By Nicholas Hamisevicz

A year of transitions finishes in historic fashion as South Korea elects Park Geun-hye as its first female president. Her election capped off a series of democratic presidential elections that featured nicely at the beginning and end of this year of transitions, leading off with Ma Ying-jeou winning reelection in Taiwan. Yet North Korea still tried to garner all of the attention. Kim Jong-il’s death in late December 2011 and the rocket launch this December briefly took headlines away from these important elections. Despite these North Korean events, much of the focus will turn to the new leader in South Korea. While Park Geun-hye will still have to deal with North Korea and relations in the region, she will also have a heavy domestic agenda that will be vital for the future of South Korea. Her ability to handle North Korea relations while working toward solutions to domestic issues will determine the rest of her legacy in the Blue House beyond being South Korea’s first female president.

While there is no polling data yet on the impact of the North Korean rocket launch or the effect of important voter concerns on the election, relations with North Korea were likely seen as an issue during the election, not the issue. There were increasing sentiments in South Korea that Lee Myung-bak’s policy was not working. Both Moon Jae-in, the progressive candidate, and the conservative Park Geun-hye, offered ideas on reengaging North Korea. Some of Park’s ideas during the campaign for reaching out to North Korea consisted of humanitarian aid, resuming family visits, diplomatic, and social exchanges, and expanding Kaesong. These possibilities for dealing with North Korea would all fall under her trustpolitik policy toward North Korea. While still vaguely defined, the recent North Korean rocket launch will probably force Park Geun-hye to emphasize the trust part of the trustpolitik early in her administration.

A more cautious approach toward North Korea will help U.S.-South Korea relations remain positive and allow for the U.S. to be more prepared for South Korea’s engagement process with North Korea. The U.S. would like to follow South Korea’s lead with inter-Korean relations, and appear in coordination with its ally. Ideas like restarting humanitarian aid to North Korea or expanding Kaesong are politically feasible for support in both South Korea and the United States.

Even with all of these issues connected with North Korea, Park Geun-hye has an ambitious domestic agenda as well. Chaebol reform, rising education costs, an increasing unemployment rate, and creating greater economic gains throughout Korean society were all important campaign topics. Many of these issues fall under the rubric of “economic democratization,” key buzzwords during this election and involving the idea of closing the gap between rich and poor in Korea and making sure all Koreans can gain from its overall economic success. Moreover, a demographic challenge will also require Park to find ways to address some of these issues quickly as well as hope the interconnections in many of these problems also permeate through many of the solutions.

With pressure to fix the domestic economy and South Koreans’ individual welfare along with a desire to see improved relations with North Korea, Japan, and China, all while not ruining the current positive U.S.-Korea relationship, Park Geun-hye will have to work quickly on both fronts to have a chance of succeeding. Opportunities are there for both South Korean domestic and international success.  All South Korean presidents have to navigate a potentially turbulent Northeast Asia while solving domestic problems. Yet the emphasis and importance placed on Korea because of an Asia-Pacific century, the expectations for a Global Korea, uncertainty over the future of North Korea as well as U.S.-China relations, and the need for continued economic success only increases the difficulty and necessity for a impactful Park Geun-hye administration for the future of South Korea.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Below are the key findings from the surveys conducted by Research and Research in November and December. Where applicable, dates the survey was conducted are in brackets.

The presidential race between Park Geun-Hye and Moon Jae-In remained tight. As of December 12, 43.4% support Park, while 41.9% support Moon.

Following Ahn Cheol-Soo’s exit from the race, 38.5% stated it would be advantageous for Moon Jae-In, while 33.5% said it would benefit Park Geun-Hye. [Nov. 24-26]

44.8% cited Park Geun-Hye as being more capable of handling relations with North Korea. 40.6% cited Moon Jae-In. [Nov. 30-Dec. 2]

Regarding the announcement by North Korea on December 1 of a planned long range missile launch, 25.4% stated that this would be advantageous for Park Geun-Hye. 9.4% stated it would help Moon. 48.5% said it would have no influence. [Dec. 3–5]

While 48.6% said that this election would be a referendum on the administration of Lee Myung-Bak, 43.3% said it would not. [Dec. 3–5]

55.1% expected Park Geun-Hye to win the election. 25.0% expected Moon to win. [Dec. 9–11]

The sample size of the survey was 1,000 respondents over the age of 19. The margin of error is ±3.1% at the 95% confidence level. The survey was conducted by the Research & Research. It employed the Random Digit Dialing method for mobile and landline telephones.

Note: Due to election law in Korea, the last results that can legally be released are those from on or before December 12. Polling will continue, but those results are embargoed until after the election.

Also, results presented for December 12 should not be interpreted as fully accounting for the North Korean missile launch. Only one-third of the sample was collected on that day. While this sample was likely aware of the launch, the other two-thirds of the sample was collected in the two days prior.

Long-Range Missile Diplomacy

For those who follow the Korean Peninsula closely, South Korean elections and North Korean provocations seemingly go hand-in-hand. While North Korea has railed against the potential election of Ms. Park, conventional wisdom holds that provocations benefit the conservative party. Thus, debate remains on which benefits North Korea more—a liberal
administration willing to provide unconditional food and economic aid or a conservative administration that provides in with important internal legitimization. But the more immediate question is if North Korea’s reportedly successful missile launch will have any effect on the South Korean presidential election.

While an announced, and failed, launch is a known variable in terms of South Korean public opinion, a successful launch remains an unknown. However, the best reading of the data suggests that the launch will not have a strong impact on the election. There is some recent history to back this up. Just a day prior to the National Assembly elections in April, headlines hit the papers that North Korea was ready to launch a long range missile. Of course, the
conservative Saenuri party went on to unexpectedly win that election. However, connecting one to the other is spurious at best. First, as the March edition of this report noted, the Saenuri Party was clearly surging before the announcement of the rocket launch and the Democratic United Party (DUP) made several strategic blunders during the campaign. Second, in a survey conducted by the Asan Institute immediately following the National Assembly election only 6.1% cited the pending North Korean missile launch as the issue which decided their vote. Of course, it could be argued that because the Blue House, and not the National Assembly, sets North Korea policy the most recent launch will have a much larger impact.

There are two strong arguments that this will not be the case. First, the Korean public’s opinion on which candidate is most capable of handling North Korea relations is split—44.8% cite Park Geun-Hye as most capable, 40.6% cite Moon Jae-In.1 This is roughly in line with the spread from the previous time this question was asked in late October. In that survey, 40.9% cited Park versus 35.5% for Moon. 2 (10.0% cited Ahn Cheol-Soo.) It appears that respondents have already decided which candidate’s North Korea policy they prefer and a non-lethal missile launch may harden those positions rather than causing voters to switch.

Second, following the announcement of the launch on December 1 there was no evidence of a shift in candidate support. Support for Ms. Park remained largely flat from December 4—the first day when the North’s announcement would have been fully accounted for in the data. However, a significant rise for Moon Jae-In coincides with the launch announcement, but such a connection is speculative. Thus, the effect of the announcement on the presidential polls is unclear but likely negligible.

Regarding the effect of the actual launch, there is little data to go on, and its interpretation should be done carefully. On December 12, 337 respondents participated in the survey— approximately one-third of the full sample. (One-third participated on December 11 and onethird on December 10.) Because the launch occurred before 10am, it is likely that this group of respondents was aware of the missile launch. However, there was no surge in support among this group for Park Geun-Hye. While support did rise slightly (2.7pp from the previous day’s respondents), it was within the margin of error. Moreover, Moon Jae-In also saw a slight rise in support among this group as compared with the previous day. Again, this is not a full sample, but it does suggest that there will not be a strong impact from the North
Korean launch.

If there is to be a shift, it is most likely to come from voters in their 20s. One of the most consistent results in Asan surveys is that this cohort is decidedly security conservative. When it comes to issues related to North Korea, they identify much more with Koreans in their 60s than with those in their 30s or 40s. On which candidate is best able to handle North Korea relations, 48.3% cited Ms. Park—14.7pp higher than those in their thirties and 10.8pp higher
than those in their forties. However, since December 4 there has been no consistent upswing for Ms. Park (Figure 2). While she did gain 8.4pp from December 4 to December 7, those gains were erased by December 11. While there was a 3.7pp gain for Ms. Park from December 11 to December 12 the driver of that gain is not clear nor is such a gain unusual for her among this cohort.

