By Troy Stangarone

Ever since the United States detonated a nuclear weapon over Japan at the end of World War II, nations have felt the need to pursue a nuclear weapons program. They have sought nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of deterrent, as a means to gain leverage over their adversaries, and as a form of international prestige. In the case of South Korea, the success of North Korea’s recent nuclear test and the heightened rhetoric for war coming out of Pyongyang has caused some leaders in Seoul to rethink the necessity of maintaining their own nuclear arsenal as a means of deterrence. However, this path, while potentially appealing, comes with significant political and economic costs that would ultimately make pursing an independent nuclear deterrent a mistake.

Why South Koreans Might Think They Need Nuclear Weapons

As the Cold War was dawning, the Soviet Union felt it needed nuclear weapons to maintain parity with the United States. France, which remained outside NATO’s military command for 43 years and has always sought the ability to project military power independent of the United States, followed the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom’s acquisition of nuclear weapons to bolster its own military might. Even South Korea previously sought nuclear weapons after the United States withdraw from Vietnam. The lure of nuclear weapons is so strong that Saddam Hussein allowed other countries to think he might have them as a means of deterrent.

Since South Korea gave up its own ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1970s, it has relied on the protection of the United States nuclear umbrella. However, with North Korea’s successful missile and nuclear tests, withdrawal from the Korean War armistice, and increasingly hostile rhetoric, some in South Korea have begun discussing the option of Seoul gaining its own nuclear deterrent or seeking the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula as the New York Times recently reported.

Under the United States’ nuclear umbrella, South Korea depends on the extended deterrence of the United States’ nuclear weapons to preclude either a nuclear attack or a large scale conventional attack. The principal of extended deterrence works as long as both potential adversary and the country under protection believe that the U.S. promise of nuclear retaliation is credible. The other challenge is that, while extended deterrence has worked to deter major attacks on U.S. allies, it has not proven successful in preventing the small scale attacks North Korea has engaged in with the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong-do.

However, it is not just North Korea’s actions that have prompted discussions of changes in South Korea’s nuclear posture. According to polling by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, South Koreans have begun to lose faith in the credibility of the nuclear umbrella. In 2012, only 48 percent of South Koreans thought the United States would respond with nuclear forces if South Korea suffered a North Korean nuclear attack. That is a 7 point decline from the previous year. At the same time, public support for the development of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons program has grown from 56 percent in 2010 to 66 percent shortly after North Korea’s third nuclear test.

The Potential Costs of Going Nuclear

While a good deal of attention has been paid to the potential impact of the reintroduction of U.S. nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula or the development of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons on Seoul’s own deterrent posture, relatively little attention has been paid to the potential political and economic costs South Korea might face if it choose to develop its own nuclear weapons.

South Korea developing its own nuclear deterrent would in many ways be unprecedented. No state with a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States has acquired a nuclear weapon since the advent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Additionally, other than North Korea, all of the states that have developed nuclear weapons since the NPT have done so while outside of the NPT. North Korea tested its first nuclear after it’s withdraw from the treaty.

Additionally, Seoul would be in violation of its NPT responsibilities, and if it withdrew from the treaty, join North Korea as the only countries to withdraw from the NPT. It would likely find itself unable to draw upon the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which provides much of the fuel needed to power nuclear plants.

It would also find itself in violation of its civilian nuclear agreement with the United States, which inhibits its ability to use nuclear plants with any U.S. content for weapons development, and see the current talks to extend the agreement grind to a halt.

South Korea’s Domestic Nuclear Program

The development of a nuclear deterrent would likely end South Korea’s goals of becoming a nuclear exporter. It could also potentially impact South Korea’s own domestic nuclear program. South Korea has a robust domestic nuclear program which meets 13 percent of its domestic energy needs and a desire to become a player in the international market for nuclear power exports.

In 2009, South Korea won a $40 billion contract to manage and construct four nuclear power plants in the United Arab Emirates. This was seen as a first step in South Korea’s efforts to become a significant player in the nuclear export industry and potentially build 80 plants worldwide by 2030. That contract would likely be at risk as well as South Korea’s own long term fuel supply.

Economic Sanctions

In recent years, both North Korea and Iran have seen economic and financial sanctions placed on their economies as they either pursued or were suspected of pursing nuclear weapons. South Korea would also likely face either bilateral or multilateral economic sanctions.

India and Pakistan faced sanctions for their pursuit of nuclear weapons. While UN sanctions only called on countries not to supply technology, equipment, or material that could benefit their programs, both faced additional U.S. sanctions which prohibited military assistance and support for loans in financial institutions.

Because of the unique nature in which South Korea would develop nuclear weapons, it is hard to truly know what the consequences might be. However, on a minimal level history would suggest that Seoul would find itself facing economic sanctions and limits on its own nuclear program unless it pursued nuclear weapons in the face of eminent war. Perhaps South Korea, due to its international reputation and sympathy for the challenges it faces from North Korea could minimize these costs, but there are no assurances that it would not face the same type of sanctions that Iran and North Korea face today.

While North Korea clearly presents unique challenges to South Korea, there is no reason to believe that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is unreliable. At the same time, the costs of pursing a nuclear weapons program in the absence of a clear failure of deterrence means that while there will likely continue to be robust debate about the option of developing nuclear weapons as long as North Korea continues its provocations, it is not an option which South Korea is likely to seriously pursue.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from U.S. Pacific Fleet’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad O’Carroll

The DPRK’s nuclear weapons test today appears to act as a bandage for a number of wounds that have somehow yet to kill the Pyongyang regime.  As the last outpost of quasi-Stalinism in the world, North Korea remains in a Cold War mindset when it comes to its increasingly acrimonious relations with both the U.S. and ROK.  Ruled by an inefficient socialist system and enduring bilateral U.S. financial sanctions since 1953 and ever-tightening UN sanctions since 2006, North Korea’s economy has never truly been given a chance to flourish. In these circumstances, nuclear weapons have become an increasingly critical pillar of Pyongyang’s security, allowing a morally reprehensible government to access significant aid, garner domestic support, deter foreign military intervention and even perpetuate the rule of a family dynasty from generation to generation.  While the unique character and context of the North Korean leadership’s relationship to nuclear weapons suggests that potential for denuclearization is extremely unlikely, the risks associated with what is now an increasing threat suggests denuclearization efforts must remain a critical if lofty international goal.

In the early stages of North Korea’s nuclear program, non-proliferation policy would arguably have only had to deal with perceived external security concerns to prevent the crystallization of the ninth nuclear state.  Perhaps this could have been achieved had the U.S. negotiated a peace treaty with North Korea prior to the collapse of the Agreed Framework.  But now North Korea has nuclear weapons and keeps testing them, any effective denuclearization policy must now address the same security concerns in a far more comprehensive manner, including new external and internal angles.  Externally, a peace treaty still remains essential from North Korea’s perspective, but for this to be achieved sanctions would also have to be removed, isolation ended and decades of mutual mistrust overcome.  Simultaneously, absolute domestic security would have to be assured to Pyongyang during the transition, achievable only through unconditional guarantees of energy and aid provision.  And perhaps most importantly, hard-line political and military figures in North Korea would have to be won over in order to persuade them of the logic to denuclearizing, not to mention persuading the general public.  Unfortunately, even if all of these often contradictory issues could ever be addressed, previous efforts to achieve them underscore the abundance of barriers in applying even the most modest of concessions to Pyongyang.

