By Duyeon Kim

The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Korea could have been a watershed moment for nuclear security. The 58 heads of state and world leaders were expected to implement nuclear security measures conceptualized by the Obama administration’s first Summit in Washington two years ago, and pivot toward a harmonized and coherent roadmap. After all, participating nations fulfilled over 90 percent of their voluntary summit commitments since the Washington Summit resulting in the reduction of vast amounts of highly enriched uranium and numerous reactor conversion measures.

The expectation, or hope, was that the Seoul Summit would build on these successes by reenergizing the international community on security issues, collecting new commitments to strengthen global nuclear security, implementing measures, and innovating global governance.

Unfortunately, domestic agendas and geopolitics stole the show, and what few accomplishments were achieved ended up more toothless than most analysts had hoped.

World leaders will and should take advantage of a major international assembly to discuss other pressing issues on the sidelines. But it was all too clear that 2012 is simply too crowded with domestic issues and election races for most leaders or media to concentrate on the task at hand.

North Korea grabbed the first headlines on the eve of the Summit. Then a Russian Foreign Ministry statement suggesting Moscow would not present new commitments to reduce its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium had a dispiriting effect on analysts, those with good-faith, and those with earnest intentions for the reduction and security of fissile materials. Headlines during the summit were taken by President Obama’s open-mic gaffe ensuring President Medvedev of his second-term political flexibility on missile defense and other issues.

It, of course, doesn’t help that nuclear security is a tough sell to a global public more focused on the economy and other kitchen-table issues than on the global stockpile of nuclear materials, a topic that’s too wonky for most people.

Seoul Communiqué

The format of the Seoul Communiqué intended to ensure all nuclear security issues are given the highest political attention by producing one combined document instead of the two (Communiqué and Work Plan) seen in 2010. The rationale was that a second, more technical document could be treated as an “Appendix” or side note with lesser importance. The intention was commendable. However, since a communiqué is a political statement at the top level, a combined document runs the risk of only agreeing on the lowest common denominators.

Alas, the Seoul Communiqué did just that, with weaker language used, such as “we encourage” instead of “we will” or “we call on” seen in the 2010 Summit documents. It also focused more on what was achieved in the past two years, though extremely important, and less on how to chart a deeper, coherent course of action for the future.

Still, Some Progress

Despite the lack of more detailed, future-oriented commitments in Summit documents, there were four noteworthy points of significant progress this year.

The most prominent achievement was tackling the nuclear safety-security interface — an initially controversial topic — for the first time in the Summit. By doing so, it sent an important reminder that the facilities that house nuclear materials should also be strengthened. Not only did world leaders recognize the commonalities of two distinct measures, but they advanced the idea by stating that the interface should be considered in all stages, from design to emergency response, in a synergistic manner so that strengthening one area does not compromise the other. Summit participants also aimed to seek the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) assistance in further enhancing the interface by, as a first step, organizing meetings on this matter. These are all part of an extremely significant first step, but the key is implementing measures that strengthen both nuclear safety and security until and beyond 2014. Fukushima provided the impetus to think in terms of safety-security, but the passing of time should not be allowed to dilute the sense of necessity and urgency. Safety-security measures should also be implemented as long as nuclear terrorism exists and as long as countries continue to use nuclear power.

The bulk of nuclear security measures rests on reducing the global stockpile of fissile materials — highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The summit set a target date, the end of 2013, to announce specific voluntary actions that countries will implement in order to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in their civilian sectors. That’s a goal-oriented statement, and a noteworthy achievement considering the complexities of multilateral diplomatic negotiations. However, it is merely an encouragement rather than a unanimous commitment. Not to mention, some states may find it difficult to meet this deadline due to technical difficulties such as the time it takes to convert existing or newly-ordered reactors to use low-enriched uranium fuel instead of highly-enriched uranium. It is also the first official acknowledgement that completely securing all vulnerable nuclear materials by December 31, 2013 — Obama’s four-year goalpost — is not within reach.

The third area of progress was in radiological security. Thousands of sites worldwide house radioactive materials. So it’s significant that world leaders have not only raised the importance of radiological security since the first summit in 2010, but they’ve set forth a more detailed vision for the safety and security of radioactive materials. For example, they’ve realized the need to establish national registers of high-activity radioactive sources and committed to work closely with the IAEA to cooperate on advanced technologies, and share best practices and management of radioactive sources. It’s not just nuclear materials that are game-changers. Radioactive materials can be used for terrorist means to make dirty bombs. Since radioactive materials are also widely used for benign purposes — industrial, medical, research, agricultural — their security is just as important to prevent and recover lost, stolen or orphaned sources.

