By Nicholas Hamisevicz

Earlier this week the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) finally responded to North Korea’s December 12^th rocket launch with a new resolution. Predictably, North Korea reacted angrily with statements, including one attributed to its National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC statement specifically targeted the United States as a problem and as a threat to North Korea; moreover, it vowed that “a variety of satellites and long-range rockets will be launched by the DPRK one after another and a third nuclear test of higher level which will be carried out by it in the upcoming all-out action, a new phase of the anti-U.S. struggle that has lasted century after century, will target against the U.S., the sworn enemy of the Korean people.” North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in the past after being punished by UN resolutions for launching missiles. If the North Korean leadership tests another nuclear device, it might actually do more to separate U.S.-ROK coordination than the anticipated engagement of North Korea from the incoming Park Geun-hye administration.

This potential nuclear test could disrupt close U.S.-ROK coordination. In the event of a third North Korean nuclear test, the U.S. would have to respond, at least with another trip to the UNSC to maintain some credibility for UN resolutions and to demonstrate an international consensus against North Korea’s actions. Moreover, a successful nuclear test would move North Korea one step closer to being a direct threat to U.S. territory. Two years ago, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that North Korea would be able to hit the continental U.S. within five years with an intercontinental ballistic missile. North Korea’s actions suggest they are trying to make that schedule a reality and become a direct threat to the U.S., not just to its troops, citizens, and interests in Asia. These factors could force the Obama administration to push for a firm response from its South Korean ally to the nuclear test rather than supporting its immediate direct outreach.

Even though support for engagement with North Korea inside the U.S. is quite low because of the difficulty in getting a quicker turnaround on a resolution condemning the North Korean rocket launch, the April rocket launch that scuttled the February 29 agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, and North Korean missile and nuclear tests in 2009 that welcomed an incoming President Obama open to engagement, it could still be possible. In President Obama’s second inaugural address he stated that “engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.” Additionally, his likely incoming Secretary of State John Kerry has been perceived as more open to dialogue. Lastly, the U.S. wants to be supportive of South Korea in inter-Korean relations, and would probably look for ways to demonstrate its support for the South Korean government’s engagement efforts. In some ways, a second Obama administration and the more cautious approach to engagement described by the Park Geun-hye team was seen as the best possible combination for maintaining strong U.S.-South Korea relations through difficult early challenges. Thus, the often worrisome divergence in the engagement and containment approaches by the U.S. and South Korea that have caused separation in U.S.-Korea relations in the past could be minimized. But those small possibilities for support and engagement shrink considerably if North Korea tests a nuclear device.

A third nuclear test would put Park Geun-hye in an almost no win situation. If she immediately engages North Korea after a nuclear test, it could be seen as undermining her pledge to present a credible deterrence and seek commensurate actions from North Korea on denuclearization. This is especially the case in light of North Korea’s threat to attack South Korea if it takes part in new UN sanctions. If she pushes for tougher sanctions and doesn’t reach out to North Korea quickly, she could be seen as failing to live up to her campaign pledges and continuing the perceived hard-line policy of President Lee Myung-bak. Park campaigned on a new engagement with North Korea based on trust. A positive action from North Korea would help her argue that South Korea can benefit from engaging North Korea and convince the U.S. to support her policy, but a significant gesture hasn’t happened yet. A last resort for justifying an outreach gesture, especially if North Korea explodes a nuclear device before her inauguration, is to blame the test on President Lee’s perceived failure to engage North Korea.

But with such a direct reference to the U.S., could the Park administration convince President Obama and his team to support South Korea’s outreach to North Korea after a nuclear test? Exploding a nuclear device challenges the ability of the U.S.-Korea alliance’s leaders to coordinate potentially different policies toward North Korea aimed at convincing it not to provoke the U.S. and its neighbors. A third nuclear test could lead to a difference in approaches by Park and Obama administrations toward North Korea and could create that separation amongst allies that North Korea loves to exploit even further.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from the Secretary of Defense’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

As countries in Asia emerge from this year of elections and transitions, the role and rise of China in the region will remain a top priority. For most of these countries, significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of positive U.S.-China relations in the region. This is especially true for South Korea. And in that need for better U.S.-China relations, there is an idea that a country can mediate the tensions between the two largest players in the region. There are suggestions that South Korea, as an ally of the U.S. and a strategic partner to China, can play this mediator role. However, South Korea inserting itself into U.S.-China bilateral issues would not bring about the positive relations it seeks, and it would limit South Korea’s own options and strategic interests it has worked so hard to develop.

First, South Korea is not seen by China as unbiased. An alliance trumps a strategic partnership. China does not view its relationship with South Korea as on the same level as South Korea’s relationship with the United States. Related to this is a belief that removing U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula would likely be one of the first requests from Chinese leaders after unification. South Korea can try to be a mediator if it wants, but it will eat up significant resources and be forced to remain engaged in the process instead of working on other issues more impactful toward its own interests. This is especially true if the process is long or if South Korea is unable to bring the two sides together. Additionally, if China doesn’t view South Korea as a fair mediator, then South Korea’s actions will be put toward a policy that will inevitably fail because China will not use South Korea to help create better ties with the U.S.