But while denuclearization seems a dim prospect at the moment, it is clear that the ever growing dangers associated with the DPRK’s expanding nuclear arsenal continue to flourish.  However, it is these dangers that provide a compelling justification for the need to continue efforts to denuclearize the DPRK, no matter how low hopes are that this can ever be achieved. That’s because even just in the process of trying for denuclearization, the international community can have tangible impact on parts and aspects of the North Korean nuclear program that could yield positive effects for partners in both the region and beyond.  These benefits can broadly be split into four areas:

1. An immediate aspectof the DPRK program that needs to be addressed in the short to medium term is reducing the potential for sensitive nuclear technology and science transfers.  Indeed, the tighter sanctions become and the more that barriers are introduced to limit legitimate trade, the greater the motivation for Pyongyang to try and sell its nuclear know-how on the black market. One way these intellectual transfers could be somewhat minimized is through a dual-track policy of stimulating the DPRK economy and increasing the penalties associated with such transfers.
2. Safeguarding the North Korea’s weapons and fissile materials is another important issue, especially post Fukushima nuclear disaster, that could be easy to solve through foreign assistance, expertise and investment. Of course, better relations will be required for the DPRK to even consider such a proposal, and while necessary, such initiatives may come with the cost of sending a negative message to would-be-proliferators.  However, the dangers associated with unauthorized usage or nuclear accidents are more pressing than the correspondingly negative, but slow-reaching,  signal such a move would have on the non-proliferation regime.  In addition, this effect could be minimized if safeguarding was pursued under the long-term auspices of denuclearization.
3. Medium term, the likely potential for a regional nuclear domino effect arising from the DPRK weapons program seems low.  However, this is likely contingent on the continued U.S provision of a nuclear umbrella to allies in the region and the salience of the non-proliferation regime.  In this regard, it is essential that the U.S. remains committed to its security agreements in the region and that the non-proliferation regime remains credible.  This latter issue can be realized to a degree through avoiding temptations to formally ever recognize the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state.  And this response can form part of a long-term denuclearization policy that never accepts the legitimacy of Pyongyang’s weapons in order to minimize the scope for damage to the non-proliferation norm.
4. Longer term, if engagement policies are pursued – and even if the DPRK acquires significant surpluses of fissile materials – then motivations to one day sell complete arms or fissile materials can and must be reduced.  Only a DPRK better integrated into the world community and economy will be more susceptible to the costs associated with fissile material / arms transfers. A DPRK living in perpetual isolation won’t necessarily care as much.  Importantly, increased confidence in restricting this type of sale could also be simultaneously sharpened through the further development of global nuclear attribution capacities, an area that needs increases in resources at this time.

Because little is known about Kim Jong Un’s leadership and the systems of control in his supporting regime, it is impossible to preclude nuclear weapons being one day deployed in offensive configurations.  Each day that is passed without meaningful progress towards a resolution on the peninsula, this likelihood of this scenario developing sharpens.  However, should nuclear engagement policies be pursued now, these risks could potentially be lowered. That’s because it seems that North Korea would be less motivated to use weapons offensively if efforts to improve its political, economic and security relations were addressed now.

While the third test proves beyond doubt that the prospects for denuclearizing North Korea remains low, an overarching goal of denuclearization should still be pursued as a way of dampening the side effects of what is becoming an increasingly dangerous program. Whilst the weapons program has dangers associated with it, there are steps that can be taken in the short – medium term to mitigate these.  A consequence of these mitigations may be a boost in the DPRK’s confidence in the world system and thus an increase in prospects for denuclearization.

Chad 0′Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from 涉外山頂人’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad O’Carroll

With North Korea’s recent satellite launch highlighting the progressing state of Pyongyang’s long-range rocket capabilities and prospects of a third nuclear weapons test likely to show further advancements in that area, it is easy to forget about the DPRK’s conventional weapons technology. While the North Korean rocket and nuclear programs no doubt pose serious risks in the medium to long-term, their high impact effects suggests they would be the least likely technologies to be used in any Korean conflict in the short term. We’ve already taken a look at the asymmetrical challenges of North Korea’s Air Force (KPAF) on this blog, so today we take a closer look at the nation’s artillery systems – systems that have long been rumored capable of turning Seoul into a “sea of fire.

A SEA OF FIRE?

Pyongyang often boasts of its capacity to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire”, something arguably more related to its forward deployed weapons systems than the controversial nuclear weapons program.  Possessing some 8,500 field artillery pieces (caliber 122mm or greater) and 5,100 multiple-launch rocket systems, the Korean People’s Army could certainly inflict serious damage along the Southern side of the DMZ in the event of a surprise attack. Nevertheless, a close look at these capacities suggests that although Pyongyang does indeed possess a large projectile arsenal, a relatively small proportion of it would be capable of targeting downtown Seoul from north of the DMZ.

Since the 1994 nuclear crisis, the DPRK has put a high priority on deploying weapons systems along the DMZ that can damage South Korea without the need of a ground invasion.  But of the estimated 13,000 or so field artillery pieces and multiple-launch rocket systems in North Korea’s possession, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 2011 reported that just 700 of these systems are considered to have the range needed to hit Seoul. And when it comes to being in a position to actually target Seoul, IISS also reported that fewer than half (300) of these systems are actually deployed in areas close enough to reach the South Korean capital. So in the event of a conflict, would these 300 or so artillery pieces really be able to turn Seoul into a sea of fire?

KOKSAN 170MM THREAT

North Korea’s 170mm Koksan guns, reported to be the only artillery which “can reach central Seoul from behind the North Korean Border,” are arguably Pyongyang’s most powerful artillery asset. Designed to fire between two to four rounds per minute, these massive guns (each 14m long) can strike targets 40km away if using conventional mortar ammunition, or up to 54km when firing “rocket assisted projectiles”. Depending on positioning, both of these ranges put South Korea’s capital city firmly in target of North Korea’s artillery men. And if using the rocket propelled mortar variants, these Koksan guns could be hidden among sites a few kilometers north of the DMZ and still reach downtown Seoul with full effect.

In total, both the Nautilus Institute and Global Security suggest there are as many as 500 of these long-range guns located along the DMZ. Capable of launching “4 rounds a minute” in any opening barrage, North Korean military expert Roger Cavazos says that after initial salvos, “the DPRK has to go into a sustained rate of fire which is one round in just under three minutes, or about 24 rounds per hour.” Taken all together, these figures suggest that North Korea could bombard South Korea with about 12,000 shells per hour if it were to use all of its Koksan Guns simultaneously. However, for strategic reasons this isn’t likely, because it would expose all of these units to allied counter-attack at the outset. In addition, figures published by IISS (also shared by Mr. Cavazos) suggest only about 100 of these guns are located close to Seoul, meaning a risk there of about 2,400 shells per hour. Though there are undoubtedly other cities and towns within reach of these Koksan Guns along the border, together it means the threat to Seoul is perhaps not sufficient to turn the capital into a “sea of fire”.

240MM MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS

While the Koksan Guns undoubtedly form a core pillar of North Korea’s long-range artillery threat, as a direct threat to Seoul it is arguable that they form the lesser of two evils. That’s because the majority of Pyongyang’s most lethal artillery capability is invested in their 60km range, 240mm multiple rocket launchers (MRL 240).  Possessing around 200 of the MRL 240’s in the border region directly north of Seoul (according to IISS), these units would be well within range of bombarding even downtown areas in the South Korean capital.

