By Jack Pritchard

There was a plausible scenario ready to work itself out with a successful launch of a missile by North Korea.  The Security Council would meet and issue a stern presidential statement condemning Pyongyang.  North Korea would push back rhetorically, claiming its sovereign right to space exploration while Beijing would send a high level delegation to Pyongyang to privately caution the North not to conduct a third nuclear test.  Because the Security Council presidential statement carries no actual new punishments, Pyongyang would have absorbed the criticism and reveled in its achievement of placing a satellite in orbit and, most importantly, would not have seen the need to conduct a third nuclear test – at least not in the near term.  Beijing would have been given credit for preventing the situation from escalating out of hand.

But that is not what happened.  Pyongyang gambled that it could successfully launch a satellite and in a grand gesture to spotlight the launch as the centerpiece in the celebration of the country’s founder’s 100^th birthday, the North invited the international press to witness the event. The consequences of that decision were immediately evident when Pyongyang was forced to publicly admit that the missile had failed.  In contrast to past failures where North Korea has declared success to its citizens, there was no possibility that Pyongyang could cover up this failure.  Journalists were in real time communications with their networks and within minutes of the missile failure being reported outside of North Korea, the invited journalists were pressing their North Korean minders for comments about the failure. While there are controls on the 1 million cell phones in North Korea, news of the missile failure was certain to spread quickly.

The embarrassment to the new regime cannot be over stated.  The failure will cast a dark shadow over the most important celebratory day in North Korean history.  The credibility and perhaps the survivability of the regime are at stake.  Pyongyang will need a spectacular achievement to overcome the national embarrassment it finds itself in now.  Declaring yourself a “strong and prosperous nation” requires that you be able to point to some kind of tangible achievement. What that means is that it is now much more likely that North Korea will move forward with its third nuclear test.  Unlike a missile launch that is observable and is either a success or failure, a nuclear detonation, regardless of yield, can be touted as an absolute success.

If Pyongyang does proceed with a nuclear test, it will also mean that North Korea has made the political calculation that it can do anything without fear of serious negative consequences from Beijing. It will have concluded that China has put itself in a position where it will not allow North Korea to collapse – no matter what.  And it will be right.

The precedent for this type of calculation was set several years ago.  In spite of the tough non-proliferation rhetoric coming out of the George W. Bush administration, Pyongyang calculated that it could cooperate with Syria in building a nuclear reactor (proliferating nuclear technology) and get away with it.  Unfortunately, that calculation proved correct.  There were no consequences. 

Now China finds itself in a difficult situation. What, if any, leverage can it exert to prevent a third nuclear test and not risk contributing to the collapse of North Korea?  For Beijing, the answer is: very little.  The need for Pyongyang to overcome the immense embarrassment caused by the very public failure of its missile and to quell any latent rumblings about the leadership of Kim Jong Un is far stronger than any unrealistic threat by Beijing to seriously punish the North.

While a successful satellite launch would have it its negative consequences regarding North Korea’s missile delivery program, it just might have precluded the need for a third nuclear test.  However much relief there is because of the missile failure, it just may mean that Pyongyang disregards any warnings from China and goes ahead with a nuclear test. 

Jack Pritchard is the former ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the President of the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Joseph Turk Jun’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

After holding its Fourth Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea, North Korea now has an eternal president and an eternal general secretary. Kim Jong-il was named Eternal General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), and Kim Jong-un was given the title of First Secretary of the WPK. These initial changes and those suspected to come in the next few days will give some indications on how North Korea will try to structure its leadership under Kim Jong-un.

After his death, it was likely that North Korea would try to honor Kim Jong-il in some way. The Kim family lineage being an important aspect of the young Kim Jong-un’s power, it was anticipated that Kim Jong-il would be given a special recognition along the lines of Kim Il-sung. There were some predictions that Kim Jong-il would be given an eternal title in connection with the National Defense Commission (NDC). Now with Kim Jong-il posthumously given the title of Eternal General Secretary, it will be interesting to see if this move further indicates a renewed emphasis leadership on the Party instead of the military.

For Kim Jong-un, he officially becomes head of the party through the new position of first secretary. After the death of Kim Jong-il, North Korean media labeled Kim Jong-un as head of the Party and supreme commander of the military. Even in the story announcing Kim Jong-un’s new title, KCNA said Kim Jong-un as the “supreme leader of the WPK and the people of the DPRK” was elected “as first secretary of the WPK, true to the behest of leader Kim Jong Il.” With him as the head of the party, the question now is Kim Jong-un officially the chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC)?

A week after Kim Jong-il’s death, the Rodong Sinmun apparently said Kim Jong-un was leading the CMC. Yet, the AP’s Jean Lee recently saw signs in North Korea saying “”We will defend vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission Comrade Kim Jong Un to the death.” According to the Party’s constitution updated in September 2010, it states the “general secretary” (총비서) is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission, compared to Kim Jong-un’s new title as first secretary (제1비서). KCNA did say that the Fourth Conference of the WPK discussed “revising WPK rules,” so possibly this is where changes will occur to officially connect Kim Jong-un’s new title with the chairmanship of the CMC.

Further evidence of Party strengthening can be seen with Jang Song Taek and Kim Kyong Hui, uncle and aunt of Kim Jong-un, moving into prominent positions in the WPK. Jang Song Taek now joins the Political Bureau while his wife becomes a secretary in the Party Secretariat. Ri Myong Su, the Minister of Public Security, joins Jang Song Taek on the Political Bureau and was named a member of the CMC. Ri Myong Su, the Minister of Public Security, joins Jang Song Taek on the Political Bureau and was named a member of the CMC.