The Final Count Down

The timing of the North Korean missile launch has now overshadowed what might actually be the most important event of the campaign—Ahn Cheol-Soo’s exit from the race. Unable to come to terms on how to best decide a unified progressive candidate, Dr. Ahn unilaterally withdrew from the race on November 23. This was certainly not an ideal situation for either Ms. Park or Mr. Moon. Park would have preferred that both candidates remained, creating a
three-way race which she would have easily won. For Moon, the result was even more unsatisfactory. Even though he became the unified candidate, the unification process was not perceived to be based on consent between the two candidates but rather a failure of negotiations.

The less than harmonious unification process may have led some Ahn supporters to refuse to support Moon immediately. According to Research & Reasearch’s survey on November 26, 56.8% of previous Ahn supporters answered that they would now support Moon, while 18.9% stated they would support Park—21.9% remained undecided. This was not unexpected. It was clear that Moon and Ahn were not seen as perfect substitutes for one another, and the October-November issue of this report noted that there would not be a 1:1 shift.

Following Ahn’s resignation, Moon failed to overtake Park in the polls, and on November 29 the gap between Park and Moon was as large as 8.5pp. However, Moon’s support began to recover and the spread between Moon and Park gradually shrank. As of December 12, the race remains tight with Park leading by only 1.5pp.

Generation, Generation, Generation

This election is projected to be another battle between generations. As is already well established, Park Geun-Hye’s base is among those in their 50s and 60s, while Moon Jae-In now enjoys strong support—thanks to Dr. Ahn’s withdrawal—from those in their 20s and 30s. Given that it is generally known how the oldest and youngest generations will vote, those in their 40s could prove to be critical in this election. As shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, and in
true tossup fashion, this cohort is divided amongst itself on which candidate it prefers. While those aged 40-44 have consistently preferred Moon Jae-In (Figure 3), those aged 45-49 have generally preferred Park Geun-Hye (Figure 4), although that lead has been narrowed significantly.

Demographic Shift

One of the challenges facing not only Moon Jae-In, but the progressive candidates of the future, is the demographic shift towards an older society. According to the National Election Commission, in the 2007 election those in their 50s and 60s or over combined to make up 33.7% of all eligible voters. However, in terms of actual voter turnout, these two cohorts combined to make up 40.8%. In 2012, according to the most recent census data, these two cohorts now combine to make up 38.7% of eligible voters, a 5.0pp increase from five years earlier (Figure 5).

Turnout among these cohorts has been incredibly reliable. In every election since 2000, turnout among the 50s and 60s+ has averaged 74.7%. Comparatively, turnout for those in their 20s and 30s averaged 41.8% and 51.8%, respectively. (That number is 64.5% for the 40s.) In presidential elections, those in their 50s and 60s combined for an average turnout of 78.9%, compared with 51.8% of those in their 20s, 61.3% of those in their 30s, and 71.3% of
those in their 40s.3 This strong, reliable turnout among the oldest voting blocs provides Ms. Park an advantage given their strong support for her (Appendix Figure 1, Appendix Figure 2).

If this trend holds, and there is every reason to believe that it will, Mr. Moon will clearly need very strong turnout from the young cohorts—cohorts which have historically had trouble in making it to the voting booth. However, a rise in youth turnout would likely create a rise in overall turnout, something that would be swimming against history. Since 1987, each presidential election has had lower voter turnout than the previous election. In 1987, turnout was at 89%, declining each year, with major decreases from 1997 (81%) to 2002 (71%), and from 2002 to 2007 (63%).

The Gender Card

Somewhat surprisingly, there has been very little said about Ms. Park as the first female candidate with a real chance at taking the Blue House. Given the generally poor reviews Korea is given for gender equality and female labor force participation rates, almost nothing has been said about gender throughout the entire race. The older generations have left the issue alone because she is the daughter of Park Chung-Hee, and the younger generations have been quite on the issue because they are much more liberal on social issues.

However, there has been a consistent preference among women for Ms. Park. While the two candidates have been virtually tied among men, Ms. Park has maintained a 6-10pp lead over Mr. Moon among women (Figure 6). This is an interesting phenomenon, particularly considering that in American elections female voters disproportionately vote for Democrats. Yet, it is premature to assert that Korean women see Park Geun-Hye as a presidential candidate representing women. In fact, Korean female voters have long been quite conservative, and are more likely to support the Saenuri Party than the DUP.

Regional Races

The regionalism present in South Korean elections isone of the most well-known features of Korean politics. The east-west rivalry has been in existence since before the Japanese invaded Korean in 1592, and shows little sign of abating in the current election. While Park holds large leads in the Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam area (Appendix Figure 3) and Daegu/Gyeongbuk  (Appendix Figure 4), Moon leads easily in Gwangju/Jeolla (Appendix Figure 5). The Daejeon/Choongchung area was expected to be hotly contested and indeed that has been the case. What was once a commanding Park lead in late November has become a race within the margin of error in early December (Appendix Figure 6). The real prize remains as the greater national capital region. Seoul and its surroundings combine to make up approximately 48% of the population, and a clear victory here could create a huge advantage for either candidate. While Park trails in Seoul by 7.4pp as of December 12 (Figure 7), Incheon/Gyeonggi remains within the margin of error (Figure 8).

Conclusion

This report presents a mixed view of the election for both candidates. However, even though the race remains tight in the poll, Moon Jae-In still faces several significant challenges. The most significant problem is going to be youth turnout. While many of these young voters voice support for Moon Jae-In, it is not clear that they will actually turn up on voting day. After all, many of them were supporters of Ahn Cheol-Soo, and without him in the race they may simply abstain. This, along with the simple demographic challenges he faces, presents a very difficult—but not impossible—path to victory for Mr. Moon.

To download the full report from Asan Institute, please click here.

By Sarah K. Yun

Both the United States and China went through leadership transitions in November. In the United States  President Barack Obama was reelected, while China announced a new era under General Secretary Xi Jiping.  With both countries future leadership now decided, what are the implications for Korea as the U.S. and China consolidate their respective leaderships and policy towards Asia?

The key takeaway from the U.S. election is that the United States will continue its strategy of rebalancing toward Asia.  This is less surprising given the re-elected Obama administration’s commitment to continue the rebalancing towards Asia.  Beginning in the fall of 2011, the Obama administration indicated the United States’ determination to play a larger role in the Asia-Pacific region militarily, economically, and politically.  In line with this position the U.S. renewed its commitment towards allies such as South Korea, Japan and the Philippines, and strengthened relationships with other partners such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and India.

Militarily, the U.S. cooperated with South Korea and Japan on missile defense technologies, while announcing new deployments or rotations of troops in Australia and Singapore.  At the same time, the U.S. continues to work to strengthen its commitment to South Korea and Japan, encourage Australia to take more active role in regional security, and renew security ties with the Philippines, while laying the foundations to solidify strategic relationship with Vietnam and India.

Economically, the U.S. recognizes that the fastest growing economies of the world are in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, the U.S. concluded the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement while actively participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement negotiations.  Furthermore, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have in unprecedented fashion attended consecutive regional forums including APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the EAS.

Recognizing that diplomacy requires more than agreements and public pronouncements, the rebalancing also implies the crucial need for trust-building in the region. To that end, President Obama’s first trip abroad after his reelection was to Southeast Asia to meet ASEAN leaders on November 18. His trip is a recognition that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy has shifted to the Asia-Pacific region.  Overall, the U.S. has been actively and comprehensively engaged in the region on a variety of issues both bilaterally and multilaterally.

While the United States pursues its policy of rebalancing, any policy change from China towards the region remains to be seen.  The Asia-Pacific is undoubtedly important to China as the country sees itself as the leader of the region to which they belong and centers its own policy around the need for a peaceful region to facilitate China’s own continued development.

China’s policy towards Asia is not as defined as the U.S. rebalancing strategy, leading neighbors to wonder what its intentions are. Many are concerned at China’s recent assertive posture related to maritime and territorial issues. However, the reality is that an assessment of China’s foreign policy under Xi may be too early at this point.  Although Xi became the General Secretary of the Community Party of China, he will not become president until the National People’s Congress in March 2013.  Furthermore, key foreign affairs officials have not been appointed yet, such as the director of Central Foreign Affairs Office, foreign minister, and the head of the CCP’s International Liaison Department. The best indication of Xi’s foreign policy may be Hu Jintao’s opening report at the 18^th CPC National Congress where Xi was appointed the successor. It was declared that China was to become a maritime power to exploit marine resources, develop its marine economy, protect marine ecological environment, and resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.  For the most part, however, the emphasis was on domestic politics, perhaps indicating that foreign policy will be largely reactive in the initial years under Xi.

