rule is that Kim Jong-un will be different and more willing to engage in provocations than his father. With the growth in rhetoric predating the successful satellite launch and third nuclear test, it seems likely that the shift in leadership style we are witnessing is driven more by the new leadership than North Korea’s recent successful weapons tests. However, those same weapons tests could make the regime more dangerous in the future. With the successful tests behind it, the regime could feel emboldened in the measures it could take, making future crises potentially less stable if Pyongyang continues to escalate the level of rhetoric.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute of America. Andrew Kwon is a recent Masters of International Security Graduate from the University of Sydney. Peter Taves is currently undertaking a Masters of International Economic Relations at American University. The views expressed here are the authors alone.

Photo from theADDproject.com’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Jinho Park

While North Korea ratchets up the tension in Northeast Asia, Kim Jong-un made the bold—though not surprising—decision of withdrawing all North Korean workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Recently, South Korea and the United States together have called for a dialogue with North Korea. North Korea has dismissed the offer by denouncing it as a “crafty trick.” To some extent, offering a dialogue manages North Korea’s provocations. So, is it a signal of moving into a new game on the Korean Peninsula? For South Korea it is now crucial to plan what to do next while preparing for a new game with Kim Jong-un.

First, South Korea’s call for a dialogue is not an “out of the box” response to North Korean decision-makers. So, it is unlikely that this offer changes the atmosphere surrounding North Korea’s decision-making process. As the reform of the intelligence service is under discussion in South Korea to strengthen its human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to better access information of value in North Korea, the way for reforming HUMINT operations should be focused on providing stories—beyond gathering information—to be discussed and exerting an influence on the consensus-building process among decision-makers in Pyongyang. Anything taken for granted by North Korea does not change the cognitive and intuitive the mind-set of its leaders. We have to ‘educate them to learn from us’ through HUMINT operations.

Second, if North Korea decides to sit at the table with Korea or the U.S., what can we discuss with North Korea to change a negotiation paradigm, while not going back to the status-quo? Among several options for North Korea—probably in consultation with China—is to hold a separate dialogue regarding different issues with South Korea and the U.S. respectively. To U.S. policymakers, this is a dangerous option, to sit back and watch a dialogue between the two Koreas regarding issues such as nuclear and missile development and proliferation. To South Korea, a top priority is to resume the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Last month, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification introduced an ambitious plan to attract foreign investment in the Complex and further transform it into an international complex. From the founding spirit of the Kaesong Industrial Complex for mutual economic benefits, it was regrettable that the Ministry of Unification did not articulate how such a plan would be helpful for the North Korean regime at the same time. After all, what is going on now seems to return to the status-quo rather than a paradigm shift.

Third, the Park administration needs to explore a new partner for supplementing its efforts toward building political and economic confidence with North Korea to overcome the realistic limits of cooperation with the U.S., China, and Japan. An opportunity to work with a new partner would create the chance to intensify a multi-directional approach to North Korea. The new partner should be one who can exert an influence on North Korea and at the same time be relatively free from North Korean provocations. In this regard, the EU is potentially a very appropriate partner. As the EU has a strong and strategic relationship with the U.S. and China, the EU could be a reliable and sustainable broker between the two Koreas, hopefully the U.S. and China as well. President Park Geun-hye visited North Korea in 2002 under the auspice of the Korea-Europe Foundation.

Fourth, while discussing what to do with North Korea, South Korea should develop a realistic assessment of how the tension on the Korean Peninsula affects the strategic competition in Asia between the U.S. and China. Chinese officials recently expressed their serious concerns about U.S.’s recent military demonstration—both air and naval power—in responding to North Korea bellicose threats. Although the U.S. and China have a different strategic perspective in dealing with North Korean issues, they share a common view on North Korean issues in regards to how to protect and increase their own national interests, particularly in Northeast Asia.

It is not certain whether this common denominator among the two global powers is helpful for South Korea’s strategic interests. As it is incredibly difficult for South Korea to reduce the perspective gap between the U.S. and China, South Korea needs to find and expand common interests with the U.S. and China respectively in negotiating with North Korea while increasing cooperation among the three players. This balancing effort between the two superpowers should be one of key strategic guidelines for implementing President Park’s Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula.

Lastly, it should be noted that Americans do not have a clear understanding about what President Park’s Trust-building Process is and how it is different from former policies.  Through the recent Korea-US Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on April 12, the U.S. welcomed the process. Such diplomatic rhetoric does not necessarily mean that the U.S. supports the new initiative under a common approach for the goal of peaceful denuclearization. What the two nations can do together is still to be seen. In a similar vein, the upcoming trilateral Korea-China-Japan summit talks in Seoul would be the first official venue for discussing the initiative among the three leaders together. Some argue that building a trilateral cooperative mechanism among the three nations for the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula might be more challenging than achieving a similar goal among Korea, the U.S., and China.  The reason is that China and Japan do not have significant common ground to cooperate.

President Park Geun-hye faces a tough and challenging deadlock with North Korea. The same is true for North Korea’s leaders. In continuing negotiations with North Korea, the current situation should not been viewed as a matter of ‘strategic patience’, but as a rare chance of ‘taking steps toward paradigm shift.’ Adhering to strategic patience will at best control the escalation of tensions, while not resolving issues with North Korea.

Mr. Jinho Park is a Legislative Aide to South Korean Legislator Jinha Hwang of the ruling Saenuri Party, also a non-resident fellow of Korea Defense & Security Forum (KODEF) in Seoul.

Photo from Joseph A. Ferris III’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

Last week former NBA player Dennis Rodman, along with three members of the Harlem Globetrotters and Vice Media, traveled to North Korea to play and promote basketball as well as hang out with the new North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. On Sunday, Dennis Rodman talked about his trip with George Stephanopoulos on “This Week.” Rodman’s answers in his interview with George Stephanopoulos illustrates that he doesn’t understand the larger picture of U.S.-North Korea relations, and he doesn’t care. His visit and his conveying of messages from Kim Jong Un to President Obama didn’t help the larger picture for U.S. relations with North Korea. Kim Jong Un’s responses to U.S. offers of engagement with missile and nuclear tests effect the relationship more that his love of basketball.

The big news from the interview is that Kim Jong Un supposedly told Dennis Rodman that he would like President Obama to call him. With the U.S.-North Korea relationship in a poor state right now, some in the media and policy world will see this as an opportunity for the U.S. to respond to North Korea. However, this statement from Kim Jong Un via Dennis Rodman could put pressure on the U.S. to do something. There will be a sentiment that North Korea is reaching out to the United States. Yet the main thrust behind the offer is power and politics. North Korean leadership understands that the U.S. and its allies are currently trying to put pressure on the international community to do more against North Korea in response to its nuclear test. The North Korean leadership also understands there are prominent Chinese commentaries questioning China’s relationship with North Korea. By requesting President Obama call him, Kim Jong Un and his leadership team are trying to force the focus on the United States to respond to their overture rather than North Korea stopping its missile and nuclear programs.

In the interview, Dennis Rodman tried to excuse his behavior and that of his “friend” Kim Jong Un by saying everything is about politics. But President Obama knows the real effect of politics with North Korea. He used his political capital, which is part of his power, to try to engage North Korea. Throughout his campaign for president and then after taking office in 2009, President Obama and his team made it clear they would be willing to reach out to problematic leaders of the world if they would unclench their fist. North Korea took its fist and slammed it down on the button to launch a missile four months into President Obama’s presidency and followed it up with a nuclear test.

