By Troy Stangarone

Ever since the United States detonated a nuclear weapon over Japan at the end of World War II, nations have felt the need to pursue a nuclear weapons program. They have sought nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of deterrent, as a means to gain leverage over their adversaries, and as a form of international prestige. In the case of South Korea, the success of North Korea’s recent nuclear test and the heightened rhetoric for war coming out of Pyongyang has caused some leaders in Seoul to rethink the necessity of maintaining their own nuclear arsenal as a means of deterrence. However, this path, while potentially appealing, comes with significant political and economic costs that would ultimately make pursing an independent nuclear deterrent a mistake.

Why South Koreans Might Think They Need Nuclear Weapons

As the Cold War was dawning, the Soviet Union felt it needed nuclear weapons to maintain parity with the United States. France, which remained outside NATO’s military command for 43 years and has always sought the ability to project military power independent of the United States, followed the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom’s acquisition of nuclear weapons to bolster its own military might. Even South Korea previously sought nuclear weapons after the United States withdraw from Vietnam. The lure of nuclear weapons is so strong that Saddam Hussein allowed other countries to think he might have them as a means of deterrent.

Since South Korea gave up its own ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1970s, it has relied on the protection of the United States nuclear umbrella. However, with North Korea’s successful missile and nuclear tests, withdrawal from the Korean War armistice, and increasingly hostile rhetoric, some in South Korea have begun discussing the option of Seoul gaining its own nuclear deterrent or seeking the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula as the New York Times recently reported.

Under the United States’ nuclear umbrella, South Korea depends on the extended deterrence of the United States’ nuclear weapons to preclude either a nuclear attack or a large scale conventional attack. The principal of extended deterrence works as long as both potential adversary and the country under protection believe that the U.S. promise of nuclear retaliation is credible. The other challenge is that, while extended deterrence has worked to deter major attacks on U.S. allies, it has not proven successful in preventing the small scale attacks North Korea has engaged in with the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong-do.

However, it is not just North Korea’s actions that have prompted discussions of changes in South Korea’s nuclear posture. According to polling by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, South Koreans have begun to lose faith in the credibility of the nuclear umbrella. In 2012, only 48 percent of South Koreans thought the United States would respond with nuclear forces if South Korea suffered a North Korean nuclear attack. That is a 7 point decline from the previous year. At the same time, public support for the development of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons program has grown from 56 percent in 2010 to 66 percent shortly after North Korea’s third nuclear test.

The Potential Costs of Going Nuclear

While a good deal of attention has been paid to the potential impact of the reintroduction of U.S. nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula or the development of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons on Seoul’s own deterrent posture, relatively little attention has been paid to the potential political and economic costs South Korea might face if it choose to develop its own nuclear weapons.

South Korea developing its own nuclear deterrent would in many ways be unprecedented. No state with a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States has acquired a nuclear weapon since the advent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Additionally, other than North Korea, all of the states that have developed nuclear weapons since the NPT have done so while outside of the NPT. North Korea tested its first nuclear after it’s withdraw from the treaty.

Additionally, Seoul would be in violation of its NPT responsibilities, and if it withdrew from the treaty, join North Korea as the only countries to withdraw from the NPT. It would likely find itself unable to draw upon the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which provides much of the fuel needed to power nuclear plants.

It would also find itself in violation of its civilian nuclear agreement with the United States, which inhibits its ability to use nuclear plants with any U.S. content for weapons development, and see the current talks to extend the agreement grind to a halt.

South Korea’s Domestic Nuclear Program

The development of a nuclear deterrent would likely end South Korea’s goals of becoming a nuclear exporter. It could also potentially impact South Korea’s own domestic nuclear program. South Korea has a robust domestic nuclear program which meets 13 percent of its domestic energy needs and a desire to become a player in the international market for nuclear power exports.

In 2009, South Korea won a $40 billion contract to manage and construct four nuclear power plants in the United Arab Emirates. This was seen as a first step in South Korea’s efforts to become a significant player in the nuclear export industry and potentially build 80 plants worldwide by 2030. That contract would likely be at risk as well as South Korea’s own long term fuel supply.

Economic Sanctions

In recent years, both North Korea and Iran have seen economic and financial sanctions placed on their economies as they either pursued or were suspected of pursing nuclear weapons. South Korea would also likely face either bilateral or multilateral economic sanctions.

India and Pakistan faced sanctions for their pursuit of nuclear weapons. While UN sanctions only called on countries not to supply technology, equipment, or material that could benefit their programs, both faced additional U.S. sanctions which prohibited military assistance and support for loans in financial institutions.

Because of the unique nature in which South Korea would develop nuclear weapons, it is hard to truly know what the consequences might be. However, on a minimal level history would suggest that Seoul would find itself facing economic sanctions and limits on its own nuclear program unless it pursued nuclear weapons in the face of eminent war. Perhaps South Korea, due to its international reputation and sympathy for the challenges it faces from North Korea could minimize these costs, but there are no assurances that it would not face the same type of sanctions that Iran and North Korea face today.