Capable of launching 12-22 rounds in a single burst, the MRL240 rockets can include high explosive, smoke, incendiary and chemical warhead capabilities. In times of war, this forward facing deployment could reportedly fire up to 4,400 shells in a single burst, reloading four times per hour to bombard the capital city at a rate of between 9,600 to 17,600 rounds per hour (the variation depends on whether or not they use the 22 or 12 barrel capacity launchers). In a worst case scenario, this means the North Koreans could even be capable of quickly turning a 6 sq. km area “into rubble”. Wed to chemical warheads, the scope for damage increases significantly, albeit in non kinetic ways. And because these MRL 240’s are relatively unguided, their main goal can be seen as destroying large urban areas with “little regard for accuracy”.

It is important to note the above figures would be in a “best-case” scenario and that the actual figures could likely be far different. Indeed, satellite analysis shows that the majority of North Korea’s 240 MRL units are kept secure in Hardened Artillery Sites (HARTS) concentrated along the northern side of the DMZ. While this would protect them to some degree in the event of conflict, because a certain blast radius needs to be cleared when launching the rockets, the MRL 240 would need to come out from its defenses to fire. This would therefore puts the MRL units at grave risk of being quickly destroyed by U.S. and ROK forces in the event of conflict, meaning that they would unlikely be used simultaneously.

A SEOUL SEA OF FIRE?

Having looked at North Korea’s long range artillery capability, it is evident that Pyongyang possesses two arsenals easily capable of causing serious damage to Seoul. Taken together, North Korea’s forward deployed long-range artillery could launch as many as 20,000 shells an hour at downtown Seoul. These numbers are significant and should not be taken lightly. However, it is important to underscore that these are best-case figures (from North Korea’s military point of view) and in all reality, performance and frequency of the bombardment would be much lower than the numbers detailed above.

First, there is the issue of range. While the Koksan Guns can at best hit targets up to 54km range and the MRL240’s 60km range, Roger Cavazos suggests this would not be enough to do significant damage in downtown Seoul. Underscoring that these ranges are in themselves best case figures, Cavazos explains, “North Korea’s weapons don’t reach into the most densely populated parts of Seoul… The DPRK might be able to range the very northern edges of Gangbuk gu, Nowon gu, Dobong gu, and Eunpyong gu and the Incheon suburb of Noyang, but the rest of Seoul proper is out of range.”

Second, as mentioned, there are military reasons that it remains highly unlikely that all of North Korea’s forward deployed artillery would be used simultaneously, even in the event of a surprise attack. This is because doing so would make allied forces acutely aware of launching points, while the decades old age nature of the machinery means it is probably not even possible from a technical perspective to use all of it simultaneously.

Finally, the recent bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island showed that 25% of the shells used in that attack proved to be duds. In addition, IISS reports that up to 50% of these shells missed their target (even though it was much closer than Seoul would be to North Korea’s long range artillery). And even if they do reach their targets, Cavazos suggests the damage could be minimal. “The issue is the weapons for the most part only reach low-density areas and bunkers.  This is what the same shells do to bunkers.  Fortunately, we don’t have any examples of those shells hitting a modern Seoul apartment complex all of which should be constructed according to reinforced standards.”

While the notion that North Korea could launch as many as 20,000 shells per hour looks unlikely in light of the issues described above, 300 artillery pieces in direct range of Seoul is of course a serious concern for allied commanders. A “sea of fire” might not be the result in case of their use, but it is evident that tens of thousands of civilians could die and even more injured if they were used in an indiscriminate way. However, that it would be political suicide for North Korea to use this weaponry in an unprovoked manner serves as a reminder of the unlikelihood of the DPRK using its artillery arsenal in the ways described above.

ALTERNATIVE MEANS

While we’ve take a look at North Korea’s most formidable artillery, it is nevertheless important to remember that this isn’t the full story. Indeed, the Korean People’s Army possesses a wide range of other self-propelled artillery pieces, including various road mobile 122mm and smaller MRL systems and the M-1992 120mm gun. In addition, it possesses towed systems like the D-20 152mm and D-30 122m guns, both of which could cause substantial damage when used in groups simultaneously. But because the range of all of these artillery pieces falls short of even suburban Seoul, it means their usage north of the DMZ would only be suited for nearby targets like military bases and small towns and villages. And in the event of conflict, it is not clear how long they’d be able to last when exposed in an active military environment or how soon they would run out of ammunition in a country where food distribution (PDS) has been so erratic.

It is also important to remember that North Korea can pose threats in many other ways to nearby Seoul. In particular, the KPA reportedly has chemical munitions for all types of artillery rounds 107mm and greater. Sixty five per cent of DPRK ground troops are now located within 60 miles of the DMZ, compared with 45 per cent in 1984.[1]  In addition, the DPRK now possesses an arsenal of roughly 600 Hwasong missiles and 100 Nodong missiles that put all of ROK and Japanese territory (and the United States bases therein) well within striking range of projectiles equipped withWMD warheads. Then as described in a previous post, there is the asymmetrical threat of the DPRK Air Force, a rather large naval presence, and a population that could see up to eight million soldiers conscripted in the event of conflict.

All together, North Korea’s non-nuclear ICBM threats are significant. But despite this, mainstream media (and even elected politicians) choose to focus primarily on Taepodong and Unha launches and underground nuclear tests.  With Seoul just a stone’s throw from the DMZ (35km), some estimates calculate that an artillery exchange alone between the Koreas could lead to as many as hundreds of thousands of deaths in Seoul, with one former U.S. commander saying it could even cost the U.S. 52,000 military personnel and over $100 billion, not to mention the catastrophic economic damages caused to the region. And that’s not even considering the manifold other ways North Korea is able to inflict damage using conventional military means.  As such, it seems that however things play out over the coming weeks and months, regardless of whether a nuclear test happens or not, all parties should pursue diplomacy at all costs.

BIOGRAPHY

Robinson, C. (2003), Stand-off withNorth Korea: War Scenarios and Consequences,CDIweekly Defence Monitor Volume 7, Issue #17

Chad 0′Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from NOS Nieuws photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

North Korea’s decision to launch a satellite in the midst of important regional political transitions underscores its disregard for building better relations with new leaders throughout its neighborhood. Rather than creating a favorable environment for South Korean presidential candidates who had been talking about re-engaging with the DPRK, Pyongyang has slammed the door in South Korea’s face on the eve of critical elections. With high level talks that had been scheduled to take place with Japan recently called off on news of North Korea’s rocket plan, it seems Pyongyang felt that rapprochement with Tokyo could wait. And although China new leadership attempted to dissuade North Korea from going ahead with the launch, Kim Jong Un’s government seemingly isn’t worried about being the cause of Xi Jinping’s first foreign policy crisis.

The timing of today’s rocket launch shows that North Korea’s leadership calculated that immediate internal benefits far outweighed any potential gains from the outreach in 2013 that may have materialized without a launch. Indeed, the prospects for increased engagement, aid, and better regional ties have all now been shunned in favor of actions North Korea’s neighbors other than China view as provocative. Instead, it appears that North Korea was motivated to go ahead with the launch in order to gain from key domestic reasons related to symbolic timing, domestic prestige, and military considerations.