Second, talk of a mediator role for South Korea could also bring to mind the difficult times of the South Korea-U.S. relationship during the Roh Moo-hyun era. The dynamics between the two countries led to a perception where South Korean officials thought their country needed a more equal balance between the U.S. and China, and thus start to move away from cooperation opportunities with the United States. Although different circumstances now surround the relationship, a move in this direction is one of the few concerns in the U.S. about the aftermath of the South Korean elections. Aspects of this sentiment can be found in the young generation in Korea, meaning these feelings will be something U.S. officials will have to deal with for a long time.

Third, South Korea can’t be more assertive in its own foreign policy if it is trying to be a mediator. In the book Korea at the Center, it is suggested that throughout history, Korea has only been free to pursue its own interests when there is no hegemonic power in the region. Thus, it is understandable for Korea to desire that a hegemonic order not develop in the region. Korea wants to preserve space to act; however, becoming a mediator in U.S.-China relations might actually constrain the space for Korea. Part of South Korea’s freedom to maneuver is embedded in its own growth. South Korea’s development has allowed it to be more active internationally in a wide variety of issues. Korea has more to gain at the international level as a middle power than it does as a mediator for U.S.-China tensions.

Lastly, suggesting that Korea be a mediator between the U.S. and China can conjure up the idea that the U.S. is in decline and countries that are friends and allies of the U.S. need to help manage its decline. Look at Australia, another country that has an alliance with the United States and whose top trading partner is China. Hugh White, one of the main people responsible for Australia’s 2000 defense white paper, suggested a similar type of role for Australia. He said Australia should “persuade America that it would be in everyone’s best interest for it to relinquish primacy in Asia, but remain engaged as a member of collective leadership.”

While South Korea rightly has to evaluate the future of Asia and determine its own interests and goals, the U.S. needs to convince its ally that the U.S. can maintain its primacy in Asia and that the alliance can provide the security and collaboration that will benefit South Korea in the Asia-Pacific Century. This is why joint vision statements for the alliance that indicate pathways for the alliance beyond North Korean issues are vital. The U.S. wants Korea and the alliance to be more involved in other issues not because the U.S. is declining but because it is the best way to shape and create a strong and more secure Asia for everyone. The U.S. government has welcomed Korea’s impact globally, especially seen in hosting the G-20 and Nuclear Security Summit.

Uncertainty over America’s role in Asia is also why the relationship must go beyond alliance management tactics by the U.S. constantly demonstrating the value of the alliance, the staying power of the U.S. in Asia, and the importance of a strong U.S. presence in Asia, regardless of whether the current U.S.-China relationship is good or bad.

Part of the difficulty with these types of discussions is the misunderstanding of the ideas of shaping versus mediating. Shaping means creating norms, values, institutions, and processes that provide countries a positive, safe environment for interaction, collaboration, and peace. Mediating is often a country inserting itself into a broken or stalemated process between two countries and developing norms, processes, or an actual agreement for the two sides to use for their future relationship. The U.S. and other countries and international institutions around the world are trying to shape China’s rise. Both history and current interactions indicate that having a rising power develop without conflict is important and necessary for regional and global development and stability.

The U.S.-South Korea alliance can be used to help shape China’s rise as well as remind the U.S. of the importance of good Sino-U.S. relations for South Korea. South Korea itself can help shape China’s rise by undertaking projects abroad that demonstrate proper development assistance in places like Africa and Southeast Asia. South Korea’s developmental history and assistance can illustrate how host countries can sustain development and improve the lives of their own people rather than having resources exploited by an outside partner. However, it doesn’t seem to be in South Korea’s interest to mediate the overall relations between the United States and China. There are too many other factors that would draw Korea away from focusing on its own plans for the future development in Asia and South Korea’s role in the world.

South Korea is better positioned for shaping the environment surrounding U.S.-China relations rather than inserting itself into the always changing dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship. Moreover, South Korea’s interests of economic growth dependent on trade, seeing the Korean development model and values implemented abroad, and creating a secure environment through an alliance, partnerships, international law, and diplomacy to deal with North Korean provocations and possible unification can all be achieved even if U.S.-China relations are poor.

In an Asia-Pacific Century with uncertainty still surrounding the future paths of China and the U.S., combined with the fear that the paths could very possibly intersect in violence, it is understandable for other countries in the region to look for ways to create good U.S.-China relations. The mediator idea is there, but South Korea gains more as a middle power. Shaping the environment around U.S.-China relations fits better with South Korea’s goals and capabilities.  South Korea needs good U.S.-China relations; however, attempting to mediate between the two countries, and sacrificing its own interests and damaging relations with its U.S. ally in the process, will prevent South Korea from fully benefiting from the good Sino-U.S. relations it seeks.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own. He would also like to thank Matt Tranquada and Troy Stangarone for their discussions on these issues. 

Photo from U.S. Mission Geneva’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

A year of transitions finishes in historic fashion as South Korea elects Park Geun-hye as its first female president. Her election capped off a series of democratic presidential elections that featured nicely at the beginning and end of this year of transitions, leading off with Ma Ying-jeou winning reelection in Taiwan. Yet North Korea still tried to garner all of the attention. Kim Jong-il’s death in late December 2011 and the rocket launch this December briefly took headlines away from these important elections. Despite these North Korean events, much of the focus will turn to the new leader in South Korea. While Park Geun-hye will still have to deal with North Korea and relations in the region, she will also have a heavy domestic agenda that will be vital for the future of South Korea. Her ability to handle North Korea relations while working toward solutions to domestic issues will determine the rest of her legacy in the Blue House beyond being South Korea’s first female president.