While North Korea clearly presents unique challenges to South Korea, there is no reason to believe that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is unreliable. At the same time, the costs of pursing a nuclear weapons program in the absence of a clear failure of deterrence means that while there will likely continue to be robust debate about the option of developing nuclear weapons as long as North Korea continues its provocations, it is not an option which South Korea is likely to seriously pursue.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from U.S. Pacific Fleet’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Jinho Park

While North Korea ratchets up the tension in Northeast Asia, Kim Jong-un made the bold—though not surprising—decision of withdrawing all North Korean workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Recently, South Korea and the United States together have called for a dialogue with North Korea. North Korea has dismissed the offer by denouncing it as a “crafty trick.” To some extent, offering a dialogue manages North Korea’s provocations. So, is it a signal of moving into a new game on the Korean Peninsula? For South Korea it is now crucial to plan what to do next while preparing for a new game with Kim Jong-un.

First, South Korea’s call for a dialogue is not an “out of the box” response to North Korean decision-makers. So, it is unlikely that this offer changes the atmosphere surrounding North Korea’s decision-making process. As the reform of the intelligence service is under discussion in South Korea to strengthen its human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to better access information of value in North Korea, the way for reforming HUMINT operations should be focused on providing stories—beyond gathering information—to be discussed and exerting an influence on the consensus-building process among decision-makers in Pyongyang. Anything taken for granted by North Korea does not change the cognitive and intuitive the mind-set of its leaders. We have to ‘educate them to learn from us’ through HUMINT operations.

Second, if North Korea decides to sit at the table with Korea or the U.S., what can we discuss with North Korea to change a negotiation paradigm, while not going back to the status-quo? Among several options for North Korea—probably in consultation with China—is to hold a separate dialogue regarding different issues with South Korea and the U.S. respectively. To U.S. policymakers, this is a dangerous option, to sit back and watch a dialogue between the two Koreas regarding issues such as nuclear and missile development and proliferation. To South Korea, a top priority is to resume the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Last month, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification introduced an ambitious plan to attract foreign investment in the Complex and further transform it into an international complex. From the founding spirit of the Kaesong Industrial Complex for mutual economic benefits, it was regrettable that the Ministry of Unification did not articulate how such a plan would be helpful for the North Korean regime at the same time. After all, what is going on now seems to return to the status-quo rather than a paradigm shift.

Third, the Park administration needs to explore a new partner for supplementing its efforts toward building political and economic confidence with North Korea to overcome the realistic limits of cooperation with the U.S., China, and Japan. An opportunity to work with a new partner would create the chance to intensify a multi-directional approach to North Korea. The new partner should be one who can exert an influence on North Korea and at the same time be relatively free from North Korean provocations. In this regard, the EU is potentially a very appropriate partner. As the EU has a strong and strategic relationship with the U.S. and China, the EU could be a reliable and sustainable broker between the two Koreas, hopefully the U.S. and China as well. President Park Geun-hye visited North Korea in 2002 under the auspice of the Korea-Europe Foundation.

Fourth, while discussing what to do with North Korea, South Korea should develop a realistic assessment of how the tension on the Korean Peninsula affects the strategic competition in Asia between the U.S. and China. Chinese officials recently expressed their serious concerns about U.S.’s recent military demonstration—both air and naval power—in responding to North Korea bellicose threats. Although the U.S. and China have a different strategic perspective in dealing with North Korean issues, they share a common view on North Korean issues in regards to how to protect and increase their own national interests, particularly in Northeast Asia.

It is not certain whether this common denominator among the two global powers is helpful for South Korea’s strategic interests. As it is incredibly difficult for South Korea to reduce the perspective gap between the U.S. and China, South Korea needs to find and expand common interests with the U.S. and China respectively in negotiating with North Korea while increasing cooperation among the three players. This balancing effort between the two superpowers should be one of key strategic guidelines for implementing President Park’s Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula.

Lastly, it should be noted that Americans do not have a clear understanding about what President Park’s Trust-building Process is and how it is different from former policies.  Through the recent Korea-US Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on April 12, the U.S. welcomed the process. Such diplomatic rhetoric does not necessarily mean that the U.S. supports the new initiative under a common approach for the goal of peaceful denuclearization. What the two nations can do together is still to be seen. In a similar vein, the upcoming trilateral Korea-China-Japan summit talks in Seoul would be the first official venue for discussing the initiative among the three leaders together. Some argue that building a trilateral cooperative mechanism among the three nations for the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula might be more challenging than achieving a similar goal among Korea, the U.S., and China.  The reason is that China and Japan do not have significant common ground to cooperate.

President Park Geun-hye faces a tough and challenging deadlock with North Korea. The same is true for North Korea’s leaders. In continuing negotiations with North Korea, the current situation should not been viewed as a matter of ‘strategic patience’, but as a rare chance of ‘taking steps toward paradigm shift.’ Adhering to strategic patience will at best control the escalation of tensions, while not resolving issues with North Korea.

Mr. Jinho Park is a Legislative Aide to South Korean Legislator Jinha Hwang of the ruling Saenuri Party, also a non-resident fellow of Korea Defense & Security Forum (KODEF) in Seoul.

