By Nicholas Hamisevicz

Last week former NBA player Dennis Rodman, along with three members of the Harlem Globetrotters and Vice Media, traveled to North Korea to play and promote basketball as well as hang out with the new North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. On Sunday, Dennis Rodman talked about his trip with George Stephanopoulos on “This Week.” Rodman’s answers in his interview with George Stephanopoulos illustrates that he doesn’t understand the larger picture of U.S.-North Korea relations, and he doesn’t care. His visit and his conveying of messages from Kim Jong Un to President Obama didn’t help the larger picture for U.S. relations with North Korea. Kim Jong Un’s responses to U.S. offers of engagement with missile and nuclear tests effect the relationship more that his love of basketball.

The big news from the interview is that Kim Jong Un supposedly told Dennis Rodman that he would like President Obama to call him. With the U.S.-North Korea relationship in a poor state right now, some in the media and policy world will see this as an opportunity for the U.S. to respond to North Korea. However, this statement from Kim Jong Un via Dennis Rodman could put pressure on the U.S. to do something. There will be a sentiment that North Korea is reaching out to the United States. Yet the main thrust behind the offer is power and politics. North Korean leadership understands that the U.S. and its allies are currently trying to put pressure on the international community to do more against North Korea in response to its nuclear test. The North Korean leadership also understands there are prominent Chinese commentaries questioning China’s relationship with North Korea. By requesting President Obama call him, Kim Jong Un and his leadership team are trying to force the focus on the United States to respond to their overture rather than North Korea stopping its missile and nuclear programs.

In the interview, Dennis Rodman tried to excuse his behavior and that of his “friend” Kim Jong Un by saying everything is about politics. But President Obama knows the real effect of politics with North Korea. He used his political capital, which is part of his power, to try to engage North Korea. Throughout his campaign for president and then after taking office in 2009, President Obama and his team made it clear they would be willing to reach out to problematic leaders of the world if they would unclench their fist. North Korea took its fist and slammed it down on the button to launch a missile four months into President Obama’s presidency and followed it up with a nuclear test.

Risking political capital in an election year, the Obama administration signed a bilateral agreement with North Korea on February 29, 2012 in which the U.S. offered food aid in exchange for a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. Kim Jong Un couldn’t even wait two weeks before announcing a missile test disguised as a satellite launch, and launched it on April 12. Despite breaking the deal, President Obama again said the U.S. would give North Korea an “extended hand.” This came just after he was elected for a second term when he traveled to Burma and while North Korea appeared to be gearing up for another missile launch. Kim Jong Un responded to President Obama’s offer of an extended hand with that rocket test that put a satellite into orbit in December 2012.

Once more, President Obama signaled the possibility for better relations when he stated in his second inaugural address that “engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.”   Kim Jong Un couldn’t even wait a month before having North Korea test a nuclear device. The Obama administration has used some of its political capital to engage North Korea, and North Korea slapped them away. Now, Kim Jong Un wants a phone call.

When asked what he learned about Kim Jong Un, Dennis Rodman said his “friend” loves power and control. As much as Rodman thinks it is a nice gesture, Kim Jong Un hosting him and the Globetrotters and then asking President Obama for a phone call is mainly about power and control, not about actual engagement. The main example was highlighted last month with Eric Schmidt’s visit to North Korea, one month after North Korea tested a rocket. The visit was portrayed to the international community as North Korea trying to open up to the outside world, but internally, the North Korean media barely mentioned the visit. Perhaps they even subtlety bashed Eric Schmidt and Bill Richardson. The propaganda machine would be in full force if the leader of the free world called Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un and the North Korean leadership are using Rodman’s visit and the offer of a phone call to shift the blame to the United States and go unpunished for its own actions of testing a nuclear device.

Dennis Rodman tried to describe his visit as historic. However, his engagement with Kim Jong Un was only small part of a larger and complex relationship between the U.S. and North Korea. George Stephanopoulos was correct in telling Rodman that basketball is just “one tiny bit of common ground.” Small efforts like tourism can in the long run possibly lead to bigger things. Basketball may be a great bridge for connections. Koryo Tours has already led basketball and other sports groups to North Korea, and others will likely try to do so after this visit as well. One possibility would be to have the whole Harlem Globetrotters team go over. However, one basketball game that ended in a tie is not going to immediately open things up. The trip was a small gesture. A phone call from President Obama to a country that threatens U.S. allies and interests in Asia and is getting closer to directly threatening the United States with its most recent rocket and nuclear tests would be a very large step that should not be undertaken. The Obama administration rightly said that North Korea knows how to contact them.