In the backdrop of Xi Jinping’s leadership transition is China’s recent aggressive stance on maritime issues against Japan and Southeast Asia.  Recently, an Op-Ed in the state-run People’s Daily, stated that “China’s stance of maintaining peaceful development does not mean it gives up its right to protect national interests” and that China will “protect national sovereignty, safety and developmental interest and will never surrender to any external pressure”. The territorial dispute with Japan will likely be one of Xi Jinping’s top foreign policy priorities in 2013 in order to prevent any domestic dissatisfaction and instability. At the same time, China’s policy stance towards North Korea has remained largely consistent as it has urged all relevant parties to take a “prudent and moderate” response to North Korea’s missile launch.

On the economic front, China remains invested in international trade and economic development as its domestic economy depends on the global market. On September 22 during the China-ASEAN Expo, Xi pledged to advance China-ASEAN relations and FTA development, showing China’s emphasis on economic tools for diplomacy in the region despite intense maritime disputes.  Trade volume between China and ASEAN countries amounted to $362.8 billion in 2011, with a trade volume target of $500 billion by 2013.

All in all, there are signs of both continuity in China’s foreign policy as well as signs of a more assertive China. However, China’s policy also indicates a fragmentation between security and economic interests.  Priority goes to economic development and stability, then regional security.  Even maritime disputes have a strong economic interests regarding shipping lanes.  While China was on the course to develop a comprehensive Asia policy amidst the wars in the Middle East, the U.S. initiated its comprehensive rebalancing towards Asia, which threw a curveball into China’s plans.  China is realizing the need to increasingly get involved in multilateral channels such as the G-20, BRICs, and other Asia related multilateral forums.

As the two major powers navigate in the Asia-Pacific region to establish their respective leadership positions, what is the role that Korea can play?  U.S. policy towards Asia and the Korean Peninsula is more predictable, which eliminates many of the potential surprise elements.  The U.S.-Korea alliance has been coined the lynchpin of regional security, leaving little room for ambiguity in the U.S. rebalancing vis-à-vis Korea.  China, on the other hand, may require more management for Korea.  Although the initial phase of Xi’s foreign policy will likely be dominated by domestic issues such as economic slowdown and anti-corruption, bilateral issues such as Chinese fishermen in Korean waters and Korea-China Free Trade Agreement will need careful navigation.

Korea, like other countries in the region, does not want to be forced to choose between the U.S. and China.  Both the United States and China are important to Korea in different ways and the realities of their respective Asia policies may lead Korea to actively engage diplomatically with both powers.  Therefore, Korea can play a mediating role to support the U.S., Korea’s most important ally, and China, Korea’s largest trading partner, to work together on key issues.  This may include North Korea and Iran’s nuclear problems, disaster relief in region, and assisting China to mature its market capital structures and move towards a knowledge-based economy. Some of the seesaw dynamics between the U.S. and China may change after the South Korean presidential elections in December.  Regardless of who becomes the new South Korean president, the reality is that both the U.S. and China are important partners to Korea.  As a middle power, Korea can play an important and unique role the Asia policies of the U.S. and China.

Sarah K. Yun is the Director of Public Affairs and Regional Issues for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are her own. 

Photo from U.S. Pacific Fleet’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad O’Carroll

When South Korea picks either a progressive or conservative leader next month, we will know the full extent of the impact of President Obama’s re-election on the next four years on the Korean peninsula. Whether Obama and the next leader of South Korea will be able to sustain the current momentum of the U.S. – Korea alliance remains an unanswered question. But while there is much to suggest that Obama is in an advantageous starting position to work on U.S.-Korea ties, there are nevertheless several areas of real concern as we move forward post the December election.

Having strengthened the U.S – Korea alliance and forged a close friendship over the past four years with President Lee Myung Bak, Obama has proven he has the ability to work well with even those at the opposite end of the South Korean political spectrum. Having signed off on the KORUS FTA and cooperated closely on major global issues, whoever takes power in South Korea this December will inherent an excellent relationship from Lee Myung-bak. However, as Ambassador Thomas Hubbard recently pointed out, political transitions can be difficult periods when it comes to U.S. – Korea relations.

If Park wins the election, her administration will inherit five years of tacit experience in working with the current White House, a great starting point to be sure. And while a progressive administration will be starting afresh with Obama, compared to a Romney victory they can at least benefit from an external working understanding of how the relationship has worked so far. However, there is always the risk that things could deteriorate from the status quo, especially when considering how important personal friendship has been to contributing to the success of U.S.-Korea relations of late.

What does an alliance look like when personal friendship is lacking? The case of Benjamin Netanyahu’s relations with Obama is a case in point, showing how tensions can emerge among allies when the personal relationships of the two leaders don’t chime. For Israel – U.S. relations, over the past four years seemingly impassable policy chasms have been accentuated by leaks, distrust and seemingly artificially created protocol issues. As a result, Obama is often obliged to reach out to the Israeli public in order to remind them that the U.S. is still committed to Israel’s security. While this is a strong example, it underscores the importance of mutual respect between leaders. Naturally, both Washington and Seoul will be eager to avoid a repeat of the acrimonious relations that Bush had with the late progressive president Roh.

Another trouble spot for U.S. – Korea relations circles around North Korea policy. With Obama likely feeling burnt by his last attempt to engage Pyongyang in the “Leap Day Agreement”, it is unclear how supportive the U.S. will be of the next South Korean administration’s North Korea policy. After all, all three Korean candidates are campaigning for increased inter-Korean engagement, with even the conservatives calling for comparatively radical initiatives such as the opening of liaison offices in Pyongyang. Here the problem comes down to how denuclearization is prioritized by South Korea when it comes to engagement. That’s because Obama may have a hard time reducing focus on the denuclearization of North Korea if he is to continue emphasizing his wider global non-proliferation strategy. As such, there is a risk that an incoming South Korean administration may wish to sequence this goal in a way that proves incompatible with Obama’s own policy positions.

An additional hurdle that could set back U.S. – Korea relations relates to Seoul’s domestic nuclear power infrastructure. The current U.S.-ROK nuclear energy agreement is due to expire in March 2014 and South Korea is now increasingly eager to make use of the spent fuel from its nuclear reactors. Having outlined a goal of processing the spent fuel through a capability known as pyroprocessing, South Korea hopes to potentially recycle fuel by using the transuranic elements in fast reactors. As the world’s sixth biggest exporter of nuclear power plants, South Korea has an understandable desire to close the nuclear fuel cycle – doing so will put it in an even better position to offer full range of nuclear services worldwide and attract additional contracts. However, if the ROK were to be allowed to develop a reprocessing facility there would be consequences for global non-proliferation regime and implications for the dismantling of the DPRK nuclear program. As such, it is a delicate issue that will require thoughtful diplomacy to resolve.

Although there are challenges ahead, it is important to remember that Obama is extremely popular in South Korea. Data in a recent opinion poll released by the German Marshall Fund shows that compared to ten years ago, public support for the U.S.-Korea alliance has doubled under Obama’s stewardship. As such, there will be a strong onus on the incoming president of South Korea to maintain the close and friendly ties that have characterized the past five years between Lee Myung-bak and Obama. Correspondingly, among the risks outlined there should still be cause for optimism.

Chad O’Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from art_es_anna’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Luke Herman

As the Kim Jong Un regime completes its eighth month in power following Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011, there seem to be a number of differences between how this succession is being carried out with how it was carried out in 1994. For one thing, it has proceeded at a much more rapid pace: excluding the December 2011 appearances where KJU visited KJI’s bier, he has made 101 appearances in eight months. By comparison, KJI made 88 appearances total from July 1994 – December 1996 as he went through a three-year mourning period.

This piece will attempt to lay out other differences between the successions, possible reasons for them and prospects going forward. In this article I will lay out the background of each succession, examine which elites were important (using on-the-spot guidance inspection data), as well as examining who rose and who fell (and who died) during the respective periods. In addition, I will take a close look at the reemergence of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) under Kim Jong Un, the growing visibility of the security services and what both could mean going forward.

Background

The Kim Jong Il Succession (1994-1996)

The groundwork for the Kim Jong Il succession was laid for nearly twenty years before he formally took over power. He was first mentioned in the North Korean press in the 1970s, but was referred to as the “party center.” His first true public introduction was in 1980 when he appeared at the Sixth Party Congress and was given a number of important party positions. Eventually, as Kim Il Sung aged and declined in health he began to take over the day-to-day affairs of running North Korea, and became Supreme Commander of the armed forces in 1992. Despite this preparation, the regime was not fully prepared for Kim Il Sung’s sudden death on July 8, 1994. There were eleven days between the death and actual funeral, supposedly to allow for the public to fully express their grief but more likely because the regime needed to figure out exactly what message they wanted to convey.