Choe Ryong Hae and Hyon Chol Hae, members of the CMC and the NDC respectively, were both awarded the title of Vice Marshal in the Korean People’s Army. These military promotions probably helped with their new positions in the WPK. Choe, a relatively young leader at 61 and appears to have close ties with Jang Song Taek, was given big promotions to Vice-Chairmen of the CMC as well as a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau. Hyon Chol Hae is now part of the CMC in addition to his role in the NDC.

For leadership changes, we will wait to see if any other announcements are made on moves stemming from the Workers’ Party Conference. With the WPK having a lot of changes during its last recent meeting in September 2010, it is possible few other changes will occur. The Supreme People’s Assembly is scheduled to meet on Friday, April 13, so more news could follow. The main question still remains if Kim Jong-un will officially be the chair of the CMC and the NDC, despite North Korean media basically describing him as the supreme leader of the Party and the military. All of these meetings and moves, along with the anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday next week, are meant to illustrate North Korea’s ability to smoothly transition to Kim Jong-un.

Early indications suggest a strengthening of the Party as key members of the North Korean leadership gain positions. If Kim Jong-un will indeed rule more through the Party than his father, he will likely need people like Jang Song Taek, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Gak, and Ri Myong Su to help him. Their new positions, along with the promotions of Choe Ryong Hae and Hyon Chol Hae give some indication on how Kim Jong-un and the leaders around him plan to maintain power and begin a new era of Kim family leadership in North Korea.   

For more info on Kim Jong-un, Jang Song Taek,  Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Yong Chun, and Ri Myong Su, visit  10 People You Need to Know for Transition in North Korea on The Peninsula blog.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Zennie Abraham’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Ben Hancock

President Obama this week is gearing up for a trip to South Korea that will see him both participate in the international Nuclear Security Summit and make the short journey from Seoul to the border with North Korea. It’s also his first trip to Korea — indeed, anywhere in Asia — since last November, when his administration trumpeted the “Asia pivot,” a term that still has many in the foreign policy world scratching their heads. This makes now a good moment to reflect on what the “pivot” really means for South Korea, a long-time U.S. ally that already hosts a strong contingent of some 28,500 American soldiers.

It’s seems safe to say that, so far, the pivot has not yielded any concrete outcomes, perhaps other than stronger U.S. military ties with Australia. But even so, many observers have framed the policy as Washington taking an active role to counter-balance the widening influence of Beijing in the Asia-Pacific. Clearly, if true, this is an aspect that would have bearing on South Korea and its neighbor to the north. The questions are: How exactly would this affect the peninsula, and how likely is this effort to yield new results given the current geo-political dynamic?

In concept at least, it seems fairly straightforward that reducing military and economic tension in the Asia-Pacific by having the U.S. reaffirm its commitment to serving as an outside balancer in the region at a time when the rise of China has many worried would be beneficial for South Korea. Any subsequent increased U.S. leverage on China would also probably give Washington a better hand in negotiating with the North on its nuclear program — also a benefit for Seoul.

So that’s a partial answer to my first question. The fuller answer is: it’s complicated.  For example, it’s not really clear whether a new U.S. military focus on the Asia-Pacific would really counter-balance against China, or would simply raise the stakes as Beijing undergoes a leadership transition of its own and seeks to ensure stability and project strength. For that matter, it’s unclear if the pivot truly means an increased U.S. military focus on the region or more of a commitment not to reduce its presence. Similarly, on the economic front, it’s unanswered whether a new U.S.-led trade deal among nations along the Pacific Rim will really pressure China to adopt high standards, or will simply lead it to forge its own deals — with Korea and Japan, for instance.

We may not need to worry about any of that. In answer to the second question, I would bet that the likelihood of new developments under the “pivot” is very low. Though House Republicans are trying to reduce the budgetary impact on the Pentagon, defense cuts of some measure appear to be on the horizon. That seems to rule out a rise in U.S. military might in Asia being a cornerstone of the “pivot” policy. In Korea, it seems likely that the base consolidation now underway will continue along the same course, along with the transfer of wartime command to Seoul.

Next, economics and trade. Obama kicked off the year in his State of the Union with a clear salvo against China in this area, almost undoubtedly because it plays well in an election year. But this approach seems unlikely to further the long-term U.S. goal of convincing China to rebalance its export-dominated economy. This probably means the status quo for South Korea, too, which continues to be interested in making inroads into the Chinese market.  Of course, Korea could make advances on its own by increasing market share and investment in China if bilateral negotiations with Beijing take off. In the meantime, the conclusion of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (in which Korea has shown little interest) is still miles away.

This mix of factors seems to foreshadow a familiar formula for dealing with North Korea as well. Absent any new show of U.S. military might, increased leverage with China economically or otherwise, or real diplomatic maneuvering, what’s to keep the North from playing its old tricks? Not a whole lot, it seems, as evidenced by its return to testing missiles with the purported purpose of sending satellites into space. When Obama looks over the DMZ early next week for the first time since taking office, he may well find himself still puzzled at how to engage such a defiant nation.