Risking political capital in an election year, the Obama administration signed a bilateral agreement with North Korea on February 29, 2012 in which the U.S. offered food aid in exchange for a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. Kim Jong Un couldn’t even wait two weeks before announcing a missile test disguised as a satellite launch, and launched it on April 12. Despite breaking the deal, President Obama again said the U.S. would give North Korea an “extended hand.” This came just after he was elected for a second term when he traveled to Burma and while North Korea appeared to be gearing up for another missile launch. Kim Jong Un responded to President Obama’s offer of an extended hand with that rocket test that put a satellite into orbit in December 2012.

Once more, President Obama signaled the possibility for better relations when he stated in his second inaugural address that “engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.”   Kim Jong Un couldn’t even wait a month before having North Korea test a nuclear device. The Obama administration has used some of its political capital to engage North Korea, and North Korea slapped them away. Now, Kim Jong Un wants a phone call.

When asked what he learned about Kim Jong Un, Dennis Rodman said his “friend” loves power and control. As much as Rodman thinks it is a nice gesture, Kim Jong Un hosting him and the Globetrotters and then asking President Obama for a phone call is mainly about power and control, not about actual engagement. The main example was highlighted last month with Eric Schmidt’s visit to North Korea, one month after North Korea tested a rocket. The visit was portrayed to the international community as North Korea trying to open up to the outside world, but internally, the North Korean media barely mentioned the visit. Perhaps they even subtlety bashed Eric Schmidt and Bill Richardson. The propaganda machine would be in full force if the leader of the free world called Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un and the North Korean leadership are using Rodman’s visit and the offer of a phone call to shift the blame to the United States and go unpunished for its own actions of testing a nuclear device.

Dennis Rodman tried to describe his visit as historic. However, his engagement with Kim Jong Un was only small part of a larger and complex relationship between the U.S. and North Korea. George Stephanopoulos was correct in telling Rodman that basketball is just “one tiny bit of common ground.” Small efforts like tourism can in the long run possibly lead to bigger things. Basketball may be a great bridge for connections. Koryo Tours has already led basketball and other sports groups to North Korea, and others will likely try to do so after this visit as well. One possibility would be to have the whole Harlem Globetrotters team go over. However, one basketball game that ended in a tie is not going to immediately open things up. The trip was a small gesture. A phone call from President Obama to a country that threatens U.S. allies and interests in Asia and is getting closer to directly threatening the United States with its most recent rocket and nuclear tests would be a very large step that should not be undertaken. The Obama administration rightly said that North Korea knows how to contact them.

The trip with Dennis Rodman to North Korea was described by Vice co-founder Shane Smith as a “crazy story,” but it should not dramatically affect the overall political relationship between the two sides because Kim Jong Un is are using the trip and the phone call for power and control. The North Korean leadership has to expect potential sanctions and hardening of diplomatic positions after its nuclear test. The visit and phone call request is an attempt to shift the pressure to the United States, hoping that heightened tensions will increase the public pressure on President Obama to respond to its attempted charm offensive. As much as he loves basketball, President Obama should know that lasting engagement is tougher than talking hoops over the phone with Kim Jong Un. President Obama and the United States have offered North Korea real opportunities for engagement, but Kim Jong Un has rejected them.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Storm Crypt’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Adam Cathcart, Roger Cavazos, and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga

No one knows if Kim Jong-un’s favorite films extend into the acerbic oeuvre of Peter Sellers, but the young North Korean dictator’s behavior indicates that he might indeed be taking one such film as inspiration. At various key moments at the end of 2012 and into the new year, the North Korean leadership has seemed determined to imitate the behavior of Slim Pickens at the madcap conclusion of the Cold War film classic Dr. Strangelove, shutting off two-way communications and launching an unexpectedly quick display of armed technological prowess and threatening to do even more.

The Chinese leadership generally fails to appreciate satire, but they have surely noted the wild and Strangelove-esque behavior of their erstwhile socialist ally. Whether it was the North Korean rocket being launched into outer space under the pretext of a “satellite,” or the more recent threat of unbridled nuclear testing and firing successive missiles, hides were chapping in Beijing.

It is still probably too soon to speak of an irrevocable transformation of China’s relationship with the DPRK, but things are clearly not going in the right direction. Chinese scholars are musing to anyone who will listen about the need to cut off the DPRK and prepare for reunification.

Amid all of this tit-for-tat, Chinese leaders are probably most frustrated by some lingering and unavoidable facts: North Korean leaders are missing the real endgame, the DPRK is failing in its charge to keep alive the flame of Beijing’s longer-term plan for the DPRK, and the plan for “reform and opening up” of the border region shared with China is not being focused upon in Pyongyang. The North Koreans are delaying uncomfortable discussions of further economic measures along the border, and failing to engage in meaningful internal economic reforms – China’s real goal.

PERSONALITIES AND DELEGATIONS

What makes us say that the North Koreans are not discussing economic measures with the PRC?  When a high-level Chinese delegation went to Pyongyang on November 29, Jang Song-taek, the co-chairman of the Sinuiju Special Economic Zone (SEZ) (新义州特别经济区 /신의주 특별경제구 ) and the head of a large August delegation to China, was kept studiously away. Instead, Kim Jong-un was accompanied by Kim Ki-nam 金己男 (#3), the aged propagandist, and two less senior but frequent Sino-DPRK interlocutor officials, Kim Yang-gon  金养建 (#15; Jang Song-taek is #19) of the United Front Department and  Kim Song-nam / 金成男 who is a Vice Director  of the International Department (lower than 233). During their meetings, Jang Song-taek maintained a profile as high as Xi Jinping’s during early September 2012.  Jang even missed Li Jianguo making an unfortunate bow to the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il statues.

But this relationship is more than personalities, and it is certainly more important than Kim Jong-un’s “hug diplomacy” with the CCP.  Recent work indicates that Chinese discussions about reform have not emerged from a vacuum; Chinese doubts about the SEZs and the North Korean reform project more generally are deeply rooted in more than a decade of analysis and Chinese domestic policy discussion.

The pre-Kim Jong-un era is an important baseline from which to evaluate China’s North Korea strategy. After all, each element of the Chinese bureaucracy has been brought into closer understanding of the DPRK over a series of years and has an imperfect but indisputably institutional feel for the DPRK. This is distinctly not just about politics and relations of personalities, but more a fabric of bureaucratic (and somewhat predictable) ties and patterns. One of those patterns is North Korea’s recalcitrant acceptance and sometimes outright rejection of Chinese economic ideas and influence—the marketization of the border region.

BEYOND KIM JONG-UN: CHINA’S ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR THE DPRK

Chinese hopes for reform in North Korea are not so much rooted in a desire for Kim Jong-un to start things, but for Kim Jong-un to merely follow through on positive initiatives which had begun back in 2010, or, in some cases, 2002. Indeed, Chinese analysts have been trying to understand and use DPRK’s Joint Venture Law (合营法) to create the basis for more Foreign Direct Investment.

China has pumped about RMB 2.2 billion ($354 million) into just one supporting project, a new bridge to handle what is expected to be new and heavy traffic flows – which also helps out should China ever need to move into North Korea – with businesses that make both sides of the Yalu richer.