As Ken Gause discusses in his excellent North Korea under Kim Chong-il, there were two major (but related) splits that Kim Jong Il had to overcome as he took the throne: 1) a generational split between the old revolutionaries that fought alongside KIS in Manchuria and in the Korean War and the newer army officials who KJI had become close to, and 2) a hierarchical split that had existed for a number of years as both KIS and KJI had their own lines of communication and power. Failure to adequately deal with either would likely have doomed KJI. He approached both cautiously, keeping in place much of the old guard while consolidating his own rule through appointments of loyalists at lower levels. After the death of O Jin U, who had been Minister of the People’s Armed Forces for almost two decades, he replaced him with Choe Gwang (at that time Chief of the KPA General Staff), another old timer. However, he replaced Choe with a relative unknown, Kim Yong Chun, who had risen through the ranks rapidly (reportedly after putting down a coup attempt by the VI Corps).

The KJI succession came at a particularly difficult time for North Korea. Though the first nuclear crisis had been peacefully settled with the Agreed Framework, the famine (called the “Arduous March” in North Korea) was just beginning. The Party and State institutions that were responsible for economic decision-making and food distribution essentially stopped functioning effectively. KJI, who preferred to rule through informal networks in any case, therefore turned to the only body that seemed capable of responding – the military. Along with the nuclear crisis, the famine was a major catalyst for the songun (military-first) policy that would eventually take hold.

The Kim Jong Un Succession

The KJU succession began in earnest following KJI’s stroke in August 2008. It was after this point that a large number of reshuffles were carried out in 2009 (notably Ri Yong Ho became Chief of the KPA General Staff at this time) and the younger Kim was reportedly accompanying his father on inspection tours (though he was not publicly identified). His formal introduction to the public came in September 2010 at the Third Party Conference, which was the first major party meeting in 30 years. Though his only party post was as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), he was also named a four-star General and was reported to be working closely with the Ministry of State Security. After this point he appeared frequently with KJI until the latter’s death last December. There was an eleven-day period between his death and the funeral, the same as with Kim Il Sung, and (as many remarked at the time) the funeral ceremony was remarkably similar in style to the KIS funeral.

There are two major differences in how the successions have unfolded. First, the KJU succession is moving at a far advanced pace compared to his father’s. As mentioned before, KJU has already made more public appearances in eight months than his father made in his first two and a half years. Additionally, the mourning period was officially one hundred days as opposed to three years. Finally, KJU acquired the functional equivalent of his father’s titles four months after KJI’s death, and did so through formal means at the Fourth Party Conference in April of this year. KJI, on the other hand, became General Secretary of the WPK in October 1997 by Central Committee and Central Military Committee decree.

Second, and likely related, the regime is facing nothing like the crises that racked the country from 1994-1996. Harsh sanctions remain in place, but the country has adapted and actually experienced modest growth last year. Relations with China are much improved since the mid-1990s and give the regime a buffer against something like the famine reoccurring. Furthermore, the security situation has improved since the regime built a nuclear deterrent to complement its conventional deterrent.

The Elites

This section will detail the elites who appeared with both KJI and KJU most frequently (over 20% of the time) during the post-succession period we are examining. It gives one a good, though not complete by any means, idea of who was being featured prominently at the time, as well as their positions (and any promotions that they received during this time).

 Notes:

–> indicates the elite was promoted from lower rank to higher during this time

KPA = Korean People’s Army

GPB = General Political Bureau

GSD = General Staff Department

CMC = Central Military Commission

NDC = National Defense Commission

Kim Jong Il (July 1994-December 1996)

Out of the 16 most frequent accompaniers, 10 were military and the rest held high-level positions within the WPK. Three things are notable from the table:

1)      Clearly we see the beginning of a shift towards the military, and notably a shift towards the next generation military as opposed to the old revolutionaries. Though KJI was cautious in appointing 1.5 / 2^nd / 3^rd generation military men to the high level positions, nine of his most frequent accompaniers were from this group, while two (Choe Gwang and Ri Ul Sol) were first generation revolutionaries.

2)      The two most frequent accompaniers during this period were the WPK members responsible for propaganda (Kim Ki Nam) and security (Kye Ung Thae), two areas that were critical to a successful succession.

3)      There are no state officials at the top of this list (the first one who is classified as such is Yang Hyong Sop at 19^th most frequent). State officials and institutions, not counting the NDC, were simply not a priority at this point.

Kim Jong Un (January 2012 – July 2012)

As one would expect, the most frequent accompaniers with KJU is more balanced than under his father. Two notable observations:

• These numbers certainly lend more credence to the theory that there is a Jang Song Thaek – Choe Ryong Hae alliance. Choe has also made a number of his own visits since being named Director of the KPA General Political Bureau.
• Two of the top military accompaniers – Ri Yong Ho and Kim Yong Chun –have respectively been removed and demoted. As we all know, Ri was removed in July from all his positions for “illness,” though it is more likely he was purged. Kim Yong Chun was removed from his position as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces and instead became director of the WPK Civil Defense Department – an indication that his stock has dropped significantly. The numbers show a definite shift occurring since May began– before May Ri appeared with KJU 31 times, while Kim appeared 23 times (out of 57 total appearances). The story is drastically different once May began – 4 times for Ri and 4 for Kim Yong Chun (out of 44). By contrast, the splits for Jang and Choe are 32/30 and 24/26 respectively.

Promotions, Purges and Deaths

Promotions

There were a few promotions during the early KJI years, but none were related to party or state institutions; instead, they were all related to the military or security apparatuses. The most important emerged due to O Jin U’s death in February 1995. As mentioned, KJI promoted Choe Gwang from Chief of the KPA General Staff to Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, while Kim Yong Chun went from being a director of logistics in the General Staff Department to Chief of the KPA General Staff. Jo Myong Rok, who would play a major role going forward, was promoted from Commander of the KPA Air Force to Director of the General Political Bureau. Pak Ki So became commander of the important Pyongyang Defense Command. Jang Song U, brother of Jang Song Thaek, became a Deputy Director in the Guards Command (and may have essentially run the Command in place of Ri Ul Sol.) Furthermore, there were a number of promotions in the military ranks handed out by KJI.

By contrast, the promotions under KJU have also included party and state institutions. Thirteen elites were either added to the Politburo or promoted from alternate to full member or alternate to presidium member. Four were added to the NDC and five added or promoted on the CMC. There were also significant promotions in the military / security apparatuses. Kim Won Hong became Minister of State Security, Kim Jong Gak Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Hyon Yong Chol Chief of the KPA General Staff and Choe Ryong Hae Director of the KPA General Political Bureau. There were also, of course, the obligatory orders raising military rank for a number of elites. Again, the main takeaway is that the state and party institutions that languished for many years under KJI have been revitalized since his stroke, and received an additional shot in the arm under KJU.

Purges / Deaths

The first three years of KJI’s rule were relatively free of purges, though some occurred at lower levels in the security agencies. The only major events along these lines were the death of O Jin U in February 1995 and the deaths of Choe Gwang and Kim Kwang Jin in February 1997, as well as the defection of Hwang Jang Yop in the same month.

The same cannot be said for the first few months of KJU’s tenure. There have been no major deaths within the regime like KJI faced, but quite a few members have been publicly and privately removed. Most important was the aforementioned Ri Yong Ho, but April also saw the removal of a number of Politburo members (both full and alternate). This includes: Jon Pyong Ho (Secretary of the Politburo), Pyon Yong Rip (SPA Chairman), Ri Thae Nam (Vice Premier), and Kim Rak Hui (Vice Premier). Thae Jong Su, who was previously a member of the Secretariat and Director of the General Affairs Department was demoted to Chief Secretary of the South Hamgyong Province and likely lost his Politburo spot (unconfirmed as of right now). U Tong Chuk, who was (is?) First Vice Director of State Security was also removed from the Politburo, NDC and CMC; however, it remains unclear if he was purged, fell ill or is still in power but had his institutional roles taken over by Kim Wong Hong who is now head of MSS.

The Rise of the WPK

The major story of Kim Jong Un’s first eight months in power is the re-emergence of the WPK. Below is a comparison of elite appearances made during the periods under examination (for Kim Jong Il July 12, 1994 – December 31, 1996, for Kim Jong Un January 1, 2012 until July 25, 2012.) I made a list of every elite who appeared with KJI and KJU during their respective periods, assigned each elite to a particular category (party, military / security, state or provincial), and then tallied the total number of appearances each elite in that particular category made. The percentage is derived from dividing the category number by the total number.