The trip with Dennis Rodman to North Korea was described by Vice co-founder Shane Smith as a “crazy story,” but it should not dramatically affect the overall political relationship between the two sides because Kim Jong Un is are using the trip and the phone call for power and control. The North Korean leadership has to expect potential sanctions and hardening of diplomatic positions after its nuclear test. The visit and phone call request is an attempt to shift the pressure to the United States, hoping that heightened tensions will increase the public pressure on President Obama to respond to its attempted charm offensive. As much as he loves basketball, President Obama should know that lasting engagement is tougher than talking hoops over the phone with Kim Jong Un. President Obama and the United States have offered North Korea real opportunities for engagement, but Kim Jong Un has rejected them.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Storm Crypt’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Troy Stangarone

When members of the 19^th National Assembly take their seats in Seoul a defector from North Korea will join them for the first time. As a candidate on the New Frontier Party’s proportional representation list, Cho Myung-chul became the first defector to win a seat in the National Assembly.

Cho defected to South Korea in 1994 and came from a relatively privileged background in North Korea. His father was a minister in the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, while his mother was a professor at the People’s Economic College. At the time of his defection, he was serving as an exchange professor at Nankai University in China and had received a Ph.D from Kim Il-sung University where he would later become a professor before his defection.

Since arriving in South Korea, he has been fairly successful at integrating into society. Before turning to elective politics he oversaw the Center for International Development Cooperation at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy and became the first North Korean defector to work in a high level position at the Ministry of Unification where he served as chief of the Education Center, which develops curriculum for schools related to unification.

In an interview with CNN, Cho talks about how one of the reasons he chose to enter politics is to help policy makers shape better policy towards Pyongyang. When it comes to North Korea he points out that South Koreans “understand in an abstract sense that something is not right, but they don’t have actual knowledge of life there.”

While his election to the National Assembly as a proportional representative holds interesting questions regarding how he will be able to achieve his goal of bringing greater understanding to policy towards North Korea, it also represents a microcosm of the challenges that Korea will face when reunification occurs.

To date much of the discussion on reunification has focused on the financial aspects or how to slow the process down to avoid some of the difficulties Germany has faced. However, these are likely to be minor challenges when compared to the questions Korea will face when it comes to integrating North Koreans into South Korean society, including those in the former elite like Cho.

After sixty years of separation, the two societies have drifted apart in ways that will likely only truly become evident after reunification occurs. The most basic things in life from work to social norms in South Korea will be alien to many in the North and no amount of pirated DVD’s of South Korean movies will likely change that. Handling these challenges will raise a series of difficult issues beyond the hard choices that will have to be made in regards to handling members of the regime in North Korea.

For the average North Korean living in a society where the rule of law rather than the rule of force applies will be a challenge. Even though many North Koreans have been forced into markets for survival in the North, that does not mean that they will be prepared to live in a society where one is expected to work to support themselves in the manner that South Korea and many Western societies have developed.

Cho’s own experience in South Korea illustrates this. When describing his own transition to South Korean society in the same interview he said that “Living here [South Korea] I had to re-learn everything from the beginning. There was only one thing we had in common, the language and other than that, the gap was huge.”

Politically, there will be hard choices as well. Will people in the North be allowed to develop their own political party or will they be restricted to joining the existing political parties of the South? This question will befuddle many who will have come from a society where opposition parties are not allowed and Cho describes elections as event where North Koreans don’t have a choice but rather “have a little piece of paper and a pencil right next to it. If you don’t like the candidate you can pick up the pencil and cross the name off, but the person who picks up the pencil will die. There is always someone watching outside and of course there is only one candidate.”

While Cho’s achievement is an important step, the lack of experience with politics and multiple parties will be additional hurdles for South Korea in integrating citizens for the North. Just as being able to earn a living to support a family will be one of the key tests for the new integrated society, ensuring that North Koreans feel as though they have a true say and stake in the political system will be a key the long-term success of a united Korea.

Many Germans living in the East had prior experiences with democracy and living in a market based economy prior to the separation after World War II. North Koreans will share none of these institutional memories that likely helped to facilitate the reintegration of the people of the two German states.