Photo from Joseph A. Ferris III’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

Nearly 70 nations and international organizations issued statements on North Korea’s third nuclear test. The following is a list of current available statements:

Albania-Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Australia – Prime Minister Julia Gillard

Austria – Foreign Minister Spindelegger

Bahrain – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Belarus – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Belgium – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation

Brazil

Bulgaria – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Canada – John Baird – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chile – Ministry of Foreign Relations

China

Colombia – Ministry of Exterior Relations

Croatia – Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs

Costa Rica – Ministry of Foreign Relations

Estonia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Finland – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

France – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Germany

Georgia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Greece – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Guatemala – Ministry of Foreign Relations

Honduras – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

India – Ministry of External Affairs

Indonesia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ireland – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Israel – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Japan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Kazakhstan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Kosovo

Latvia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Malaysia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Maldives – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Malta – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mexico – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mongolia – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Netherlands – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

New Zealand

Norway

Pakistan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Panama – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Paraguay – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Peru – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Philippines

Poland – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Republic of Korea – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Romania – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Russia – Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

Singapore

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa – Department of International Relations and Cooperation

Spain

Sri Lanka – Ministry of External Affairs

Switzerland

Taiwan

Thailand

Turkey

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom – Foreign and Commonwealth Office

United States

Uruguay – Ministry of External Relations

Uzbekistan

Vietnam

ASEAN

European Union – Council of the European Union

NATO

United Nations- Security Council

Photo from United Nations Photo’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Troy Stangarone

With North Korea having successfully conducted a third nuclear test, questions are once again being raised about the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” towards North Korea. However, have critics of strategic patience hit on a fundamental flaw of the policy or are they merely expressing their policy preferences?

One of the more recent criticisms of strategic patience comes from William Tobey, who on ForeignPolicy.com argues that “the Administration can no longer apply “strategic patience” to the threats from Iran and North Korea. Patience is becoming neglect and neglecting them will only make them worse.”

However, it is unclear what alternative policy Tobey or others would suggest. In the case of both Iran and North Korea, the United States has alternatively attempted to engage both regimes in dialogue while also pursuing additional sanctions either through the United Nations Security Council or on a bilateral basis. In many ways, both North Korea and Iran are relatively insensitive to sanctions, while efforts such as the “Leap Day” agreement to reach even a limited new understanding with Pyongyang quickly feel apart with North Korea’s missile test.

Tobey’s criticism of strategic patience isn’t the first. In 2010, it was criticized as “strategic passivity” and a “strategic blunder” among other things.  Many of these criticisms are based in the idea that by not actively engaging North Korea the United States is only allowing the problems with North Korea to grow and that it is not really addressing the root of the problem on the Korean peninsula, the strategic insecurity of North Korea. Of course, if Pyongyang was pursuing a highly enriched uranium program in secret while negotiating on its plutonium program, it raises questions about the ability of dialogue to contain the problem.

At the same time, critics have argued in the past that Pyongyang is open to negotiations because of its concerns about becoming increasingly dependent upon China. However, just because Pyongyang is open to dialogue, does not mean that the regime has the same goals and objectives for discussions. While Pyongyang may be uncomfortable with too great a reliance on China, and hence hopeful of eliciting U.S. and South Korean aid, that does not also mean that they are willing to give up their weapons programs. If North Korea has made the strategic decision to proceed with its program, no amount of dialogue and engagement may be successful.

In this context, the policy of strategic patience was put in place as an attempt to modify Pyongyang’s behavior. Or rather, to demonstrate that there would be no reward for North Korean provocations as in the past.

The administration’s policy of strategic patience was never designed to preclude negotiation with North Korea over its weapons programs. In fact, the United States held talks with North Korea in Geneva in 2011 that at the time seemed to lead nowhere due to concerns that Pyongyang was not seriously interested in denuclearization. Those talks, however, likely laid the groundwork for what became the “Leap Day” agreement in early 2012 when the administration reached out to the new regime in Pyongyang shortly after Kim Jong-il’s death. The agreement sought to establish a moratorium on North Korean missile tests, but was left stillborn by North Korea’s failed satellite launch later that April.

The real challenge for strategic patience is that it faces the same difficulty as the “Sunshine Policy” under progressive administrations in Seoul. Can the policy yield results before it loses the political support needed to be viable? For any policy of strategic patience to work, North Korea would have to engage in a series of provocations for which the administration did not respond with engagement. By seeking talks too soon after a provocation, the administration would run the risk of its engagement being seen as the same past attempts of offering concessions for promises of better behavior. Hence, to conclude that the policy has failed because North Korea engaged in a provocation is more a statement of the critics’ policy preference than a criticism of the actual policy’s weaknesses – the primary of which is arguably that the policy provides no active leverage to change North Korea’s behavior.

This means that any policy of strategic patience must be coupled with a policy of strategic ambiguity. Without uncertainty regarding if and how the United States will respond to provocations, it is unlikely that the calculus in Pyongyang will fundamentally change. Instead the risk, which critics would rightly point out, is that North Korea will merely conclude that a higher threshold of provocations is needed to achieve its goals. In essence, like the rest of North Korea’s economy, inflation will have set into its policy of nuclear blackmail.

In the end, whether strategic patience succeeds or fails, the United States faces few good options in dealing with North Korea. At the same time, while there are good reasons to engage North Korea when opportunities present themselves, negotiations should not be seen as an end in themselves. Negotiations are a tool, one which can be used by both sides. In the end, to succeed with North Korea there must be a willing partner in Pyongyang. Otherwise, negotiations could end up just being North Korea’s own version of strategic patience.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his alone.