The numbers below show that military figures appeared However, as Stephan Haggard and I have pointed out, classifying elites under Kim Jong Un is not quite as simple as it used to be, especially when it comes to the military. There are a number of elites given military rankings – up to Vice Marshal – who have no real military background, but are essentially civilians in military clothing. As can be seen in the figure below, there is a major difference in the story the data tells based on how one classifies. If one classifies based purely on holding a military ranking, it seems like the military has actually gained prominence under KJU.[1] But if we classify more accurately, it is clear that party members – based on public appearances – are appearing more frequently with KJU (though not by a large percentage).

The evidence gets stronger once we break the KJU numbers down by month as shown in Figure 2. The party and military actually track fairly closely – right up until the beginning of May, at which point we see a huge divergence. Following the April 2012 Party Conference, Aidan Foster-Carter wrote that Choe Ryong Hae’s appointment as Director of the KPA General Political Bureau was “a bid to reassert Party control over a military which under Kim Jong Il rather ruled the roost.” This data gives credence to that idea. Paired with the fact that two of the most influential military men, Ri Yong Ho and Kim Yong Chun, were either removed or demoted as well, there definitely seems to be a pattern emerging.

For comparison purposes, we can look at a breakdown of Kim Jong Il’s appearances (note: due to the more spread out nature of his appearances, these are done by half-years instead of months). This breakdown also fits in well with what we now know about the military’s rise, though admittedly it bounces around much more.

Emergence of the Security Services

Another thing that differentiates the KJI and KJU successions is the greater public prominence of the security services, namely the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Minister of People’s Security (MPS), Guard Command (GC) and Military Security Command (MSC) (the Korean People’s Internal Security Force, which is a part of the MPS, has also been fairly prominent). For a great overview of the history and mission of each of these agencies see Ken Gause’s piece at HRNK.

The below graph compares security members based on the percentage they appeared (out of total elite appearances). It also shows what percentage of the military / security category figure they made up. (Kim Jong Il’s numbers are in blue, Kim Jong Un’s in red)

The heads of these security organizations have also been well-placed in the relevant party and state institutions.

(MSS – Political Bureau)Ri Myong Su (MPS) Ri Pyong Sam (KPISF)

Total = 14%

Total = 16%

Total = 17%

It should also be pointed out that Jang Song Thaek, who oversees party control of these organizations through his position as Director of the Administration Department, sits on all three institutions.

How does this fit into a shift towards greater party control and a shift away from the military-first policy? Because the security organizations will all play an essential role in ensuring the military does not become a source of dissent. They may also see a chance to increase their own stature, especially as money that was once allocated specifically to the military is freed up.

Conclusion

Given the preceding paragraphs, it’s fairly clear that the KJU succession has been undertaken in a far different way from his father’s. While most analysts were skeptical that an untested 28 (or 29) year old could successfully take control, from the outside (an important qualifier when talking about North Korea) it seems like he has successfully begun the process of consolidating power. He was aided in this process greatly by the security and economic situation, both of which were not nearly as tumultuous as when his father took over. Another overlooked aspect is that many of the same people running this succession were around for the last one, including Kim Ki Nam (propaganda), Kim Kyong Hui and Jang Song Thaek, It seems likely that they learned a great deal from their previous experience and have used that to their advantage in carrying out this succession. The result has been far smoother than anyone expected. However, whether or not this “smoothness” can translate into meaningful change within the country is anyone’s guess.

Sources:

Gause, Kenneth E. Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of the North Korean Police State.  Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012.

Gause, Kenneth E. . North Korea under Kim Chong-Il: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change.  Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International 2011.

Kim, Insoo, and Min Yong Lee. “Predictors of Kim Jong-Il’s on-the-Spot Guidance under Military-First Politics.” North Korean Review 8, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 93-104.

North Korea Leadership Watch. www.nkleadershipwatch.com

Korean Institute for National Unification. Kim Jong Il Hyunjijido Donghyang 1994-2011

(Analysis of Kim Jong Il’

Ministry of Unification. http://unibook.unikorea.go.kr/?sub_num=54&sty=I&ste=%A4%A1.

By Nick Miller

Main Actors within North Korea Decision Making

North Korea’s political structure is a set of institutions built to sustain the Kim family. The Korean Worker’s Party (WKP) and other state agencies were designed by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to be used to play rivals off one another and assist him in consolidating elites under him. The four key powers within North Korea are as follows:

• The KWP apparatus;
• The military and security apparatus;
• The Kim family patronage system; and,
• The Kim family.

Factionalism within North Korean Politics

Kim Il-sung removed the major factors that served as direct challenges to his rule: the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions in the 1950s. In 1991/1992 there was a possible coup against Kim Jong-il’s time by the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces and generals who sought to overthrow the North Korean leadership over the economic hardships that the country was experiencing.

Conservatives vs. Liberals

Over the summer of 2012 Western analysts thought the removal of Ri Yong-ho, one of the strongest defenders of the Military First policy, was a sign that there was a power struggle between the military versus reformers. Factionalism in North Korea is more focused, according to Ken Gause, on ensuring influence for the Supreme Leader, the Suryong, rather than attempting to remove him from power. The removal of Ri Yong-ho showed Pyongyang watchers that there were challenges within the North Korean elites over what direction Kim Jong-un should take the country.

Collective Leadership

North Korea is run as a one-party dictatorship run through the Suryong. As Kim Jong-un is still too inexperienced to rule a collective leadership was created to help manage North Korea with Kim Jong-un as regent.

Kim Jong-un

As Kim Jong-un is a young and untested ruler he has to rely upon the security apparatus and elites his father elevated. Kim Jong-il entrusted Jang Song-taek and Kim Kyong-hui to act as his political guardians. In Kim Jong-un’s first public speech he stated that the people did not need “tighten their belts” which is possibly a coded phrase insinuating that there will be a shift away from military-first policy. The removal of Ri Yong-ho was one of the first major signs that there was a shift occurring away from military dominance over the political process

Jang Song-taek and Kim Kyong-hui

Jang Song Taek and Kim Kyong-hui serve as the guardians for Kim Jong-un. North Korean watchers believe that Jang Song-taek is a reformer and one of the strongest supporters of Chinese style reform. He was purged in the early 2000s for his support of Kim Jong-un’s disgraced older half-brother Kim Jong-nam. Jang Song-taek has been able to re-affirm his control over North Korean politics and back into Kim Jong-il’s graces by affirming his support the regency of Kim Jong-un. Jang Song-taek trip to China in August 2012 is believed to have served as a likely preclude to Kim Jong-un first official state visit after he assumed control over North Korea. Jang is believed to be the official organizing the expansion of the state economic zones (SEZs) ventures with China.

Kim Kyung-hui is Kim Jong-il’s sister and one of his closest advisors. After the elder Kim’s death in December of 2011 she was critical in maintaining stability within North Korean regime. She was elevated to General of the KPA in 2010 despite never serving in the military, a Secretary in the Organization of the WPK, and director of the WPK Light Industry Department. As she is the daughter of Ki Il-Sung she serves as an important linchpin to the North Korean political system as it needs a Kim family member to keep the system running and the elites supporting Kim Jong-un. There have been reports of Kim Kyung-hui’s failing health due to alcohol consumption. Whether the rumors are true and what impact will it have on Jang Song-taek’s ability to initiate economic reforms remains to be seen.

O Kuk-ryol

O Kuk-ryol serves as the Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission and his family has been supporting the Kim family since the founding of the country. General O served as Kim Jong-il’s intelligence managers and advisers. He is considered one of the more powerful figures within North Korean politics. In 2011 there were reports in The Chosun Ilbo that his protégés were purged because of the influence he held during Kim Jong-il’s reign. General O served as one of the top leaders to plan Kim Jong-il’s funeral and assisted in the succession process. He has also been identified by the U.S. government as one of the key members involved in North Korea’s counterfeiting activities. Kim Jong –un needs General O’s support because of his influence on the KPA. He could also be a counterweight, as Ken Gause contends, to Jang Song-taek and whether General O will be purged by the end of 2012 like Ri Yong-ho as Kim Jong-un removes further old guard members remains a possibility.

Kim Jong-un’s Collective Leadership

Government Agencies

Worker’s Party of Korea (WKP)

The National Party Congress is the supreme party organ and approves the reports for the party organs, adopts party policy and tactics, and elects members to the KWP Central Committee and Central Auditing Committee. When the National Party Congress is not in session the Central Committee acts as the official agent of the Party. The Central Committee meets once every six months and is responsible for the election of the Party General Secretary, members of the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, and Central Military Commission. Kim Jong-Il shifted power away from KWP towards the Korean People’s Army (KPA) with the military-first policy. The military took over numerous positions within Politburo and Secretariat and WKP influence was significantly weakened during Kim Jong-il’s reign.