As we know, North Korea’s previous April 2012 launch appeared to be a continuation of Kim Jong-il’s policy to celebrate the 100^th year anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth.  Seemingly, the late Kim had hoped that by putting a satellite into space, Pyongyang would be able to demonstrate to its people that North Korea was indeed becoming a “strong and prosperous” nation. The April launch was an embarrassing failure, so it seems Kim Jong Un was compelled to try again, with this December launch announcement connecting the new attempt to the “true to the behests of leader Kim Jong Il.”  Moreover, commemorating of the 100^th anniversary year of Kim Il Sung’s birth and the one year anniversary of the death of Kim Jong-il with a successful rocket and a satellite in orbit was another bonus for internal sentiment and the legacy of Kim Jong Un as a leader.

KCNA’s reporting on today’s launch also illustrates how domestic motivations were extremely important for North Korea. The internal prestige Kim Jong Un will have garnered through a successful launch is not hard to see, with DPRK media quickly showing dances in Kim Il Sung square and placing ecstatic news presenters on TV to break the news. With the launch being hyped domestically as a major policy success of the regime, it will also very likely help Kim Jong Un consolidate power during his first year as leader.

An additional motivating factor may have been Kim Jong Un’s desire to placate possible military pressure by trying a second launch.  Recent reports indicate numerous military purges have taken place of late in North Korea, with the high profile departures of Ri Yong Ho and Kim Jong-gak suggesting that Kim Jong-un has been working hard to replace foes with individuals he believes can better support his vision and rule.  But because some of these former foes were well respected military officials, Kim may have also used this launch as a means to buy much-need approval and time from an uncertain military.

While North Korea’s satellite success will lead to a number of domestic gains for Kim Jong Un, an external environment that had appeared ready for better relations with North Korea will now change. The apparent success of the rocket launch will increase pressure on the United Nations to think of new ways to punish North Korea’s Security Council Resolution violations while at the same time decreases the chances for any inter-Korean, Japanese, or U.S. based engagement. Those countries could potentially take more unilateral measures against North Korea to punish this action and try to prevent future provocations. North Korea’s assertiveness in launching a rocket despite encouragement not to do so from its most important donor, China, puts focus on Xi Jinping and the new Chinese leadership.  Outcomes from the UN Security Council and China’s own unilateral response will quickly provide evidence to the international community about China’s future relationship with North Korea. Unfortunately, early statements from China and commentary from Xinhua suggests North Korea can continue to count on Chinese support after this launch.

In short, the regional dynamics have changed for the new and incoming leaders. The launch will draw the U.S. and its allies closer together and provide an important common ground that can get South Korea-Japan relations off to a more positive in 2013. The successful launch makes it difficult for Japan to restart the postponed talks with North Korea. The launch indicates North Korea’s willingness to choose internal benefits over outside support with a confidence that it can survive on its own, with some unspoken hope that China’s support will not wane too much, if at all.

Finally, the rocket launch demonstrates that North Korea will disregard international resolutions and interactions with its neighbors despite efforts and opportunities for engagement. These factors indicate 2013 will be even more complicated for the regional players in Northeast Asia courtesy once again of North Korea.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Flickr photo by NOS Nieuws

by Chad O’Carroll

With North Korea having conducted two long range rocket launch in a year, many analysts have been speculating as to why Pyongyang was so keen to try another launch just months after the last one ended in catastrophic failure. One straightforward theory suggests Pyongyang wants an inter-continental ballistic missile capability and that today’s launch was motivated to get North Korea one step closer to that goal. Another theory suggests the launch was symbolic, designed primarily to mark the 100 year anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth and recent departure of Kim Jong Il. Yet other theories suggest the launch may even have been an attempt to influence South Korean elections or to simply remind leaders that Pyongyang still exists.

While the world has gotten used to an increasing frequency of long-range North Korean missile testing, it is true that the more the country launches, the closer they come to acquiring an inter-continental ballistic missile capability. Wed to Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, this capability could one day present a security risk to the United States and one that policy makers in Washington DC will be keen avoid. But following decades of investment in ballistic missile technology, it seems North Korea’s missile motivations are deep and as time passes, becoming increasingly difficult to override. If hopes to one-day reverse North Korea’s missile motivations remain, it is important that policy makers address what have now become a multitude of drivers.

CHANGING SECURITY MOTIVATIONS

Motivations for North Korea’s missile program began in the early 1960s, a period of time that saw insecurity mounting for Pyongyang due to deteriorating Soviet-DPRK relations and increasing friction between traditional allies Moscow and Beijing. Responding to a seemingly more dangerous threat environment and wanting to free the country from Soviet and Chinese dependence, Kim Il Sung in 1965 commented, “If a war breaks out, the U.S and Japan will be involved [and] in order to prevent their involvement, we have to be able to produce rockets which fly as far as Japan.”

Whilst insecurity was undoubtedly the underlying factor behind Kim Il-Sung’s 1965 decision to pursue missiles, it has nonetheless continued to prevail as an important motivation for the program’s continuation and development.  As such, militarily impulses can be seen as contributing towards the thinking that necessitated the DPRK’s initial requirement of possessing a short, medium and long-range missile arsenal.  The early short-range low-technology missile acquisitions of the late 1960s and early 1970s, combined with the North’s then goal of conquering the South using military means, suggested that Kim Il Sung certainly regarded these missiles as primarily offensive weapons.  Consequently, North Korea’s 1980s work to develop 600km range missiles be seen then as a way of assuring a pan-ROK strike capacity.

While Pyongyang was able to roughly match ROK military expenditure up until the early 1970s with relatively equivalent technology, as economic decline became more and more apparent, the DPRK’s potential to force reunification dwindled.  But although the Korean People’s Army (KPA) represented (and still does) a quantitatively superior force compared to that of the South, the North’s economic problems have kept its technology and equipment frozen in time.  As a result it is likely the security motivation behind North Korea’s pursuit of medium and long-range (‘No-Dong’ and ‘Taepodong’ class respectively) missiles in the late 1980s and 1990s changed.  Indeed, the No-Dong 1,500km SCUD variant was designed to reach Japan whilst the 8000km range Taepodong series was likely designed with the aim of reaching continental USA. It’s this Taepodong rocket that evolved to the Unha-3 class used most recently.

Rather than ready such missiles for offensive use like North Korea had done in the 1970s and early 1980s, it is likely that the increased ranges of these two variants represent a changed defensive posture.  In combination with nascent chemical, biological and nuclear programs, North Korea was able to use its medium and longer-range missile delivery system as a strategic deterrent, capable of leveling the playing field vis-à-vis its traditional and militarily advanced enemies. Evidently then, in either offensive or defensive lights, this missile program can thus be partially as an outgrowth of North Korean strategic thinking that has been largely driven by a sense of insecurity.

A MISSILE MONEY MAKER

As already alluded to, North Korea’s economy was by the early 1980s in a downward and seemingly irreversible spiral.  Given that during the early 1980s DPRK Hwasong missiles cost between $1.5 and $2 million each, one might initially assume the financial burden of the program to have ended further research and development at this time.  Paradoxically, North Korea regarded the high cost of its missiles as way of raising much-needed foreign exchange and as a possible trading chip that could secure the acquisition of important resources.