Photo from the Secretary of Defense’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

North Korea conducted a third nuclear test, and initial reports indicate a potentially larger explosion. North Korea’s media stated the test used a “miniaturized and lighter nuclear device.” If true, and combined with its successful rocket launch in December, these recent actions suggest North Korea’s ability to increase its direct military threat to the United States and its allies is outpacing the efforts to prevent it from developing these capabilities. Despite an environment ripe for engagement with its neighbors, North Korea had chosen to pursue improving its military capabilities. Even if deterrence against North Korea is strengthened, it is becoming clearer that North Korea must decide to change its actions in order to have a less contentious environment in Northeast Asia.

With the successful rocket launch already indicating a potential for North Korea to directly threaten the United States, this possibly larger nuclear test will also raise concerns about North Korea’s capabilities. The U.S. will return to the United Nations Security Council in hopes of tougher sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program. In conjunction with the effort at the UN, the U.S. should strengthen its missile defense capabilities with South Korea and Japan, as well as push to strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative measures that track and monitors suspicious North Korean ships and cargo. However, despite all of these previous efforts, North Korea has learned from other countries in the past and has now developed relatively indigenous missile and nuclear programs on their own. This makes it more difficult for countries to deter the improvement and use of these programs from outside pressure alone. Thus, the U.S. and its allies will try to bolster their deterrence efforts, but the nuclear test still leaves a sense that deterrence is not enough and engagement will be needed as well.

Before the rocket test in December and this nuclear test, the neighbors around North Korea were gearing up to try more engagement with North Korea, but North Korea rejected these overtures. North Korea and Japan were talking, albeit at a lower level. After being re-elected president and almost a month before North Korea’s rocket launch, at his speech at the University of Yangon Barack Obama specifically spoke to the North Korean leadership urging, “let go of your nuclear weapons and choose the path of peace and progress. If you do, you will find an extended hand from the United States of America.” Even after North Korea had its successful rocket test and satellite launch, President Obama’s second inaugural address stated that “engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear,” providing another outlet for potential engagement with North Korea if it changed its behavior. In South Korea, all the presidential candidates had to describe their plans for engaging North Korea during the campaign. Even after her election, Park Geun-hye reiterated that relations must improve with North Korea. But the nuclear test from North Korea has made it more difficult for countries to immediately pursue outreach efforts with North Korea. Park Geun-hye’s strong statement condemning the nuclear test suggests a frustration with North Korea for failing to respond positively to an environment fit for engagement.

Yet North Korea’s actions increasingly suggest that it is not necessarily the right balance of deterrence and engagement that matters most but the willingness of the North Korean leadership to enact positive change that helps its people and cooperates with its neighbors. Both deterrence and engagement were being attempted by the United State and South Korea. That right balance of deterrence and providing North Korea an outlet for constructive dialogue will help shape the political, security, and social environment to allow North Korea to benefit from undertaking significant positive change.  However, the North Korean leadership appears to be deliberately trying to escalate tensions in the region and develop capabilities to threaten the United States and its allies. The United States, South Korea, and others countries will attempt further sanctions and policies to prevent provocations from North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs. This will make it more difficult to engage North Korea and more likely that it is only a switch in North Korea’s outlook and actions that will change the dynamics in Northeast Asia for the better.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

By Linda Kim

Known as the “Political Super Bowl,” the 2013 State of the Union Address by President Barack Obama did not disappoint. In the hours leading up to it, people guessed what would be discussed, which SOTU game they would partake in and who would be seated in FLOTUS’s box.

But, in just less than 23 hours before the big show, the world had its own version of the Superdome blackout. North Korea had conducted its third nuclear test.

Was this a surprise to POTUS? According to sources, North Korea warned the U.S. and South Korea of its intention to conduct a third nuclear test. Even more so, the White House made the statement that “this wasn’t a surprise” and that POTUS would already be addressing nonproliferation in his speech. But the damage was already done and critics began questioning just how effective President Obama has been in his nuclear nonproliferation goals.

Many speculated that his speech would change to address this issue, but fortunately for Cody Keenan, the SOTU version of Joe Flacco, it barely made a difference. Instead, POTUS generalized and stated:

America will continue to lead the effort to prevent the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons. The regime in North Korea must know that they will only achieve security and prosperity by meeting their international obligations.  Provocations of the sort we saw last night will only isolate them further, as we stand by our allies, strengthen our own missile defense, and lead the world in taking firm action in response to these threats.

This obviously is not the Down the Field March that many North Korea watchers were hoping for, but rather the safe play that you make when you are already 10 points ahead with 15 seconds left on the clock.

Linda Kim is the Director of Programs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are her own.

Photo from jilig’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Troy Stangarone

In the aftermath of Pyongyang’s third nuclear test the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, issued a story on the needs to address the root causes of North Korea’s nuclear concerns. According to the story in Xinhua:

“At a superficial level, it was Pyongyang that has repeatedly breached UN resolutions and used its nuclear program as a weapon to challenge the world community, which was considered to be unwise and regrettable.

In reality, the DPRK’s defiance was deeply rooted in its strong sense of insecurity after years of confrontation with South Korea, Japan and a militarily more superior United States.

In the eyes of the DPRK, Washington has spared no efforts to contain it and flexed its military muscle time and again by holding joint military drills with South Korea and Japan in the region.

The latest nuclear test is apparently another manifestation of the attempt of a desperate DPRK to keep threat at bay.”