While there is no polling data yet on the impact of the North Korean rocket launch or the effect of important voter concerns on the election, relations with North Korea were likely seen as an issue during the election, not the issue. There were increasing sentiments in South Korea that Lee Myung-bak’s policy was not working. Both Moon Jae-in, the progressive candidate, and the conservative Park Geun-hye, offered ideas on reengaging North Korea. Some of Park’s ideas during the campaign for reaching out to North Korea consisted of humanitarian aid, resuming family visits, diplomatic, and social exchanges, and expanding Kaesong. These possibilities for dealing with North Korea would all fall under her trustpolitik policy toward North Korea. While still vaguely defined, the recent North Korean rocket launch will probably force Park Geun-hye to emphasize the trust part of the trustpolitik early in her administration.

A more cautious approach toward North Korea will help U.S.-South Korea relations remain positive and allow for the U.S. to be more prepared for South Korea’s engagement process with North Korea. The U.S. would like to follow South Korea’s lead with inter-Korean relations, and appear in coordination with its ally. Ideas like restarting humanitarian aid to North Korea or expanding Kaesong are politically feasible for support in both South Korea and the United States.

Even with all of these issues connected with North Korea, Park Geun-hye has an ambitious domestic agenda as well. Chaebol reform, rising education costs, an increasing unemployment rate, and creating greater economic gains throughout Korean society were all important campaign topics. Many of these issues fall under the rubric of “economic democratization,” key buzzwords during this election and involving the idea of closing the gap between rich and poor in Korea and making sure all Koreans can gain from its overall economic success. Moreover, a demographic challenge will also require Park to find ways to address some of these issues quickly as well as hope the interconnections in many of these problems also permeate through many of the solutions.

With pressure to fix the domestic economy and South Koreans’ individual welfare along with a desire to see improved relations with North Korea, Japan, and China, all while not ruining the current positive U.S.-Korea relationship, Park Geun-hye will have to work quickly on both fronts to have a chance of succeeding. Opportunities are there for both South Korean domestic and international success.  All South Korean presidents have to navigate a potentially turbulent Northeast Asia while solving domestic problems. Yet the emphasis and importance placed on Korea because of an Asia-Pacific century, the expectations for a Global Korea, uncertainty over the future of North Korea as well as U.S.-China relations, and the need for continued economic success only increases the difficulty and necessity for a impactful Park Geun-hye administration for the future of South Korea.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

By Sarah K. Yun

Both the United States and China went through leadership transitions in November. In the United States  President Barack Obama was reelected, while China announced a new era under General Secretary Xi Jiping.  With both countries future leadership now decided, what are the implications for Korea as the U.S. and China consolidate their respective leaderships and policy towards Asia?

The key takeaway from the U.S. election is that the United States will continue its strategy of rebalancing toward Asia.  This is less surprising given the re-elected Obama administration’s commitment to continue the rebalancing towards Asia.  Beginning in the fall of 2011, the Obama administration indicated the United States’ determination to play a larger role in the Asia-Pacific region militarily, economically, and politically.  In line with this position the U.S. renewed its commitment towards allies such as South Korea, Japan and the Philippines, and strengthened relationships with other partners such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and India.

Militarily, the U.S. cooperated with South Korea and Japan on missile defense technologies, while announcing new deployments or rotations of troops in Australia and Singapore.  At the same time, the U.S. continues to work to strengthen its commitment to South Korea and Japan, encourage Australia to take more active role in regional security, and renew security ties with the Philippines, while laying the foundations to solidify strategic relationship with Vietnam and India.

Economically, the U.S. recognizes that the fastest growing economies of the world are in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, the U.S. concluded the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement while actively participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement negotiations.  Furthermore, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have in unprecedented fashion attended consecutive regional forums including APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the EAS.

Recognizing that diplomacy requires more than agreements and public pronouncements, the rebalancing also implies the crucial need for trust-building in the region. To that end, President Obama’s first trip abroad after his reelection was to Southeast Asia to meet ASEAN leaders on November 18. His trip is a recognition that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy has shifted to the Asia-Pacific region.  Overall, the U.S. has been actively and comprehensively engaged in the region on a variety of issues both bilaterally and multilaterally.

While the United States pursues its policy of rebalancing, any policy change from China towards the region remains to be seen.  The Asia-Pacific is undoubtedly important to China as the country sees itself as the leader of the region to which they belong and centers its own policy around the need for a peaceful region to facilitate China’s own continued development.

China’s policy towards Asia is not as defined as the U.S. rebalancing strategy, leading neighbors to wonder what its intentions are. Many are concerned at China’s recent assertive posture related to maritime and territorial issues. However, the reality is that an assessment of China’s foreign policy under Xi may be too early at this point.  Although Xi became the General Secretary of the Community Party of China, he will not become president until the National People’s Congress in March 2013.  Furthermore, key foreign affairs officials have not been appointed yet, such as the director of Central Foreign Affairs Office, foreign minister, and the head of the CCP’s International Liaison Department. The best indication of Xi’s foreign policy may be Hu Jintao’s opening report at the 18^th CPC National Congress where Xi was appointed the successor. It was declared that China was to become a maritime power to exploit marine resources, develop its marine economy, protect marine ecological environment, and resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.  For the most part, however, the emphasis was on domestic politics, perhaps indicating that foreign policy will be largely reactive in the initial years under Xi.