Finally, a new contribution this year is the presentation of “gift baskets,” or joint pledges, from like-minded countries to strengthen nuclear security. For example, Belgium, France, Korea, and the United States announced a joint project to develop high-density low-enriched uranium fuel to replace highly enriched uranium fuels in high-performance research reactors. If the technology — developed by Korea — is effective, it could have a profound impact on minimizing highly enriched uranium usage globally.

Seoul Achievements

Korea displayed significant leadership as Summit Chair and succeeded in adding a Korean twist to the summit agenda while achieving its major goals. It surely impressed the skeptics who predicted Seoul would merely play host and organizer with Washington in the driver’s seat. Over the years, Korea has hosted major international summits, but this one is perhaps the first in which Seoul fully exerted its influence on substantive issues.

Seoul showcased its skills in multilateral diplomacy by deflating the highly controversial safety-security issue, overcoming stiff opposition from its closest ally to include safety, and garnering global consensus on a vision to strengthen nuclear safety-security. Korea also contributed a significant technology to replace highly-enriched uranium fuels in high performance research reactors, while showcasing its know-how in tracking radioactive materials. Seoul, together with allies and partners, was also able to send Pyongyang a message on the sidelines of the Summit. While it set out to regain public confidence in nuclear energy via the Summit, this will only be achieved through future actions that strengthen nuclear safety-security.

These notable outcomes came under some difficult circumstances. It puzzled many, even during the Summit, as to why Korea would and would want to take on a gathering that began as a U.S.-centric initiative. When Seoul agreed to receive the baton after the 2010 Summit, it was, knowingly or not, walking into tough waters. Unlike the U.S., which had engaged in nuclear security programs for decades, nuclear terrorism and “nuclear security” are foreign concepts for South Korea — it doesn’t have nuclear weapons or fissile materials, and security is always framed in the context of its number one threat, North Korea, which did not even make it on the Summit agenda, though for good reason. In other words, while the Nuclear Security Summit was established to deal with the U.S.’ greatest security threat — terrorists and non-state actors — South Korea’s greatest security threat has always been a state that produces nuclear material.

Thus, the natural lack of initial public interest and awareness was indeed a challenge. Another problem was the lack of public outreach on the issue ahead of the Summit, but this was true for most countries. The Summit also faced stiff competition with the entire country focusing on Korea’s April 11^th general elections, nuclear security becoming a partisan issue, major media outlets going on strike for their own reasons, and every presidential initiative becoming tough sells during the final lame duck year.

While the Nuclear Security Summit process began as President Obama’s idea with an American focus, the scope has clearly expanded in the Seoul Summit to address the global realities of today’s and tomorrow’s challenges. This was a result of Seoul’s leadership. The next question is whether Seoul will continue to contribute to global nuclear security with the same drive and politicial will, exhibited in preparation for the 2012 Sumimt, after handing the chairmanship to the Netherlands.

Next Steps

The challenge for the Nuclear Security Summit process going forward is sustaining nuclear security initiatives while keeping states accountable to their summit commitments. It is crucial that world leaders reestablish the sense of urgency, existentiality, and awareness of the terrorism threat that the planet faces. Summit fatigue among heads of state could threaten global nuclear security; there are already questions as to whether the summit process needs to continue regularly or be absorbed by existing mechanisms, like the IAEA.

Attracting all heads of state to future Summits may become another challenge. For months, it was unclear whether the Seoul Summit would see 100 percent participation, but including a safety discussion with the security conversation in the aftermath of Fukushima helped considerably. This is why 2014 should leave open the door to again expand the scope to ensure full participation and interest.

The Nuclear Security Summit process places a burden of proof on all states to implement their nuclear security pledges as well as on the three chairs — Korea, the U.S. and the Netherlands — to continue to lead the process together. The Chairs should adopt, officially or unofficially, the troika system familiar in the G-20 when preparing for 2014.

