By Nicholas Hamisevicz

Dr. Sunny Lee’s recent PacNet article captured the dynamics between South Korea, China, and the United States as they try to develop better overall relations while simultaneously dealing with a provocative North Korea. A fascinating part of the article touched upon South Korea wanting to “‘work on’ China so that China leans toward South Korea and eventually supports Seoul-led unification.” In addition, writings by Chinese scholars and online commentary are creating a perception that China may be shifting its policy on North Korea and potentially being open to more conversations on unification. Yet there are reasons these talks on unification have not developed previously, such as China’s own vision for unification, historical and territorial concerns, and closer ties between the U.S. and South Korea compared to China-ROK ties. South Korean desires for better relations with China are understandable and important. However, South Korean leaders should use caution when discussing unification with China as the perceived opportunities could actually be detrimental to the South Korean-led process of unification.

Dr. Lee cited the Financial Times op-ed by Deng Yuwen of China’s Central Party School as an example of China’s shifting policy on North Korea and that South Korea may be able to convince China to let South Korea lead. Setting aside the question of whether China’s policy toward North Korea is shifting, evolving, readjusting, or staying the same, the more interesting aspect of the piece was the second to last paragraph on unification. Deng suggests China should abandon North Korea in order to “take the initiative” on unification, which would “undermine the strategic alliance between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul; ease the geopolitical pressure on China from northeast Asia; and be helpful to the resolution of the Taiwan question.” None of those appear to be in the main interests of South Korea. Even though his reasons for ditching North Korea might resonate with Seoul and Washington, if Mr. Deng’s argument wins out, South Korean officials will have a lot of work to do on Chinese leaders to convince them to let South Korea handle everything.

China’s views and interests regarding stability on the Korean peninsula in the case of a collapse of North Korea should be considered as well. As these precarious periods with North Korea have illustrated, the Chinese leadership has a different definition and comfort level for stability on the peninsula. If collapse is imminent, there is a possibility that the Chinese government would work to prop up the North Korean leadership in order to avoid the negative consequences stemming from instability on its doorstep. As painful as the reunification process may be, a more painful sight might be unification being so close only to be taken away at the last minute by China’s support for North Korea.

In addition to differing views on unification and stability, contentious views over historical territory could prevent an understanding between China and South Korea on the unification process. The Koguryo issue, where Chinese and Korean historians and leaders dispute the historical territory of the Koguryo kingdom and the Chinese empire, has been a vexing complication in South Korea-China relations. Koreans fear China using historical claims that its former people controlled areas that are now part of North Korea to allow the Chinese military to move in if there was trouble in North Korea or just for political purposes during unification talks. In contrast, Chinese leaders and scholars are worried Korea will claim parts of China after unification as part of a greater Korea because parts of the former Koguryo kingdom are now part of modern China.

In Scott Snyder’s book China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security, he states that “…the Koguryo dispute takes on a greater significance and drastically limits options for compromise on either side.” Mr. Snyder also emphasizes that many South Korean leaders and citizens view China’s handling of the Koguryo issue as a litmus test for China’s overall intentions in Northeast Asia. Putting it all together, if the Koguryo issue leaves China and South Korea little room to compromise, South Korea will have to work very hard to convince China that the compromise is actually to let South Korea manage the unification process.

Moreover, former U.S. Senator Richard Lugar thought this historical issue and its impact on China’s views toward unification was so important, before he left office, he pushed the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff to write a report for the committee in order to explain the complexities and concerns over China’s views on unification of the Korean peninsula. Thus, while China and Korea may have been able to keep the issue quiet recently, when unification is close, this territorial issue will likely be prominent again.

In his PacNet article, Dr. Lee suggests that South Korea’s efforts with China are actually also geared toward getting the U.S. to “accommodate Seoul’s long-running complaints” in the U.S.-ROK relationship. While there may be some difficult issues between the U.S. and South Korea, it would appear that on big issues like unification, the two countries are on the same page or at least very close. The main evidence for this is the Joint Vision Statement that came out on June 16, 2009 during President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to the United States. The statement acknowledges the desire by the United States and South Korea to work together “to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.” Moreover, during her time as U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Kathleen Stephens emphasized the Joint Statement at a Korea Institute for National Unification event featuring the U.S., Japanese, and Russian ambassadors and noted that “nothing has disturbed me more over the years than at times having it suggested to me by Korean friends or others that somehow the United States thinks the division of the Korean peninsula is right or even serves U.S. interests. Nothing could be further from the truth.” China’s Ambassador to South Korea was invited but did not attend the event. It might be easier for South Korean-led unification to happen with a free democracy and a market economy as seen in the U.S. and Korea versus the soft totalitarianism and mixed economy in China.