This all paints a picture of the “pivot” not meaning very much for Korea in the near term. In fact, it may be more accurate to think of the phrase as the administration’s branding for what it has already accomplished in Asia — joining new dialogues, showing a lot of earnest diplomatic engagement in the region, and passing the KORUS FTA. That doesn’t mean there are no prospects for future developments under this umbrella; if Obama is granted more time to pursue the policy by voters this November, we may yet see it take on new aspects. A positive shift in the direction of the U.S. economy and fiscal situation could also alter the narrative, but neither of those appear to be in the offing any time soon.

Ben Hancock is a journalist based in Washington, D.C. He has studied Korean language and culture since 2004, and most recently lived in Korea from 2008 to 2010. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Expert Infantry’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

by Nicholas Hamisevicz

Last month South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) commissioner Noh Dae-lae stated that DAPA had exceeded its defense exports goals last year and was now attempting to sell over $3 billion defense exports in 2012.  South Korea might have hit that $3 billion mark last year if it won a contract from the Indian Air Force to supply 75 KT-1 fighter aircraft trainers. Despite losing out on the bid, South Korea’s should continue to compete for military acquisition bids by the Indian military and other emerging countries to help strengthen partnerships and enhance its domestic military development.

South Korea is looking to increase its military exports. Shipbuilding has typically been one of South Korea’s main advantages. Last year, Korea was able to win a contract worth around $500 million for eight minesweepers to India to help protect Indian harbors from being mined by enemy submarines.

Korea has also had success in selling fighter aircraft trainers abroad. The KT-1 and the T-50 are the two fighter trainers Korea has pushed in competitive bid selections by foreign countries. Indonesia bought 12 KT-1 fighter trainers in 2001 and signed a deal last year to buy 16 T-50 fighter jet trainers from Korea. Turkey agreed to buy 40 KT-1 trainers as well.

Success in these countries led to the KT-1 competing in India’s bid for fighter trainers. The KT-1 recently came in second behind the Swiss Pilatus PC-7 in this competition. However, South Korea has filed a complaint arguing that Switzerland’s Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. did not submit a maintenance transfer of technology cost assessment (MTOT), giving the Pilatus PC-7 aircraft a cost advantage over the other competitors. The complaint appears to have delayed the Indian Air Force’s process of moving forward with Pilatus, but it will likely be difficult to see the decision reversed and given to the KT-1.

The intense competition to win the fighter trainer contract and the uncertainty around the decision recalls the rejection by India’s Ministry of Defense of the U.S.’s bids from Boeing with its F-18 and Lockheed Martin with its F-16 for the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) competition. Dassault’s Rafale fighter recently won this high-profile bid.

The combination of companies trying to win military contracts worth millions of dollars (or billions with the MMRCA bid) and countries attempting to augment their partnerships with a rising India makes these bids even more competitive. India’s desire to strengthen its military capabilities and its history of purchasing equipment and arms from variety of companies from multiple countries will likely remain, keeping competition for military contracts fierce. Winning a large military contract with India helps solidify a country’s strategic partnership with Indian and provide a unique connection that further enhances the relationship between the two countries. South Korea is hoping its new strategic partnership with India would lead to success with its defense exports to the rising power. Winning the minesweeper contract but difficulties with the fighter trainer competition demonstrate the tough aspects of the military acquisition process in India. However, South Korea should continue to pursue military bids in India and create connections with Indian military officials, which will benefit the long-term strategic aspects of their strategic partnership and the enhancement of overall South Korea – India relations.

Picture by Defense Industry Daily

By Ben Hancock

It’s still unclear whether the rapid political shift underway in Burma can carry its momentum. Even the matter of what is truly driving its evolution seems to be guesswork at this point; and as the NYT’s Edward Wong reminds us, there is the minor matter of a seething rebellion in the Kachin region for the government of President Thein Sein to overcome — hopefully in a way that ends without dramatic displacement or violence. But either way, if what the world is witnessing now signals a lasting change in a country long seen as Southeast Asia’s answer to North Korea, it raises a fresh set of questions about what an open, U.S.-oriented Burma could mean for the Korean Peninsula.

For U.S. policy makers, past and present military engagement between Pyongyang and Naypyidaw appears to be the area of chief concern. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said in November that his panel was told years ago about the North helping Burma to develop nuclear weapons. Speaking just before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s trip to Burma (which included a stop-off in Busan), Lugar put that information out there to “throw a spotlight on this issue and make sure it’s on the table in our talks with the Burmese government,” an aide told The Washington Post. The information had already surfaced in cables released in 2010 by Wikileaks, although doubts were raised then, too, about the degree to which a Burmese nuclear program could have advanced.

It seems fair to assume that if Mr. Sein continues along his current trajectory, Burma’s military cooperation with the North — however limited or expansive it really is — will grind to a halt. With a U.S. ambassador on the way and prospects for eased sanctions on the horizon, the promise of economic development in Burma is almost sure to outweigh any perceived benefits of maintaining military links the North. In a recent editorial, Sydney Morning Herald writer William Pesek asks an interesting question: Could that mean the North follows Burma’s lead.

There are clear differences between the states. Pesek writes that Burma was never as “surreal” as North Korea has become; the surprising durability and pervasiveness of the authoritarian regime in the North is unique. David Steinberg, professor of Asian studies at Georgetown, writes in the Irrawady that the propaganda machine employed by the Burmese junta was never as effective at cocooning its people in misinformation as Pyongyang’s is. But Pesek also makes another interesting point: Burma could be just the latest in a string of lost customers to North Korea. The Arab Spring revolutions — which took out Gaddafi and rattled Syria — have whittled at its list of weapons buyers.