While Cho’s election is likely an important first step on the road to successfully answering how to integrate the two societies, it also shows the potential difficulties that lie ahead as his achievements tend to be more the exception than the rule when it comes to the integration of defectors within South Korean society. The better Seoul is able to address that challenge before reunification the easier it will likely be to integrate the people of the North when the time comes.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Jeroen Elfferich’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Luke Herman

North Korea recently held a series of meetings to formalize leadership positions in the new regime. Kim Jong-il was named the Eternal Secretary General, while Kim Jong-un became the party’s First Secretary. Here is an updated Workers Party of Korea leadership chart.

By Troy Stangarone

Voting in the shadow of North Korea’s missile launch and a prospective third nuclear test, South Korean voters went to the polls on April 11 in an election that some 60 percent described as a referendum on the administration of President Lee Myung-bak.  Despite perceptions that that there was widespread dissatisfaction in South Korea with the current administration, results indicate that South Koreans came away from the polls undecided about their nation’s future but giving a slim majority to the conservative New Frontier Party (NFP).

With almost all of the votes counted, the NFP had secured a small majority in the 300 seat National Assembly with at least 152 seats. Turnout was estimated at nearly 55 percent, which means that the results go somewhat against the grain of prior Korean elections as turnout near the 55 percent mark has historically favored liberals. However, the NFP’s slim majority means that Korea may avoid the gridlock that seemed likely when early polls indicated that neither of the major parties would secure an outright majority in the National Assembly. Though, that could change with defections and bi-elections in the years ahead, but for the moment the NFP’s slim majority means stability in the legislative branch.

The NFP’s victory also means we are unlikely to see any major foreign policy shifts in the near future. President Lee will remain in office for the rest of the year and he will now have support within the National Assembly to maintain his policies. The Democratic United Party (DUP) tried to make revision of the KORUS FTA a major point of its campaign, but the issue never seemed to gain traction as the DUP might have hoped. While the agreement may still remain a campaign issue, the DUP will likely shift its emphasis away from the FTA as it tries to build a winning coalition for the presidential election in December.

While the DUP may press for a softer policy towards North Korea, it seems unlikely to change in the near future as well. With even Russia calling North Korea’s satellite launch a violation of UN Security Council Resolutions and the prospect of a 3^rd nuclear test in the near future, it seems unlikely that the Lee administration would change course in its final months despite pressure from the DUP.

One significant milestone from the elections related to North Korea is the likelihood that the first North Korean defector will be elected to the National Assembly. Cho Myong Chul, who is running as one of the proportional candidates for the NFP and seems likely to gain a seat based on the early results.

On the domestic front, less may divide the two parties than many realize. Both parties campaigned on platforms of strengthening Korea’s welfare state and implementing policies that would help small and medium sized businesses in the face of increasing competition from the Chaebols. This may provide opportunities for liberals and conservatives to work together in the National Assembly as the NFP will only have the smallest of margins with which to pass major legislation.

The big winner in the elections would seem to be Park Geun-hye. Runner up to Lee Myung-bak in the then Grand National Party’s (GNP) presidential primary five years ago, and presumptive nominee for the NFP this time, she is being credited with engineering the NFP’s turnaround. The election results should only enhance her chances in this fall’s presidential race.

However, in the long-run the National Assembly elections are only the first step in determining who will lead Korea. Much of the future foreign and trade policy will be shaped by the next occupant of the Blue House. While the quite support of Ahn Cheol-soo did not work as well for the DUP as it did during last fall’s Seoul mayoral election, there is one lesson for both parties from that campaign. Eight months in any political campaign is an eternity. After losing the mayor’s office in Seoul it seemed as though the then GNP was down and out. That didn’t happen and December is an eternity away.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute. His views are his own.

Photo from Chitra Chaaya’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

After holding its Fourth Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea, North Korea now has an eternal president and an eternal general secretary. Kim Jong-il was named Eternal General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), and Kim Jong-un was given the title of First Secretary of the WPK. These initial changes and those suspected to come in the next few days will give some indications on how North Korea will try to structure its leadership under Kim Jong-un.

After his death, it was likely that North Korea would try to honor Kim Jong-il in some way. The Kim family lineage being an important aspect of the young Kim Jong-un’s power, it was anticipated that Kim Jong-il would be given a special recognition along the lines of Kim Il-sung. There were some predictions that Kim Jong-il would be given an eternal title in connection with the National Defense Commission (NDC). Now with Kim Jong-il posthumously given the title of Eternal General Secretary, it will be interesting to see if this move further indicates a renewed emphasis leadership on the Party instead of the military.