In addition to the Joint Vision Statement, David Straub from Stanford University stated that “the United States is more than willing to let South Korea take the lead on North Korea — as long as it is comfortable with the general direction.” In many ways unification policy is an extension of North Korea policy. Therefore, if the U.S. is comfortable with South Korea taking the lead on North Korea policy, then if South Korea’s plan for unification is with the framework expressed in the Joint Vision Statement, the U.S. should be comfortable with South Korea leading the unification process as well.

Almost everything involving unification is complicated. But a perceived shift in China’s North Korea policy doesn’t automatically mean it will shift its unification policy to be like South Korea’s. As Deng Yuwen’s article suggests, China might ditch North Korea in order for the Chinese government to take the lead in facilitating unification. South Korea should be careful in thinking that it can easily woo China into accepting South Korean-led unification and remember that it has a committed ally in the United States already capable of supporting South Korea’s desired process.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Christian Senger’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Clare Hubbard

One indicator of the difficulty that North Korean defectors have in assimilating to life in South Korea is crime statistics. The crime rate among North Korean defectors in South Korea is more than twice that of the country’s overall crime rate of 4.3%.  Defectors are also five times more likely to fall victim to crime.  Desperate for money, defectors will commit crimes against each other, playing off the vulnerability of newly defected countrymen. The ill-gotten money is used to send to the criminals’ families in North Korea, pay back their brokers for defection costs and to create a financially stable life in South Korea. The money earned through the resettlement program at Hanawon (House of Unity) Center, along with life skills training, is not enough to create a successful transition into South Korean society for most defectors.

Two recent cases highlight defectors committing crimes against their peers:

• The 2012 Human Trafficking report states that in April of 2011, the Seoul Metropolitan Police arrested a 40-year-old North Korean female refugee who had forced 70 North Korean women into prostitution. She and others involved had paid Chinese brokers around $32,000 to bring the North Korean women who were living in China to South Korea. The woman pleaded guilty to charges related to commercial sex trade and paid a $1,800 fine.
• In October 2012, North Korean defectors were arrested on charges of using a real estate scam to con other defectors. Defectors were told that their money would be invested by a Chinese proxy because of Chinese limits on investments by foreigners.  The cons showed pictures of apartments under construction in China to make the scam more believable. The pyramid scheme tactic took around $4.6 million from 155 defectors over the course of two years.  Each defector was told to invest 30 million won ($25,000) and were then paid 3 million won a month later ($2,500) and told they would receive all their money back once they found other investors. Fifteen defectors were charge in the scheme.  A Chinese man is also believed to have been involved.

These crimes occur because of defectors’ general lack of awareness about practices in South Korea and overseas.  Many North Koreans also face prejudice from South Koreans who perceive them as socialists who are dependent, lazy and selfish. This discrimination makes it hard for North Koreans to fully integrate into South Korean society.

By law, North Koreans are automatically given South Korean
citizenship.  When defectors come to South Korea they endure a month-long vetting process to check their background and make sure they are not North Korean spies.  Then they are put into the two month re-education program at Hanawon, which provides defectors with social readjustment training, medical care, and counseling.  Upon leaving, each North Korean adult receives a stipend of 36,960,000 won (about $35,000) with the expectation that part of it will be used as  a down payment for an apartment. Also, every defector is assigned a career counselor. All of this is provided by the South Korean government. Yet, despite all this support, North Koreans still have an extremely challenging time assimilating into a South Korean lifestyle.

The overwhelming freedom that comes in a capitalist society is often too much for a defector to adapt to within the two months of training.  Having lived in a totalitarian society for so long the defectors are ingrained with a set of values different from those of Koreans who grew up in a democratic environment.  Language, technology and discrimination are major barriers for defectors.  South Korean’s have embedded some English words into their vernacular (often called Konglish) which makes it difficult for defectors to understand. Also words associated with capitalism such as real estate and insurance are unfamiliar to defectors.

There are 29 South Korean regional support centers for defectors looking for jobs.  These centers provide three weeks of training.  Also, to encourage South Korean industries to hire defectors, the government subsidizes half of the defector’s monthly wages for two years.  Despite aide from the government South Korean companies are reluctant to hire North Koreans because of discrimination and also from “some defector’s inability to compete with South Koreans in work ethics, habits and skills.”  Defectors are known to frequently miss work and high absence rates give South Koreans the impression that defectors are undependable and lazy.