Missile exports can be traced back to the mid-1980s when nearly 100 Hwasongs were sold to Iran for use in her war with Iraq.  Deals such as this, and largely with states shunned by traditional arms suppliers partaking in non-proliferation initiatives, have since continued in varying degrees with the additional benefit of creating numerous missile production employment opportunities in North Korea. Estimates suggest that between 1987 and 1992 missile exports totaled $580 million, whilst in 1993 exports were used to secure $120 million worth of Iranian crude oil.  By 2001 North Korea’s GDP was valued at $15.7 billion, being made up of $650 million of legitimate exports and some $560 million of clandestine missile sales.

Whilst the Kim dynasty denied the existence of the missile cash cow for many years, the motivation to engage in missile production for financial reasons was made clear when Pyongyang declared, “our missile export is aimed at obtaining foreign money which we need at present”. It is therefore evident that the cumulative effects of North Korea’s shrinking economy, the need for foreign exchange and natural resources, and the existence of a buoyant export market all contributed towards motivating North Korea to continue missile production for much of the 1980 and early 1990s. Intriguingly, the export market itself likely contributed towards the shaping and facilitating of the strategic policies mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

THE DIRECT LINE TO ISRAEL: A DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING CHIP

A further (if perhaps unintentional) driver for North Korea’s long running missile program can be seen commencing in Pyongyang’s 1992 attempt to use the technology as a diplomatic bargaining chip in response to Israel’s request to stop Hwasong (a DPRK SCUD clone) exports to Syria and Iran.  Upon Israel’s call that Pyongyang stop exporting missiles to the Middle East, North Korea demanded Israeli economic cooperation worth approximately one billion dollars in compensation and the development of a gold mine in Unsan.  Tellingly North Korea’s reported exports to Iran and Syria at this time totaled well under one billion dollars, far less than the net worth of what Pyongyang was demanding from Israel.

Although the U.S. ultimately forced Israel to back out of this deal, the fact that the Israelis were at all considering the agreement goes to illustrate the diplomatic leverage that missiles could give the DPRK on the world stage. Learning from this episode, in response to North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong-1 test, renewed calls from the U.S to curtail the DPRK’s missile exports were met with comparable demands for economic and scientific compensation from Pyongyang.   Here again, the missile program gave negotiating power to the DPRK that was well beyond what it ‘should’ have realistically possessed as a small, developing nation.

Since the DPRK’s nuclear test of 2006 it is arguable that the value of this bargaining chip has been increased significantly.   For the outside world, developments in North Korean missile technology cannot now be understood as being divorced from their nuclear capability. That’s why North Korea satellite launches in 2012 are viewed with so much suspicion, being regarded by many as progress towards a nuclear ICBM capability.  And should North Korea eventually acquire such a weapon, it will clearly mark a far more valuable possession on any negotiating table in future. This factor may now be playing a significant role in motivating North Korea to further refine or develop a long-range capacity.

GROWING NATIONAL PRIDE

Many analysts are regarding North Korea’s latest satellite launch as evidence that Pyongyang is strongly motivated to invest in rocket technology as a way of bolstering domestic support. In a similar fashion to how the regime learnt to use missiles as a bargaining chip, it would appear that this factor was unlikely an initial impetus behind the program but instead a utility whose potential advantage became evident to the regime in more recent years, as technical improvements increased.

Accordingly, the 1998, 2006, 2009 and April 2012 long-range “satellite launches” can be understood domestically as part of the leadership’s efforts to advance the country as a “strong and prosperous” state. In this light the launch can be understood in terms of inward looking national prestige, as a mechanism to galvanize support for the regime and promote unity at a time when economic hardship and food shortage remained. This was made evident by the manner in which North Korean media extracted every last ounce of propaganda value from first three satellite launch attempts, reporting that all launches were a success – despite credible allegations of failure from widespread external sources.

After the first launch in 1998, for months state news pushed the satellite story with extravagant reports suggesting that citizens were expressing great national pride and calling in to describe their sightings of the Kwangmyonsong-1 satellite. The domestic importance assigned to the ostensible ‘space program’ was again illustrated in 2009 as evidenced by the state organized mass rallies celebrating the success of the launch in Pyongyang.  That launch took place just days before Kim was sworn in as chairman of the National Defense Commission, the highest position of authority in the North, suggesting it may have even been used to bolster public support in him.

More recently, the December 2012 launch was timed to coincide with the 100 year anniversary celebrations of Kim Il Sung’s birth, also taking place just days before the anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s death.  As highly symbolic dates in the DPRK calendar, North Korea’s rocket launches can thus be seen as playing a major role in promoting both national solidarity and pride – something crucial for Kim Jong Un in what remains an early period of leadership.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the 1950’s the DPRK has evolved in a state of perpetual suspicion, fear and isolation.  While the theme of security can be seen as having played a major role in the initial driving force of the DPRK missile program, it is evident that it still prevails today as an important explanation for their program.   But that the program evolved from a short-range arsenal to the current objective of achieving an intercontinental capability is simply a reflection of the evolving security threats that face the DPRK regime.

Initially, short-range missiles were required to attack the rear of the ROK in a war that was widely expected to rekindle at any moment.  As economic difficulties commenced in the 1970s, longer range missiles helped mitigate the growing differences in North-South military capabilities.  The further the North was economically marginalized through the 1980s, the more valuable its burgeoning missile trade was at securing the regime internally; providing employment opportunities and valuable commodities for the state.  Fast forward to the late 80s and early 90s, and increased missile ranges wed to increasing WMD opportunities bolstered Pyongyang’s diplomatic leverage whilst improving the deterrent value of the arsenal.  Domestic support was further fortified through internal propaganda based on the rapid developments that brought Pyongyang closer and closer to entering space.

In short, it is evident that the ever-changing motivations of the DPRK missile program can be understood primarily through the lens of regime survival, having evolved in accordance with technical developments as and when they happened.  Under current conditions it is arguable that Pyongyang will therefore continue to regard missiles as an essential facet of national security.  Regardless of the success of today’s launch, the evidence suggests the DPRK will continue investing in the missile program regardless.

PHOTO: Some rights reserved by NelC, Flickr Creative Commons

By Chad 0′Carroll

News emerged today on the Globes.il news website that suggests Israel expects South Korea to be potentially interested in acquiring Iron Dome technology if talks with Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. about the purchase of four patrol boats for Israel’s navy prove successful. As conflict in Gaza continues to escalate, news about the repeated success of Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system in protecting the country from Hamas’ rocket threat continues to make the system more attractive.

With Israeli officials saying that 80-90 percent of attempted intercepts have now succeeded, some are now citing Iron Dome’s record as evidence that Ronald Reagan’s dreams of building a space based missile defense might have been well founded.  And if Iron Dome proves missile defense really works, might South Korea now be looking at a potential defense against the threat of North Korea’s wide ranging projectile arsenal?

Alas, anyone hoping that Iron Dome might be a quick fix to North Korea’s missile threat will unfortunately be mistaken. That’s because the missiles owned by North Korea’s military vary significantly from the type of rockets possessed by the likes of Israeli’s local foes – Hamas and Hezbollah.

Investing huge resources into their development since the early 1970s, North Korea today possesses a large arsenal of SCUD variant ballistic missiles (Hwasong series).  Bringing most of South Korea into range, these missiles provide Pyongyang with a delivery system for kinetic and non-conventional payloads (nuclear, chemical, biological).  Travelling at several times the speed of sound and at extremely high altitude, it not hard to understand why they are difficult to defend against.  Indeed, these characteristics allow North Korea to hit targets extremely quickly and in the event of carrying a non-conventional payload, with potentially extremely deadly results.