International negotiations and diplomacy is indeed challenging when 53 different national interests are involved. There was — and will always be — push back from states on more ambitious commitments. But the Nuclear Security Summit needs to chart a deeper and wider course of action. Global nuclear security also needs to move beyond the voluntary, patchwork nature of the current effort toward the creation of a coherent global architecture and governance, starting with a minimum universal guideline for the security of nuclear materials and facilities. Without structure, the summit and nuclear security initiatives could be rendered impotent, and leaders will have even less incentive to pay attention to the goal. Universal standards can be devised and recommended without running into the complexities of sovereignty.

The 2014 Summit in the Netherlands must be drastically different and must not be a meeting that spends more time reviewing past accomplishments; it should not only address new or evolving security concerns that may arise over the next two years, but also set future goals. The Nuclear Security Summit may have begun as President Obama’s project, but Seoul 2012 has proven that nuclear security is a global responsibility with regional contexts. The Seoul Summit ultimately served as a pivot to a more global agenda.

The fundamental dilemma moving forward is narrowing the gap in threat perceptions among states and reconciling the debate on whether to include more nuclear issues or maintain a narrow focus on nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear terrorism is indeed a low-probability scenario, but the threat is real, and its consequences are unimaginably devastating. The human tendency is to wait until after a catastrophe to devise preventive measures. But when a nuclear or radiological incident occurs, a chance to even clean up may not be granted.

A version of this op-ed was published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on 30 March 2012.

Duyeon Kim is the Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. The views expressed here are her own.

Image from Blue House photos of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

By Peter Crail

The upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul will, for the second time, bring significant high-level attention to the threat of nuclear terrorism and the global responsibility of nuclear material security. World leaders have recognized that a nuclear terrorist attack anywhere would have global consequences, and that with enough nuclear material spread around the world for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, the prospect of nuclear terrorism is real but preventable.

At the 2010 summit in Washington, 50 world leaders endorsed President Barack Obama’s April 2009 call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years and agreed that strengthening nuclear security requires “responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation.” Establishing a global nuclear security architecture, therefore, is not just a U.S. initiative but an international prerogative in which every state plays a part. South Korea’s role in hosting the 2012 summit reflects the need for countries in different parts of the globe to provide regional leadership and to address the challenges of nuclear terrorism in their regional contexts while at the same time ensuring that international standards on nuclear material security are strengthened and harmonized.

Taking Stock

The Seoul summit is most likely a mid-point in the nuclear security summit process, with a final summit to be held in the Netherlands in 2014. A key function of the meeting will then be to take stock, both literally and figuratively, of the progress made over the past two years to consolidate and secure nuclear material.

One important measuring stick to evaluate progress is the degree to which the participants at the 2010 summit accomplished the specific goals they pledged to achieve. A recent study by the Arms Control Association and the Partnership for Global Security assessed that about 80 percent of the 67 commitments made at the 2010 summit by 30 countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been completed. These accomplishments range from the ratification of nuclear security conventions to the removal or disposition of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. This represents significant progress and the parties involved should be commended for engaging in such important follow-up. However, there remains a substantial amount of nuclear material at risk for misuse and there are still no globally agreed standards to effectively secure it. The summit should build on the progress made by charting a path to setting high standards for controlling weapons-useable nuclear material and minimizing its use around the world.

A Broader Agenda

While the 2010 summit focused on the key goal of securing nuclear material, the Seoul summit will expand the agenda to address additional threats stemming from the use of nuclear technology.

With the summit being held a little over a year after the tragic accident at the Fukushima reactors, the summit will confront the nexus between nuclear safety and security and highlight the responsibilities of states possessing nuclear power to prevent, mitigate, and respond to potential dangers. It is important to remember that the prospect of nuclear terrorism is not limited to the use of a nuclear device, but also includes sabotage against nuclear reactors with the intent of causing a man-made Fukushima. Efforts to protect against such a scenario overlap considerably with measures to limit the damage caused by another natural disaster.

The summit will also touch upon a broader class of material than just those used in nuclear weapons. Whereas 32 countries currently maintain HEU and plutonium, nearly every country has radioactive material, which is used in the construction, food, and medical industries, among others. Terrorist groups may be interested in acquiring such material for use in a so-called “dirty bomb,” which uses explosives to spread radiation over a wide area. Though not as destructive as a nuclear device, the prevalence of radioactive materials might make such radiation dispersal devices an attractive alternative.