For Kim Jong-un, he officially becomes head of the party through the new position of first secretary. After the death of Kim Jong-il, North Korean media labeled Kim Jong-un as head of the Party and supreme commander of the military. Even in the story announcing Kim Jong-un’s new title, KCNA said Kim Jong-un as the “supreme leader of the WPK and the people of the DPRK” was elected “as first secretary of the WPK, true to the behest of leader Kim Jong Il.” With him as the head of the party, the question now is Kim Jong-un officially the chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC)?

A week after Kim Jong-il’s death, the Rodong Sinmun apparently said Kim Jong-un was leading the CMC. Yet, the AP’s Jean Lee recently saw signs in North Korea saying “”We will defend vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission Comrade Kim Jong Un to the death.” According to the Party’s constitution updated in September 2010, it states the “general secretary” (총비서) is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission, compared to Kim Jong-un’s new title as first secretary (제1비서). KCNA did say that the Fourth Conference of the WPK discussed “revising WPK rules,” so possibly this is where changes will occur to officially connect Kim Jong-un’s new title with the chairmanship of the CMC.

Further evidence of Party strengthening can be seen with Jang Song Taek and Kim Kyong Hui, uncle and aunt of Kim Jong-un, moving into prominent positions in the WPK. Jang Song Taek now joins the Political Bureau while his wife becomes a secretary in the Party Secretariat. Ri Myong Su, the Minister of Public Security, joins Jang Song Taek on the Political Bureau and was named a member of the CMC. Ri Myong Su, the Minister of Public Security, joins Jang Song Taek on the Political Bureau and was named a member of the CMC.

Choe Ryong Hae and Hyon Chol Hae, members of the CMC and the NDC respectively, were both awarded the title of Vice Marshal in the Korean People’s Army. These military promotions probably helped with their new positions in the WPK. Choe, a relatively young leader at 61 and appears to have close ties with Jang Song Taek, was given big promotions to Vice-Chairmen of the CMC as well as a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau. Hyon Chol Hae is now part of the CMC in addition to his role in the NDC.

For leadership changes, we will wait to see if any other announcements are made on moves stemming from the Workers’ Party Conference. With the WPK having a lot of changes during its last recent meeting in September 2010, it is possible few other changes will occur. The Supreme People’s Assembly is scheduled to meet on Friday, April 13, so more news could follow. The main question still remains if Kim Jong-un will officially be the chair of the CMC and the NDC, despite North Korean media basically describing him as the supreme leader of the Party and the military. All of these meetings and moves, along with the anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday next week, are meant to illustrate North Korea’s ability to smoothly transition to Kim Jong-un.

Early indications suggest a strengthening of the Party as key members of the North Korean leadership gain positions. If Kim Jong-un will indeed rule more through the Party than his father, he will likely need people like Jang Song Taek, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Gak, and Ri Myong Su to help him. Their new positions, along with the promotions of Choe Ryong Hae and Hyon Chol Hae give some indication on how Kim Jong-un and the leaders around him plan to maintain power and begin a new era of Kim family leadership in North Korea.

For more info on Kim Jong-un, Jang Song Taek,  Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Yong Chun, and Ri Myong Su, visit  10 People You Need to Know for Transition in North Korea on The Peninsula blog.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Zennie Abraham’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Troy Stangarone

It has generally been acknowledged that the U.S.-Korea alliance is at an all time high. At a time of rising international challenges from the 2008 global financial crisis to enhanced efforts to secure nuclear materials, Korea has played an increasingly prominent role on the global stage and become a key partner for the United States.  Despite all of the progress the two sides have made in recent years, elections for the National Assembly in Korea on April 11^th will likely be the firsts of a series of turning points over the next year that could reshape the alliance.

Over the next nine months, three critical elections will take place which will impact how U.S.-Korea relations evolve in the coming years. While the United States will hold presidential and Congressional elections in November, and Korea will vote for its next president in December, the National Assembly elections will come first and begin to indicate the potential directions of change.