Both sides have nominally discussed and agreed to the Economic Zone Act.  The documents and agreements in the act cover the basic economic zone development and economic zone management.  There are also procedures for establishing, registering and operating enterprises, as well as protecting economic activity (but it is unclear who or what they are protecting it from), encouraging preferential policies and outlining complaint and dispute resolution. The law covers basic economic zone investment related matters, and outlines even more detailed, specific requirements.

The preferred industries for the 16.6 square kilometer zones include industry garment processing, producing consumer electronics, modern and efficient agriculture, culture, creativity and even financial services.  The Chinese side in particular hopes major banks will set up branch offices in the zone in order to transfer currencies and allow for foreign remittances of legitimate profits. China even hopes to employ 10-20,000 North Koreans!

However, even in glowing reviews of the SEZs in Sinuiju, there is much left to do. In a long December 3 article focusing on those SEZs, China Economic Weekly called them “an innovative model of international cooperation [that] still needs much work, thought and human talent.” The article went on to catalogue a laundry list of items that had yet to be resolved, including visa issues, banking regulations, and communications.  It’s further worth noting that North Korea’s lifting of the ban on foreign cell phones in Pyongyang was pointedly not extended into Sinuiju and surrounding areas, a virtual necessity if North Korea wants Chinese business partners to be functional in the zone. As with so many things, the grand gesture in the capital obscures recalcitrance toward and distrust of the periphery.

Visits to Dandong and Shenyang by the authors, along with conversations with experts in China, all confirm China’s searing desire to get economic activity geared up in the Liaoning-Korean frontier zone. The moves to set up SEZs in Sinuiju area, it bears recalling, are not Kim Jong-un’s brainchild in the least. He has not associated himself with them in any way, either through juxtaposition in the state media or through on-site inspections.  In the recent Chinese trip to Pyongyang, the SEZs were conspicuously absent in public pronouncements, even after the big October 2012 trade fair in Dandong. Chinese media stories indicate that the silence on this matter was no indication that relevant problems had been solved by Jang Song-taek when he sojourned to the PRC in August 2012.

Looking back at the past decade of Chinese efforts to stimulate and support North Korean economic reforms reveals few success stories. The Chinese Communist Party was not in the least pleased with Pyongyang’s efforts in 2009 to reform its currency. Cui Yan, a scholar from Heilongjiang University saw the move as a radical re-centralization, when an unleashed decentralization and marketization at the small level was precisely what was needed instead. China saw the economics of the situation, but North Korea took the action as a political measure. Small wonder, then, that the CCP media responded to the currency reform by showing off North Korea’s worst side by passing along South Korean media reports about executions in Sinuiju.

CONCLUSION

China wants a strong and stable border and a peaceful peninsula. A North Korea focused on economic development means more security for China and an ally that does not drain so many spoils from China’s coffers. A richer North Korea also helps revitalize China’s Northeast by engaging in two-way trade.  There are any number of areas China would like to see improvement on: building out Sinuiju SEZs, completing the bridge to North Pyong’an, more infrastructure investment in the Rason SEZ, a slight downturn in the monument-building frenzy, strengthening legal and procedural guarantees for foreign investors, a nod to small-market activity, greater regional connectivity, etc. So long as the North Korea discussion continues to rotate around the launching pad and an outstretched empty DPRK hand, China’s border remains unsettled and China’s economic strategy for the DPRK remains gathering dust in Zhongnanhai’s top-shelf and on the banks of the Yalu River.

In Peter Sellers’ black-and-white film, the lone bomber continues over the Arctic toward its enemy, unaware that its mission has been canceled and that a volte-face is in fact possible. Likewise, the men at the cockpit of the North Korean state burgeoning with arms of a military-first policy continue to barrel forward, following the directives of a dead leader. Perhaps China’s pragmatic and self-interested calls for North Korea to return to the unglamorous work of economic construction and reform will be sufficient for them to finally call the mission off.

Adam Cathcart is a Lecturer in Asian history at Queen’s University, Belfast. Roger Cavazos is an Associate at the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga is a dual-degree master’s student at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Peking University.The views expressed here are the authors’ opinions alone.

Image from the photo stream of the United Nation’s Photo on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

North Korea’s decision to launch a satellite in the midst of important regional political transitions underscores its disregard for building better relations with new leaders throughout its neighborhood. Rather than creating a favorable environment for South Korean presidential candidates who had been talking about re-engaging with the DPRK, Pyongyang has slammed the door in South Korea’s face on the eve of critical elections. With high level talks that had been scheduled to take place with Japan recently called off on news of North Korea’s rocket plan, it seems Pyongyang felt that rapprochement with Tokyo could wait. And although China new leadership attempted to dissuade North Korea from going ahead with the launch, Kim Jong Un’s government seemingly isn’t worried about being the cause of Xi Jinping’s first foreign policy crisis.

The timing of today’s rocket launch shows that North Korea’s leadership calculated that immediate internal benefits far outweighed any potential gains from the outreach in 2013 that may have materialized without a launch. Indeed, the prospects for increased engagement, aid, and better regional ties have all now been shunned in favor of actions North Korea’s neighbors other than China view as provocative. Instead, it appears that North Korea was motivated to go ahead with the launch in order to gain from key domestic reasons related to symbolic timing, domestic prestige, and military considerations.

As we know, North Korea’s previous April 2012 launch appeared to be a continuation of Kim Jong-il’s policy to celebrate the 100^th year anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth.  Seemingly, the late Kim had hoped that by putting a satellite into space, Pyongyang would be able to demonstrate to its people that North Korea was indeed becoming a “strong and prosperous” nation. The April launch was an embarrassing failure, so it seems Kim Jong Un was compelled to try again, with this December launch announcement connecting the new attempt to the “true to the behests of leader Kim Jong Il.”  Moreover, commemorating of the 100^th anniversary year of Kim Il Sung’s birth and the one year anniversary of the death of Kim Jong-il with a successful rocket and a satellite in orbit was another bonus for internal sentiment and the legacy of Kim Jong Un as a leader.

KCNA’s reporting on today’s launch also illustrates how domestic motivations were extremely important for North Korea. The internal prestige Kim Jong Un will have garnered through a successful launch is not hard to see, with DPRK media quickly showing dances in Kim Il Sung square and placing ecstatic news presenters on TV to break the news. With the launch being hyped domestically as a major policy success of the regime, it will also very likely help Kim Jong Un consolidate power during his first year as leader.

An additional motivating factor may have been Kim Jong Un’s desire to placate possible military pressure by trying a second launch.  Recent reports indicate numerous military purges have taken place of late in North Korea, with the high profile departures of Ri Yong Ho and Kim Jong-gak suggesting that Kim Jong-un has been working hard to replace foes with individuals he believes can better support his vision and rule.  But because some of these former foes were well respected military officials, Kim may have also used this launch as a means to buy much-need approval and time from an uncertain military.

While North Korea’s satellite success will lead to a number of domestic gains for Kim Jong Un, an external environment that had appeared ready for better relations with North Korea will now change. The apparent success of the rocket launch will increase pressure on the United Nations to think of new ways to punish North Korea’s Security Council Resolution violations while at the same time decreases the chances for any inter-Korean, Japanese, or U.S. based engagement. Those countries could potentially take more unilateral measures against North Korea to punish this action and try to prevent future provocations. North Korea’s assertiveness in launching a rocket despite encouragement not to do so from its most important donor, China, puts focus on Xi Jinping and the new Chinese leadership.  Outcomes from the UN Security Council and China’s own unilateral response will quickly provide evidence to the international community about China’s future relationship with North Korea. Unfortunately, early statements from China and commentary from Xinhua suggests North Korea can continue to count on Chinese support after this launch.