In the backdrop of Xi Jinping’s leadership transition is China’s recent aggressive stance on maritime issues against Japan and Southeast Asia.  Recently, an Op-Ed in the state-run People’s Daily, stated that “China’s stance of maintaining peaceful development does not mean it gives up its right to protect national interests” and that China will “protect national sovereignty, safety and developmental interest and will never surrender to any external pressure”. The territorial dispute with Japan will likely be one of Xi Jinping’s top foreign policy priorities in 2013 in order to prevent any domestic dissatisfaction and instability. At the same time, China’s policy stance towards North Korea has remained largely consistent as it has urged all relevant parties to take a “prudent and moderate” response to North Korea’s missile launch.

On the economic front, China remains invested in international trade and economic development as its domestic economy depends on the global market. On September 22 during the China-ASEAN Expo, Xi pledged to advance China-ASEAN relations and FTA development, showing China’s emphasis on economic tools for diplomacy in the region despite intense maritime disputes.  Trade volume between China and ASEAN countries amounted to $362.8 billion in 2011, with a trade volume target of $500 billion by 2013.

All in all, there are signs of both continuity in China’s foreign policy as well as signs of a more assertive China. However, China’s policy also indicates a fragmentation between security and economic interests.  Priority goes to economic development and stability, then regional security.  Even maritime disputes have a strong economic interests regarding shipping lanes.  While China was on the course to develop a comprehensive Asia policy amidst the wars in the Middle East, the U.S. initiated its comprehensive rebalancing towards Asia, which threw a curveball into China’s plans.  China is realizing the need to increasingly get involved in multilateral channels such as the G-20, BRICs, and other Asia related multilateral forums.

As the two major powers navigate in the Asia-Pacific region to establish their respective leadership positions, what is the role that Korea can play?  U.S. policy towards Asia and the Korean Peninsula is more predictable, which eliminates many of the potential surprise elements.  The U.S.-Korea alliance has been coined the lynchpin of regional security, leaving little room for ambiguity in the U.S. rebalancing vis-à-vis Korea.  China, on the other hand, may require more management for Korea.  Although the initial phase of Xi’s foreign policy will likely be dominated by domestic issues such as economic slowdown and anti-corruption, bilateral issues such as Chinese fishermen in Korean waters and Korea-China Free Trade Agreement will need careful navigation.

Korea, like other countries in the region, does not want to be forced to choose between the U.S. and China.  Both the United States and China are important to Korea in different ways and the realities of their respective Asia policies may lead Korea to actively engage diplomatically with both powers.  Therefore, Korea can play a mediating role to support the U.S., Korea’s most important ally, and China, Korea’s largest trading partner, to work together on key issues.  This may include North Korea and Iran’s nuclear problems, disaster relief in region, and assisting China to mature its market capital structures and move towards a knowledge-based economy. Some of the seesaw dynamics between the U.S. and China may change after the South Korean presidential elections in December.  Regardless of who becomes the new South Korean president, the reality is that both the U.S. and China are important partners to Korea.  As a middle power, Korea can play an important and unique role the Asia policies of the U.S. and China.

Sarah K. Yun is the Director of Public Affairs and Regional Issues for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are her own. 

Photo from U.S. Pacific Fleet’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Chad O’Carroll

When South Korea picks either a progressive or conservative leader next month, we will know the full extent of the impact of President Obama’s re-election on the next four years on the Korean peninsula. Whether Obama and the next leader of South Korea will be able to sustain the current momentum of the U.S. – Korea alliance remains an unanswered question. But while there is much to suggest that Obama is in an advantageous starting position to work on U.S.-Korea ties, there are nevertheless several areas of real concern as we move forward post the December election.

Having strengthened the U.S – Korea alliance and forged a close friendship over the past four years with President Lee Myung Bak, Obama has proven he has the ability to work well with even those at the opposite end of the South Korean political spectrum. Having signed off on the KORUS FTA and cooperated closely on major global issues, whoever takes power in South Korea this December will inherent an excellent relationship from Lee Myung-bak. However, as Ambassador Thomas Hubbard recently pointed out, political transitions can be difficult periods when it comes to U.S. – Korea relations.

If Park wins the election, her administration will inherit five years of tacit experience in working with the current White House, a great starting point to be sure. And while a progressive administration will be starting afresh with Obama, compared to a Romney victory they can at least benefit from an external working understanding of how the relationship has worked so far. However, there is always the risk that things could deteriorate from the status quo, especially when considering how important personal friendship has been to contributing to the success of U.S.-Korea relations of late.

What does an alliance look like when personal friendship is lacking? The case of Benjamin Netanyahu’s relations with Obama is a case in point, showing how tensions can emerge among allies when the personal relationships of the two leaders don’t chime. For Israel – U.S. relations, over the past four years seemingly impassable policy chasms have been accentuated by leaks, distrust and seemingly artificially created protocol issues. As a result, Obama is often obliged to reach out to the Israeli public in order to remind them that the U.S. is still committed to Israel’s security. While this is a strong example, it underscores the importance of mutual respect between leaders. Naturally, both Washington and Seoul will be eager to avoid a repeat of the acrimonious relations that Bush had with the late progressive president Roh.