One issue that is likely to be raised in the course of the meeting, but not specifically addressed, is the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The enigmatic country possess enough nuclear material for several nuclear weapons and has the ability to make more using its uranium-enrichment program. The summit’s proximity to the North Korean threat makes it difficult to ignore, particularly in light of Pyongyang’s announced rocket launch next month and its implications for disarmament diplomacy, but it will not be an appropriate forum to shape the agenda on the North’s weapons program.

It is fitting the Seoul Summit would seek to address a broader agenda of nuclear security concerns, particularly as they relate to recent regional experiences. Yet the core priority of the summit process should remain: consolidating, securing, and where possible, eliminating HEU and plutonium around the world.

Maintaining Momentum

Unlike efforts to address nuclear proliferation and disarmament, which involve much political conflict and compromise, nuclear security is more a matter of coordination and cooperation. The steps necessary to consolidate, control, and curtail the use of weapons-useable nuclear material are largely well known and this lack of political controversy has allowed a wide variety of countries to take part in the summit process. However, priorities need to be set, funds need to be committed, and expertise needs to be developed to achieve this goal. The summit process has placed the challenge of nuclear terrorism firmly on the international agenda and that momentum should be used now to lock down the remaining vulnerable nuclear material and to lay the groundwork for sustained efforts past 2014 to build a robust and uniform nuclear security regime.

Peter Crail is a Nonproliferation Analyst for the Arms Control Association. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo from Korea.net’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

We now know that the “modest progress” after the U.S’s first meeting with North Korea after the death of Kim Jong-il actually meant that a deal regarding food aid, missile launches, and nuclear tests would be forthcoming. The statement on U.S.-DPRK discussions released today by the U.S. Department of State entails an understanding that the U.S. will provide nutritional assistance and North Korea will start a moratorium on long-range missile launches and nuclear tests as well as letting IAEA inspectors back to Yongbyon. The initial steps enclosed in the statement provide both North Korea and the U.S. short-term gains that allow each side to continue to move toward better relations and denuclearization talks.

For North Korea, the big gains from this statement are food aid and legitimacy. On top of the food aid it will reportedly receive from China, North Korea will now receive 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance from the United States with the potential for more. Both of these donations should help North Korea have some more food for its April celebrations of the 100^th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth and help demonstrate the new government led by Kim Jong-un can help provide for its people. Even though the U.S. government insists that it tried to keep food aid separate from other discussions, especially nuclear issues, the linkages are clear and fully interpreted as together by the North Koreans. 

Moreover, North Korea will use the statement to illustrate the U.S.’s recognition of the new Kim Jong-un leadership. The first bullet point summarizing the understandings from the meetings in Beijing last week on the U.S. and the DPRK improving relations through “the spirit of mutual respect for sovereignty and equality” provides that need for the North Koreans. In a continual process of consolidating power, Kim Jong-un can use this phrase suggesting the U.S.’s recognition of his leadership to illustrate he is seen by outside powers as the leader in charge of North Korea.

For the U.S., the discussions and statement provide it time and space to move forward on denuclearization efforts. Fears lingered that in an attempt for stability under the new leadership or if the new regime felt threatened, North Korea would launch a long-range missile or test another nuclear device. The moratorium by North Korea will mitigate some of those fears, but doubts will remain on how long North Korea will sustain the suspension. Furthermore, the Obama administration can point to IAEA inspectors being allowed back to Yongbyon as a success and as an indication that it is committed to pursuing the denuclearization of North Korea.

The deal and understanding suggested in the statement also allows more access into North Korea under the new leadership of Kim Jong-un. Even though they are just to clear up “administrative details,” the U.S. and North Korea will continue to meet. Despite Glyn Davies, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea policy, suggesting there was no substantial difference from the North Korean negotiators now that Kim Jong-un has taken over, more meetings will help the U.S. understand any potential changes in future negotiations. IAEA inspectors will be back to Yongbyon, and there is supposed to be “intensive monitoring” of the nutritional assistance.

The statement provides a way forward, but the potential for backsliding is always there. Disagreements between the U.S. and North Korea over nutritional assistance monitoring seemed to hamper earlier attempts at food aid.  With more monitoring, the North Koreans could get nervous and limit access; the U.S. and North Korea have had this history before over food aid. Access will be critical for the IAEA inspectors visiting Yongbyon. They should be allowed to see even more than what was revealed to KEI President Jack Pritchard in November 2010 and shown to Sig Hecker the week following Ambassador Pritchard’s visit.