Defectors can have such unrealistically high expectations of life in South Korea that they develop in China or during readjustment training.  The reality of working at a blue-collar job is often not what was anticipated and defectors will quit to create their own businesses or with the belief that they will be hired for better work. If the self-owned business fails or they are not hired at another job, maintaining a stable lifestyle can be impossible; defectors will find other ways to make money, sometimes turning to crime. Families can play crucial roles in the adjustment process, and a defector will think twice before quitting a job because they are more aware of their responsibility to others.

To better integrate North Koreans into South Korean society, the Hanawon Center should look for ways to better prepare defectors for their new lives. Also, South Koreans should be more understanding of the difficulties defectors face when being integrated into South Korea.  With possible future unification, South Korea needs to come up with a better system of integrating defectors to create a foundation for a more stable and prosperous Korea.

Clare Hubbard is a former Fulbright Korea English Teaching Assistant and current intern for the Korea Economic Institute.

Photo from InSapphoWe Trust’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

by Chad 0′Carroll

As South Korea evaluates a range of advanced fighter jets in preparation for an October decision on upgrading part of its air force, North Korean air force commanders are likely getting increasingly worried about their capacity to defend the skies of the DPRK. Although Pyongyang has long possessed a much larger air force than its southern neighbor, rudimentary weapons systems capabilities, a mainly vintage selection of aircraft, and inadequate levels of pilot training have all increasingly undermined its aerial capabilities. This problem will only be further compounded when the ROK receives its latest order of next generation fighters in 2016.

Estimates of the size of North Korea’s Air Force vary, but the Library of Congress estimates the DPRK possesses over 800 fighters and bombers in total. In addition, it owns a staggeringly high number of transport aircraft, including 318 fixed wing planes and 518 helicopters. However, while these numbers do significantly dwarf South Korea’s Air Force, the quality and age of North Korea’s aircraft reduces its threat level considerably.

Chronic fuel shortages have meant that pilots have been reported to have as little as 20 hours training per year, giving them little experiencing in either defensive or offensive aerial flight. In addition, North Korea’s moribund economy has meant it has long been unable to purchase modern jets of any substantial quantity, a problem that will continue even if the economic situation improves due to UN sanctions that prevent the legitimate sale of modern fighter jets. And while theoretically possessing a large air force, much of the equipment has been shown by satellite images to be in a state of decay, with inventory often stripped of parts, left in un-flyable condition.

All these factors help explain why during a recent Air-Force mobilization effort following the shelling of Yeonpyeong island, North Korea’s Air-Force reportedly fared extremely poorly, with pilots demonstrating sub-par flying skills, air craft performing poorly, and even several crashes and near misses taking place. So as South Korea looks forward to taking delivery of a further 60 next generation fighters, what is North Korea doing to improve its aerial capabilities moving forward?

MiG 29 at Sunchon

Better Training

One new way North Korea seems to be attempting to improve its Air Force is through better training of its pilots, and focusing that training on its very best aircraft types. Following the death of Kim Jong-il, several reports emerged which said that the North Korean air force was flying far more training missions than was normal. During winter up to 650 training flights per day were recorded, well up from the 100 or so average throughout 2011. The training flights in the earlier part of 2012 were also reportedly more antagonistic than usual, with DPRK forces flying so close to the DMZ that South Korean Air Force reportedly had to scramble aircraft several times in response. These training flights also employed North Korea’s best inventory, its fleet of MiG-29 fighter jets and SU-25 close-air-support jets. This was a prudent choice given the vintage nature of the rest of its inventory, including many aircraft from the early 1950s and 1960s that could be easily destroyed by South Korean forces. It is possible that the increased flight frequency is linked to Kim Jong-un’s recent visit to a base housing one of North Korea’s advanced Mig-29 squadrons, a visit during which crew may have lobbied him about the need to increase training missions.

AN2s at Sondok

Asymmetric “Stealth” Capabilities

North Korea is very familiar with using asymmetric means to improve its capabilities, and its air-force is no different in this regard. Although many of its aircraft would not look out of place in aviation history museums, this does not mean that some of the older aircraft types do not have significant tactical value. One such aircraft is the Soviet built Antonov AN-2 (introduced 1947), the largest biplane ever designed. Capable of carrying at least 12 paratroopers, the AN-2’s biplane design has many interesting advantages, being able to take off and land on rough surface runways from very short distances (just 560ft required), fly very slowly (the stall speed is just 30mph), and as a result of its low speed flight capability, fly safely at extremely low altitude. Interestingly, its light airframe, canvas skin and single propeller engine also give it a surprisingly high degree of stealth capabilities. When coupled with its low flying capabilities, these characteristics make the AN-2 remarkably invisible to South Korean radars.