In short, the regional dynamics have changed for the new and incoming leaders. The launch will draw the U.S. and its allies closer together and provide an important common ground that can get South Korea-Japan relations off to a more positive in 2013. The successful launch makes it difficult for Japan to restart the postponed talks with North Korea. The launch indicates North Korea’s willingness to choose internal benefits over outside support with a confidence that it can survive on its own, with some unspoken hope that China’s support will not wane too much, if at all.

Finally, the rocket launch demonstrates that North Korea will disregard international resolutions and interactions with its neighbors despite efforts and opportunities for engagement. These factors indicate 2013 will be even more complicated for the regional players in Northeast Asia courtesy once again of North Korea.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Flickr photo by NOS Nieuws

By Luke Herman

As the Kim Jong Un regime completes its eighth month in power following Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011, there seem to be a number of differences between how this succession is being carried out with how it was carried out in 1994. For one thing, it has proceeded at a much more rapid pace: excluding the December 2011 appearances where KJU visited KJI’s bier, he has made 101 appearances in eight months. By comparison, KJI made 88 appearances total from July 1994 – December 1996 as he went through a three-year mourning period.

This piece will attempt to lay out other differences between the successions, possible reasons for them and prospects going forward. In this article I will lay out the background of each succession, examine which elites were important (using on-the-spot guidance inspection data), as well as examining who rose and who fell (and who died) during the respective periods. In addition, I will take a close look at the reemergence of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) under Kim Jong Un, the growing visibility of the security services and what both could mean going forward.

Background

The Kim Jong Il Succession (1994-1996)

The groundwork for the Kim Jong Il succession was laid for nearly twenty years before he formally took over power. He was first mentioned in the North Korean press in the 1970s, but was referred to as the “party center.” His first true public introduction was in 1980 when he appeared at the Sixth Party Congress and was given a number of important party positions. Eventually, as Kim Il Sung aged and declined in health he began to take over the day-to-day affairs of running North Korea, and became Supreme Commander of the armed forces in 1992. Despite this preparation, the regime was not fully prepared for Kim Il Sung’s sudden death on July 8, 1994. There were eleven days between the death and actual funeral, supposedly to allow for the public to fully express their grief but more likely because the regime needed to figure out exactly what message they wanted to convey.

As Ken Gause discusses in his excellent North Korea under Kim Chong-il, there were two major (but related) splits that Kim Jong Il had to overcome as he took the throne: 1) a generational split between the old revolutionaries that fought alongside KIS in Manchuria and in the Korean War and the newer army officials who KJI had become close to, and 2) a hierarchical split that had existed for a number of years as both KIS and KJI had their own lines of communication and power. Failure to adequately deal with either would likely have doomed KJI. He approached both cautiously, keeping in place much of the old guard while consolidating his own rule through appointments of loyalists at lower levels. After the death of O Jin U, who had been Minister of the People’s Armed Forces for almost two decades, he replaced him with Choe Gwang (at that time Chief of the KPA General Staff), another old timer. However, he replaced Choe with a relative unknown, Kim Yong Chun, who had risen through the ranks rapidly (reportedly after putting down a coup attempt by the VI Corps).

The KJI succession came at a particularly difficult time for North Korea. Though the first nuclear crisis had been peacefully settled with the Agreed Framework, the famine (called the “Arduous March” in North Korea) was just beginning. The Party and State institutions that were responsible for economic decision-making and food distribution essentially stopped functioning effectively. KJI, who preferred to rule through informal networks in any case, therefore turned to the only body that seemed capable of responding – the military. Along with the nuclear crisis, the famine was a major catalyst for the songun (military-first) policy that would eventually take hold.

The Kim Jong Un Succession

The KJU succession began in earnest following KJI’s stroke in August 2008. It was after this point that a large number of reshuffles were carried out in 2009 (notably Ri Yong Ho became Chief of the KPA General Staff at this time) and the younger Kim was reportedly accompanying his father on inspection tours (though he was not publicly identified). His formal introduction to the public came in September 2010 at the Third Party Conference, which was the first major party meeting in 30 years. Though his only party post was as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), he was also named a four-star General and was reported to be working closely with the Ministry of State Security. After this point he appeared frequently with KJI until the latter’s death last December. There was an eleven-day period between his death and the funeral, the same as with Kim Il Sung, and (as many remarked at the time) the funeral ceremony was remarkably similar in style to the KIS funeral.

There are two major differences in how the successions have unfolded. First, the KJU succession is moving at a far advanced pace compared to his father’s. As mentioned before, KJU has already made more public appearances in eight months than his father made in his first two and a half years. Additionally, the mourning period was officially one hundred days as opposed to three years. Finally, KJU acquired the functional equivalent of his father’s titles four months after KJI’s death, and did so through formal means at the Fourth Party Conference in April of this year. KJI, on the other hand, became General Secretary of the WPK in October 1997 by Central Committee and Central Military Committee decree.

Second, and likely related, the regime is facing nothing like the crises that racked the country from 1994-1996. Harsh sanctions remain in place, but the country has adapted and actually experienced modest growth last year. Relations with China are much improved since the mid-1990s and give the regime a buffer against something like the famine reoccurring. Furthermore, the security situation has improved since the regime built a nuclear deterrent to complement its conventional deterrent.

The Elites

This section will detail the elites who appeared with both KJI and KJU most frequently (over 20% of the time) during the post-succession period we are examining. It gives one a good, though not complete by any means, idea of who was being featured prominently at the time, as well as their positions (and any promotions that they received during this time).

 Notes:

–> indicates the elite was promoted from lower rank to higher during this time

KPA = Korean People’s Army

GPB = General Political Bureau

GSD = General Staff Department

CMC = Central Military Commission

NDC = National Defense Commission

Kim Jong Il (July 1994-December 1996)

Out of the 16 most frequent accompaniers, 10 were military and the rest held high-level positions within the WPK. Three things are notable from the table:

1)      Clearly we see the beginning of a shift towards the military, and notably a shift towards the next generation military as opposed to the old revolutionaries. Though KJI was cautious in appointing 1.5 / 2^nd / 3^rd generation military men to the high level positions, nine of his most frequent accompaniers were from this group, while two (Choe Gwang and Ri Ul Sol) were first generation revolutionaries.

2)      The two most frequent accompaniers during this period were the WPK members responsible for propaganda (Kim Ki Nam) and security (Kye Ung Thae), two areas that were critical to a successful succession.

3)      There are no state officials at the top of this list (the first one who is classified as such is Yang Hyong Sop at 19^th most frequent). State officials and institutions, not counting the NDC, were simply not a priority at this point.