Only a few months ago, the general consensus was that the opposition Democratic United Party (DUP) would cruise to a significant victory in the National Assembly.  The ruling Grand National Party, now the New Frontier Party (NFP), had lost a snap Seoul mayoral election in October to political novice Park Won-soon and despite the poor performance by the DUP trends seemed to be moving in the direction of progressives.  However, with six months being an eternity in politics, recent polling data from the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and other outlets indicates that the two parties are virtually tied and that the balance of power in the National Assembly will be held by smaller parties.

It is unclear if a coalition government in the National Assembly will work as smoothly as the Conservative-Liberal coalition in the United Kingdom or the minority Conservative government that ruled Canada until recently. Instead, there is a chance that without a working majority, either party might be pulled to the extremes by its coalition partner.  The most likely outcome would be the DUP needing votes from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to create a working majority. With the DPP being firmly against the KORUS FTA, it could push a DUP minority government in the National Assembly to take harder line positions on the agreement than it might otherwise want.

Adding to the complicated picture is the chance that liberal parties could end up in control of the legislature while the conservatives win the Blue House in the fall. While the parties have yet to nominate their candidates, Park Geun-hye of the NFP is the likely leading candidate, with political novice and independent Ahn Cheol-soo potentially another strong contender.

What will these, and changes in the United States later this year mean for the alliance? One potential outcome is something similar to what has become of the U.S.-Japan alliance in recent years. After reaching a high tide with the personal relationship between Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush, the relationship cooled as politics became more complicated in Japan and that warm personal relationship was removed from the equation.

One of the current strengths of U.S.-Korea relations is the close personal tie between President’s Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak, who is perhaps President Obama’s closest ally abroad. Even should Obama be reelected, the nature of the relationship with a new president in Korea will likely change. Add in the likelihood of political gridlock in the National Assembly impacting U.S.-Korea issues, and one could see something similar to what happened in Japan occurring in Korea.

A second potential outcome could be an alliance where both parties seek to emphasize new interests. Regardless of who wins the presidential elections in the United States, the emphasis on the Asian pivot will likely remain. However, much of its focus to date has been on South Asia rather than Northeast Asia. At the same time, progressive forces in Korea could seek to move away from the heavy level of cooperation with the United States and seek greater balance in Korea’s relations with other nations. Under this scenario, while the United States and Korea would remain cordial allies, the current level of coordination and cooperation would likely be scaled back.

Another factor will be who wins the U.S. and Korean presidential elections. One of the strong aspects of the current relationship is the close level of coordination between the United States and Korea on North Korea policy. However, even Park Geun-hye and other conservatives have indicated a new approach to North Korea may be needed. If Mitt Romney were to win the presidency, there could be a push for a more hard-line policy in the United States at the same time Korea sought to go another direction.

From the Korean side, should Ahn Cheol-soo decide to run for the presidency and win, he could create a completely unknown dynamic. While he continues to flesh out his political philosophy, he has indicated a desire to move beyond ideological politics. How this would translate in practicality is unclear.  Alternatively, he could serve as a kingmaker endorsing the progressive candidate of his choice much as he did in the Seoul mayoral election.

Whoever wins the elections on April 11^th, or later this fall, the nature of the relationship will begin to change. Each of the parties will bring new interests and new perspectives on the alliance. This will not necessarily be a bad thing. Alliances grow and evolve over time. While the Roh Moo-hyun years were often contentious, they were also highly productive years in terms of negotiating the KORUS FTA and restructuring the security aspects of the alliance. That being said, U.S.-Korea relations will soon begin transitioning from the close relationship of the last few years to a more normal alliance.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director of Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Image from Jens-Olaf’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad O’Carroll

In 2012 South Korea will hold elections for both the National Assembly and the presidency, the first time that both votes will be in held during the same year in several decades. With South Korean president’s being limited to a maximum term of five years, Lee Myung-bak will be ending his term in December, most likely to be replaced by either a candidate from the ruling Saenuri party, or from the main opposition – the Democratic United Party.  But what are the main issues of contention between the two parties in this year’s two elections?  The Peninsula takes a closer look at five of the main factors that will contribute towards the outcome of the 2012 votes:

PARTY REBRANDING

Despite Lee Myung-bak having brought the ruling conservative party success with a landslide victory in 2007, recent developments have led to a reorientation away from traditional political values on both sides of the political spectrum:

1. The recent win in the Seoul mayoral election by political novice Park Won-soon has altered the political environment for the 2012 elections, contributing to one in which more focus on identifying with younger generations will be important.  Having beaten the ruling party backed candidate, Park’s victory was aided by key support from software tycoon Ahn Chul-soo, a potential Presidential candidate that himself enjoys widespread popularity among younger generations.
2. As a result of the mayoral elections, both major parties have undergone name and identity changes in an attempt to capture some of the recent surge in support for non-traditional figures like Park Won-soon and Ahn Cheol-soo. The ruling party (GNP) has been renamed to Saenuri (“New Frontier Party”), while the Democratic Party is now known as the “Democratic Unified Party”.
3. The proportion of voters who regard themselves as conservatives fell from 43 percent in 2007 to 31 percent in 2011.  But despite the DUP’s efforts to change, one recent poll suggests the public view the Saenuri Party’s change of direction as being more credible.

NORTH KOREA

While a recent poll suggested that just 8.1% of South Koreans believe improving inter-Korean ties is an important goal for the next president, there are three reasons North Korea will nevertheless play an important role in determining the outcome of this year’s elections:

1. After five years of hard-line policy under Lee Myung-bak, indicators suggest that there will be increased impetus to make engaging with North Korea a priority on both sides of the political compass.  Seoul’s new progressive mayor has already started engaging with Pyongyang in cultural and sporting domains, while the ruling parties’ approval of these activities suggests that Saenuri are also becoming more open to engagement with North Korea.
2. North Korea has long been suspected of trying to influence elections in South Korea to create a more amenable Blue House.  This year, Pyongyang’s state-run media has been making a special effort to undermine the ruling Saenuri party and has been working hard to frame the elections as a dichotomy between war and peace.  With overseas citizens now able to in Korean elections for the first time this year, there are concerns North Korea’s input may have some influence in determining the votes of overseas Koreans.
3. Should North Korea decide to act belligerently in advance of either vote, then it could seriously impact the outcome of the elections. Following provocations like the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong, many South Koreans took on a more hardline view of North Korea, less willing to pursue engagement policies. Because of this, North Korea might be reluctant to initiate any major provocations in advance of general elections, fearful of putting pro-engagement candidates at a disadvantage.

SOCIAL MEDIA

Social media, including Twitter, are playing an increasingly prominent role in Korean political discourse. A recent Hankyroreh and Korea Society Opinion Institute poll showed politics to be one of the most retweeted topics by users in South Korea this year. This and other indicators suggest social media will continue to shape the electoral campaigns in the months to come:

1. As mentioned, Seoul’s 2011 mayoral elections brought to power a political novice with a history of social activism.  This was achieved mainly through the support he garnered from younger generations through IT tycoon Ahn Cheol-soo (who is also extremely popular on Twitter with the under 40 age group).
2. Seeking to draw the attention of the politically active younger generations and increase transparency, in January the Democratic Unity Party decided to accept text votes from cell-phones to select their new leader.  The mobile voting system had previously proved influential, especially during the aforementioned 2011 Seoul mayoral by-election.
3. The team behind one of the world’s most listened to podcast, Naneun Ggomsuda, may also have a key role in determining the outcome of elections in South Korea this year.  Specializing in political satire, the podcast has to date taken a vehemently anti- Lee Myung Bak and New Frontier Party (formerly the Grand National Party) position which may influence listeners to vote for the opposition.

KORUS FTA

Signed in 2007by late President Roh Moo-hyun and his Uri Party (one of the predecessors of the renamed Democratic Unified Party), the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was later renegotiated by President Lee Myung-bak and his American counterparts in December 2010.  But while the FTA should therefore enjoy bipartisan support in South Korea, recent developments suggest it may emerge as an electoral issue later in 2012:

1. On Feb 8 2012, DUP Chairwoman Han Myeong-sook said her party would scrap the FTA upon winning power unless several “poison clauses” were modified.   Since threatening to scrap the FTA, Han has been silent on the matter. This may have been due to a backlash in public opinion, with some key groups worried her position could undermine Korea’s international credibility.
2. In response to Han’s threat, the Saenuri party conducted a poll which determined that 50.5% of the population thought scrapping the FTA would damage the interests of Korea, with just 33.2% in favor of nullifying the treat.  Lee Myung-bak has also rebuked the opposition for flip-flopping on the agreement, with many opposition figures having originally supported it under former leader President Roh.
3. The KORUS FTA is set to enter the implementation stage as of March 15.  But with Han having labeled the forthcoming April 11 general election as a referendum of the Lee administrations “overall policies”, it could nevertheless re-emerge in the 2012 political discourse.