Perceptions matter. If one party misperceives the actions of another, it can lead to policy miscalculation. By trying to play both sides of the issue, China potentially adds to the problem of misperception.

If North Korea’s actions are driven by a shared leadership perception that North Korea is under threat from the United States, South Korea, and Japan rather than by the necessities of internal political dynamics, reaching a resolution to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs is unlikely.

Pyongyang’s prior use of calculated brinksmanship to extract aid from its neighbors would seem to indicate that North Korea’s actions are not wrapped in a perceived threat from the United States, which it no doubt believes to exist, but rather from internal dynamics at play in the transition or a new attempt to elicit aid for the regime.

While joint military drills do have political purpose, they are also a normal function of any group of allies’ preparedness and take place on a regularized basis. Those that have not taken place in regularized fashion have been in response to a provocation by North Korea.

While downplaying perceptions of North Korea’s culpability in its actions may serve immediate purposes, such as lessoning international response to Pyongyang’s actions, it does little to create a narrative that can lead to China’s ultimate policy goal – “for all parties concerned to think and act rationally to create favorable conditions to revive the long-stalled six-party talks and avoid a disastrous fallout” – as creating the environment necessary for a rational solution to the issues at hand requires for all parties to have similar perceptions of the challenges faced.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his alone.

Photo from freiheitsfreund’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad O’Carroll

The DPRK’s nuclear weapons test today appears to act as a bandage for a number of wounds that have somehow yet to kill the Pyongyang regime.  As the last outpost of quasi-Stalinism in the world, North Korea remains in a Cold War mindset when it comes to its increasingly acrimonious relations with both the U.S. and ROK.  Ruled by an inefficient socialist system and enduring bilateral U.S. financial sanctions since 1953 and ever-tightening UN sanctions since 2006, North Korea’s economy has never truly been given a chance to flourish. In these circumstances, nuclear weapons have become an increasingly critical pillar of Pyongyang’s security, allowing a morally reprehensible government to access significant aid, garner domestic support, deter foreign military intervention and even perpetuate the rule of a family dynasty from generation to generation.  While the unique character and context of the North Korean leadership’s relationship to nuclear weapons suggests that potential for denuclearization is extremely unlikely, the risks associated with what is now an increasing threat suggests denuclearization efforts must remain a critical if lofty international goal.

In the early stages of North Korea’s nuclear program, non-proliferation policy would arguably have only had to deal with perceived external security concerns to prevent the crystallization of the ninth nuclear state.  Perhaps this could have been achieved had the U.S. negotiated a peace treaty with North Korea prior to the collapse of the Agreed Framework.  But now North Korea has nuclear weapons and keeps testing them, any effective denuclearization policy must now address the same security concerns in a far more comprehensive manner, including new external and internal angles.  Externally, a peace treaty still remains essential from North Korea’s perspective, but for this to be achieved sanctions would also have to be removed, isolation ended and decades of mutual mistrust overcome.  Simultaneously, absolute domestic security would have to be assured to Pyongyang during the transition, achievable only through unconditional guarantees of energy and aid provision.  And perhaps most importantly, hard-line political and military figures in North Korea would have to be won over in order to persuade them of the logic to denuclearizing, not to mention persuading the general public.  Unfortunately, even if all of these often contradictory issues could ever be addressed, previous efforts to achieve them underscore the abundance of barriers in applying even the most modest of concessions to Pyongyang.

But while denuclearization seems a dim prospect at the moment, it is clear that the ever growing dangers associated with the DPRK’s expanding nuclear arsenal continue to flourish.  However, it is these dangers that provide a compelling justification for the need to continue efforts to denuclearize the DPRK, no matter how low hopes are that this can ever be achieved. That’s because even just in the process of trying for denuclearization, the international community can have tangible impact on parts and aspects of the North Korean nuclear program that could yield positive effects for partners in both the region and beyond.  These benefits can broadly be split into four areas:

1. An immediate aspectof the DPRK program that needs to be addressed in the short to medium term is reducing the potential for sensitive nuclear technology and science transfers.  Indeed, the tighter sanctions become and the more that barriers are introduced to limit legitimate trade, the greater the motivation for Pyongyang to try and sell its nuclear know-how on the black market. One way these intellectual transfers could be somewhat minimized is through a dual-track policy of stimulating the DPRK economy and increasing the penalties associated with such transfers.
2. Safeguarding the North Korea’s weapons and fissile materials is another important issue, especially post Fukushima nuclear disaster, that could be easy to solve through foreign assistance, expertise and investment. Of course, better relations will be required for the DPRK to even consider such a proposal, and while necessary, such initiatives may come with the cost of sending a negative message to would-be-proliferators.  However, the dangers associated with unauthorized usage or nuclear accidents are more pressing than the correspondingly negative, but slow-reaching,  signal such a move would have on the non-proliferation regime.  In addition, this effect could be minimized if safeguarding was pursued under the long-term auspices of denuclearization.
3. Medium term, the likely potential for a regional nuclear domino effect arising from the DPRK weapons program seems low.  However, this is likely contingent on the continued U.S provision of a nuclear umbrella to allies in the region and the salience of the non-proliferation regime.  In this regard, it is essential that the U.S. remains committed to its security agreements in the region and that the non-proliferation regime remains credible.  This latter issue can be realized to a degree through avoiding temptations to formally ever recognize the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state.  And this response can form part of a long-term denuclearization policy that never accepts the legitimacy of Pyongyang’s weapons in order to minimize the scope for damage to the non-proliferation norm.
4. Longer term, if engagement policies are pursued – and even if the DPRK acquires significant surpluses of fissile materials – then motivations to one day sell complete arms or fissile materials can and must be reduced.  Only a DPRK better integrated into the world community and economy will be more susceptible to the costs associated with fissile material / arms transfers. A DPRK living in perpetual isolation won’t necessarily care as much.  Importantly, increased confidence in restricting this type of sale could also be simultaneously sharpened through the further development of global nuclear attribution capacities, an area that needs increases in resources at this time.