The potential is there to get the monitors and inspectors into North Korea and have them return with their assessments in time for the U.S. to implement some next steps with North Korea before the final campaigning for the presidential election limits the Obama administration’s ability to maneuver policies toward denuclearization of North Korea. The statement provides some steps for future talks and action, but the details and commitments must be scrutinized and specifically followed. Otherwise, this statement can easily get set aside with numerous other attempts at bridging difficult U.S.-North Korea relations and creating a more peaceful Korean peninsula.   

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo from IAEA Imagebank’s photo stream on flickr Creative Commons.

By Karin Lee, NCNK

In December 2010, North Korea began asking multiple countries for food aid.  Its request to the U.S. came in early 2011, but it wasn’t until December 2011 that a deal seemed close, with the U.S. prepared to provide 240,000 metric tons (MTs) of assistance. Kim Jong Il died soon after this news hit the press, and details of the potential deal were never announced.

In the ideal world, Ronald Reagan’s “hungry child” knows no politics. But the case of North Korea is far from ideal. The U.S. government states it does not take politics into consideration when determining whether to provide aid to North Korea. Instead, the decision is based on three criteria: need in North Korea, competing demands for assistance, and the ability to monitor aid effectively. Yet these three criteria are subjective and tinged by politics.

In 2011 a succession of four assessment delegations (one by U.S. NGOs, one by the U.S. government, one by the EU and one by the UN) visited the DPRK. All found pretty much the same thing: widespread chronic malnutrition, especially among children and pregnant or lactating women, and cases of acute malnutrition. The UN confirmed the findings late last year, reporting chronic malnutrition in children under five in the areas visited — 33% overall, and 45% in the northern part of the country.

Some donors responded quickly. For example, shortly after its July assessment, the EU announced a 10 Million Euro donation. Following its own May assessment, however, the U.S. government was slow to make a commitment.  Competing demands may have played a role. In July, the predicted famine in the Horn of Africa emerged, prompting a U.S. response of over $668 million in aid to “the worst food crisis in half a century.”  While there was no public linkage between U.S. action on the African famine and inaction on North Korea, there could have been an impact.

But the two biggest factors shaping the U.S. government’s indecisiveness continued to be uncertainty about both the severity of the need and the ability to establish an adequate monitoring regime. At times, South Korean private and public actors questioned the extent of the North’s need. Early on, a lawmaker in South Korea asserted that North Korea already had stockpiled 1,000,000 metric tons of rice for its military. Human rights activist Ha Tae Keung argued that North Korea would use the aid contributed in 2011 to augment food distributions in 2012 in celebration of the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung and North Korea’s status as a “strong and prosperous nation.”  According to Yonhap, shortly after the U.N. released the above-noted figures, South Korean Unification Minister Yu Woo-Ik called the food situation in North Korea not “very serious.”

South Korea’s ambivalence about the extent of the food crisis was noted by Capitol Hill, exacerbating congressional reluctance to support food aid. A letter to Secretary Clinton sent shortly before the U.S. assessment trip in May began with Senators Lieberman, McCain, Webb and Kyl explaining they shared South Korean government suspicions that food aid would be stockpiled and requesting State to “rigorously” evaluate any DPRK request for aid. With the close ROK-U.S. relationship one of the administration’s most notable foreign policy accomplishments, such a warning may have carried some weight.

Monitoring is of equal, if not greater congressional concern. Since the 1990s U.S. NGOs and USAID have worked hard with DPRK counterparts to expand monitoring protocols, and conditions have consistently improved over time. In the 2008/2009 program, the first food program funded by the U.S. government since 2000, the DPRK agreed to provisions such as Korean-speaking monitors. The NGO portion of the program was fairly successful in implementing the monitoring protocol; when implementation of the WFP portion hit some bumps, USAID suspended shipments to WFP until issues could be resolved. The DPRK ended the program prematurely in March 2009 with 330,000 MT remaining.

In 2011 the Network for North Korean Human Rights and Democracy conducted a survey of recent defectors to examine “aid effectiveness” in the current era. Out of the 500 interviewees, 274 left the DPRK after 2010. However, only six were from provinces where NGOs had distributed aid in 2008/2009. Disturbingly, of the 106 people interviewees who had knowingly received food aid, 29 reported being forced to return food. Yet the report doesn’t state their home towns, or when the events took place. Unfortunately such incomplete data proves neither the effectiveness nor ineffectiveness of the most recent monitoring regime.