A Burma that embraces the U.S. may also mean a Burma that leans away from China. News media have documented how the neighbors are already on thin ice over the Myitsone hydroelectric dam. That project is being pursued by a Chinese state-owned enterprise, but was suspended last year by Burmese leaders in a surprising response to public opposition. It’s possible that this clears the way for increased investment from close U.S. ally South Korea — a resource-poor country that already has its hand in the Burmese market. Seoul and Naypyidaw announced in 2010 that they were upping their cooperation in the energy sector by exploiting two more gas blocks.

Perhaps more importantly, Burma’s political shift could lessen the moral hazard that Korean companies face in investing in the Southeast Asian country. Korean Gas Corp (KOGAS) and Daewoo International hold sizable stakes in the Shwe gas pipeline project, which has been deeply controversial. EarthRights International filed an official complaint against the companies via the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), charging that they had ignored human rights abuses entailed in the construction of the pipeline. That kind of behavior doesn’t seem to be particularly new; complaints filed in the U.S. against the now-defunct Unocal oil company in 1997 involved many similar claims.

But one would hope that a regime that is now releasing political prisoners would also lay the groundwork for a more responsible business environment. The next test of the new regime’s commitment to democracy will come on April 1, when the country holds a by-election for parliamentary seats.

Ben Hancock is a reporter covering international trade and investment. He has studied Korean language and culture since 2004, and lived in Korea most recently from 2008 to 2010. His views are his own.

Picture from DPRK – Myanmar Military Delegation Visit, 2008.

By Ken E. Gause

Three sets of messages have emerged from the North Korean media in the days since Kim Chong-il’s death on December 17. The first two sets of messages are tied to the leadership configuration that is rising up to take over the reins of power, namely Kim Chong-un supported by a collective group of close aides and regents. The third message is that the regime will continue to adhere to the policy line set down by Kim Chong-il, namely the Songun (Military First) Policy. Together these messages support a regime plan for a smooth transfer of power, which by all indications appears to have taken place. Going forward, what does this mean for the regime and the young man who would be king?

With regard to Kim Chong-un, the regime appears to have launched a blitz campaign to portray him as the legitimate successor to his father, removing any doubt within the mind of the public and elite alike over who is in charge. Particular emphasis has been placed on Kim Chong-un’s bona fides as the leader of the Party and, just as important, the military. On December 24, the 20^th anniversary of Kim Chong-il’s assumption of the post of Supreme Commander in 1991, Kim Chong-un visited his father’s funeral bier for a third time. Accompanying the young successor were members of the KWP Central Military Committee (CMC), the National Defense Commission, major commanding officers of the KPA, staff members of the KPA Supreme Command, and commanding officers of the KPA’s large combined units. In other words, it was a ceremonial gathering of the high command. On the same day, the Party daily, Nodong Sinmun, ran a commemorative political essay calling Kim Chong-un the “supreme commander” of the military. Two days later, the same source referred to Kim as leading the KWP CMC, although he only formally holds the title vice chairman.

What seems to be happening is that the regime is using the mourning period to rapidly move through the third phase of the succession, a phase in which the heir apparent would be adorned with the titles of power. In the coming months, if not weeks according to some sources, we can expect that a formal meeting of the Korean Worker’s Party will be convened to convey at least the title of CMC chairman on Kim Chong-un, which, according to the recently revised Party Charter (Article 22), carries with it the title of General Secretary of the Party. On 30 December, the Politburo passed a decree formally transferring the post of Supreme Commander to Kim Chong-un in accordance with his father’s will. Now all military units are required to obey Kim Chong-un’s orders.

The role of Supreme Commander (Choson inmin’gun ch’oego) raises an important question. Will Kim Chong-un be made chairman of the National Defense Commission, a post that is responsible for commanding the armed forces (i.e., the Supreme Commander)? Although the North Korean media called for Kim Chong-un to assume the role of Supreme Commander, it has been mute on the post of NDC chairman. The regime may choose to leave the NDC post vacant. Much as Kim Il-sung became the eternal president, Kim Chong-il might become the eternal head of the NDC, an organization that embodied his leadership era. This scenario might have been tipped by the fact that at least one, if not more, of the funeral events have been handled by Chon Hui-chong, the protocol director for the NDC. This suggests the possibility that the NDC apparatus is already acting in the service of the Party’s CMC. In addition, the key members of the NDC, such as O Kuk-yol and Paek Se-pong (head of the powerful Second Economic Committee), who do not also sit on leading Party bodies, have been integrated into the funeral lists among the government leadership, not singled out, as in the past, as part of the NDC.

These clues aside, Kim Chong-un has already been proclaimed the Supreme Leader (ch’eogo ryo’ngdoja), a title that is currently constitutionally linked to the NDC chairman (Article 100). If Kim Chong-un does not assume this post, the constitution will have to be revised (via the convening of the Supreme People’s Assembly) to separate the posts of Supreme Leader and NDC chairman.

As the funeral ceremonies have played out, the leadership configuration around the Kim Chong-un has come into focus. It is made of several rings and is based in the Party, but largely tied to the high command. The inner core will serve as gatekeepers and most likely be involved in decision-making.