In contrast to North Korea’s current ballistic missile capability, Israel faces a missile threat of a very different nature.  Although some foreign made rockets within the arsenal of Hamas can travel up to 75km, the majority of its “Grad” type devices have a range of just 20km. Often home-made, these small rockets carry kinetic payloads of between just 5-75kg, meaning their destructive impact is relatively low when compared to WMD carrying ballistic missiles.  And because they are deployed using primitive launching technology, these short-range rockets fly at low speed and low altitude – making them relatively easier to defend against.

Debates have long-swirled in military circles about the utility of ballistic missile defense systems. While some argue that with sufficient infrastructure these systems could theoretically intercept the types of missiles North Korea possesses either at launch or in their final phase, others suggest that much like trying to shoot a bullet with another bullet, this type of threat is almost impossible to defend against.   In contrast, the low-speed and low-altitude characteristics of the rockets that Israel faces mean they are much easier to intercept after launch than a ballistic missile.  Having kicked off the Iron Dome project after the Second Lebanon War of 2006, it is therefore understandable that Israel was able to enjoy the level of success it did in just six years.

But while Iron Dome will be of little use in defending South Korea from North Korea’s ballistic missiles, one area that it could prove useful in is intercepting artillery shells like those used in the bombardment of Yeonpyeong, two years ago. That’s because Iron Dome has a second role beyond intercepting rockets: to counter the flight of 155mm artillery shells and mortar rounds.

As we know, North Korea possesses thousands of artillery units, many of which are positioned strategically along the DMZ.  Although Iron Dome would likely be quickly overwhelmed in the case of a large scale simultaneous artillery attack, it could nevertheless be a potentially useful defense for South Korea against small-scale attacks such as the one witnessed at Yeonpyeong two years ago. This is all the the more true when considering that Iron Dome is able to respond to multiple threats simultaneously – something that would have been useful in intercepting the several artillery units North Korea used to attack the island last year.

Time will tell if South Korea decides to purchase the Iron Dome defense system and it seems that much relies on whether or not Israel is able to buy the naval craft from the ROK that it currently desires.  But whether the extremely expensive price tag will be worth it for South Korea (each battery costs $50 million while the individual missiles between $40,000 to $100,000) to defend against what could be rare small scale attacks is hard to judge – especially when considering the North Korean ballistic threat will remain.

Chad 0’Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Israel Defense Forces photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Jae-kyung Park

Early last month, the U.S. Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China exchanged harsh words publically on the issue of South China Sea. On August 3, the U.S. State Department issued a press statement with the heading of ‘South China Sea’. The words therein are carefully and considerately crafted, with an emphasis that the U.S. does not “take a position on competing territorial claims over land features and have no territorial ambitions in the South China Sea”.  Still, it seems hard to refute an assessment that the State Department “assailed” and “criticized” China, as the editorial of the Washington Post suggests on August 15.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry was quick to strongly refute the press statement by the State Department. On August 4, the Ministry issued a written document in the form of ‘Statement by Spokesperson’, with expressing their “strong dissatisfaction of” and “firm opposition to” the press statement by its U.S. counterpart.

From this exchange on the South China Sea issue, I find some points to be noteworthy.

First, these are open, public and written documents, targeting each other directly. It has often been the case that the two sides express their positions squarely at closed governmental meetings including the most recent one at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Cambodia in July. At leaders’ meetings, as well, like the East Asia Summit, held last year in Bali, both President Obama and Premier Wen Jiabao touched upon the issue. However, the exact statements of each side are not usually released even after the meetings. As a cure for curiosity, ASEAN hosted multilateral meetings usually release so-called ‘Chair’s Statement’ after each meeting. And there has been a paragraph on the South China Sea issue in the statement. Of course, as is most often the case, the outcome document is somewhat compromising, creative and artful works of the ASEAN chair country. In other words, it is short of reflecting the genuine discussions by the representatives during the meetings. Anyway it is safe in many cases for all the parties concerned not to reveal everything that has been exchanged at governmental meetings. It is why closed sessions may be better than open ones where they exchange blows publicly, with less room to maneuver afterwards, if necessary.

Second, “maintenance of peace and stability” was emphasized as a “national interest” in the State Department’s press statement. Through a statement released after a meeting between President Aquino of the Philippines and President Obama in June this year in Washington, the two leaders “underscored the importance of the principles of ensuring freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce.” Now the State Department added the maintenance of peace and stability, and again defined it as a national interest.

At many of the multilateral government meetings in East Asia, one can easily see maritime security as one of the key agenda items. No matter how skillfully annotated, ‘maritime security’ has been understood as the issue of freedom of navigation and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Even though China does not feel comfortable at the mentioning of freedom of navigation, China, when asked, argues that freedom of navigation has never been jeopardized and has been guaranteed. China also shows commitment to its continued freedom. Thus, it is positive to see that China shows commitment to the freedom of navigation. Here, raising the issue of freedom of navigation at multilateral meeting seems to pay. And also the emphasis on peaceful resolution of territorial issues by non-claimants serves well at least as a matter of principle.

However, when it comes to maintenance of peace and stability defined as a national interest, the emphasis may be in a danger of leading to nowhere, in which the concerned parties have fallen into pursuing never-ending arguments with each other. It is most likely because the concept of both ‘peace and stability’ and ‘national interest’ is quite a relative one, which can be understood and interpreted differently from country to country. In the U.S. statement, it mentions China’s recent establishment of Sansha, a city on Woody Island in the disputed Paracels archipelago, and states that it “run[s] counter to collaborative efforts to resolve differences and risk[s] further escalating tensions” in the region. As a response, China mentioned that peace and stability in the South China Sea “has been maintained” and the U.S act and stance are “not conducive to peace and stability” in the region in its statement. This is a typical tit-for-tat situation where countries pinpoint each other in order to stand on higher moral ground.

The South China Sea issue may not soon be solved by each claimant state. It is about more than natural resources. It is about territory. It is about history. It is about national pride. And thus it is all together about national interest. Through recognizing the complexity of the issue, one may realize it is not the resolution of the issue once and for all that is to be pursued in the near-term. Rather it is the stable management of the issue that is essential. Freedom of navigation will be further guaranteed under the situation. For the claimants, and non-claimants as well, that is the goal to be pursued and building an environment conducive towards it should be crafted. It is a tremendously important test both to the ASEAN as a community and to the U.S. and China in East Asia.

Korea is not a claimant state on any single islands in the South China Sea. Still, Korea has a significant stake in maritime commerce through the sea. The South China Sea provides vital sea lanes to Korea in its trade with outside world, in particular energy imports from Middle East. Thus, there is the relevance for Korea in to trying to secure a guaranteed and unimpeded freedom of navigation. Fortunately, there have not been actual cases reported that the freedom has been restricted by any sides on merchant ships from a third country. And China continues to express its commitment to freedom of navigation. Any possible course of action should be crafted with full consideration of the nature of disputes, its impact on maritime commerce and Korea’s own territory, and relations with each claimant states. Again, such effort needs to be pursued with caution, not to be regarded by any claimant states as an intervention or taking side in the territorial claims. That is why any comments or statements at governmental meetings should continue to be carefully chosen and delivered without sending the wrong signal to all the parties concerned.