Because little is known about Kim Jong Un’s leadership and the systems of control in his supporting regime, it is impossible to preclude nuclear weapons being one day deployed in offensive configurations.  Each day that is passed without meaningful progress towards a resolution on the peninsula, this likelihood of this scenario developing sharpens.  However, should nuclear engagement policies be pursued now, these risks could potentially be lowered. That’s because it seems that North Korea would be less motivated to use weapons offensively if efforts to improve its political, economic and security relations were addressed now.

While the third test proves beyond doubt that the prospects for denuclearizing North Korea remains low, an overarching goal of denuclearization should still be pursued as a way of dampening the side effects of what is becoming an increasingly dangerous program. Whilst the weapons program has dangers associated with it, there are steps that can be taken in the short – medium term to mitigate these.  A consequence of these mitigations may be a boost in the DPRK’s confidence in the world system and thus an increase in prospects for denuclearization.

Chad 0′Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from 涉外山頂人’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

Earlier this week the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) finally responded to North Korea’s December 12^th rocket launch with a new resolution. Predictably, North Korea reacted angrily with statements, including one attributed to its National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC statement specifically targeted the United States as a problem and as a threat to North Korea; moreover, it vowed that “a variety of satellites and long-range rockets will be launched by the DPRK one after another and a third nuclear test of higher level which will be carried out by it in the upcoming all-out action, a new phase of the anti-U.S. struggle that has lasted century after century, will target against the U.S., the sworn enemy of the Korean people.” North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in the past after being punished by UN resolutions for launching missiles. If the North Korean leadership tests another nuclear device, it might actually do more to separate U.S.-ROK coordination than the anticipated engagement of North Korea from the incoming Park Geun-hye administration.

This potential nuclear test could disrupt close U.S.-ROK coordination. In the event of a third North Korean nuclear test, the U.S. would have to respond, at least with another trip to the UNSC to maintain some credibility for UN resolutions and to demonstrate an international consensus against North Korea’s actions. Moreover, a successful nuclear test would move North Korea one step closer to being a direct threat to U.S. territory. Two years ago, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that North Korea would be able to hit the continental U.S. within five years with an intercontinental ballistic missile. North Korea’s actions suggest they are trying to make that schedule a reality and become a direct threat to the U.S., not just to its troops, citizens, and interests in Asia. These factors could force the Obama administration to push for a firm response from its South Korean ally to the nuclear test rather than supporting its immediate direct outreach.

Even though support for engagement with North Korea inside the U.S. is quite low because of the difficulty in getting a quicker turnaround on a resolution condemning the North Korean rocket launch, the April rocket launch that scuttled the February 29 agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, and North Korean missile and nuclear tests in 2009 that welcomed an incoming President Obama open to engagement, it could still be possible. In President Obama’s second inaugural address he stated that “engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.” Additionally, his likely incoming Secretary of State John Kerry has been perceived as more open to dialogue. Lastly, the U.S. wants to be supportive of South Korea in inter-Korean relations, and would probably look for ways to demonstrate its support for the South Korean government’s engagement efforts. In some ways, a second Obama administration and the more cautious approach to engagement described by the Park Geun-hye team was seen as the best possible combination for maintaining strong U.S.-South Korea relations through difficult early challenges. Thus, the often worrisome divergence in the engagement and containment approaches by the U.S. and South Korea that have caused separation in U.S.-Korea relations in the past could be minimized. But those small possibilities for support and engagement shrink considerably if North Korea tests a nuclear device.

A third nuclear test would put Park Geun-hye in an almost no win situation. If she immediately engages North Korea after a nuclear test, it could be seen as undermining her pledge to present a credible deterrence and seek commensurate actions from North Korea on denuclearization. This is especially the case in light of North Korea’s threat to attack South Korea if it takes part in new UN sanctions. If she pushes for tougher sanctions and doesn’t reach out to North Korea quickly, she could be seen as failing to live up to her campaign pledges and continuing the perceived hard-line policy of President Lee Myung-bak. Park campaigned on a new engagement with North Korea based on trust. A positive action from North Korea would help her argue that South Korea can benefit from engaging North Korea and convince the U.S. to support her policy, but a significant gesture hasn’t happened yet. A last resort for justifying an outreach gesture, especially if North Korea explodes a nuclear device before her inauguration, is to blame the test on President Lee’s perceived failure to engage North Korea.