Some believe that adequate monitoring is impossible. The House version of the 2012 Agricultural Appropriations Act included an amendment prohibiting the use of Food for Peace or Title II funding for food aid to North Korea; the amendment was premised on this belief. However the final language signed into law in November called for “adequate monitoring,” not a prohibition on funding.

The U.S. response, nine months in the making, reflects the doubts outlined above and the politically challenging task of addressing them. It took months for the two governments to engage in substantive discussions on monitoring after the May trip. In December, the State Department called the promised nutritional assistance “easier to monitor” because items such as highly fortified foods and nutritional supplements are supposedly less desirable and therefore less likely to be diverted than rice. The reported offer of 240,000 MT– less than the 330,000 MT the DPRK requested – reflects the unconfirmed report that the U.S. identified vulnerable populations but not widespread disaster.

In early January, the DPRK responded. Rather than accepting the assistance that was under discussion, it called on the United States to provide rice and for the full amount, concluding “We will watch if the U.S. truly wants to build confidence.”  While this statement has been interpreted positively by some as sign of the new Kim Jong Un regime’s willingness to talk, it also demonstrates a pervasive form of politicization – linkage. A “diplomatic source” in Seoul said the December decision on nutritional assistance was linked to a North Korean pledge to suspend its uranium enrichment program. Linkage can be difficult to avoid, and the long decision-making process in 2011 may have exacerbated the challenge. Although Special Representative Glyn Davies was quick to state that “there isn’t any linkage” between the discussion of nutritional assistance and dialogue on security issues, he acknowledged that the ability of the DPRK and US to work together cooperatively on food assistance would be interpreted as a signal regarding security issues. Meanwhile, the hungry child in North Korea is still hungry.

For a digest of humanitarian news, see the NCNK website.

By Nicholas Hamisevicz

A new report with satellite images shows North Korea’s progress constructing a new light water reactor at Yongbyon. The North Koreans revealed the facility to Ambassador Jack Pritchard, KEI’s President, and in subsequent weeks, Dr. Siegfried Hecker of Stanford University in November 2010. Dr. Hecker in his trip report expressed his surprise at how quickly the North Koreans got the 2,000 centrifuges working along with the modernity of the control room, suggesting significant progress had already been made on uranium enrichment. The new report from the 38 North blog analyzes satellite imagery and provides a timeline of two to three years for the potential start of operations of the light water reactor. This short timeframe becomes even shorter when put up against the Asia-Pacific clock. The U.S. and its allies can quickly lose almost two years just based on next year’s election cycles and transitions. It could be all the time North Korea needs.

Knowing that 2012 would be a year stacked with elections and transitions, the impetus should have been on getting things done in 2011. However, North Korea’s provocations from the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island damaged the opportunities for progress. The U.S. and South Korea rightfully had to respond and attempt to address these actions in their discussions with North Korea. There have been bilateral meetings this year between the United States and North Korea and the two Koreas respectively to work through all of these concerns; however, both the United States and South Korea have sought more positive actions from North Korea, which seems to be trying to run out the clock on the current administrations. At the same time, the satellite images show  North Korea has been upgrading their facility at Yongbyon.

The impetus for action from the United States and South Korea will continue to grow. With elections set for the National Assembly and presidency in South Korea combined with the presidential election in the United States in 2012, policy toward North Korea could be delayed due to election cycles and domestic politics, giving North Korea a year to work on its light water reactor. Additionally, the uncertainty of diplomatic engagement with North Korea could fuel political attacks  from the opposition against the incumbents in South Korea and the United States. This electoral dynamic could limit diplomatic efforts to get North Korea back on a path toward denuclearization.

Depending on the speed of transition, it will take the new presidential leadership in South Korea some time to get organized and start implementing its own North Korean policy. This transition in North Korean policy would be exacerbated if President Obama is unable to win re-election and a new president takes office in the United States. North Korea could potentially gain at least another six months from these leadership transitions; all of the sudden, the two to three year time frame becomes a current reality.

The new images of the facility at Yongbyon highlight the need for the United States, South Korea, and other allies and partners to push for denuclearization and look for ways to change North Korea’s calculations about the need for nuclear weapons. Two years can quickly evaporate in an Asia-Pacific region featuring an already packed diplomatic calendar combined with a year of wide-ranging  elections, leadership changes, and their subsequent transitions. North Korea will likely use this time to complete its light water reactor at Yongbyon. Facing this real prospect, the United States and South Korea must not neglect denuclearization efforts during this time as well.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.