Another trouble spot for U.S. – Korea relations circles around North Korea policy. With Obama likely feeling burnt by his last attempt to engage Pyongyang in the “Leap Day Agreement”, it is unclear how supportive the U.S. will be of the next South Korean administration’s North Korea policy. After all, all three Korean candidates are campaigning for increased inter-Korean engagement, with even the conservatives calling for comparatively radical initiatives such as the opening of liaison offices in Pyongyang. Here the problem comes down to how denuclearization is prioritized by South Korea when it comes to engagement. That’s because Obama may have a hard time reducing focus on the denuclearization of North Korea if he is to continue emphasizing his wider global non-proliferation strategy. As such, there is a risk that an incoming South Korean administration may wish to sequence this goal in a way that proves incompatible with Obama’s own policy positions.

An additional hurdle that could set back U.S. – Korea relations relates to Seoul’s domestic nuclear power infrastructure. The current U.S.-ROK nuclear energy agreement is due to expire in March 2014 and South Korea is now increasingly eager to make use of the spent fuel from its nuclear reactors. Having outlined a goal of processing the spent fuel through a capability known as pyroprocessing, South Korea hopes to potentially recycle fuel by using the transuranic elements in fast reactors. As the world’s sixth biggest exporter of nuclear power plants, South Korea has an understandable desire to close the nuclear fuel cycle – doing so will put it in an even better position to offer full range of nuclear services worldwide and attract additional contracts. However, if the ROK were to be allowed to develop a reprocessing facility there would be consequences for global non-proliferation regime and implications for the dismantling of the DPRK nuclear program. As such, it is a delicate issue that will require thoughtful diplomacy to resolve.

Although there are challenges ahead, it is important to remember that Obama is extremely popular in South Korea. Data in a recent opinion poll released by the German Marshall Fund shows that compared to ten years ago, public support for the U.S.-Korea alliance has doubled under Obama’s stewardship. As such, there will be a strong onus on the incoming president of South Korea to maintain the close and friendly ties that have characterized the past five years between Lee Myung-bak and Obama. Correspondingly, among the risks outlined there should still be cause for optimism.

Chad O’Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from art_es_anna’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Thomas C. Hubbard        

Nearly five years ago, when Lee Myung-bak had just been elected President of Korea, I participated in a study group sponsored by Stanford University and The Korea Society aimed at drawing up a blueprint for a “New Beginning” in US-Korea relations. The goal was to help the new administrations coming into power in both countries restore a sense of well-being to an alliance that was perceived to be adrift after five years of sometimes contentious stewardship by the conservative administration of George W. Bush in Washington and progressive administration of Roh Moo-hyun in Korea.  At the time we didn’t know who would be the next President of the United States, but we worried that public attitudes toward the alliance were at a low point in both countries and knew that our new leaders needed to rebuild a sense of common purpose if we were to deal with pressing issues such as North Korea and the modernization of our military ties and achieve ratification of the Free Trade Agreement negotiated by the Roh and Bush Administrations.  Presidents Lee and Obama more than fulfilled our hopes and expectations. Despite coming from different ends of the political spectrum, they projected a positive tone for the relationship from the outset.

As a result of their leadership, we all agree that the alliance is stronger today than ever before. President Obama and other U.S. leaders consistently refer to Korea as one of our most important allies and we often talk about a new strategic partnership. President Lee has likewise worked hard to develop his relationship with President Obama despite taking some hits at home over such issues as beef imports. Although some oppositionists still complain about the FTA, U.S.-Korea relations are not a significant issue in the Korean election campaign.  One might argue that the North Koreans helped bring us together through outrageous acts such as nuclear tests and unprecedented attacks on South Korean ships and naval vessels. Indeed the convergence of our views on North Korea, the best I’ve seen in two decades of dealing with this problem, is central to the health of our relationship, but there are a number of other factors bringing us closer together. At a time when many Americans are concerned about China and frustrated with Japan’s leadership vacuum, Washington’s relationship with Seoul has been valued as a welcome source of strength and stability. Americans admire Korea’s economic and democratic success and its willingness to take a leadership role in the world. Among other things, we are gratified to see the Korean President chair the G-20 and Nuclear Security Summit and, most recently, volunteer to host the global Green Climate Fund in a new state-of-the art city.

As Koreans and Americans vote this year, the challenge before us is not how to achieve a “new beginning” but, rather, how to maintain the high standard set by Presidents Obama and Lee for smooth and productive ties. This is no easy task.  Transitions are often a difficult period in U.S.-Korea relations, and this transition could be doubly so if we wind up with new administrations in both countries at the same time.  Many of us remember with some pain the difficult early meetings between Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton, Kim Dae-jung and George W. Bush, and Roh Moo-hyun and George W. Bush.  Miscommunications at the Summit level can be overcome, but only with time and hard work. So my first bit of advice to the incoming administrations is to prepare well for the first Summit. It can be a mistake to rush the process.