But with such a direct reference to the U.S., could the Park administration convince President Obama and his team to support South Korea’s outreach to North Korea after a nuclear test? Exploding a nuclear device challenges the ability of the U.S.-Korea alliance’s leaders to coordinate potentially different policies toward North Korea aimed at convincing it not to provoke the U.S. and its neighbors. A third nuclear test could lead to a difference in approaches by Park and Obama administrations toward North Korea and could create that separation amongst allies that North Korea loves to exploit even further.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from the Secretary of Defense’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

by Chad O’Carroll

With North Korea having conducted two long range rocket launch in a year, many analysts have been speculating as to why Pyongyang was so keen to try another launch just months after the last one ended in catastrophic failure. One straightforward theory suggests Pyongyang wants an inter-continental ballistic missile capability and that today’s launch was motivated to get North Korea one step closer to that goal. Another theory suggests the launch was symbolic, designed primarily to mark the 100 year anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth and recent departure of Kim Jong Il. Yet other theories suggest the launch may even have been an attempt to influence South Korean elections or to simply remind leaders that Pyongyang still exists.

While the world has gotten used to an increasing frequency of long-range North Korean missile testing, it is true that the more the country launches, the closer they come to acquiring an inter-continental ballistic missile capability. Wed to Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, this capability could one day present a security risk to the United States and one that policy makers in Washington DC will be keen avoid. But following decades of investment in ballistic missile technology, it seems North Korea’s missile motivations are deep and as time passes, becoming increasingly difficult to override. If hopes to one-day reverse North Korea’s missile motivations remain, it is important that policy makers address what have now become a multitude of drivers.

CHANGING SECURITY MOTIVATIONS

Motivations for North Korea’s missile program began in the early 1960s, a period of time that saw insecurity mounting for Pyongyang due to deteriorating Soviet-DPRK relations and increasing friction between traditional allies Moscow and Beijing. Responding to a seemingly more dangerous threat environment and wanting to free the country from Soviet and Chinese dependence, Kim Il Sung in 1965 commented, “If a war breaks out, the U.S and Japan will be involved [and] in order to prevent their involvement, we have to be able to produce rockets which fly as far as Japan.”

Whilst insecurity was undoubtedly the underlying factor behind Kim Il-Sung’s 1965 decision to pursue missiles, it has nonetheless continued to prevail as an important motivation for the program’s continuation and development.  As such, militarily impulses can be seen as contributing towards the thinking that necessitated the DPRK’s initial requirement of possessing a short, medium and long-range missile arsenal.  The early short-range low-technology missile acquisitions of the late 1960s and early 1970s, combined with the North’s then goal of conquering the South using military means, suggested that Kim Il Sung certainly regarded these missiles as primarily offensive weapons.  Consequently, North Korea’s 1980s work to develop 600km range missiles be seen then as a way of assuring a pan-ROK strike capacity.

While Pyongyang was able to roughly match ROK military expenditure up until the early 1970s with relatively equivalent technology, as economic decline became more and more apparent, the DPRK’s potential to force reunification dwindled.  But although the Korean People’s Army (KPA) represented (and still does) a quantitatively superior force compared to that of the South, the North’s economic problems have kept its technology and equipment frozen in time.  As a result it is likely the security motivation behind North Korea’s pursuit of medium and long-range (‘No-Dong’ and ‘Taepodong’ class respectively) missiles in the late 1980s and 1990s changed.  Indeed, the No-Dong 1,500km SCUD variant was designed to reach Japan whilst the 8000km range Taepodong series was likely designed with the aim of reaching continental USA. It’s this Taepodong rocket that evolved to the Unha-3 class used most recently.

Rather than ready such missiles for offensive use like North Korea had done in the 1970s and early 1980s, it is likely that the increased ranges of these two variants represent a changed defensive posture.  In combination with nascent chemical, biological and nuclear programs, North Korea was able to use its medium and longer-range missile delivery system as a strategic deterrent, capable of leveling the playing field vis-à-vis its traditional and militarily advanced enemies. Evidently then, in either offensive or defensive lights, this missile program can thus be partially as an outgrowth of North Korean strategic thinking that has been largely driven by a sense of insecurity.

A MISSILE MONEY MAKER

As already alluded to, North Korea’s economy was by the early 1980s in a downward and seemingly irreversible spiral.  Given that during the early 1980s DPRK Hwasong missiles cost between $1.5 and $2 million each, one might initially assume the financial burden of the program to have ended further research and development at this time.  Paradoxically, North Korea regarded the high cost of its missiles as way of raising much-needed foreign exchange and as a possible trading chip that could secure the acquisition of important resources.

Missile exports can be traced back to the mid-1980s when nearly 100 Hwasongs were sold to Iran for use in her war with Iraq.  Deals such as this, and largely with states shunned by traditional arms suppliers partaking in non-proliferation initiatives, have since continued in varying degrees with the additional benefit of creating numerous missile production employment opportunities in North Korea. Estimates suggest that between 1987 and 1992 missile exports totaled $580 million, whilst in 1993 exports were used to secure $120 million worth of Iranian crude oil.  By 2001 North Korea’s GDP was valued at $15.7 billion, being made up of $650 million of legitimate exports and some $560 million of clandestine missile sales.