Photo by DigitalGlobe

By Chad O’Carroll

After nearly three years of interruption, a flurry of recent diplomatic activity has suggested that signifcant efforts are being made to restart the Six Party Talks.   In July, officials from Pyongyang and Seoul met in Bali for the first time in months, with a second meeting taking place in Beijing just a few weeks ago.   Washington had direct contact in July through Ambassador Stephen Bosworth in New York – and now looks set to hold a second meeting with North Korean negotiators in Geneva later this month.   But do these four meetings, coupled with recent State visits by Kim Jong-il to Russia and China, give cause for optimism on a swift resumption of Six Party Talks?  A closer look at the key parties’ current positions suggests otherwise.

North Korea withdrew from the Six Party Talks in April 2009, unilaterally declaring that it would “never again take part in such talks” and would “not be bound by any agreement reached at the talks”.  Never say never though, because when Ambassador Bosworth met his counterpart Kim Kye-gwan in September 2009, he was told that Pyongyang was actually interested in resuming talks, but on condition that the U.S. first discussed a peace treaty and lifted sanctions.  Fast forward to August this year, and these preconditions were dropped all-together after a two hour meeting between Kim Jong-il and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, bringing North Korea full circle.

Following the second nuclear test, the sinking of the Cheonan, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong, it was easy to understand why South Korea was originally so insistent on North Korea apologizing for its belligerence as a precondition to resuming any disarmament talks.  However, in January leaks from the government made clear  a change in position – that Pyongyang would no longer have to apologize first.  According to a senior ROK government official the current position is now that “The six-party talks will come back to life only if North Korea shows its sincerity by taking the required pre-steps, including a monitored shutdown of its uranium enrichment program”.

As a result of strong ties between Presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung-Bak, the U.S. position has closely mirrored that of Seoul since the nuclear and missile tests of 2009.  Most recently, this position was articulated in three steps that North Korea would have to take to reinitiate dialogue – on issues related to nuclear weapons, missiles, and its relations with the South.  Predictably, North Korea rejected these, saying that they too should be entitled preconditions if such an approach were to be considered.

In contrast to the major differences between the DPRK, ROK and U.S. positions, Russia and China appear to be on the same page.  Recent initiatives such as the Medvedev – Kim Jong-il summit in Ulan Ude and Beijing’s September hosting of North and South Korean nuclear negotiators underscores a shared Sino-Russian desire to see the Six Party Talks resumed as quickly as possible.  And while little is known about Japan’s current position due to recent political turbulence, some scholars have suggested that Tokyo might be following the lead from the U.S. and South Korea.

As the current narrative would suggest, if next week’s U.S. – DPRK bilateral meeting is to achieve anything, flexibility is going to be critical.  But where will we see the motivation to show flexibility?

From the North Korean perspective, it appears unlikely that Pyongyang will be motivated to dilute its current position.   Making the type of credible gestures required to prove “sincerity” to South Korea and the U.S. would entail at least some foreign inspection presence on DPRK soil to work.   This was something previously achievable only after copious injections of cash or aid through protracted negotiations.  Without material payoff in return, it is hard to understand why Pyongyang would acquiesce to such a demand.  Having been the country to so vocally quit the Six Party Talks in 2009, it’s hard to see why North Korea might feel any burden to prove “sincerity”– after all, it is the one who can take or leave these nuclear negotiations.

The U.S. and South Korea are both in a difficult position regarding the resumption of talks.  With the North Koreans having declared a uranium program, tested a nuclear device and killed South Korean nationals, it is easy to understand why there is so little appetite in Seoul or Washington to water-down current positions.

But at the same time, there is a growing fear that if negotiations remain frozen, North Korea may be motivated to carry out a third nuclear test or attempt to cause further regional agitation.  In addition, left unchecked North Korea is now enriching uranium, improving the accuracy of its long-range missiles, and post-Fukushima, endangering the region through its aging nuclear infrastructure.   As a result, it would appear South Korea and the U.S. have the most to lose should negotiations remain stalled.  The major difficulty lies in facilitating this from a political perspective.

Chad 0’Carroll is the Director of Communications for the Korea Economic Institute. The views represented here are his own.