• VMAR Yi Yong-ho, as director of the General Staff Department, has operational control over the armed forces. A long time associate of the Kim family, he oversees one of the key support groups within the military that is supporting Kim Chong-un. This group is made up of officers in their 50s and 60s generally considered the rising stars among the field commanders and high command. VMAR Yi through this network will be instrumental in keeping the military in check during the transition period.
• Gen. Chang Song-taek, who has oversight of the internal security apparatus and the economy portfolio, is well situated to support Kim Chong-un in the running of the daily operations of the regime. He is versed in both policy execution and in the machinations revolving around personnel appointments that will be critical for Kim to consolidate his power.
• Gen. Kim Kyong-hui in the period between her brother’s death on December 17 and the final mourning ceremonies jumped from 14^th to 5^th in the formal leadership rankings. She will likely play an advisory role and serve as a key arbitrator within the Kim family as well as the larger North Korean leadership.
• Gen. O Kuk-yol is a long time Kim family loyalist. He, too, jumped within the power rankings from 29^th to 13^th. His primary responsibility will be to ensure regime stability. His input into decision-making will be limited, but his opinion could carry weight in deliberations involving tradeoffs between reform and security.

The outer ring of this leadership configuration is centered in the Party’s CMC, which is made up of key second and third generation military and security officials from the across the regime. Kim Chong-il’s reinvigoration of the CMC at the Third Party Conference has placed this body on par with the NDC in terms of reach and influence. Under Kim Chong-un, the CMC will most likely replace the NDC as the command post of Military First Politics. It will be responsible for crafting the “great successor’s” image, gathering loyalty toward the new regime, and running the country. In terms of Kim’s relationship with the military, three CMC members are particularly crucial during the transition period. All accompanied Kim Chong-un as he escorted his father’s hearse through the streets of Pyongyang.

• VMAR Kim Yong-chun, as Minister of People’s Armed Forces, oversees the logistics and training of the military. He will serve, along with Chang Song-taek, as a key conduit to the NDC. In addition he has past service in the KWP Organization Guidance Department and the KPA’s General Political Department, which give him invaluable experience in sniffing out potential disloyalty within the armed forces. It was reportedly his surveillance in this regard that contributed to the staunching of the Sixth Corps incident in the mid-1990s.
• Gen. Kim Chong-gak is the acting head of the KPA’s General Political Bureau, a responsibility he assumed with the death of Cho Myong-nok. According to North Korean leadership protocol, the director of the GPB, which is the lead agency for ensuring Party control over the military, is the de facto third ranking member in the high command behind the heads of the MPAF and GSD.
• Gen. U Tong-chuk, as first vice director of the State Security Department, oversees the country’s powerful secret police. Gen. U is a leading member of a key support group to Kim Chong-un composed of general grade officers within the security services. Presumably other members of this group include Gen. Yun Chong-rin, commander of the General Guard Command, and Gen. Kim Won-hong, the commander of the Military Security Command. These organizations form the inner ring for internal security insideNorth Korea.

Other individuals with military portfolios bear watching, such as O Il-chong (director of the KWP Military Department), Kim Kyong-ok (first vice director of the OGD for military affairs), and Choe Ryong-hae (KWP Secretary for Military Affairs). They have important roles to play in monitoring the loyalty of the armed forces and ensuring a smooth transition. They will also be critical to creating and facilitating a unified and centralized Party guidance system that invests the “great successor” with the ideological authority he will need to rule. Media coverage, however, does not suggest they will be within Kim Chong-un’s inner circle, at least initially.

The final set of signals being sent by the regime in the days following Kim Chong-il’s death is tied to policy. KCNA proclaimed on 26 December that under Kim Chong-un, Military First Politics “will be given steady continuity at all times.” This was seconded by an editorial in Nodong Sinmun entitled “Korean people will accomplish the cause of Songun (Military First) under leadership of Kim Chong-un.” This adherence to the policy line set down by Kim Chong-il was emphatically reiterated in a NDC statement on 30 December, which ruled out any policy change with regard toSouth Korea as long as the Lee Myong-bok administration is in power. Given the sensitive nature of the inter-Korean relationship, the new regime’s decision to opt for hardline continuity is not surprising since it will give Kim Chong-un a year to consolidate his position before having to take on the entrenched interests within the military that balk at dialog with Seoul.

But is this initial hardline stance a harbinger of a regime that will remain entrenched and unmoving? Currently, it is hard imagine a radical shift. Authoritative statements have no doubt linked Kim Chong-un’s name to a go slow approach toward the South (even before the NDC announcement) and an embrace of the country’s nuclear weapons capability (“a victory through songun politics”). These will likely remain lines in the sand for the regime for the foreseeable future. As noted in numerous articles, Kim Chong-un is “endlessly loyal to the idea and cause of the great general [Kim Chong-il].”

In the coming days, possibly after a 100-day mourning period, Kim will likely receive the formal positions befitting his position as Supreme Leader. As this process plays out, North Korean policymaking will probably remain firmly within the boundaries set down by Kim Chong-il. This was made clear in the Joint Editorial proclaiming the regime’s goals for 2012. For those looking for radical shifts, either on the domestic or international fronts, only time will tell if that is in the cards.

Ken Gause is the director of the International Affairs Group at CNA, a research organization located in Alexandria, VA. He is the author of the book North Korea Under Kim Chong-il: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change, which was published by Praeger in August 2011. He also authored a paper in November entitled North Korea After Kim Chong-il: Leadership Dynamics and Potential Crisis Scenarios, which can be obtained on CNA’s website. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Zennie62′s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Ken Gause

The death of Kim Chong-il does not only mean a transition in leadership as can be seen with the apparent coronation of Kim Chong-un as the successor. It also likely means a change in the leadership structure, which will potentially have a dramatic impact on how Pyongyang makes decisions and how those decisions are translated into policy. From what can be gleaned from the first days after Kim’s death, a continuity of government plan has been put in place to ensure the smooth transition in power. What is not clear is whether this plan lays out a framework by which the leadership can begin to make decisions on the range of issues facing the regime.