My second bit of advice to both sides is to try to avoid posing litmus tests to each other in the early days of new administrations.  President Clinton wanted Kim Young-sam to support his “comprehensive” approach to North Korean denuclearization before the Korean President was prepared to accept the political consequences of a U.S. lead in dealing with North Korea. The reverse occurred when President Kim Dae-jung, who insisted on meeting with President Bush within weeks of his inauguration, was deeply embarrassed when the U.S. President was not yet prepared to endorse his Sunshine policy. It took years to get over this miscommunication and return to a common track on North Korea.  Judging from their campaign statements, all of the Korean Presidential candidates appear to be looking for new beginnings with North Korea, in hopes of overcoming the confrontational atmosphere that has prevailed under the Lee Myung-bak Administration. That is probably a laudable aspiration, one that should be supported by the United States if denuclearization remains a central objective.  However, our leaders may need to allow each other a little slack in the post election period.  Experience suggests that we will consult very closely if we are to stay on the same song sheet during political transitions.

Finally, the FTA, signed under Bush and Roh and ratified under Lee and Obama, is a wonderful legacy of two administrations in both countries. It represents a powerful new element in our strategic relationship, but it is also a trade agreement that must be made to work to our mutual economic benefit. That means that American businesses must take advantage of the opportunity to expand exports of goods and services to Korea.  It also means that both sides must fulfill the letter and spirit of the agreement. We must trust that the backsliding we have begun to see in some areas will be only a passing figment of the Korean election campaign.

It is clear that our two countries need each other in today’s complex world, and I have every hope that the upcoming elections will produce leaders who, like Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama, respect each and understand the importance of the relationship.

Thomas C. Hubbard is Senior Director for Asia at McLarty Associates and Chairman of The Korea Society. He served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2001 to 2004. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Korea.net’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Troy Stangarone

On the morning of June 25, 1950 the sound of exploding shells awoke Koreans and U.S. troops alike in the city of Kaesong. With the sound of those early morning explosions, the lives of more than 300,000 soldiers from the United States and countless Koreans would be changed forever.

Many who would go to Korea had never heard of where they were going to fight or knew of the people they had been sent to protect. Nearly 34,000 of them would never make it home.

The Korean War is often called the Forgotten War. However, perhaps unique among the wars that the United States has fought many of those they fought to protect have not forgotten the sacrifices American soldiers made and the opportunity they provided for the nearly 50 million Koreans today to choose their own destiny.

I’ve often experienced this gratitude on my trips to Korea. On more than one occasion an older individual has stopped me in broken English to ask if I was American. After answering, they would proceed to shake my hand and talk happily to me in Korean even though they knew I didn’t understand. Even though language was a barrier to communication, I’ve always understood what they were saying.

Over the last couple of months, I’ve had the opportunity to meet with some of those who fought in Korea as KEI produced a short documentary on their experiences for a tribute to their service during our gala on June 7. One thing that stands out is the pride they have for what they have done and the nation that Korea has become.

Many share the same experiences. Fighting in the bitter cold, a constant loss of life around them as Korea was left devastated by the ravages of war. They also share a willingness to do it all over again after having seen what Korea has achieved, and a concern that it is not a war that the America of today would fight.

At the same time, there is often a sense on their part they have been forgotten by the pages of history despite what one veteran of both the Second World War and Korea described to me as perhaps the noblest thing the United States had done.

He also shared that for many veterans, the memorial built on the National Mall in Washington, DC is incomplete. At the time of the memorial’s construction they wanted to erect a wall of remembrance to memorialize those who had sacrifice so much during the war.

That wall is still but a dream for many who are slowly fading away from the stage of American history. However, there is legislation (H.R. 2563) before the House of Representatives to correct this. The bill would authorize the construction of a wall of remembrance to include the names of members of the U.S. Armed Forces who died, as well as the number of those wounded in action, missing in action, and prisoners of war. It would also recognize those who fought in the war for the Republic of Korea, under United Nations Command, and as part of the Korean Augmentation of the United States Army by listing the number of those who were killed in action, wounded in action, are missing in action, or were prisoners of war.

To date, this effort has only received a hearing by the Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands in the House’s Natural Resources Committee. There is currently no Senate companion legislation. However, despite the gridlock that grips Washington, especially in an election year, one would hope that Democrats and Republicans could come together to finalize America’s tribute to those who gave of themselves to protect the freedom of one of the 20^th century’s greatest success stories.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo taken by Troy Stangarone.

By Troy Stangarone

Voting in the shadow of North Korea’s missile launch and a prospective third nuclear test, South Korean voters went to the polls on April 11 in an election that some 60 percent described as a referendum on the administration of President Lee Myung-bak.  Despite perceptions that that there was widespread dissatisfaction in South Korea with the current administration, results indicate that South Koreans came away from the polls undecided about their nation’s future but giving a slim majority to the conservative New Frontier Party (NFP).

With almost all of the votes counted, the NFP had secured a small majority in the 300 seat National Assembly with at least 152 seats. Turnout was estimated at nearly 55 percent, which means that the results go somewhat against the grain of prior Korean elections as turnout near the 55 percent mark has historically favored liberals. However, the NFP’s slim majority means that Korea may avoid the gridlock that seemed likely when early polls indicated that neither of the major parties would secure an outright majority in the National Assembly. Though, that could change with defections and bi-elections in the years ahead, but for the moment the NFP’s slim majority means stability in the legislative branch.