Jae-kyung Park is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Andy Enero’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Sarah K. Yun

June 27, 2012 marks the 59^th anniversary of the armistice agreement that put a pause to the three-year Korean War in 1953. Although the armistice is a significant and still-relevant document in Korean and world history, little attention is paid to the document due to a lack of institutionalization, the challenging nature of enforcing the agreement, and North Korea’s continued violations.

There are several challenges to the successful usage of the armistice agreement.  The first challenge is the ambiguous state of the signatories. The armistice was signed by the United Nations (UN) Command representing the 16 UN member states that committed troops to the Korean War, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) of North Korea, and the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV). Additionally, it was an agreement signed by militaries, not heads of states, which creates uncertainty, especially since the CPV no longer exists. Moreover, South Korea is not a signatory of the armistice. To a large extent, the United States has maintained its policy that North Korea should agree on a peace accord with South Korea before any bilateral agreement is reached with the United States. However, North Korea has continuously attempted to exclude South Korea from peace negotiations due to the fact that the South is not a signatory of the armistice.

The second challenge is the lack of institutionalization of the armistice agreement. The armistice established several structures such as the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) separating the two Koreas, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the Joint Security Area (JSA) within DMZ, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) which is tasked with investigating violations of the armistice agreement, and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) which was originally composed of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. However, the role of MAC has diminished since North Korea’s 1991 refusal to acknowledge the South Korean Army general as the chief representative; and only Sweden and Switzerland remain at the DMZ for NNSC duties. With both the NNSC and the MAC essentially defunct, there needs to be more oversight to ensure that armistice is not violated and the needed mechanisms are in place to lead to peace framework in the future.

The third challenge is the actual threat posed to the armistice and peace on the peninsula by North Korea’s provocations. These violations include the 2010 torpedoing of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, naval skirmishes in 1999 and 2002, several submarine incursions in the 1990s, the assassination of first lady Yook Yeong-soo in 1974, and the Blue House attack in 1968. Moreover, North Korea’s nuclear program creates obstacles to peace negotiations since the United States and other stakeholder countries insist on North Korea’s serious intention of denuclearization before any negotiation of a peace regime begins.

Given the ambiguous and challenging circumstances around the armistice agreement, what developments are needed to move forward? First of all, it is important for the international community to look back to the armistice agreement before looking forward to the next steps. Many people remember the beginning of the war on June 25, but minimal attention has been paid to the June 27 armistice agreement. Thereafter, a thorough Korean Peninsula peace plan needs to be designed. Moreover, a structure needs to be put into place for the coexistence of the U.S.-ROK alliance and a multilateral security system, as the armistice was signed by the UN Command which includes 16 countries. Increased political awareness and engagement on the armistice agreement from not only the Six-Party Talks nations, but also other neighboring countries and the United Nations is important for ensuring broader regional peace and stability.

The Korean War armistice agreement is both an important historical and currently relevant document for the security structure of the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia and beyond. As we remember the 59^th anniversary of the June 27 armistice and look forward to the leadership changes in the region and the U.S., a peaceful resolution of the Korean War should not be forgotten.

Sarah K. Yun is the Director of Public Affairs and Regional Issues for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are her own.

Photo from Expert Infantry’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad 0Carroll

Chosun Ilbo columnist Kim Dae-joong wrote yesterday that because South Korea is surrounded by three nuclear weapons countries (DPRK, China and Russia), it should consider acquiring nuclear weapons. He argued that new laws passed in Japan meant that Tokyo “wants to develop nuclear weapons”, leaving the ROK as the only country in the Six Party Talks to be neither “nuclear armed or potentially armed”.  While some may just dismiss the piece as anti-Japanese rhetoric in the fallout of the recent Japan-ROK pact issue, it was in fact the second column that Kim has written on the topic since 2011, suggesting that Japan is but one motivation for South Korea to consider obtaining nuclear weapons.  His views about nuclear weapons are surprisingly also reflected by an increasing proportion of the general public and even amongst a small number of increasingly vocal lawmakers.  But a close look at his latest piece reveal five reasons why policymakers on both sides of the Pacific should not give any due consideration to his latest case for South Korean nuclear weapons:

1. Kim starts out his argument by saying that, “Why does Seoul continue to adhere to what looks like an increasingly outdated peace and denuclearization policy? The goal of denuclearization in Northeast Asia has become unattainable”.  While it may well be true that denuclearization of North Korea and indeed the region seems extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future, that does not mean that South Korea should give up on the most universally approved international security apparatus in the world – the non-proliferation treaty.  While Kim might see some short term advantages in developing a South Korean nuclear arsenal, as a state already protected by the nuclear umbrella of the U.S., this move would seriously undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and set back progress that has so-far resulted in the creation of five nuclear weapon free zones worldwide.
2. Early on in the piece Kim asserts that “Tokyo [is] taking necessary steps so it could arm itself with nuclear weapons if the need arises.”  He points to recent changes in Japanese nuclear power laws that refer to the “security of our nation” as evidence that Tokyo “suggests it wants to develop nuclear weapons too”.  However, this interpretation willfully ignores the revised laws’ wording which still limits the use and research of nuclear power to “peaceful purposes”. Secondly, it ignores Japanese minister’s assurances that “the safeguards are in place to prevent nuclear proliferation. The word ‘security’ precisely means the prevention of nuclear proliferation.”    Quite how this point leads Kim to later and completely incorrectly claim that “Japan [is] allowed to possess nuclear weapons but not South Korea”, is difficult to understand.
3. Mentioning that the House Armed Services Committee had recently voted in support of redeploying nuclear weapons in ROK territory, Kim says the White House and State Department remain opposed to the idea as part of a “a well-planned strategy” to not offend China.  Firstly, the vote did not indicate support to return tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, but was for an amendment to the fiscal year 2013 national defense authorization bill to enable an examination of the case for re-deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Secondly, even if the vote had advocated such a move, the “strategy” for rejecting it is based on sound political and military reasons.  Redeploying would likely lead to further build up of weapons in Pyongyang, while the free-falling, fighter-jet dropped nature of the tactical weapons are considerably more risky to use than advanced  ICBM technology.
4. On Washington’s “silent” reaction to Japan’s change in nuclear policy wording, Kim goes on to say, ”the U.S. may even be seeking to arm Northeast Asian countries with nuclear weapons to create a state of mutually assured destruction so that no country would be foolish enough to pull the trigger.”  However, the State Department’s lack of faith in MAD forms one of their main oppositions to Iran developing nuclear weapons, based on the lack of faith that a nuclear armed Iran would not still risk self-destruction through one-day attacking Israel.  Quite why they’d be confident of actors like North Korea acting more rationally with nuclear weapons then Iran, is hard to distil from Kim’s comments.
5. Finally, Kim later says that while South Korea shouldn’t immediately acquire nuclear weapons, it should at least “have a nuclear option”.  But having a nuclear option is extremely risky, if one is to consider at least having a real one.  While many often say Japan could use its advanced nuclear infrastructure to create a bomb in as little as six months, Jeffrey Lewis has said time and time again that Japan would actually need up to five years to make this a reality.  And during that time, alarm bells would go off – just as they are with the case of Iran right now.  Alarm bells that lead to sanctions, isolation, and international condemnation: none of which are constructive results for one of the world’s most globalized economies.