A close reading of the North Korean media suggests that the so-called “collective leadership” forming around the young leader is drawn from a number of powerful Party and military leaders who had strong ties to Kim Chong-il and held powerful portfolios within his leadership structure, namely Kim Kyong-hui, Chang Song-taek, O Kuk-yol, and Yi Yong-ho:

• Kim Kyong-hui: Kim Chong-un’s aunt and member of the Politburo. She has figured prominently in the media coverage of the mourning ceremony, though she was listed in her expected spot among the Politburo members on the funeral list. She most likely serves as a figure of continuity as the transition moves forward; however, her ties to Kim Chong-un are highly suspect given her long-standing ties to Kim Chong-il’s oldest son, Kim Chong-nam.
• Chang Song-taek: Kim Chong-un’s uncle, alternate member of the Politburo and member of the Central Military Committee (CMC). As the story goes, Chang made a deal with Kim Chong-il in early 2009 to support Kim Chong-un in return for Kim Chong-il’s permission to build his own patronage network. The defacto head of the North Korean internal security apparatus, Chang is the real wildcard in any succession scenario. His support will be vital for his nephew’s early consolidation of power. He, however, could stand in the way of Kim’s long term survival.
• O Kuk-yol: Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. The O family has been the primary support family to the Kim family since the founding of the regime. A former chief of the General Staff, O Kuk-yol has the portfolio within the regime for crisis management and sits atop a vast apparatus of special forces. A rather shadowy figure, he could serve as a counterweight to Chang Song-taek within the senior leadership and will likely play a role in ensuring the loyalty of the high command.
• Yi Yong-ho: Chief of the General Staff, Member of the Politburo Presidium, Vice Chairman of the CMC. The son of Yi Pong-su, one of Kim Il-sung’s close partisan supporters during the war against the Japanese, Yi Yong-ho is considered to be one of Kim Chong-un’s guardians within the high command. Presumably he would be involved in any decision-making regarding security and the armed forces.

Under Kim Chong-il, regime decision-making was complex. Widely referred to as a hub and spoke leadership management style, Kim was the ultimate decision-maker across the policy issues. He reached out, often through informal alliances, to key associates to execute decisions. Policy options emerging from the bottom up went through his Personal Secretariat, which packaged them for Kim’s approval or rejection. No other checks and balances existed within the system. As such, policy shifts could be embarked upon as long as Kim signed off on the shift.

With Kim’s passing, the lynch pin for the leadership structure has been removed. More likely than not, Kim Chong-un cannot fill his father’s shoes at this point. It will take time for him to consolidate his power, if ever. That said, the regime still must make decisions. To date, three major decisions seem to have been made under the new leadership configuration and none really have Kim Chong-un’s fingerprints on them. On the contrary, they seem to suggest that decision-making has devolved away from the hub to the spokes.

• Although Decision Number 1 to halt field exercises and return to the barracks was allegedly signed by Kim Chong-un, more than likely the decision fell within the portfolio for crisis management headed by O Kuk-yol, possibly with the support of Yi Yong-ho as Chief of the General Staff. This was a decision that had to be made quickly as part of the smooth transition in power. While Kim Chong-un may have been aware of the need for such an order as part of a continuity in government plan, he would have had to rely on more august leaders to make it happen.
• In the hours after Kim’s death, security measures were put into effect that closed the border withChina, closed the markets, and confined North Koreans to their homes. Public security officers patrolled the streets to ensure compliance. These decisions fell within Chang Song-taek’s portfolio for internal security. Although Kim Chong-un has been rumored to be involved in the affairs of regime security, his knowledge of the steps that need to be taken to clamp the country under wraps is probably still growing, nothing to say of the relationships he would need to garner in order to ensure that such orders are carried out.
• The mourning exercise and the coronation of Kim Chong-un as successor appears to have come directly from the playbook exercised by the Propaganda and Agitation apparatus in 1994. The arrangement of the principals and the protocol followed has the feel and look of stage management. The decisions regarding the presentation of the transfer of power were likely carried out under the watchful eye of Kim Ki-nam as the Party Secretary for Propaganda. This is an example where the senior members of the collective leadership (cited above) signed off on a decision made outside their circle.

Over the next week, as the mourning process leads up to the funeral on December 28, decision-making will likely remain along portfolio lines. The problem for this new leadership will arise as it seeks to take decisions that run across portfolios. This is where the tensions will arise and the in the absence of an ultimate decision-maker, the ability to build consensus could break down.

As we move forward, there are several things to pay attention to for clues to how well the regime is coping with this new decision-making paradigm. The first will be the New Year’s essay published on 1 or 2 January. This essay will highlight the accomplishments of 2011 and lay out the agenda for 2012. If military objectives are given priority, it could suggest a conservative decision-making process whereby the regime is going to adhere firmly within established boundaries. However, if civilian objectives are stressed, some real movement within the leadership could be afoot.