Kim Jong Un (January 2012 – July 2012)

As one would expect, the most frequent accompaniers with KJU is more balanced than under his father. Two notable observations:

• These numbers certainly lend more credence to the theory that there is a Jang Song Thaek – Choe Ryong Hae alliance. Choe has also made a number of his own visits since being named Director of the KPA General Political Bureau.
• Two of the top military accompaniers – Ri Yong Ho and Kim Yong Chun –have respectively been removed and demoted. As we all know, Ri was removed in July from all his positions for “illness,” though it is more likely he was purged. Kim Yong Chun was removed from his position as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces and instead became director of the WPK Civil Defense Department – an indication that his stock has dropped significantly. The numbers show a definite shift occurring since May began– before May Ri appeared with KJU 31 times, while Kim appeared 23 times (out of 57 total appearances). The story is drastically different once May began – 4 times for Ri and 4 for Kim Yong Chun (out of 44). By contrast, the splits for Jang and Choe are 32/30 and 24/26 respectively.

Promotions, Purges and Deaths

Promotions

There were a few promotions during the early KJI years, but none were related to party or state institutions; instead, they were all related to the military or security apparatuses. The most important emerged due to O Jin U’s death in February 1995. As mentioned, KJI promoted Choe Gwang from Chief of the KPA General Staff to Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, while Kim Yong Chun went from being a director of logistics in the General Staff Department to Chief of the KPA General Staff. Jo Myong Rok, who would play a major role going forward, was promoted from Commander of the KPA Air Force to Director of the General Political Bureau. Pak Ki So became commander of the important Pyongyang Defense Command. Jang Song U, brother of Jang Song Thaek, became a Deputy Director in the Guards Command (and may have essentially run the Command in place of Ri Ul Sol.) Furthermore, there were a number of promotions in the military ranks handed out by KJI.

By contrast, the promotions under KJU have also included party and state institutions. Thirteen elites were either added to the Politburo or promoted from alternate to full member or alternate to presidium member. Four were added to the NDC and five added or promoted on the CMC. There were also significant promotions in the military / security apparatuses. Kim Won Hong became Minister of State Security, Kim Jong Gak Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Hyon Yong Chol Chief of the KPA General Staff and Choe Ryong Hae Director of the KPA General Political Bureau. There were also, of course, the obligatory orders raising military rank for a number of elites. Again, the main takeaway is that the state and party institutions that languished for many years under KJI have been revitalized since his stroke, and received an additional shot in the arm under KJU.

Purges / Deaths

The first three years of KJI’s rule were relatively free of purges, though some occurred at lower levels in the security agencies. The only major events along these lines were the death of O Jin U in February 1995 and the deaths of Choe Gwang and Kim Kwang Jin in February 1997, as well as the defection of Hwang Jang Yop in the same month.

The same cannot be said for the first few months of KJU’s tenure. There have been no major deaths within the regime like KJI faced, but quite a few members have been publicly and privately removed. Most important was the aforementioned Ri Yong Ho, but April also saw the removal of a number of Politburo members (both full and alternate). This includes: Jon Pyong Ho (Secretary of the Politburo), Pyon Yong Rip (SPA Chairman), Ri Thae Nam (Vice Premier), and Kim Rak Hui (Vice Premier). Thae Jong Su, who was previously a member of the Secretariat and Director of the General Affairs Department was demoted to Chief Secretary of the South Hamgyong Province and likely lost his Politburo spot (unconfirmed as of right now). U Tong Chuk, who was (is?) First Vice Director of State Security was also removed from the Politburo, NDC and CMC; however, it remains unclear if he was purged, fell ill or is still in power but had his institutional roles taken over by Kim Wong Hong who is now head of MSS.

The Rise of the WPK

The major story of Kim Jong Un’s first eight months in power is the re-emergence of the WPK. Below is a comparison of elite appearances made during the periods under examination (for Kim Jong Il July 12, 1994 – December 31, 1996, for Kim Jong Un January 1, 2012 until July 25, 2012.) I made a list of every elite who appeared with KJI and KJU during their respective periods, assigned each elite to a particular category (party, military / security, state or provincial), and then tallied the total number of appearances each elite in that particular category made. The percentage is derived from dividing the category number by the total number.

The numbers below show that military figures appeared However, as Stephan Haggard and I have pointed out, classifying elites under Kim Jong Un is not quite as simple as it used to be, especially when it comes to the military. There are a number of elites given military rankings – up to Vice Marshal – who have no real military background, but are essentially civilians in military clothing. As can be seen in the figure below, there is a major difference in the story the data tells based on how one classifies. If one classifies based purely on holding a military ranking, it seems like the military has actually gained prominence under KJU.[1] But if we classify more accurately, it is clear that party members – based on public appearances – are appearing more frequently with KJU (though not by a large percentage).

The evidence gets stronger once we break the KJU numbers down by month as shown in Figure 2. The party and military actually track fairly closely – right up until the beginning of May, at which point we see a huge divergence. Following the April 2012 Party Conference, Aidan Foster-Carter wrote that Choe Ryong Hae’s appointment as Director of the KPA General Political Bureau was “a bid to reassert Party control over a military which under Kim Jong Il rather ruled the roost.” This data gives credence to that idea. Paired with the fact that two of the most influential military men, Ri Yong Ho and Kim Yong Chun, were either removed or demoted as well, there definitely seems to be a pattern emerging.

For comparison purposes, we can look at a breakdown of Kim Jong Il’s appearances (note: due to the more spread out nature of his appearances, these are done by half-years instead of months). This breakdown also fits in well with what we now know about the military’s rise, though admittedly it bounces around much more.

Emergence of the Security Services

Another thing that differentiates the KJI and KJU successions is the greater public prominence of the security services, namely the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Minister of People’s Security (MPS), Guard Command (GC) and Military Security Command (MSC) (the Korean People’s Internal Security Force, which is a part of the MPS, has also been fairly prominent). For a great overview of the history and mission of each of these agencies see Ken Gause’s piece at HRNK.

The below graph compares security members based on the percentage they appeared (out of total elite appearances). It also shows what percentage of the military / security category figure they made up. (Kim Jong Il’s numbers are in blue, Kim Jong Un’s in red)

The heads of these security organizations have also been well-placed in the relevant party and state institutions.

(MSS – Political Bureau)Ri Myong Su (MPS) Ri Pyong Sam (KPISF)

Total = 14%

Total = 16%

Total = 17%

It should also be pointed out that Jang Song Thaek, who oversees party control of these organizations through his position as Director of the Administration Department, sits on all three institutions.

How does this fit into a shift towards greater party control and a shift away from the military-first policy? Because the security organizations will all play an essential role in ensuring the military does not become a source of dissent. They may also see a chance to increase their own stature, especially as money that was once allocated specifically to the military is freed up.

Conclusion

Given the preceding paragraphs, it’s fairly clear that the KJU succession has been undertaken in a far different way from his father’s. While most analysts were skeptical that an untested 28 (or 29) year old could successfully take control, from the outside (an important qualifier when talking about North Korea) it seems like he has successfully begun the process of consolidating power. He was aided in this process greatly by the security and economic situation, both of which were not nearly as tumultuous as when his father took over. Another overlooked aspect is that many of the same people running this succession were around for the last one, including Kim Ki Nam (propaganda), Kim Kyong Hui and Jang Song Thaek, It seems likely that they learned a great deal from their previous experience and have used that to their advantage in carrying out this succession. The result has been far smoother than anyone expected. However, whether or not this “smoothness” can translate into meaningful change within the country is anyone’s guess.

Sources:

Gause, Kenneth E. Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of the North Korean Police State.  Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012.

Gause, Kenneth E. . North Korea under Kim Chong-Il: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change.  Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International 2011.