Whilst the Kim dynasty denied the existence of the missile cash cow for many years, the motivation to engage in missile production for financial reasons was made clear when Pyongyang declared, “our missile export is aimed at obtaining foreign money which we need at present”. It is therefore evident that the cumulative effects of North Korea’s shrinking economy, the need for foreign exchange and natural resources, and the existence of a buoyant export market all contributed towards motivating North Korea to continue missile production for much of the 1980 and early 1990s. Intriguingly, the export market itself likely contributed towards the shaping and facilitating of the strategic policies mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

THE DIRECT LINE TO ISRAEL: A DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING CHIP

A further (if perhaps unintentional) driver for North Korea’s long running missile program can be seen commencing in Pyongyang’s 1992 attempt to use the technology as a diplomatic bargaining chip in response to Israel’s request to stop Hwasong (a DPRK SCUD clone) exports to Syria and Iran.  Upon Israel’s call that Pyongyang stop exporting missiles to the Middle East, North Korea demanded Israeli economic cooperation worth approximately one billion dollars in compensation and the development of a gold mine in Unsan.  Tellingly North Korea’s reported exports to Iran and Syria at this time totaled well under one billion dollars, far less than the net worth of what Pyongyang was demanding from Israel.

Although the U.S. ultimately forced Israel to back out of this deal, the fact that the Israelis were at all considering the agreement goes to illustrate the diplomatic leverage that missiles could give the DPRK on the world stage. Learning from this episode, in response to North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong-1 test, renewed calls from the U.S to curtail the DPRK’s missile exports were met with comparable demands for economic and scientific compensation from Pyongyang.   Here again, the missile program gave negotiating power to the DPRK that was well beyond what it ‘should’ have realistically possessed as a small, developing nation.

Since the DPRK’s nuclear test of 2006 it is arguable that the value of this bargaining chip has been increased significantly.   For the outside world, developments in North Korean missile technology cannot now be understood as being divorced from their nuclear capability. That’s why North Korea satellite launches in 2012 are viewed with so much suspicion, being regarded by many as progress towards a nuclear ICBM capability.  And should North Korea eventually acquire such a weapon, it will clearly mark a far more valuable possession on any negotiating table in future. This factor may now be playing a significant role in motivating North Korea to further refine or develop a long-range capacity.

GROWING NATIONAL PRIDE

Many analysts are regarding North Korea’s latest satellite launch as evidence that Pyongyang is strongly motivated to invest in rocket technology as a way of bolstering domestic support. In a similar fashion to how the regime learnt to use missiles as a bargaining chip, it would appear that this factor was unlikely an initial impetus behind the program but instead a utility whose potential advantage became evident to the regime in more recent years, as technical improvements increased.

Accordingly, the 1998, 2006, 2009 and April 2012 long-range “satellite launches” can be understood domestically as part of the leadership’s efforts to advance the country as a “strong and prosperous” state. In this light the launch can be understood in terms of inward looking national prestige, as a mechanism to galvanize support for the regime and promote unity at a time when economic hardship and food shortage remained. This was made evident by the manner in which North Korean media extracted every last ounce of propaganda value from first three satellite launch attempts, reporting that all launches were a success – despite credible allegations of failure from widespread external sources.

After the first launch in 1998, for months state news pushed the satellite story with extravagant reports suggesting that citizens were expressing great national pride and calling in to describe their sightings of the Kwangmyonsong-1 satellite. The domestic importance assigned to the ostensible ‘space program’ was again illustrated in 2009 as evidenced by the state organized mass rallies celebrating the success of the launch in Pyongyang.  That launch took place just days before Kim was sworn in as chairman of the National Defense Commission, the highest position of authority in the North, suggesting it may have even been used to bolster public support in him.

More recently, the December 2012 launch was timed to coincide with the 100 year anniversary celebrations of Kim Il Sung’s birth, also taking place just days before the anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s death.  As highly symbolic dates in the DPRK calendar, North Korea’s rocket launches can thus be seen as playing a major role in promoting both national solidarity and pride – something crucial for Kim Jong Un in what remains an early period of leadership.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the 1950’s the DPRK has evolved in a state of perpetual suspicion, fear and isolation.  While the theme of security can be seen as having played a major role in the initial driving force of the DPRK missile program, it is evident that it still prevails today as an important explanation for their program.   But that the program evolved from a short-range arsenal to the current objective of achieving an intercontinental capability is simply a reflection of the evolving security threats that face the DPRK regime.

Initially, short-range missiles were required to attack the rear of the ROK in a war that was widely expected to rekindle at any moment.  As economic difficulties commenced in the 1970s, longer range missiles helped mitigate the growing differences in North-South military capabilities.  The further the North was economically marginalized through the 1980s, the more valuable its burgeoning missile trade was at securing the regime internally; providing employment opportunities and valuable commodities for the state.  Fast forward to the late 80s and early 90s, and increased missile ranges wed to increasing WMD opportunities bolstered Pyongyang’s diplomatic leverage whilst improving the deterrent value of the arsenal.  Domestic support was further fortified through internal propaganda based on the rapid developments that brought Pyongyang closer and closer to entering space.

In short, it is evident that the ever-changing motivations of the DPRK missile program can be understood primarily through the lens of regime survival, having evolved in accordance with technical developments as and when they happened.  Under current conditions it is arguable that Pyongyang will therefore continue to regard missiles as an essential facet of national security.  Regardless of the success of today’s launch, the evidence suggests the DPRK will continue investing in the missile program regardless.

PHOTO: Some rights reserved by NelC, Flickr Creative Commons