Evidently Kim’s latest justification for South Korea to consider a nuclear option is filled with very serious problems that should prevent the debate getting any airtime. However, as mentioned, his comments do nevertheless reflect how talk of South Korea having a nuclear “option” has enter the mainstream in recent time.  In March 2011, an Asan survey revealed that 68.6% of South Koreans polled believe that the country needed nuclear weapons, with 67% favoring a return of U.S. tactical weapons to ROK territory.  And in February 2012 Rep. Song Young-sun of the minor opposition Future Hope Alliance elaborated in a detailed Korea Times feature that she thought South Korea should develop a “nuclear option” so that it would be an equal footing to North Korea in denuclearization talks, a view also echoed in June this year by Saenuri Party Rep. Chung Mong-joon.  In this context, it is important that policy makers in both Seoul and Washington, DC increase their efforts to underline why South Korea does not need nuclear weapons and reinforce to the South Korean public the advantages of being a core part of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Chad 0Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Neveda Tumbleweed’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad 0Carroll

As the economic crisis continues to lead governments into austerity programs worldwide, South Korea is preparing to sign off on defense contracts totaling over $12 billion this year.  The biggest allocation of the budget is being reserved for the purchases of some $7.2 billion worth of next generation fighter jets, representing the last of a three-phase upgrade to the South Korean Air Force. Prospective aircraft include Lockheed Martin’s F-35, EAD’s Eurofighter Typhoon, and an upgraded version of Boeing’s classic F-15 design. But as an ally of the U.S. for so many decades with access to plenty of cutting-edge American technology, why does South Korea need to invest so much in upgrading its air-force now?

In short, because South Korea’s Air Force has until recently relied primarily on decades old aircraft to form the majority of its fleet an upgrade is needed.  Although South Korea built 150 modern F-16 fighter jets in the early 1990s, it still relied on the vintage F4 (original design 1958) and F-5-E (original design 1971) to fulfill the majority of the Air Force’s duties until very recently.  While the F-4 and F-5-E have proven to be reliable workhorses for the ROK Air Force, China and Japan’s investment in upgrading fleets provides plenty of reason beyond the traditional threat of North Korea to retire these aircraft as soon as possible. This is especially so with the antiquated McDonnell Douglas F-4 fighter, which is the reason that South Korea commenced a three phase “F-X” replacement program back in 2002.

Vintage South Korean F-4 (Photo: Jerry Gunner)

South Korea kicked off the F-X replacement program through their 2002 purchase of 40 F-15Ks from Boeing, ordering a further 20 aircraft during phase two in 2008.  But with the F-X plan originally scheduled to comprise of 120 new aircraft, South Korea still has an anticipated 60 units left to order when it decides on what to buy at phase three.  This decision will be made by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), a group tasked with reviewing next-generation aircraft bids against four broad sets of criteria.  These four sets include cost, capability, interoperability with South Korean forces, and industrial benefits.  And of this latter point, reports indicate that South Korea may require the winning bidder to assist with developing its own indigenous KFX fighter development program.

In terms of the threat environment that the ROK currently faces, North Korea’s air force and anti-air capability will play a major role in determining the most suitable aircraft for this phase three order.  The Korean People’s Air Force possesses over 800 fighters and bombers in total, most of which are of early Cold War era Soviet and Chinese design.  As a result, GlobalSecurity concluded that the North Korean “air force has a marginal capability for defending North Korean airspace and a limited ability to conduct air operations against South Korea.” However, North Korea does possess approximately 40 or so relatively advanced MIG-29 attack fighters, acquired during the mid 90s for protecting airspace above Pyongyang.  In terms of its ground-to-air capabilities, North Korea also possesses one of the densest air-defense networks in the world, a system that would need to be quickly overcome prior to any major air based incursion.

In contrast to North Korea’s relatively large air force, South Korea possesses just 500 fighter / bombers in its air force – bolstered by nearly 100 American planes also stationed in-country.  But while unable to match the size of North Korea’s air force, South Korea’s modern F16s and F-15s give it a good deal of qualitative superiority over the North.  This is further compounded by the fact ROK pilots are given substantially more opportunity to rack up flight training hours; as their counterparts in North Korea face fuel shortages which some suggest give pilots North of the DMZ just 20 hours of flight training per year.  However, there is clearly scope for South Korea to improve its air superiority and a burgeoning need to retire the eldest F-4 fleet.  But what would be the best aircraft for the ROK Air Force to invest in?

Picture: U.S. Forces Korea

F-15 Silent Eagle

As explained, South Korea already purchased some 60 F-15’s during phases one and two of its acquisition program.  With that in mind, there may well be a compelling case to stick with Boeing for phase three and order their further refined (but still under development) F-15 Silent Eagle design.  With a planned stealth design, the F-15SE would give substantial advantages to South Korea in times of conflict, allowing the aircraft to get well behind enemy lines without detection.  And from both interoperability and maintenance perspectives, there is a lot to be said about investing in one type of aircraft.  However, a draw-back with the Boeing option is that the next generation F-15’s stealth capabilities are reportedly far from realization, with only ten percent of work complete as of January 2012.  As such, even the newest variation of the F-15 will not provide full stealth capability.

Photo: Ronnie Macdonald

Eurofighter Typhoon

Another option for Seoul to consider is the Eurofighter Typhoon, a modern and robust jet fighter that was designed by the European consortium EADS. While the Eurofighter isn’t a true stealth fighter, the EADS Eurofighter bid does come with one major potential benefit for South Korea – in the area of industrial development.  Having previously indicated that South Korea would give preference to those bidders willing to offer it industrial assistance, it is easy to understand why EADS in 2011 invited Korea to join its high-end jet production project. According to reports, an EADS spokesperson said that if Korea chose the Eurofighter, then it would be offered the chance to assemble and partly manufacture the advanced jets in Korea – something that could help Korean engineers in their own indigenous projects.

Photo by U.S. Navy

F-35 Lightning

Perhaps the most technologically advanced of all bids comes in the form of Lockheed Martin’s fifth generation F-35 Lightning aircraft. With the U.S. having ordered nearly 2,500 F-35’s to be deployed over coming years, a major benefit of South Korea investing in the export variant of the F-35 would be to ensure interoperability with the U.S for decades to come.  In addition, the F-35 also comes with the benefit of having much better stealth credentials than either the Eurofighter or F-15. But there are nevertheless some problems with the F-35 bid; the speed of the aircraft is just Mach 1.6 (the bare minimum the Air Force has stated as a mandatory requirement) and it doesn’t have the ability to carry weapons externally (another core requirement). Rather puzzlingly though, if South Korea does insist on external weapons capabilities, then F-35s stealth credentials will be significantly reduced – undermining one of the rationales for purchasing a stealth aircraft.

Conclusions

No matter what option South Korea goes for, the new aircraft it orders will help bolster air capabilities and facilitate the retirement of the oldest parts of its fleet.  Obviously, North Korea’s capacities also play a role in determining what to choose, but South Korea must also think about long-term deterrence, and remember the fact that Japan recently ordered 42 F-35s and that China plans to introduce its own stealth fighters in the years to come.  With the Air Force carrying out tests and evaluations on all three aircrafts from June through September, a decision on which fighter to purchase is expected to be announced in October.

Chad 0Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Main photo by U.S. Forces Korea – Edward N. Johnson