Kim, Insoo, and Min Yong Lee. “Predictors of Kim Jong-Il’s on-the-Spot Guidance under Military-First Politics.” North Korean Review 8, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 93-104.

North Korea Leadership Watch. www.nkleadershipwatch.com

Korean Institute for National Unification. Kim Jong Il Hyunjijido Donghyang 1994-2011

(Analysis of Kim Jong Il’

Ministry of Unification. http://unibook.unikorea.go.kr/?sub_num=54&sty=I&ste=%A4%A1.

By Nick Miller

Main Actors within North Korea Decision Making

North Korea’s political structure is a set of institutions built to sustain the Kim family. The Korean Worker’s Party (WKP) and other state agencies were designed by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to be used to play rivals off one another and assist him in consolidating elites under him. The four key powers within North Korea are as follows:

• The KWP apparatus;
• The military and security apparatus;
• The Kim family patronage system; and,
• The Kim family.

Factionalism within North Korean Politics

Kim Il-sung removed the major factors that served as direct challenges to his rule: the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions in the 1950s. In 1991/1992 there was a possible coup against Kim Jong-il’s time by the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces and generals who sought to overthrow the North Korean leadership over the economic hardships that the country was experiencing.

Conservatives vs. Liberals

Over the summer of 2012 Western analysts thought the removal of Ri Yong-ho, one of the strongest defenders of the Military First policy, was a sign that there was a power struggle between the military versus reformers. Factionalism in North Korea is more focused, according to Ken Gause, on ensuring influence for the Supreme Leader, the Suryong, rather than attempting to remove him from power. The removal of Ri Yong-ho showed Pyongyang watchers that there were challenges within the North Korean elites over what direction Kim Jong-un should take the country.

Collective Leadership

North Korea is run as a one-party dictatorship run through the Suryong. As Kim Jong-un is still too inexperienced to rule a collective leadership was created to help manage North Korea with Kim Jong-un as regent.

Kim Jong-un

As Kim Jong-un is a young and untested ruler he has to rely upon the security apparatus and elites his father elevated. Kim Jong-il entrusted Jang Song-taek and Kim Kyong-hui to act as his political guardians. In Kim Jong-un’s first public speech he stated that the people did not need “tighten their belts” which is possibly a coded phrase insinuating that there will be a shift away from military-first policy. The removal of Ri Yong-ho was one of the first major signs that there was a shift occurring away from military dominance over the political process

Jang Song-taek and Kim Kyong-hui

Jang Song Taek and Kim Kyong-hui serve as the guardians for Kim Jong-un. North Korean watchers believe that Jang Song-taek is a reformer and one of the strongest supporters of Chinese style reform. He was purged in the early 2000s for his support of Kim Jong-un’s disgraced older half-brother Kim Jong-nam. Jang Song-taek has been able to re-affirm his control over North Korean politics and back into Kim Jong-il’s graces by affirming his support the regency of Kim Jong-un. Jang Song-taek trip to China in August 2012 is believed to have served as a likely preclude to Kim Jong-un first official state visit after he assumed control over North Korea. Jang is believed to be the official organizing the expansion of the state economic zones (SEZs) ventures with China.

Kim Kyung-hui is Kim Jong-il’s sister and one of his closest advisors. After the elder Kim’s death in December of 2011 she was critical in maintaining stability within North Korean regime. She was elevated to General of the KPA in 2010 despite never serving in the military, a Secretary in the Organization of the WPK, and director of the WPK Light Industry Department. As she is the daughter of Ki Il-Sung she serves as an important linchpin to the North Korean political system as it needs a Kim family member to keep the system running and the elites supporting Kim Jong-un. There have been reports of Kim Kyung-hui’s failing health due to alcohol consumption. Whether the rumors are true and what impact will it have on Jang Song-taek’s ability to initiate economic reforms remains to be seen.

O Kuk-ryol

O Kuk-ryol serves as the Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission and his family has been supporting the Kim family since the founding of the country. General O served as Kim Jong-il’s intelligence managers and advisers. He is considered one of the more powerful figures within North Korean politics. In 2011 there were reports in The Chosun Ilbo that his protégés were purged because of the influence he held during Kim Jong-il’s reign. General O served as one of the top leaders to plan Kim Jong-il’s funeral and assisted in the succession process. He has also been identified by the U.S. government as one of the key members involved in North Korea’s counterfeiting activities. Kim Jong –un needs General O’s support because of his influence on the KPA. He could also be a counterweight, as Ken Gause contends, to Jang Song-taek and whether General O will be purged by the end of 2012 like Ri Yong-ho as Kim Jong-un removes further old guard members remains a possibility.

Kim Jong-un’s Collective Leadership

Government Agencies

Worker’s Party of Korea (WKP)

The National Party Congress is the supreme party organ and approves the reports for the party organs, adopts party policy and tactics, and elects members to the KWP Central Committee and Central Auditing Committee. When the National Party Congress is not in session the Central Committee acts as the official agent of the Party. The Central Committee meets once every six months and is responsible for the election of the Party General Secretary, members of the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, and Central Military Commission. Kim Jong-Il shifted power away from KWP towards the Korean People’s Army (KPA) with the military-first policy. The military took over numerous positions within Politburo and Secretariat and WKP influence was significantly weakened during Kim Jong-il’s reign.

National Defense Commission (NDC)

The NDC houses the elites that hold influence within North Korean politics. Officials within the NDC also have leadership roles within Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces, KWP, and intelligence and security agencies. The NDC membership is comprised of ten individuals of which eight hold military rank. The military members of the NDC are also members of the Central Military Commission. This concentration of elites across agencies allowed Kim Jong-il to main control over the government and flow of information.

Kim Jong-il elevated the NDC in 1998 to serve as a powerful power-holding group and expanded his Military-First doctrine that gave enormous influence to the KPA. Under Kim Il-sung the armed forces was controlled via the KWP but after the power restructuring Kim Jong-Il ensured he had direct control over the military and had a forum to discuss and manage the pressing issues facing the country.

DPRK Power Structure that Shapes Foreign Policy

Central Military Committee (CMC)

This is the highest-level KWP organization that is involved directly with shaping military policy. The CMC leaders also hold positions within NDC and headed by Kim Jong-il till his death in 2011. After restructuring the CMC’s influence over the direction of military policy became negligible. While in some ways its role over the military has lessened it still holds some important sway over coordinating the party line on military policy with the Central Committee. The CMC facilitates the KWP role in managing defense responsibilities especially over military procurements.

Korean People’s Army (KPA)

In order to control the direction of North Korean politics one must have the loyalty of the military. During Kim Jong-il’s reign the Military-First policy elevated the influence of the military on North Korean politics. The KPA holds some of the strongest influence on North Korean politics today. It is also the only group that could in theory challenge the rule of Kim family, if they desired to do so. The military has over 1.1 million troops and consumes over 15.5% of the nation’s GDP.

Nick Miller received his M.A. in International Relations from Flinders University, Australia. He writes on Chinese-North Korean issues at sinonk.com.

Photo from Radio Nederland Wereldomroep’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

Initial KCNA and other reports about the September 25, 2012 Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) meeting indicate North Korea has made no public announcement on economic or agricultural reforms as anticipated by numerous press articles and North Korea watchers. Proclamations following the meeting emphasized changes to North Korea’s education system. Thus, those that were hoping to add some statements on economic changes from the SPA to previous indications of North Korea trying to reform will be left with speculation and waiting to see if North Korea will really attempt the reforms needed to change its situation.