“WELFARE POPULISM”

With an ever widening gap between rich and poor in South Korea, there is an increasing demand for politicians to address the issues of equality and welfare.  In response, both of the main political parties have been articulating new policies to address these concerns.  But some suggest welfare promises are nothing more than an attempt to pacify the demands of voters:

1. The ruling Saenuri Party is considering campaign platforms which may include raising the wages of conscripts to 400,000 won a month from below 100,000 won at present, providing free child care to families with children under the age of 5, and free high school education.  Similarly, the Democratic United Party’s promises include free school meals for all elementary and middle school students, a drastic expansion in national health insurance coverage, and slashing college tuitions by half.
2. The Finance Ministry has expressed concern regarding the continuing announcement of welfare proposals from both main parties, saying that if implemented, they could cost nearly one-third of South Korea’s entire gross domestic product.  “From the perspective of fiscal authorities, it is challenging to accept the pledges unveiled by the political circles,” the Finance Ministry said.
3. Given the extreme financial burden of the suggested reforms, politicians on both sides have been accused of pursuing populist (but unworkable) policies to attract votes. Nevertheless, opposition figures suggest that these policies are essential because the current administration drove the majority of people to greater economic difficulty with its ‘business-friendly’ policies.  For their part, the ruling party’s move towards welfare policies has been explained as an attempt to improve “the life cycle of each individual, boost employment and strengthen the government’s role in ensuring fair competition.”

Chad 0Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Jens-Olaf Walter’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Sarah K. Yun

For the first time in Korean politics, two women are leading the ruling and opposition parties.  Two other women became the chairpersons for the most liberal party in Korea.  In January 2012, Korea was accepted to chair the United Nations Women, which promotes gender equality and empowerment of women.  Also recently, the South Korean ambassador to the U.N. was appointed as the president of the U.N. Women board.  Developed countries including Japan are talking about the improved institutionalization of Korean female leadership and the elevation of Korea as a global symbol of women’s empowerment.  What explains this surge and has Korea entered into a new era of female political leadership?

Throughout history, Korea has had a small but meaningful line of female political leaders such as Queen Seondeok (57 BC-935 AD), Queen Jindeok, and Queen Jinseong of the Silla dynasty; Queen Dowager Honae of Koryo dynasty (918-1393); and Queen Min and Queen Yun of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910). All of the female rulers, however, had the role of a “queen mother,” whereby their political participation depended on being a mother or wife of past and future kings. In the contemporary history of Korea, women found their political voice during the emancipation movement against the Japanese occupation (1910-1945). However, women’s political activism during this period was on an individual basis, mostly stemming from nationalistic rightist movement.

It was not until the democracy movement in the 1980s that women began to organize as a collective and became a bipartisan movement. In 2000, the quota system was introduced to increase diversity in Korean politics, whereby women must account for over 50% of proportional representation candidates for municipal and provincial councils, and political parties must make efforts to ensure that women make up at least 30% of nominated candidates for local constituencies in the general and local level elections. The first National Assembly of Korea from 1948-1950 consisted of 199 men and 1 woman. Since then, representation of women has been on a steady rise from 3% in the 15^th Assembly, 5.3% in the 16^th Assembly, 12.7% in the 17^th Assembly with the introduction of the quota system, to 13.7% in the currently 18^th Assembly.

Although women faced hardships in breaking the glass ceiling, they also faced opportunities in times of political crisis and uncertainties. The notion of change, justice, and anti-corruption against authoritarianism was on the forefront of the mind of the Koreans during the late 1980s and 1990s. Desire for clean and moral path to politics, along with the advancement of democracy and egalitarianism provided an opportune moment for female political leaders to advance their position.

For example, both the Grand National Party (GNP) and the Uri Party appointed women as the spokesperson during the impeachment crisis of President Roh. Ms. Park Geun-hye was elected as the GNP party leader during a difficult time in 2004, and again recently in December 2011. Ms. Han Myung-sook was appointed as prime minister after President Roh’s impeachment crisis and declining popular support, and recently became the leader of the Democratic United Party (DUP) in January 2012.  Their leadership comes at a time when both parties are battling identity.

Sarah K. Yun is the Director of Public Affairs and Regional Issues for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are her own.

Korea Times photo by Ko Young-kwon.