When considering that amateur pilot Mathius Rust was able to fly into Soviet airspace during the height of the Cold War and land successfully in Red Square with a similarly small prop powered aircraft, one can see the advantage the characteristics of the AN-2 provide. As such, these benefits provide North Korea with 270 relatively stealth aircraft that could fly low over the DMZ and allow the delivery of special-forces into South Korea without much chance of anything but visual detection.

Underground Hangar, Pukchang

Defensive Measures

Tunnels - Another way North Korea has been working to improve its capabilities over the past decade or so has been through ensuring its best capabilities are survivable. While the MiG-29 and SU-25 (and to a lesser extent the MiG-23) represent North Korea’s most modern aircraft types, the DPRK Air Force owns relatively low numbers of each model (reports suggest around 40 MiG-29s, 36 Su-25s and 40 MiG-23s). As a result, North Korea has taken precautions to ensure that in the event of war, many of its best assets will be protected both before and after missions.

Having much experience in deep tunneling, North Korea has consequently embellished a number of airports with subterranean aircraft storage facilities (most obvious at airports with no aircraft visible to satellite), with a handful even featuring underground runways which allow jets to take off out from mountains. A caveat though is that these measures are not watertight, because carefully aimed explosives can temporarily block entry and exit areas to tunnels, while deep penetrating weapons could potentially even cause significant damage to deeper parts of the tunnels.

North Korean Air Defenses pictured by IMINT Analysis

Air Defense - In addition to its subterranean facilities, North Korea also possesses what one open source analyst has labeled “the most capable third-world strategic SAM (surface-to-air missile) network on paper.” Having over 30 early warning radar systems mainly consolidated towards the south, North Korea has a relatively dense air defense network – as can be seen in this extensive analysis. However, most of North Korea’s air defense systems are now dated with conflicts like the 1991 Iraq war illustrating how much of the DPRK air defense inventory was successfully overcome in other theaters.

But perhaps cognizant of aging infrastructure and its inability to purchase new fighters, North Korea has been reportedly investing resources in upgrading its air defense capabilities, with recent ROK intelligence suggesting that ground-to-air short range KN-06 testing has been successful. If true, this provides the DPRK with a much needed mobile boost to its air defenses – capable of hitting targets up to 150km away. But quite how many of these missiles North Korea has are as of yet unknown.

Conclusion

North Korea has a large but dated Air-Force. But at least for now, its fleet of modern attack planes stands at least a fighting chance against the current South Korean Air Force. However, it is important to remember that North Korea possesses around just one hundred of these aircraft in total. When South Korea receives its final batch of 60 next generation fighters in 2016, it will posses 120 next generation fighters – in addition to its relatively modern fleet of 100+ F16s. At this point, the best inventory of North Korea’s air force will be outnumbered by South Korean forces by nearly two to one. Of course this comparison does not even considering the likely substantial support the U.S. Air Force would provide in any conflict.

Unable to purchase new fighter aircraft, North Korea has had little choice but to train its air force better, protect its best assets, and rely on asymmetric means to counter South Korea’s increasingly powerful air force.

Chad 0′Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

By Chad 0Carroll

North Korea continues to ratchet up its belligerent rhetoric against South Korea, this week threatening to destroy a range of South Korean targets including the Blue House and the offices of various (and named) conservative newspapers and television stations. Rather spectacularly, DPRK state media claimed its military would “reduce all the rat-like groups and the bases for provocations to ashes in three or four minutes, in much shorter time, by unprecedented peculiar means and methods of our own style.”  As if this wasn’t enough, yesterday KCNA went one stage further and posted a series of eight cartoons depicting Lee Myung-bak‘s bloody death, head super-imposed on the body of a rat each and every time.  On one side, anyone following North Korean statements for the first time might be forgiven for thinking that the Koreas were coming ever-close to major war.  On the other, some long-time North Korea watchers will just dismiss the latest rhetoric as nothing more than bluster.  However, there is a range of reasons why both South Korea and the international community should remain on guard in the coming months.