Another issue the regime will have to deal with is food aid and what to do about the Six Party Talks. Both entail engaging the outside world, something that will demand a high degree of consensus within the regime and possibly a possibly a decision to move beyond the boundaries set down by Kim Chong-il before he died. While the move to reengage with the international community on food aid will not be surprising given the progress the regime has to show as it moves toward April and 100^th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth, if the regime were to agree to return to the Six Party Talks, it would suggest a higher degree of cohesion in decision-making than is currently suggested by the atmospherics surrounding the transition.

Finally, the potential for provocations remains a real concern for the international community. The regime could use such events to build cohesion around the new leadership. Decision-making regarding such provocations in the past were normally close hold operations signed off on by Kim Chong-il. How the calculus to support such provocations will be derived in the future is not entirely clear and whether anyone within the collective leadership, but outside the military, would have a veto over such operations is highly speculative. If such an incident occurs,Pyongyangwatchers will be left to consider whether this means Kim Chong-un is in charge? Has he been co-opted by hardline generals? Or are there other machinations at play? The answer may not be forthcoming, but if it is, it will speak volumes about how this regime is now operating.

Ken Gause is the director of the International Affairs Group at CNA, a research organization located in Alexandria, VA. He is the author of the book North Korea Under Kim Chong-il: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change, which was published by Praeger in August 2011. He also authored a paper in November entitled North Korea After Kim Chong-il: Leadership Dynamics and Potential Crisis Scenarios, which can be obtained on CNA’s website (www.cna.org). The views expressed here are his own.

 Photo from bryanh’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons. 

By Jack Pritchard

I am not sure why, but I was listening to a radio psychic for a few minutes last night.  She started off by telling the caller that she had a strong sense that he had a teenage daughter. When told no, he had two twenty-something sons and that one was gay, the psychic explained that, in fact, gay men appeared to her as young females.

This gave me encouragement to put my 2012 predictions down in writing, knowing that if I were wrong I could later twist the facts to fit my predictions in the same manner as the psychic.

Lee Myung-bak may well look back at December 17 as the best birthday he ever had.  Not that he personally is celebrating the death of Kim Jong Il, but that the death will turn out to mark the beginning of the end of North Korea and the beginning of the serious road to reunification.

North Korea has survived on a strict concept of one man authoritarian rule.  Kim Il Sung eliminated rivals and tolerated no dissent.  Kim painstakingly ensured his son learned the art of iron-fisted leadership over a twenty year period.  Even then, when Kim Il Sung died in July 1994, there were concerns that Kim Jong Il might not survive.  But at age 52 and twenty years of practical experience under his belt, he took three years to fully consolidate his power base and then autocratically ruled for the next 11 years until his stroke in August 2008.  Facing his own mortality, Kim Jong Il began a hasty and accelerated plan for succession. He settled on his then 25 year old son as his successor.  Finding the prospect of success low, Kim expanded the National Defense Commission (the ruling body) and named his brother-in-law first as a member and then later as a vice chairman.  Kim appointed his sister and son a four star general and began the process of revitalizing the Korean Workers Party as a counterweight to the military.  Analysts predicted that the process would succeed only if Kim Jong Il lived long enough to cement the paper thin credentials he had bestowed upon his son, Kim Jong Un.

Kim Jong Il did not live long enough to even enjoy his elevation to Number One Dictator in Parade Magazine’s December 18 edition.

The consequences for Kim Jong Un because of his father’s abrupt death will be dire.  He has virtually no practical experience, no individual power base and a system newly designed to weakly function after Kim Jong Il as check and balance between the military, the party and a regent (Jong SongTaek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law).  The problem is that Kim Jong Il elevated the military through his Military First Policy to the point where it is THE power in North Korea and efforts to share power can only come through the diminution of the military – something it will not accept in the mid- to long-term.

There will be a natural and short lived period of public unity in the aftermath of Kim’s death.  However, the consolidation of power and the maneuvering that is going on behind the scenes will come to the surface – probably shortly after the April 15 celebrations of Kim Il Sung’s 100^th birthday.  By then, the military will have successfully neutered Jong Song Taek and will be calling all the shots.  At some point the military will cease to find Kim Jong Un useful as the public face of continuity of the Kim dynasty and he too will vanish from public view.

Under these circumstances the military may be able to exert enough control to maintain a semblance of stability, but not for long.  At some point in the next 12-24 months, the underpinnings of control will come undone, followed by a rapid collapse of North Korea as we know it and movement toward reunification.

2012 will be a year worth remembering.

Jack Pritchard (aka Carnac the Magnificent 2nd). The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from expertinfintry’s photostream, flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a historic visit to Burma last week to assess some of the reforms undertaken by the regime.  During her trip, she rightfully insisted that one of the changes the Burmese government must enact is to end its illicit activities with North Korea.  Korea watchers need to study this relationship more to help policy makers decide if Burma really is changing. Moreover, following the development of the potential reforms in Burma, along with the response from the United States and the international community, will help prepare for a time if North Korea ever starts enacting flickers of reforms similar to Burma.

As two authoritarian regimes with a history of human rights violations and the suppression of democracy, relations between Burma and North Korea are worrisome. This summer, the U.S. navy followed another North Korea cargo ship, the MV Light, that was suspected of carrying missile components from North Korea to Burma. A U.S. destroyer tracked the ship, which discontinued its trip and returned to North Korea.  This was similar to the incident in 2009 when the U.S. navy tracked the Kang Nam, also suspected of carrying illicit cargo, and forced it to turn around as well. Military cooperation, perceived trade over missile technology and parts, combined with rumors over North Korean assistance on nuclear weapons for Burma, caused the U.S. to correctly contend that Burma end these activities with North Korea if it truly wants to change.