National Defense Commission (NDC)

The NDC houses the elites that hold influence within North Korean politics. Officials within the NDC also have leadership roles within Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces, KWP, and intelligence and security agencies. The NDC membership is comprised of ten individuals of which eight hold military rank. The military members of the NDC are also members of the Central Military Commission. This concentration of elites across agencies allowed Kim Jong-il to main control over the government and flow of information.

Kim Jong-il elevated the NDC in 1998 to serve as a powerful power-holding group and expanded his Military-First doctrine that gave enormous influence to the KPA. Under Kim Il-sung the armed forces was controlled via the KWP but after the power restructuring Kim Jong-Il ensured he had direct control over the military and had a forum to discuss and manage the pressing issues facing the country.

DPRK Power Structure that Shapes Foreign Policy

Central Military Committee (CMC)

This is the highest-level KWP organization that is involved directly with shaping military policy. The CMC leaders also hold positions within NDC and headed by Kim Jong-il till his death in 2011. After restructuring the CMC’s influence over the direction of military policy became negligible. While in some ways its role over the military has lessened it still holds some important sway over coordinating the party line on military policy with the Central Committee. The CMC facilitates the KWP role in managing defense responsibilities especially over military procurements.

Korean People’s Army (KPA)

In order to control the direction of North Korean politics one must have the loyalty of the military. During Kim Jong-il’s reign the Military-First policy elevated the influence of the military on North Korean politics. The KPA holds some of the strongest influence on North Korean politics today. It is also the only group that could in theory challenge the rule of Kim family, if they desired to do so. The military has over 1.1 million troops and consumes over 15.5% of the nation’s GDP.

Nick Miller received his M.A. in International Relations from Flinders University, Australia. He writes on Chinese-North Korean issues at sinonk.com.

Photo from Radio Nederland Wereldomroep’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

Jang Song-taek, Vice-Chairman of North Korea’s National Defense Commission and uncle to Kim Jong-un, returned from China after several days of meetings about economic cooperation between the two nations, especially in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Jang brought back agreements on further SEZ cooperation and a renewed commitment by both parties to the importance of the China-North Korea relationship. Beyond these agreements, there were no other major announcements about aid or cooperation between the two countries. However, it will be interesting to see if this trip helped lay any groundwork in convincing the outgoing Chinese leadership as well as its incoming leaders that North Korea’s transition is safe and will not damage the stability in the region.

With North Korea having already spent much of its late spring and summer reaching out to nations in Southeast Asia as well as talking to Japan, this trip was watched to gauge the status of China-North Korea relations under the new regime. Jang was sent to China as the head of the DPRK-China Joint Guidance Committee to discuss cooperation in the economic zones of Rason and the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands. His other meetings in China also focused on investments and cooperation around the economic zones. All told, his delegation consisted of about 50 people, including Ri Chol, an executive officer for North Korea’s Joint Venture and Investment Committee, which is a newly formed government office in North Korea tasked with attracting and regulating foreign investment into the DPRK. Moreover, the Committee has responsibility the Rason SEZ.

Mostly what came out of the DPRK-China Joint Guidance Committee meeting were agreements and understandings on the establishment of management committees, economic and technical cooperation, arrangements for power and energy distribution, and construction plans for the economic zones. The North Korean delegation also visited the Chinese provinces of Jilin and Liaoning for meetings with their respective Provincial Secretaries. The Yatai Group, a Chinese conglomerate out of Changchun in Jilin province, said it would build a construction materials complex in the Rason SEZ.

Interestingly, there are indications the Chinese government would actually prefer working more on the Rason SEZ rather than the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands economic zones. China initially had some concerns over the laws for these island economic zones, especially regarding double taxation and dispute mechanisms. With recent public headlines surrounding the Xiyang Group, a Chinese company, having major difficulties doing business in North Korea, getting the laws and agreements implemented correctly will be a major task for North Korea to improve economic cooperation with China. Moreover, Hwanggumpyong Island is in a flood zone, and neither North Korea or China have done much infrastructure work to bolster the construction and improvements needed for economic activity. Chinese companies along with probable Chinese government money have recently helped improve some of the infrastructure needed at the Rason port. Access to the port at the Rason SEZ seems more enticing for the development of China’s northeast provinces than to the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands economic zones, but much of the benefits are dependent on implementation, focus, and action from North Korea.

Despite the announcement from the Yatai Group, there were no big investment or aid deals stemming from the trip. There were a couple of reports suggesting that Jang Song-taek asked the Chinese for a $1 billion loan, yet there is still uncertainty if that request or something similar was made by North Korea or given by China. Moreover, with all of these meetings and discussions on economic cooperation, Wen Jiabao, China’s Premier, did encourage North Korea to use “market mechanisms” during his meeting with Jang.

The appearance of the trip was all economics, but political issues are still lingering between the two countries. The relationship has not been at its tightest this year, with North Korea informing the U.S. about its satellite launch attempt before China, capturing of some Chinese fishermen in May, and supposedly ignoring Chinese offers for Kim Jong-un to visit. Jang did meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao, where the normal pleasantries were made about the long-standing friendship between North Korea and China.

However, Jang did not meet with Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang, the expected next leaders of China. Both of them most likely spent most of their August in Beidaihae, a summer resort where top Chinese Communist Party members discuss who will be the next leaders of China. Given the timing, it is unlikely that they would have been pulled away from leadership transition discussion to meet Jang Song-taek. Early reports also suggest Jang was trying to secure an agreement for Kim Jong-un to visit China next month. If Kim Jong-un really wants to visit China before October, the North Korean leadership would have to really convince China the meeting is worthwhile to take away valuable time from the final preparations for their leadership transitions. Nothing would suggest Kim Jong-un needs to see Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao before they leave office. Thus, Kim Jong-un visiting China before the transition would mainly be about economic cooperation and showing he can handle North Korea-China relations. It could also possibly be a fear that if he waits until after the transition in China takes place, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang would rather meet with other leaders first, delaying Kim Jong-un’s visit for an undetermined period and creating some uncertainty of bilateral relations.

The overall goals of Jang’s trip appears to be an attempt to gain more support for projects within the economic zones, maintain strong relations with China, and demonstrate that the transition to Kin Jong-un is safe and will not hinder China’s influence in the region. These agreements might be the next step after the SEZ law developments; however, implementation will likely have to be smoother for North Korea and China to gain from the SEZs advancements. China will continue to help North Korea, and the appearance of greater economic cooperation along the border is fine for China, yet actual progress will still need to be made in order for the new Chinese leadership and the rest of the world to decide if Kim Jong-un’s regime is different from the previous ones.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from ezioman’s photo stream on flickr creative commons.

By Jinho Park

The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun-Tzu warns,

“He who knows the enemy and himself will never in a hundred battles be at risk; He who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes win and sometimes lose; He who know neither the enemy nor himself will be at risk in every battle.”

It is unclear how well South Korea knows North Korea. Particularly after Kim, Jong-un became the new leader, policy-makers and academics are having diverse discussions about the nature of his leadership and how North Korea will change.  At this moment, it is hard to expect how Mr. Kim is likely to craft his own leadership style: rather, our attention is focused on how different Mr. Kim’s leadership will be from his father and grandfather.

The death of Kim, Jong-Il seems to be neither a surprise nor a crisis to South Korea, rather it provides a new opportunity to develop a fresh strategic approach to North Korea’s new leader. But in order to exploit this opportunity, South Korea must refresh its understandings of North Korea and correct its misunderstandings as well.

Misinterpretation of North Korea will not necessarily cause a policy failure, but it does seriously impede us from knowing how to influence North Korea’s strategy and from learning the right lessons through our experiences with North Korea.

The first misunderstanding is our understanding of engagement policy towards North Korea.

It is widely viewed that the principle of South Korea’s strategy in dealing with North Korea is rooted in a policy of engagement. However, the effectiveness of engagement is very limited. North Korea’s interests often do not align with the outlines of South Korea’s engagement policy and North Korea has often failed to move in tandem with South Korea to enhance the prospects of progress. What makes the failure of engagement policy worse is that North Korea usually stops its diplomatic dialogue and reacts with military and non-military provocations under its self-defined excuse of blaming South Korea.

Despite these pitfalls of engaging with North Korea, South Korea and the United States are often blind to them for political reasons. For instance, when looking at North Korea’s violation of the February 29th agreement, the United States and North Korea hold a different understanding of the agreement, particularly about the test of long-range missile by North Korea. In this respect, the U.S. negotiators were blamed not for being explicit in what is prohibited in terms of missile launches in this first agreement with North Korea’s new leader.