Leading up to the meeting, there were many articles predicting economic reforms would take place. Some suggestions were that farm units would now be able to keep more of their yield, a size reduction of those farm units, and possible changes to market mechanism laws in the Special Economic Zones. However, only changes to North Korea’s educational programs were reported as outcomes of the SPA.

Theoretically, members of the Supreme People’s Assembly could have discussed economic reforms or adjustments and just not have placed those conversations in KCNA. Previous reforms were not delivered through the press. The North Korean leadership probably wants to leave itself some flexibility with reform implementation. Furthermore, some experts suggest that North Korea has already undertaken some of the reforms predicted for public announcement, like reducing the number of people that make up a collective farm unit. If North Korea has already started the reforms, then the government might feel that it is unnecessary to announce them, and the SPA could just talk about the early stages of those programs. A final possibility suggested for the lack of announcement on economic adjustments could be a desire by the North Korean leadership to keep instructions on new policies within the Korean Worker’s Party, and have those policies be passed down through the party to the people’s and cooperative farms’ committees. If so, this would be another indication that outside analysts would only learn about the implementation of the reforms from those inside North Korea or reports from defectors.

Yet no public announcement could leave the North Korean people unsure of Pyongyang’s actual support for the various reform measures, which would create an environment where new policies are not fully implemented because of the uncertainty of backing from the top. Moreover, no public press on these adjustments reduces the entry points for help and engagement from the outside world. Plus, statements on reforms are signposts for outside nations to determine North Korea’s willingness to change.

So without any announcement for the anticipated economic changes, the reports from the Supreme People’s Assembly were centered on education reform. North Korea will now try to increase compulsory education from 11 to 12 years. The policies pushed for increases in the budget for education, more electricity and power for schools, and better materials for students.

While improving the education system helps provide a more qualified workforce for an economy in the future, these initial announcements from the Supreme People’s Assembly were disappointing for those looking for statements to include references to economic reform. Analysts will still have to work with statements from defectors, anecdotes from those visiting North Korea, and stories from those governments that have diplomatic relations with Pyongyang to decipher if changes are actually taking place. Secrecy may help the North Korean government control and monitor the unannounced reforms, but it will not increase the confidence of a skeptical outside world waiting to see if these reforms will be any different from previous attempts.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from comradeanatolii’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Jinho Park

The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun-Tzu warns,

“He who knows the enemy and himself will never in a hundred battles be at risk; He who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes win and sometimes lose; He who know neither the enemy nor himself will be at risk in every battle.”

It is unclear how well South Korea knows North Korea. Particularly after Kim, Jong-un became the new leader, policy-makers and academics are having diverse discussions about the nature of his leadership and how North Korea will change.  At this moment, it is hard to expect how Mr. Kim is likely to craft his own leadership style: rather, our attention is focused on how different Mr. Kim’s leadership will be from his father and grandfather.

The death of Kim, Jong-Il seems to be neither a surprise nor a crisis to South Korea, rather it provides a new opportunity to develop a fresh strategic approach to North Korea’s new leader. But in order to exploit this opportunity, South Korea must refresh its understandings of North Korea and correct its misunderstandings as well.

Misinterpretation of North Korea will not necessarily cause a policy failure, but it does seriously impede us from knowing how to influence North Korea’s strategy and from learning the right lessons through our experiences with North Korea.

The first misunderstanding is our understanding of engagement policy towards North Korea.

It is widely viewed that the principle of South Korea’s strategy in dealing with North Korea is rooted in a policy of engagement. However, the effectiveness of engagement is very limited. North Korea’s interests often do not align with the outlines of South Korea’s engagement policy and North Korea has often failed to move in tandem with South Korea to enhance the prospects of progress. What makes the failure of engagement policy worse is that North Korea usually stops its diplomatic dialogue and reacts with military and non-military provocations under its self-defined excuse of blaming South Korea.

Despite these pitfalls of engaging with North Korea, South Korea and the United States are often blind to them for political reasons. For instance, when looking at North Korea’s violation of the February 29th agreement, the United States and North Korea hold a different understanding of the agreement, particularly about the test of long-range missile by North Korea. In this respect, the U.S. negotiators were blamed not for being explicit in what is prohibited in terms of missile launches in this first agreement with North Korea’s new leader.

However, abandoning engagement with North Korea is not a good option because there is no other alternate strategy and political leaders in South Korea and the United States often politicize North Korean issues for diverse political reasons.  Although the influence of North Korean issues on domestic politics in the two nations varies significantly across time and situations, it is unavoidable particularly when there are major political events such as an election. In addition, the success of engagement with North Korea depends on two main variables; continuity and consistency.

The most prominent engagement effort with Pyongyang is the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear development program. In terms of continuity, the other five members have strongly requested North Korea return to the table; however, North Korea seems to have lost strategic interest in the talks. Moreover, it prefers to hold bilateral talks with the United States, then moving to the Six-Party Talks if necessary.

Consistency in the Six-Party Talks is much more flawed. The final goal of de-nuclearizing North Korea is not in dispute among any of the member states of the Six-Party Talks, besides North Korea. There are, however, different opinions on how to reach the final goal, and sometimes what should be done prior to achieving the final goal. In fact, de-nuclearizing North Korea is an important goal for which much effort will be required. The parties of the Six-Party Talks, however, sometimes seem to be more concerned about negotiating side issues, such as long-range missiles and the return of Japanese kidnap victims, within the Six-Party Talks framework than de-nuclearization.

In a recent revision of North Korea’s constitution, North Korea declared itself a nuclear state, clearly demonstrating to its people and the international community that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons. Under this situation, some experts turn their attention to how to manage North Korea’s nuclear challenge rather than dismantling it. However, managing a nuclear development program is like crossing a bridge of no return—no further discussion of denuclearization—and giving North Korea more opportunities and time to decrease the costs of continuing its nuclear development program.

The second misunderstanding is wishful thinking that by demonstrating both costs and benefits, the parties of the Six Party Talks can convince North Korea to cooperate.

Benefits come when North Korea’s actions meet international demands, and costs come when North Korea’s actions do not meet international demands. Although Pyongyang fully understands this simple logic, North Korea has conducted provocation without hesitation when the leadership thinks it necessary, even an act of war such as a torpedo-attack on South Korea’s naval ship and artillery attacks on South Korea’s territory killing two civilians in 2010. What motivates North Korea to take brinkmanship is its own strategic calculation; achieving significant benefits while suffering little in the way of costs because of a lack of ROK and U.S. will.

South Korea and the U.S. are required to diversify strategic approaches to North Korea to convince it that achieving our objectives also meets its needs. At the same time, we need to draw a clear line between what is acceptable and not acceptable to us. For example, the provision of humanitarian assistance to North Korea is, on one hand, a good means to keep North Korea open to work with the international community, and on the other hand, a good carrot for the North Korean leader to provide for his starving people.

In addition, South Korea needs to explore new means of using its strategic competitiveness, including the use of its economic power. These new means could be worked together with the international efforts. South Korea could take a new initiative to establish another industrial complex in either South Korea or North Korea and encourage foreign companies to invest and join.