The NFP’s victory also means we are unlikely to see any major foreign policy shifts in the near future. President Lee will remain in office for the rest of the year and he will now have support within the National Assembly to maintain his policies. The Democratic United Party (DUP) tried to make revision of the KORUS FTA a major point of its campaign, but the issue never seemed to gain traction as the DUP might have hoped. While the agreement may still remain a campaign issue, the DUP will likely shift its emphasis away from the FTA as it tries to build a winning coalition for the presidential election in December.

While the DUP may press for a softer policy towards North Korea, it seems unlikely to change in the near future as well. With even Russia calling North Korea’s satellite launch a violation of UN Security Council Resolutions and the prospect of a 3^rd nuclear test in the near future, it seems unlikely that the Lee administration would change course in its final months despite pressure from the DUP.

One significant milestone from the elections related to North Korea is the likelihood that the first North Korean defector will be elected to the National Assembly. Cho Myong Chul, who is running as one of the proportional candidates for the NFP and seems likely to gain a seat based on the early results.

On the domestic front, less may divide the two parties than many realize. Both parties campaigned on platforms of strengthening Korea’s welfare state and implementing policies that would help small and medium sized businesses in the face of increasing competition from the Chaebols. This may provide opportunities for liberals and conservatives to work together in the National Assembly as the NFP will only have the smallest of margins with which to pass major legislation.

The big winner in the elections would seem to be Park Geun-hye. Runner up to Lee Myung-bak in the then Grand National Party’s (GNP) presidential primary five years ago, and presumptive nominee for the NFP this time, she is being credited with engineering the NFP’s turnaround. The election results should only enhance her chances in this fall’s presidential race.

However, in the long-run the National Assembly elections are only the first step in determining who will lead Korea. Much of the future foreign and trade policy will be shaped by the next occupant of the Blue House. While the quite support of Ahn Cheol-soo did not work as well for the DUP as it did during last fall’s Seoul mayoral election, there is one lesson for both parties from that campaign. Eight months in any political campaign is an eternity. After losing the mayor’s office in Seoul it seemed as though the then GNP was down and out. That didn’t happen and December is an eternity away.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute. His views are his own.

Photo from Chitra Chaaya’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Ben Hancock

President Obama this week is gearing up for a trip to South Korea that will see him both participate in the international Nuclear Security Summit and make the short journey from Seoul to the border with North Korea. It’s also his first trip to Korea — indeed, anywhere in Asia — since last November, when his administration trumpeted the “Asia pivot,” a term that still has many in the foreign policy world scratching their heads. This makes now a good moment to reflect on what the “pivot” really means for South Korea, a long-time U.S. ally that already hosts a strong contingent of some 28,500 American soldiers.

It’s seems safe to say that, so far, the pivot has not yielded any concrete outcomes, perhaps other than stronger U.S. military ties with Australia. But even so, many observers have framed the policy as Washington taking an active role to counter-balance the widening influence of Beijing in the Asia-Pacific. Clearly, if true, this is an aspect that would have bearing on South Korea and its neighbor to the north. The questions are: How exactly would this affect the peninsula, and how likely is this effort to yield new results given the current geo-political dynamic?

In concept at least, it seems fairly straightforward that reducing military and economic tension in the Asia-Pacific by having the U.S. reaffirm its commitment to serving as an outside balancer in the region at a time when the rise of China has many worried would be beneficial for South Korea. Any subsequent increased U.S. leverage on China would also probably give Washington a better hand in negotiating with the North on its nuclear program — also a benefit for Seoul.

So that’s a partial answer to my first question. The fuller answer is: it’s complicated.  For example, it’s not really clear whether a new U.S. military focus on the Asia-Pacific would really counter-balance against China, or would simply raise the stakes as Beijing undergoes a leadership transition of its own and seeks to ensure stability and project strength. For that matter, it’s unclear if the pivot truly means an increased U.S. military focus on the region or more of a commitment not to reduce its presence. Similarly, on the economic front, it’s unanswered whether a new U.S.-led trade deal among nations along the Pacific Rim will really pressure China to adopt high standards, or will simply lead it to forge its own deals — with Korea and Japan, for instance.

We may not need to worry about any of that. In answer to the second question, I would bet that the likelihood of new developments under the “pivot” is very low. Though House Republicans are trying to reduce the budgetary impact on the Pentagon, defense cuts of some measure appear to be on the horizon. That seems to rule out a rise in U.S. military might in Asia being a cornerstone of the “pivot” policy. In Korea, it seems likely that the base consolidation now underway will continue along the same course, along with the transfer of wartime command to Seoul.

Next, economics and trade. Obama kicked off the year in his State of the Union with a clear salvo against China in this area, almost undoubtedly because it plays well in an election year. But this approach seems unlikely to further the long-term U.S. goal of convincing China to rebalance its export-dominated economy. This probably means the status quo for South Korea, too, which continues to be interested in making inroads into the Chinese market.  Of course, Korea could make advances on its own by increasing market share and investment in China if bilateral negotiations with Beijing take off. In the meantime, the conclusion of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (in which Korea has shown little interest) is still miles away.