However, abandoning engagement with North Korea is not a good option because there is no other alternate strategy and political leaders in South Korea and the United States often politicize North Korean issues for diverse political reasons.  Although the influence of North Korean issues on domestic politics in the two nations varies significantly across time and situations, it is unavoidable particularly when there are major political events such as an election. In addition, the success of engagement with North Korea depends on two main variables; continuity and consistency.

The most prominent engagement effort with Pyongyang is the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear development program. In terms of continuity, the other five members have strongly requested North Korea return to the table; however, North Korea seems to have lost strategic interest in the talks. Moreover, it prefers to hold bilateral talks with the United States, then moving to the Six-Party Talks if necessary.

Consistency in the Six-Party Talks is much more flawed. The final goal of de-nuclearizing North Korea is not in dispute among any of the member states of the Six-Party Talks, besides North Korea. There are, however, different opinions on how to reach the final goal, and sometimes what should be done prior to achieving the final goal. In fact, de-nuclearizing North Korea is an important goal for which much effort will be required. The parties of the Six-Party Talks, however, sometimes seem to be more concerned about negotiating side issues, such as long-range missiles and the return of Japanese kidnap victims, within the Six-Party Talks framework than de-nuclearization.

In a recent revision of North Korea’s constitution, North Korea declared itself a nuclear state, clearly demonstrating to its people and the international community that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons. Under this situation, some experts turn their attention to how to manage North Korea’s nuclear challenge rather than dismantling it. However, managing a nuclear development program is like crossing a bridge of no return—no further discussion of denuclearization—and giving North Korea more opportunities and time to decrease the costs of continuing its nuclear development program.

The second misunderstanding is wishful thinking that by demonstrating both costs and benefits, the parties of the Six Party Talks can convince North Korea to cooperate.

Benefits come when North Korea’s actions meet international demands, and costs come when North Korea’s actions do not meet international demands. Although Pyongyang fully understands this simple logic, North Korea has conducted provocation without hesitation when the leadership thinks it necessary, even an act of war such as a torpedo-attack on South Korea’s naval ship and artillery attacks on South Korea’s territory killing two civilians in 2010. What motivates North Korea to take brinkmanship is its own strategic calculation; achieving significant benefits while suffering little in the way of costs because of a lack of ROK and U.S. will.

South Korea and the U.S. are required to diversify strategic approaches to North Korea to convince it that achieving our objectives also meets its needs. At the same time, we need to draw a clear line between what is acceptable and not acceptable to us. For example, the provision of humanitarian assistance to North Korea is, on one hand, a good means to keep North Korea open to work with the international community, and on the other hand, a good carrot for the North Korean leader to provide for his starving people.

In addition, South Korea needs to explore new means of using its strategic competitiveness, including the use of its economic power. These new means could be worked together with the international efforts. South Korea could take a new initiative to establish another industrial complex in either South Korea or North Korea and encourage foreign companies to invest and join.

While employing diverse strategic approaches to North Korea, it is of great importance to communicate with North Korean people about South Korea’s intention and will. The message to North Koreans should be focused on “we are not their enemy.” North Korea will try to counter this psychological message by reinforcing its domestic security system for controlling public unrest and strengthening cohesiveness of government officials. These responses from North Korea prove indirectly the effectiveness of such a psychological message. Sending balloons containing leaflets and CDs denouncing North Korean leader is not very effective in that the critical essence of the psychological message is “who sends the message and the credibility of the message.” Unlike a message in the balloons by a group of anti-North Korea people in Korea, a message from the South Korean government—even if its rhetoric is somewhat ambiguous—would have a significant impact on the mind-set and views of the North Korean elites and public.

The third misunderstanding comes from our expectation about China’s role in resolving North Korean issues.

Many experts point out that China’s support of North Korea is the main factor in weakening the effectiveness of international sanctions against North Korea. From Beijing’s strategic perspective, it is uncertain whether China has strategic leverage to use against North Korea. Even if China possesses strong measures to pressure North Korea to change its activities, it would not be willing to use these measures because North Korea’s response is unpredictable. Unless North Korea moves as China intends, China will face a serious strategic difficulty requiring a paradigm change in its strategy toward the Korean Peninsula. Although North Korea and China have maintained an alliance relationship since the end of the Korean War, Pyongyang is not willing to sacrifice its national interests for China.

To draw a constructive and responsible role from China in resolving North Korea’s issues, it is often said that the United States needs to strengthen its partnership with regional countries in Asia and promote a cooperative and multidimensional relationship with China. If these approaches go as the U.S. plans, interdependence between the United States and China would become much deeper and broader. Under this complex interdependent relationship between the United States and China, Beijing would be forced to pay a bigger cost than now when in a diplomatic conflict with the United States or other regional countries. On the other hand, the United States would be in the same situation. And, China now does not seem to be willing to pressure North Korea to dismantle its nuclear development program in the near future, but rather is trying to manage the progress of the program and stop a further nuclear weapons test; in other words, continuing the status-quo on the Korean Peninsula.

With an existing possibility of leadership-style change and attendant political, social, economic crisis, it is much harder to expect the effectiveness of sanctions or punishments by China on North Korea than when Kim, Jong-Il was in power. For these reasons, China is much more cautious about applying pressure on North Korea under the new leader. It takes time for China to draw up a set of policies to be applicable to North Korea. As economic cooperation between North Korea and China is strengthened and expanded, a risk-taking decision by China in regards to North Korea is increasingly unlikely to occur.

Lastly, I would like to point out that while the United States makes its prudent and multilayered efforts to shift its defense and diplomatic policy to Asia, Secretary Hillary Clinton claims in her contribution to Foreign Policy (November/2011):

“One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region.”

It is expected that the United States and China will be in a much more complex strategic game than ever before. And, as one of key components of U.S. strategy in Asia is to strengthen and adapt its traditional partnership with regional countries to changing environments in the region, regional countries will encounter a strategic dilemma of balancing their diplomatic distance between the United States and China, although not choosing one of them. Although regional countries look the United States to play a greater leadership in the region, unlike the Cold-War era, the United States will not allow regional countries to free-ride on U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region. This potential phenomenon will be another challenging issue for regional countries. After all, uncertainty in regional politics is likely to increase. What this challenging environment in the region implies for South Korean efforts in dealing with North Korea remains to be seen.

Mr. Jinho Park is a Legislative Aide to South Korean Legislator Jinha Hwang of the ruling Saenuri Party, also a non-resident fellow of Korea Defense & Security Forum (KODEF) in Seoul.

Photo from AK Rockefeller’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

The surprise news to start the week is that Vice Marshall Ri Yong Ho, chief of the general staff of North Korea’s army as well as a member of the Political Bureau and the Central Military Commission, was relieved of all his positions due to “illness.” During the last year of Kim Jong-il’s life, Ri Yong Ho was seen as a key advisor to Kim Jong-un during the transition. Following the death of Kim Jong-il, Ri Yong Ho was a leader to watch as he appeared to be a close confidant and guardian for Kim Jong-un in his new role as leader of North Korea. Now, as with almost all of the leadership moves that occur during this initial transition phase under Kim Jong-un, the removal of Ri Yong Ho will be analyzed and scrutinized to better understand the leadership style of Kim Jong-un, the actual power players in the new regime, and the role of the military.

Many decisions coming from Pyongyang often bring about more questions than answers; this news is no different. With Ri Yong Ho having now been removed, the critical questions will be how Kim Jong-un and key leaders in the regime will control the military and where will Kim Jong-un gets his military advice?  These questions will play a crucial role in future North Korean interaction with its neighbors and the United States.

The statement from KCNA about Ri Yong Ho being relieved of his duties due to illness initially suggests a purge. If so, it is likely he had fallen out of favor. Evidence to support this theory would be that he did not get many new positions in April during the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and National Defense Commission (NDC) meetings.

Vice Marshall Ri being purged because of corruption could also be a possibility. The North Korean Leadership Watch blog notes that “illness” “can be a party center euphemism for insubordination or corruption.” Being at the axis of three important power bases in the military, the Party’s Central Military Commission, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, would provide Ri Yong Ho quality access, influence, and power where corruption, or damaging high-profile corruption, could be a temptation.

Lastly, though less likely, “illness” could simply mean illness. North Korea Leadership Watch again noticed Ri Yong Ho looking like his health was declining and making fewer public appearances.  Although 70 is not that old by North Korean leadership standards, the overall average age of North Korean leaders has been declining since 2008; therefore, there could still be a slight possibility Ri Yong Ho is actually sick, or it is time for him to retire.

Yet a purge is still the most likely scenario. Ri was on the opposite side of Kim Jong-il’s hearse from Kim Jong-un and was viewed as an advisor for the young leader. His sudden removal could signal trouble in the transition or an acceptable switch to a new group of leaders.