Although connected by these dangerous policies, Burma differs from North Korea in an important way: it has a democratic opposition leader in Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. As part of the slow change in Burma, the authoritarian government released her from house arrest, allowed the government controlled media to talk about her, and arranged for her to meet with Thein Sein, the former general now president. Granted the Burmese government has done this before, but Aung San Suu Kyi’s “cautious optimism,” both for the reforms and U.S. engagement, helped bring Secretary Clinton to Burma. With no democratic opposition leader in sight in North Korea, appropriately responding in the future to any type of positive change will be even more difficult.

If a slow change similar to Burma’s current actions ever started in North Korea (a big “if”), the threshold of suspicion and concern might be even higher, particularly because of prior failed talks with North Korea over nuclear issues. Underlining that point, as Secretary Clinton was heading to Burma to investigate their reforms; North Korea was announcing progress on their light water reactor. If not a violation, the improvement of the facility is contrary to UN resolutions and other agreements.

With the Six Party Talks still suspended,  there hasn’t been a sufficient response from North Korea acknowledging the sinking of the South Korean naval corvette and shelling Yeonpyeong Island. Thus, it seems unlikely that North Korea would take actions comparable to Burma in the near future. Yet the determination of North Korea’s sincerity along with the policy response will be analogous. The secret nature of the regimes, histories of illicit activity, serious human rights violations, lack of democratic processes, and the need to consult closely with Congress on sanctions policies, are all issues that policy makers will have to deal with during a reform or changing period in either Burma or North Korea.

Burma, like North Korea, has a history of enacting small reforms to gain favor with the international community only to retract them later. The Burma – North Korea relationship will be an important factor in determining if Burma is truly changing. Thus, Korea analysts need to continue to follow this interaction to help calculate Burma’s actual response to Secretary Clinton’s insistence of a cessation of illicit activities with North Korea. Furthermore, the lessons learned from the current situation with Burma can assist in developing proper a response if the authoritarian government in North Korea were ever to start similar changes.

 Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

By Troy Stangarone

During the Cold War, Russia served as North Korea’s primary trading partner and provider of security guarantees. As the Cold War came to an end, however, Russia reoriented its foreign policy towards the West and relations with North Korea were downgraded as Moscow sought closer ties with Seoul. That may be changing. In recent months there have been indications that relations could again be warming between Russia and North Korea.

Today, North Korea has become dependent upon China. China’s share of North Korea’s trade has grown from 41.6 percent in 2007 to 57.1 percent last year. This is similar to North Korea’s dependence on the Soviet Union when the Cold War was coming to an end. In 1988, trade between the Soviet Union and North Korea had grown to $2.8 billion, accounting for 56 percent of North Korea’s two-way trade. 

With the ending of the Cold War the relationship began to change. Military cooperation and Russia’s obligation to defend North Korea slowly came to an end, and trade began to dry up after Mikhail Gorbachev converted all of the Soviet Union’s trade relations to commercial terms. What had been North Korea’s most important trade relationship has fallen to a mere $62 million in two-way trade in 2010 according to the WTO’s Trade Map.

That has begun to change recently as North Korea seeks aid and investment for its economy in advance of 2012. However, increased economic ties between Russia and North Korea have long been blocked by Pyongyang’s inability to pay off Soviet era debt, but the two sides have recently found a way to address this issue. Under the current proposal, Moscow would forgive 90 percent of North Korea’s debt and reinvest the remaining 10 percent in projects in North Korea.

At the recent summit in Ulan-Ude, Russia provided North Korea with 50,000 metric tons of grain as food aid and the two sides agreed to explore the development of a gas pipeline through North Korea that would supply Russian gas to South Korea. The project would potentially provide North Korea with $100 million in transit fees per year, or about five times as much as it currently receives in wages from the Kaesong Industrial Complex with South Korea.

Russia is also undertaking other economic development projects in North Korea. It recently repaired a rail line connecting Khasan in Russia to Rajin in North Korea, where it is building a container terminal.  It has also expressed an interested in ultimately connecting the Trans-Siberian Railway to the Inter-Korean Railway, perhaps as part of the gas pipeline project.

On the security front, Russia and North Korea have also announced they will conduct joint naval exercises in 2012. The exercises will focus on joint search and rescue operations.

As cooperation between Russia and North Korea has increased, Seoul has grown weary. Improved ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, however, are unlikely to be a challenge for South Korea. Russia’s interests in North Korea ultimately have little to do with North Korea itself, but rather a means to a larger ends.

After the Cold War, Russia’s influence in Asia and the Korean peninsula began to wane and its cooperation with North Korea is part of its efforts to restore its influence in the region, while at the same time integrate the Russian Far East into East Asia. 

The Russian Far East has some of the world’s largest deposits of oil and natural gas and the pipeline to South Korea will help Russia diversify beyond its current Europe customers and help to put pressure on China in its negotiations with Russia. Even linking the Trans-Siberian Railway with the Inter-Korean Railway is more about connecting Russia to South Korea than greater ties with North Korea.

If Russia is to find new markets for its natural resources, as well as potentially entice South Korean capital to help modernize Russia, it needs stability on the Korean peninsula and a direct connection to South Korea. This will require it to improve its ties with North Korea, which could also enhance its influence in the region, meeting both of Russia’s goals for its policy towards the region. Ultimately, though, increased ties with Pyongyang are more about South Korea than North Korea.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director of Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.