While North Korea has often been derogatory about South Korean leaders, the latest bluster is much more militant than what we have seen in recent years.  Indeed, the most recent threats have shown a specificity in targets not seen before (including a long list of Conservative media outlets), while the “cartoon” series shows just how far Pyongyang’s disdain for Lee Myung-bak has come since him taking the Presidency in 2008.  On the surface, the harsh reaction seems to be a tit-for-tat retaliation to Lee Myung Bak’s recent farmland advice to Kim Jong-un, his suggestion that North Korea could have used its rocket-launch budget to instead alleviate hunger, and the South Korean militaries’ decision to showcase extended-range cruise missile to international media last week, capable of reaching “anywhere in North Korea.”  Beyond these triggers, internal factors are likely also contributing to the increase in North Korean rhetoric, with the government either trying to divert attention from the failed satellite launch or attempting to increase tension in order to bolster flailing support for new leader Kim Jong-un.

But should we read anything particularly into this? Of course, this is not the first time belligerent rhetoric has been used against Seoul, with North Korea threatening to spill seas of blood and destroy imperialist lackeys for many years now.  In fact, on most days there is language published on KCNA which might in one way or another be construed as being threatening to South Korea or the U.S and as a result, some are on record as saying these threats are little to worry about.  This is presumably why one report from 2010 suggested that most young people in the ROK remain unconcerned about North Korea, despite heightened tensions even after the sinking of the Cheonan. Of course, decades of threats make it relatively easy to disregard them.  But is there a risk to assume that North Korean rhetoric is something that can be safely ignored?

On occasion, the language in North Korea’s threats becomes far more belligerent than what is usually the norm for even its own fiery style. Often, this type of belligerent language includes threats of “Holy War”, “Seas of Fire”, “Bolstering Deterrence”, and “Physical Retaliation”.  A close look at the chronology of events on the Korean peninsula since 1994 (when Google News records first recorded Pyongyang’s first- use of its famous “sea of fire” threat) shows that it is imprudent to simply dismiss DPRK threats as bluster.  An inspection of 15 of North Korea’s most well-reported threats (that use belligerent rhetoric as described above) since 1994 show an alarming number of “incidents” that occurred subsequent to warnings:

Table: North Korean Threats and Actions

From this table we can observe that from a total of 15 major threats, 8 subsequent incidents took place (5 if you count the 3 occurring between February – July 2003 as a single response).  Caveat: this is only using a small range of threat terms – there have been times when North Korea has made good on other less belligerent threats and many other times when it has not.  And while it is difficult to know if we can link specific warnings to incidents like naval clashes or the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, some are obviously very clearly linked (for example, nuclear test warnings).

So should we be worried about the current increase in threat from North Korea?  With elections forthcoming in South Korea, Pyongyang has a strong motivation to try to manipulate the South Korean populace.  It’s no secret that the DPRK prefers a liberal administration in the Blue House so Pyongyang will be keen to demonstrate to South Koreans that keeping the conservatives in power will create unnecessary future complications. As a result, these recent threats might be designed to make South Korean voters think twice when voting at the next elections, especially after the conservative’s recent (albeit marginal) victory in April’s parliamentary elections.  But if is true that North Korean threats will no longer make an impact on the future voting behavior of South Korea, might Pyongyang have a stronger motivation to actually make good of its latest range of threats?

Pyongyang’s claim that their newly threatened special actions will be “unprecedented” implies that nuclear tests, naval skirmishes, and border incidents along the DMZ are unlikely to comprise the core of their most recent threats.  If these threats are to come to fruition, perhaps we can expect  unconventional means, like those used on  Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, or large-scale cyber-attacks on South Korean online media and government.  “Limited” actions such as these appear far more likely than major aggressions like the outright shelling of targets in Seoul, perhaps explaining why South Korea has stationed around 240 officers around aforementioned media offices.  Either way, with the Blue House and South Korean military promising severe retaliation to any provocation, the risk of escalation remains severe if North Korea goes ahead even with even limited physical attacks.

Although reading into North Korean threats is like attempting to read tea leaves, one should not be too hasty in dismissing them entirely.  With Kim Jong-un’s uncertain hold of power, there is a stronger chance than ever that brinkmanship between the two Koreas could prove highly dangerous this year. The sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island have changed the dynamics on the Korean peninsula and South Korea may be unable to show the restraint it has during past provocations. .  However, while Seoul shouldn’t pander to North Korea’s belligerence, it should also be cognizant that for the moment it seems it is the hardliners who are behind the wheel of North Korean foreign policy.

Chad 0Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.