While employing diverse strategic approaches to North Korea, it is of great importance to communicate with North Korean people about South Korea’s intention and will. The message to North Koreans should be focused on “we are not their enemy.” North Korea will try to counter this psychological message by reinforcing its domestic security system for controlling public unrest and strengthening cohesiveness of government officials. These responses from North Korea prove indirectly the effectiveness of such a psychological message. Sending balloons containing leaflets and CDs denouncing North Korean leader is not very effective in that the critical essence of the psychological message is “who sends the message and the credibility of the message.” Unlike a message in the balloons by a group of anti-North Korea people in Korea, a message from the South Korean government—even if its rhetoric is somewhat ambiguous—would have a significant impact on the mind-set and views of the North Korean elites and public.

The third misunderstanding comes from our expectation about China’s role in resolving North Korean issues.

Many experts point out that China’s support of North Korea is the main factor in weakening the effectiveness of international sanctions against North Korea. From Beijing’s strategic perspective, it is uncertain whether China has strategic leverage to use against North Korea. Even if China possesses strong measures to pressure North Korea to change its activities, it would not be willing to use these measures because North Korea’s response is unpredictable. Unless North Korea moves as China intends, China will face a serious strategic difficulty requiring a paradigm change in its strategy toward the Korean Peninsula. Although North Korea and China have maintained an alliance relationship since the end of the Korean War, Pyongyang is not willing to sacrifice its national interests for China.

To draw a constructive and responsible role from China in resolving North Korea’s issues, it is often said that the United States needs to strengthen its partnership with regional countries in Asia and promote a cooperative and multidimensional relationship with China. If these approaches go as the U.S. plans, interdependence between the United States and China would become much deeper and broader. Under this complex interdependent relationship between the United States and China, Beijing would be forced to pay a bigger cost than now when in a diplomatic conflict with the United States or other regional countries. On the other hand, the United States would be in the same situation. And, China now does not seem to be willing to pressure North Korea to dismantle its nuclear development program in the near future, but rather is trying to manage the progress of the program and stop a further nuclear weapons test; in other words, continuing the status-quo on the Korean Peninsula.

With an existing possibility of leadership-style change and attendant political, social, economic crisis, it is much harder to expect the effectiveness of sanctions or punishments by China on North Korea than when Kim, Jong-Il was in power. For these reasons, China is much more cautious about applying pressure on North Korea under the new leader. It takes time for China to draw up a set of policies to be applicable to North Korea. As economic cooperation between North Korea and China is strengthened and expanded, a risk-taking decision by China in regards to North Korea is increasingly unlikely to occur.

Lastly, I would like to point out that while the United States makes its prudent and multilayered efforts to shift its defense and diplomatic policy to Asia, Secretary Hillary Clinton claims in her contribution to Foreign Policy (November/2011):

“One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region.”

It is expected that the United States and China will be in a much more complex strategic game than ever before. And, as one of key components of U.S. strategy in Asia is to strengthen and adapt its traditional partnership with regional countries to changing environments in the region, regional countries will encounter a strategic dilemma of balancing their diplomatic distance between the United States and China, although not choosing one of them. Although regional countries look the United States to play a greater leadership in the region, unlike the Cold-War era, the United States will not allow regional countries to free-ride on U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region. This potential phenomenon will be another challenging issue for regional countries. After all, uncertainty in regional politics is likely to increase. What this challenging environment in the region implies for South Korean efforts in dealing with North Korea remains to be seen.

Mr. Jinho Park is a Legislative Aide to South Korean Legislator Jinha Hwang of the ruling Saenuri Party, also a non-resident fellow of Korea Defense & Security Forum (KODEF) in Seoul.

Photo from AK Rockefeller’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

The surprise news to start the week is that Vice Marshall Ri Yong Ho, chief of the general staff of North Korea’s army as well as a member of the Political Bureau and the Central Military Commission, was relieved of all his positions due to “illness.” During the last year of Kim Jong-il’s life, Ri Yong Ho was seen as a key advisor to Kim Jong-un during the transition. Following the death of Kim Jong-il, Ri Yong Ho was a leader to watch as he appeared to be a close confidant and guardian for Kim Jong-un in his new role as leader of North Korea. Now, as with almost all of the leadership moves that occur during this initial transition phase under Kim Jong-un, the removal of Ri Yong Ho will be analyzed and scrutinized to better understand the leadership style of Kim Jong-un, the actual power players in the new regime, and the role of the military.

Many decisions coming from Pyongyang often bring about more questions than answers; this news is no different. With Ri Yong Ho having now been removed, the critical questions will be how Kim Jong-un and key leaders in the regime will control the military and where will Kim Jong-un gets his military advice?  These questions will play a crucial role in future North Korean interaction with its neighbors and the United States.

The statement from KCNA about Ri Yong Ho being relieved of his duties due to illness initially suggests a purge. If so, it is likely he had fallen out of favor. Evidence to support this theory would be that he did not get many new positions in April during the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and National Defense Commission (NDC) meetings.

Vice Marshall Ri being purged because of corruption could also be a possibility. The North Korean Leadership Watch blog notes that “illness” “can be a party center euphemism for insubordination or corruption.” Being at the axis of three important power bases in the military, the Party’s Central Military Commission, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, would provide Ri Yong Ho quality access, influence, and power where corruption, or damaging high-profile corruption, could be a temptation.

Lastly, though less likely, “illness” could simply mean illness. North Korea Leadership Watch again noticed Ri Yong Ho looking like his health was declining and making fewer public appearances.  Although 70 is not that old by North Korean leadership standards, the overall average age of North Korean leaders has been declining since 2008; therefore, there could still be a slight possibility Ri Yong Ho is actually sick, or it is time for him to retire.

Yet a purge is still the most likely scenario. Ri was on the opposite side of Kim Jong-il’s hearse from Kim Jong-un and was viewed as an advisor for the young leader. His sudden removal could signal trouble in the transition or an acceptable switch to a new group of leaders.

One of the suggestions is that Ri Yong Ho wasn’t in favor of deploying military resources for infrastructure projects. Interestingly, the very next article on the KCNA website is about Kim Jong-un sending a message of thanks to a unit of North Korea’s internal security forces for working on construction projects. The article also described Kim Jong-un as “Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army,” as opposed to the previous article about Kim Jong-un visiting a kindergarten, where the title used for him is “first secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea.” A July 14 KCNA article describes Kim Jong-un having his photo taken with “exemplary soldiers of the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces who performed labor feats in major construction projects.” Ri Yong Ho was not listed among the other leaders present.

If it is a purge, Ri Yong Ho’s removal because of disagreement over the proper use of military troops or any other policy will be felt internally. Externally, the removal of Ri Yong Ho for whatever reason also creates a question of where Kim Jong-un will get his military advice. An answer will likely emerge from North Korea’s relationship with South Korea and the United States, especially as the two countries move into the heated final stretch of their respective presidential campaign seasons.

Provocations from North Korea during this transition time have been a concern for both the U.S. and South Korea, especially while the prospect of a nuclear test continues to linger after the failed missile launch. Without Ri Yong Ho’s military advice, which leader with actual military experience, not just being given the title of general, will Kim Jong-un turn to? Will his new group of advisors be able to properly calculate threats and provocations with South Korea and avoid mishandling a potentially stronger response from South Korea to a major attack on its soil or interests? However, internally, we will have to wait to see the impact of his removal. Ri Yong Ho’s “illness” has made Kim Jong-un’s transition even more interesting, and once again, has left us with more questions than answers on North Korea.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.