This mix of factors seems to foreshadow a familiar formula for dealing with North Korea as well. Absent any new show of U.S. military might, increased leverage with China economically or otherwise, or real diplomatic maneuvering, what’s to keep the North from playing its old tricks? Not a whole lot, it seems, as evidenced by its return to testing missiles with the purported purpose of sending satellites into space. When Obama looks over the DMZ early next week for the first time since taking office, he may well find himself still puzzled at how to engage such a defiant nation.

This all paints a picture of the “pivot” not meaning very much for Korea in the near term. In fact, it may be more accurate to think of the phrase as the administration’s branding for what it has already accomplished in Asia — joining new dialogues, showing a lot of earnest diplomatic engagement in the region, and passing the KORUS FTA. That doesn’t mean there are no prospects for future developments under this umbrella; if Obama is granted more time to pursue the policy by voters this November, we may yet see it take on new aspects. A positive shift in the direction of the U.S. economy and fiscal situation could also alter the narrative, but neither of those appear to be in the offing any time soon.

Ben Hancock is a journalist based in Washington, D.C. He has studied Korean language and culture since 2004, and most recently lived in Korea from 2008 to 2010. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from Expert Infantry’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Troy Stangarone

For years experts have known that Iran and North Korea have cooperated on missile technology, and suspected that they did so in pursuing their nuclear ambitions as well. But as tensions between the United States and Iran increase, Seoul is increasingly finding itself caught in the middle as its economic and national security interest come into conflict. Should it take part in sanctions that could harm South Korea’s own economic interests, or back its closest ally in an effort to bring Iran back to the negotiation table over its suspected nuclear weapons program?

While South Korea supported previous rounds of sanctions against Iran in 2010 and the fall of 2011 with seemingly little negative economic impact, the new push by the United States to squeeze Iran’s oil exports more directly impacts Seoul’s economic interests. As is the case with much of Asia, Iran and the Middle East are a significant source of oil for Korea. Through the first eleven months of 2011, Iran accounted for 9.6 percent of Korea’s oil imports, while 80 percent of Korea’s oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

Without its own domestic energy reserves South Korea is dependent upon imports to meet its energy needs. However, replacing Iranian oil may not be as simple as buying from another supplier because of questions regarding current surplus oil supplies. Iran currently supplies the world with about 2.2 million barrels of oil per day, while the U.S. Energy Information Agency estimates that OPEC has about 3 million barrels a day of spare capacity at the moment. Most of the world’s spare capacity is in OPEC, which is expected to see its surplus capacity rise to a little more than 4 million barrels a day later this year as Libya and Iraq bring more capacity on line.  Though some experts question whether Saudi Arabia, which has the world’s largest spare capacity, truly has the ability to increase its production as much as is believed, while analysts at Goldman Sachs estimate that there may be very little spare capacity overall.

In addition to having to find a new supplier at the same time as other major oil importers such as Europe; South Korea will likely face an increasing price for oil and a loss of export markets. As enlarged demand for non-Iranian oil drives up prices, cheaper Iranian oil will be increasingly inaccessible to South Korea. At the same time, the Persian Gulf has become an attractive export destination for Korean products. Through the first eleven months of 2011, South Korea exported $5.7 billion dollars to Iran and another $9.4 billion to other states in the Persian Gulf, up from $1.2 billion a decade earlier in Iran and $1.75 billion in the rest of the Persian Gulf. Some of this trade, especially with Saudi Arabia, could likely be diverted to Red Sea ports, but South Korea would still likely see a fall in exports to the region if hostilities were to break out.

However, it is not only the United States push for sanctions that threatens South Korea’s economic interests. Facing increasingly tough sanctions and growing isolation, Iran’s regime has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and said there would be consequences for Middle Eastern nations that raise oil production to replace embargoed Iranian supplies Iran’s threats alone have kept oil prices over $100 per barrel in the last month from uncertainty over tensions in the region. All of this is creating another dimension for Korean policy makers to consider. While Iran could not likely close off the Strait of Hormuz for long, it is capable of mining or harassing ships in the strait, as it did during the Iran-Iraq War, which could drive up the cost of oil. According to the New York Times, if Iran were to take similar actions the price of oil could rise 50 percent within days.

This is where national security interests conflict with South Korea’s economic interests. Like Iran, North Korea remains one of the world’s pressing nuclear proliferation concerns. While South Korea has expressed support for U.S. efforts to check Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it has yet to announce if or how much it will reduce its imports from Iran.  As Seoul weighs its options, it faces three considerations. Because Iranian and North Korean nuclear proliferation are becoming linked in the United States and the international community, there is pressure for South Korea to take action against proliferation in general. More specifically, as Seoul weighs options to reduce the potential economic impact on its economy, it must balance the efforts it makes and ensure that they do not inadvertently undermine U.S. efforts to get other Asian nations to take part in the sanctions. Lastly, because the United States Congress is taking a hard and bi-partisan line on sanctions, South Korea runs the risk of meeting requests of the U.S. administration but not the expectations of the U.S. Congress, potentially creating additional points of tension with the United States.

However, even if Seoul complies with the sanctions it will still potentially face risks. If the United States efforts were to fail, Israel might feel increasingly compelled to act on its own. If it did, a conflict in the Middle East might bring about the economic consequences Seoul seeks to avoid. Either way, South Korea’s security and economic interests are at risk from instability in the Middle East

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Official Navy Imagery photostream on flickr Creative Commons.