One of the suggestions is that Ri Yong Ho wasn’t in favor of deploying military resources for infrastructure projects. Interestingly, the very next article on the KCNA website is about Kim Jong-un sending a message of thanks to a unit of North Korea’s internal security forces for working on construction projects. The article also described Kim Jong-un as “Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army,” as opposed to the previous article about Kim Jong-un visiting a kindergarten, where the title used for him is “first secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea.” A July 14 KCNA article describes Kim Jong-un having his photo taken with “exemplary soldiers of the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces who performed labor feats in major construction projects.” Ri Yong Ho was not listed among the other leaders present.

If it is a purge, Ri Yong Ho’s removal because of disagreement over the proper use of military troops or any other policy will be felt internally. Externally, the removal of Ri Yong Ho for whatever reason also creates a question of where Kim Jong-un will get his military advice. An answer will likely emerge from North Korea’s relationship with South Korea and the United States, especially as the two countries move into the heated final stretch of their respective presidential campaign seasons.

Provocations from North Korea during this transition time have been a concern for both the U.S. and South Korea, especially while the prospect of a nuclear test continues to linger after the failed missile launch. Without Ri Yong Ho’s military advice, which leader with actual military experience, not just being given the title of general, will Kim Jong-un turn to? Will his new group of advisors be able to properly calculate threats and provocations with South Korea and avoid mishandling a potentially stronger response from South Korea to a major attack on its soil or interests? However, internally, we will have to wait to see the impact of his removal. Ri Yong Ho’s “illness” has made Kim Jong-un’s transition even more interesting, and once again, has left us with more questions than answers on North Korea.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

By Sarah K. Yun

June 17, 2012 marks the six month anniversary of Kim Jong-un’s leadership in North Korea.  Some analysts predicted that the new Kim regime was unlikely to survive the first six months, but it has been surprisingly smooth sailing despite several major challenges.  The past half year can be seen as part of the process of establishing internal stability under Kim Jong-un juxtaposed by sporadic events of external psychological warfare.  However, the real test for the regime may lie in the months ahead. With many of the preplanned events for the anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth passed, there will be fewer opportunities for Kim Jong-un to utilize previously choreographed occasions to bolster his legitimacy. Over the next half year, we should begin to see how the real power structure will take shape and what type of leader Kim Jong-un will emerge as.

Stability = Titles + Public Relations + Legacy

For a much needed assertion of legitimacy, the new regime in North Korea has engaged in a process of instilling legitimacy with titles, traditions, and claims of ties to the past. It has turned to a formula of bestowing titles to the living and the dead, public relations campaigns, and an adherence to legacy. On December 31, 2011, Kim Jong-un became the supreme commander of armed forces.  On April 11, 2012, he was appointed the first secretary of the Korea Workers’ Party, standing member of the Politburo, and chairman of the Central Military Commission.  On April 14, he became the first chairman of the National Defense Commission, which officially completed his power transition. At the same time, his legitimacy was tied to the past with the elevation of Kim Jong-il to Eternal General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Eternal Chairman of the National Defense Commission.

While the changes in government were at work, Kim Jong-un made a concerted effort to frequently appear before the public.  His public appearances have helped to create a perception of being in charge and provide the veneer of a leader taking the reins of power. Had he not done so, it would have left the new regime open to speculations of dissent or a coup.  Beginning with his first official visit to a tank brigade on December 30, 2011, he has made approximately 70 public visits (excluding his visits to Kim Jong-il’s bier).  According to sources from NKnews, about 45% of Kim’s public sightings have been related to the military; 41% cultural, education, other symbolic political appearances; and 14% the economy.  The frequency of his public visits indicates Kim Jong-un undertook a strategy to enhance his relevance to the North Korean leaders and people, given his quick ascension to leadership.  The emphasis on military visits is also key as they point to Kim Jong-un’s adherence to the military-first policy, where the true base for his power likely lies.

Moreover, Kim Jong-un made his first public speech in central Pyongyang for the lavish celebration of Kim Il-sung’s 100^th birthday. The speech quieted hopes of Kim Jong-un being a reformed leader, as he focused on carrying the legacy of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, military superiority and songun policy, and ability to stand up to international intimidation.  In his second public speech at the 6^th Children’s Day Festival, he urged young people to take part in the military-first revolution.

Since April 2012, Kim Jong-un has published three public treatises praising the accomplishments of his grandfather and father.  In the treatise dated April 20 titled “The Great Comrade Kim Il-sung is the Eternal Leader of Our Party and People,” Kim Jong-un praised his grandfather for being “the most prominent leader and peerlessly great man in the 20^th century.”

While the North Korean leadership came to the conclusion that a combination of the three factors (titles, public relations, and legacy) would yield internal stability, it also engaged in another tactic of regimes seeking to secure their own legitimacy – rally the population around an external threat.  Therefore, in concert with internal moves to buy time for regime consolidation, North Korea engaged in external psychological warfare with the South Korean leadership to divert attention from North Korea to the outside world.  Much of this can be seen in the recent rhetoric focused on South Korea, but also in the unusually harsh depictions of President Lee Myung-bak.

Insecurities and Challenges

On the other hand, signs of insecurity can be seen within Kim leadership from the lightening speed in which the leadership transition is taking place.  After all, Kim Jong-il had 20 years to consolidate power compared to Kim Jong-un who barely had two years to establish himself.  It has been reported that Kim Jong-un mentioned Kim Il-sung 19 times and Kim Jong-il 15 times in his first speech. This implies that the three Kims are one in mind, ideology and leadership, and also shows a window into North Korea’s dire need to stabilize the new regime under the young leader. Importantly, it indicates how closely the regime’s legitimacy is tied to the Kim family.

Additionally, North Korea’s fixation with information technology and Kim Jong-un’s speech on land management reveal an insecurity of wanting a quick-fix to leapfrog over past steps in its approach to development.  Kim’s emphasis on the need for continued face lift on the buildings and infrastructure of Pyongyang to “spruce up the land as befitting that of a thriving nation” is a limited approach to development.

At the same time, the regime is tamping down the rhetoric in terms of its promises to the population. North Korea’s goal of becoming a strong and prosperous nation by 2012 is dismal. The regime has implied its achievement of a strong and prosperous nation on ideology and military, but not on the economic front. According to South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo, the Congress of the Korea Workers Party reportedly revised its regulations to replace “juche” with “principles of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il” and “strong and prosperous nation” with “powerful nation.”

The failed rocket launch amidst the presence of foreign media in North Korea also posed a significant hurdle for Kim Jong-un’s leadership.  Arguably, the rocket launch was a continuation of Kim Jong-il’s policy.  Therefore, Kim Jong-un’s next step to recover from the embarrassment will be an important factor in whether he garners continued support from the military or creates fissures for opposition to grow.

Future Challenges

Given that Kim Jong-un focused almost solely on the consolidation of leadership in the first half year of his ascension to power, the next six months will be a test of his ability to make policy decisions that impact internal dynamics or diplomatic relationships.  Urgent issues that need to be addressed include the next steps on the nuclear program and an economic stagnation compounded by one of the worst droughts in 50 years.

While North Korea adopts a wait-and-see approach towards the U.S. and South Korea, who both have presidential elections at the end of 2012, Kim has also adopted a more visible diplomatic approach with Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam.  The upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum in July might be an interesting venue to watch Kim Jong-un’s engagement strategy.  Furthermore, North Korea’s relationship with China after the UNSC Presidential Statement condemning the rocket launch and detainment of Chinese fishermen will be noteworthy to observe.

The true test for Kim Jong-un may be whether is able to carve out a style of leadership that respects the legacy of his family but is able to set a new path for North Korea. Two issues could help provide insight on this. First is whether Kim Jong-un would be compelled to respond to the failure of the missile launch or stick to his statement that the regime has no plans for a third nuclear test. If the regime is able to merely move on without any demonstration, it could represent a significant change in the leadership. Additionally, if discussions on economic development begin, they could represent the first steps towards gradual economic reform.

Over the next six months and coming years, Kim Jong-un and North Korea will surely face further leadership decisions and challenges.  What remains unanswered is what type of leader he will be and how the power structure in Pyongyang will unfold. How this is answered in an unscripted environment will give us a concrete framework to better understand the future leadership. The first six months under Kim Jong-un have been relatively smooth, but have also only been enough to provide a window into Kim Jong-un’s leadership style.  The next phase will determine if he can establish legitimacy as a leader outside the shadow of his father and grandfather.

Sarah K. Yun is the Director of Public Affairs and Regional Issues for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are her own.

Photo from zennie62’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.